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Abstract 
Through a detailed case study of South-Eastern France, this thesis represents 
the first environmental history of the "dark years" and their aftennath. 
Contributing to Vichy historiography, environmental histories of war, and 
French environmental history, this study argues that nature mattered during 
the years of war and occupation, both materially and culturally. The natural 
environment was a site of combat, a means for constructing identities during a 
time of political and social upheaval, and a ",~ictim" of human conflict. 
Following defeat in 1940, the Vichy regime launched an ultimately unsuccessful 
war against "wasteland," born of ideological convictions and severe material 
shortages. Forests represented a particularly important source of natural 
resources and were consequendy over-exploited, as well as being transformed 
into political spaces by both Vichy and the resistance. In addition, occupation 
armies plundered forest resources and used them for military manoeuvres, 
developments which French foresters struggled to restrain. Similarly, nature 
preservationists batded to preserve the Camargue from agricultural 
modernisation, military manoeuvres, and German submersion plans, aided 
(unwittingly) by nature. Elsewhere, Vichy and the Club Alpin Fran~ais 
mobilised mountains as a space in which to remake French masculinity. This 
mobilisation of the mountains was echoed by the resistance, especially in the 
Vercors, which was transformed into a "natural fortress." This intense human 
activity necessitated the reconstruction of the environment in the postwar era, 
which was planned and state-led through schemes such as the Fonds Forestier 
National. Just as it had between 1940 and 1944, nature continues to matter, 
and plays a role in preserving and obscuring memories of the war. 
Drawing on governmental and other archival sources (some previously 
unexamined), this thesis aims to demonstrate the relevancy of environmental 
history to wider historiography, as well as inform contemporary concerns 
about the complex relationship between war and nature. 
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Warfare dramatically transforms the material world. Battles rip up farmland and 
flatten forests, bombs pound cities, roads, and bridges, people and biota are 
displaced, borders redrawn, humans and animals killed or maimed. and industrial 
installations are attacked with potentially huge environmental consequences 
through the release of pollutants. Some wartime environmental destruction may 
be "accidental," but there is much truth in W.G. Sebald's comment that "the 
innermost principle of every war' aims for 'an annihilation of the enemy with his 
dwellings, his history, and his natural environment.' I The natural world is also 
part of the battlefield experience; soldiers generally fight in the outdoors, armies 
pay attention to and mobilise topographical features in their strategic plans, and 
natural forces and features themselves can disrupt military planning. At the same 
time, material shortages force societies to rethink their relationship with the 
environment and their use of natural resources. While environmental 
modifications and reconfigurations of the relationship between humans and 
nature are clearly visible during some conflicts, such as the First World War and 
the Vietnam War (when the US army used defoliants to strip the Viet Cong's 
I W.G. Sebald. On the Natural History of Destruction (London: Penguin. 2003). 19. Notable 
examples of ecological damage during wartime include the Roman army' s salting of Carthage' s 
environs during the Third Punic War and the Gennan military's employment of scorched earth 
tactics in northern NOIway during the Second War World. See Environmental Law Institute. 
Research Report. Addressing Environmental Consequences of War: Baclcground Paper for the 
International Conference on Addressing Environmen/al Consequences of War: Legal. Economic. 
and Scienlijic Perspectives (Washington D.C.: 1988). accessed at hnp:llwww.eli.org. 1. 
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jungle cover), every conflict potentially alters physical environments and cultural 
landscapes to some degree. This was manifestly the case during the Second 
World War in France, even if that particular conflict is commonly assumed to 
have lacked an environmental dimension. 2 Historians have barely begun to 
consider relationship between war and nature in Second World War France. 
Nature mattered during the period of war and occupation that has come to 
be known as "the dark years." It was a central component. materially and 
culturally, of the Second World War and its aftennath in France, acting as a site 
for military conflict and competing political and social identities. Furthennore. 
the natural world represented an indispensable source of resources for French 
society, occupation armies, and Allied soldiers, and a space in which to carry out 
military manoeuvres. This intensive human activity led to changes on the land. 
The Vichy regime attempted (unsuccessfully) to reshape the French landscape by 
waging war on "wasteland," while forests and other habitats were degraded 
through war's direct and indirect impact. Forest habitat, for example, was 
damaged directly during battles, but also through overexploitation and illegal 
felling. 
This war damage did not pass unnoticed and foresters battled to secure 
the conservation of France' s forest resources and its own sovereignty over them. 
while organisations such as the Societe nationale d'acclimatation de France 
(SNAF) fought to preserve other landscapes of natural beauty and scientific 
interest. Although the power relationship between occupation forces and the 
SNAF was heavily weighted in favour of the fonner. the latter did have some 
success in restraining military use of the Camargue wetlands. The military 
~ During the course of this research. I was frequently infonned that the Second World War had no 
environmental impacts on the French landscape. 
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mobilisation of the environment IS a consistent theme throughout this 
dissertation. Following the Liberatio~ Allied forces drew on the resources of the 
French environment, leading to continuing tensions with foresters and the SNAF. 
These various military mobilisations contributed to the degradation of the 
environment, convincing foresters and other officials of the need for greater state 
intervention in environmental reconstruction and management. In this way" war 
led to increased human control over nature. 
But this is not just a history of war damage and physical changes to 
landscape. Not least, the Vichy regime"s attempt to cultivate as much of French 
soil as possible was intimately bound up in its attempt to rejuvenate French 
society and restore a French identity based on supposedly timeless rural values. 3 
Furthermore, Vichy mobilised forest and mountain space to strengthen male 
bodies and rejuvenate French society. a strategy that was increasingly subverted 
by the resistance' s tightening physical and imaginative control over the 
countryside. However. the resistance's representations of these landscapes were 
not dissimilar to those of Vichy. even if their aims were diametrically opposed. 
Just as it was deployed to formulate identity during the ~~dark years," the 
environment has become a means of naturalising the links between resistance 
memories and national identity in the postwar period. 
Yet this is not a one-sided story of human dominance over nature and the 
environmental history of the "dark years" also provides a way to reveal nature' s 
"agency." Nature was not just the object or victim of war and occupation. At 
times it displayed resilience and resistance to human conflict, thwarting the plans 
) As Thomas Lekan argues. with regards to Gennany, the 'assenion that there is an organic link 
between a people and its landscape' is 'one of the most powerful rhetorical means for grounding 
national identities in modem Europe.' Imagining the Nation in Nature: Landscape Presen'ation 
and German Identity, /885-/945 (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2(04), I. 
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of combatants. As Lisa Brady argues, with regard to the American Civil \\·ar. 
'the landscape was not simply a backdrop to the events of the war - a place 
where battles took place - but a powerful military resource and an important 
factor in military decision making.' 4 During the war. combatants tried to turn the 
lie of the land to their advantage. Maquisards sought shelter and military 
advantage in areas of forest, maquis, and mountains, while Gennan troops 
attempted to flood the Camargue to strengthen their Mediterranean defences. 
Military strategists and geographers have long since identified the strategic 
importance of landscape and environmental history nuances these analyses by 
highlighting nature's unpredictability. 5 So while nature does not possess agency 
in the sense that it consciously undertakes to frustrate human objectives. it was a 
factor that could not be ignored. After the war. dense maquis and forest 
vegetation undermined the landmine clearance programme. while weather and 
vegetation threaten to undermine the preservation of war memories. This history. 
then, is palpably plural, as nature was simultaneously a site. victim. and actor 
during the "dark years." 
4 Lisa M. Brady. 'The Wilderness of War: Nature and Strategy in the American Civil War.' 
Environmental History 10/3 (July 2005), 423. A century later, Viet Cong rebels turned the 
Vietnamese jungle into a military resource, using it as cover for supply routes and raids on U.S. 
forces. Richard L. Stevens goes so far as to claim that 'nature decided the Viet Nam War. nature 
and the Ho Chi Minh Trail: The Trail: A History of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Role of 
Nature in the War in Vietnam (New York and London: Garland Publising. 1995). ix. 
S Ted Steinberg shows how mud literally bogged down Union supply trains during the U.S. CiviJ 
War, concluding that 'it is simply quite wrong to view the natural world as an unchanging 
backdrop to the past.' Down to Earth: Nature's Role in American History (New York: Oxford 
University Press. 2002),89-98,284. Military historian John Keegan highlights how the rasputitsa 
(the twice-yearly occasion when autumn rain and melting snow tum the Russian steppes into a 
gooey mud bath) crucially delayed the attempted German invasion of Moscow during the Second 
World War. A History of Warfare (London: Pimlico, 1993). 63, 67-72. For early military 
strategists on the environment. see Sun Tzu~ The Art of War, Trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston. 
Mass: Shambhola Publications. 1988). 17.44, 143: and Carl von Clausewitz. On War. Eds. and 
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. 1984).417-52. 
For more recent military geographies. see Patrick O'Sullivan. Terrain and Tactics (Westport CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1991); and H. A. Winters. Gerald E. Galloway Jr .. William J. Reynolds. and 
David W. Rhyne. Bauling the Elements: Weather and Te"ain in the Conduct of H'ar (Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
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This dissertation is the first comprehensive and detailed exploration of the 
environmental history of the Second World War in France. 6 This gap in the 
literature reflects wider historiographical trends as, on the whole. historians are 
unaccustomed to examining the relationship between war and the environment 
even if wars have contained environmental dimensions since at least the Persian-
Scythian War of 512 B.C.E, when the Scytbians implemented a scorched earth 
strategy on their own land to slow down the advancing Persians. 7 As Edmund 
Russell observes, 'with a few exceptions, even historians who have broken down 
other boundaries have left the war-nature divide intact.' 8 Although historians 
have demonstrated that war's influence reaches far beyond the battlefield to 
affect gender relations, national identities, and political, economic. and social 
structures, they have tended to overlook war's environmental aspects. 9 
Through a detailed case study of South Eastern France. I aim to highlight 
the multiple ways in which nature mattered during the war and its aftermath. In 
doing so. I seek to draw upon and contribute to Vichy historiography and the 
growing body of literature on war's environmental history. I also endeavour to 
fill in a gap in French environmental history. which has so far overlooked the 
war years. I argue that environmental history provides a new way of looking at 
this extensively analysed conflict, by providing alternative narratives and a fresh 
6 A chapter by Frederic Fesquet briefly discusses wartime reforestation but limits itself to a single 
case study and is written from the narrow perspective of 'forest improvement." See 'Les 
reboisements de protection dans la guerre: Ie massif de l'Aigoual,' Andree Corvol and Jean-Paul 
Amat (eds.), Foret et guerre (Paris: L'Hannattan, 1994), 155-61. 
7 Arthur Westing, Warfare in a Fragile World: Military Impact on the Human Environment 
(London: Taylor & Francis, 1980). 14. 
8 Edmund P. Russell, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World 
War Ito Silent Spring (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1. 
9 For examples of such histories. see Karen Hageman and Stefanie SchUler-Springorum (eds.), 
Home/Front: The Military. War and Gender in Twentieth Century Germany (Oxford: Berg. 
2002): Pat Kirkham and David Thoms (eds.), War Culture: Social Change and Changing 
Experience in World War Two (London: Lawrence & Wishart. 1995); Arthur Marwick. War and 
Social Change in the Twentieth Century: A Comparative Study of Britain. France. Germany. 
Russia. and the United States (London: MacMillan. 1974): and Michael Scriven and Peter 
Wagstaff(e<is.), War and Society in ]Ull Century France (Oxford: Berg, 1991). 
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way of approaching established themes of historical inquiry, such as analyses of 
the Vichy regime, resistance, and memory. At the same time, this case study 
provides a way of understanding more about the complex relationship between 
war and the environment, which is of increasing concern to environmentalists. 
policy-makers, and public opinion. 
Towards an environmental history of war 
Environmental history ('the history of the mutual relations between 
humankind and the rest of nature,' according to John McNeill 10 ) has been 
hesitant to integrate war into its narratives. This oversight is surprising given that 
Ralph H. Lutts traces the roots of modem US environmentalism, which was so 
crucial to the development of environmental history, to the mid-twentieth centul)' 
climate of fear created by the terrifying prospect of nuclear war. radioactivity 
arising from weapons testing, and the disturbing realisation that humankind 
possessed the means to threaten its very survival. 11 
Nonetheless, this relatively new field of history is uniquely well-placed to 
uncover the historical relationship between war and the environment. Edmund 
, 
Russell' s War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from 
World War 1 10 Silent Spring pioneered the study of war within environmental 
history and. although more concerned with policy making than the land itself. 
10 John R. McNeill, 'Observations on the Nature and Culture of Environmental History,' History 
and Theory 42 (December 2003).6. 17. For other overviews of environmental history. see Alfred 
W. Crosby, 'The Past and Present of Environmental History: American Historical Review 100,'4 
(October 1995): 1177-89; and Richard White, 'Afterword. Environmental History: Watching a 
Historical Field Mature.' Pacific Historical Review 70,'1 (February 200 I): ) 03-1 ). 
II Ralph H. Lutts, 'Chemical Fallout: Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, Radioactive Fallout, and the 
Environmental Movement.' Environmental Review 9/3 (Fall 1985): 210-225. 
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points to the potential of this growing body of literature. 12 Following Russell's 
lead, other environmental historians have drawn out the environmental 
dimensions of warfare across a range of periods and places. 13 
Environmental history can do more than relate the purely ecological 
history of warfare, as important and interesting as that may be in its own right. 
Environmental historians are in a position to ask wider and previously unasked 
questions about war, society, and human and nonhuman agency, especially if the 
environment is treated as a site where history takes place. Ellen Stroud argues 
that the environment is not just another category of historical analysis to be 
placed alongside those of gender, class, and race. Instead. she posits that the 
importance and relevance of environmental history lies in its focus on the 
materiality of the past and its recognition of the natural environment as an 
historical site which other historians tend to overlook. Attention to materiality. 
Stroud suggests, has the potential to reshape wider historical narratives and open 
up new sites and sources for historians of all persuasions. By keeping the 
12 Russell, War and Nature. 
13 See Judith A. Bennett, 'War, Emergency and the Environment: Fiji, 1939-1946,' Environment 
and History 7 (2001): 255-87: Brian Black, 'Gallery: Brian Black on the Copse at Gettysberg.' 
Environmental History 9/2 (April 2004): 306-10; Brady, 'Wilderness of War,' 421-47; Rauno 
Lahtinen and Timo Vuorisalo, ""It's war and everyone can do as they please!" An Environmental 
History of a Finnish City in Wartime,' Environmental History 9/4 (October 2004): 879-700: John 
R. McNeill. 'Woods and Warfare in World History,' Environmental History. 9/3 (July 2004): 
388-410; Edmund P. Russell and Richard P. Tucker (eds.), Natural Enemy. Natural A/~l': Toward 
an Environmental History of Warfare (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2004); William 
M. Tsutsui. 'Landscapes in the Dark Valley: Toward an Environmental History of Wartime 
Japan,' Environmental History 812 (April 2003): 294-311; and Joshua West, 'Forests and 
National Security: British and American Forest Policy in the Wake of World War I: 
Environmental History 812 (Apri12003): 270-94. Ferenc M. Szasz's 'The Impact of World War II 
on the Land: Gruinard Island, Scotland. and Trinty Site, New Mexico as Case Studies,' 
Environmental History Revie''''' 19/4 (Winter 1995): 15-30 predates Russell. The impact of the 
World Wars on the European environment is briefly considered in Tamara L. Whited. Jens I. 
Engels. Richard C. Hoffmann, Hilde Ibsen, and Wybren Verstegen, Northern Europe: An 
Environmental History (Santa Barbara. CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005). 128-129: 133-4. Brief. global 
overviews of war by environmental historians include John R. McNeill, Something New Under 
the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth Century World (New York and London: W. 
W. Norton. 2000). 342-7: and Richard P. Tucker. 'War: in Shepard Krech Ill. John R. McNeill, 
and Carolyn Merchant (eds.). Encyclopaedia of World Environmental History. 3 vols .. Vol. 3.0-
Z. (New York: Routledge. 2004). 1284-91. 
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environment as both the subject and the source of the questions they ask about 
the past, Stroud argues that historians can 'bring to light connections. 
transformations, and expressions of power that otherwise remain obscure. ,14 
Stroud's contention that focussing on the materiality of the past 
illuminates wider power structures is supported by Russell's work on the 
development of chemical weapons for deployment against insect and human 
enemies. Russell uses his analysis of the reciprocal and interlocking relationship 
between war and the environment to highlight how strategies to control, contain, 
and destroy human and nonhuman enemies shaped the nature of warfare and, in 
tum, how war expanded human management of the natural world. 15 Following 
Russell and Stroud, I treat the environment as a site where war unfolds. Not only 
does war have physical ramifications for the site in which it takes place. but 
societies deploy the natural world to construct identities while increasing their 
control over nature during wartime. All these areas deserve greater attention from 
historians. 
In addition to analysing how the environment was simultaneously a site. 
actor, and victim during the war, one of my main aims is to highlight the war's 
interlocking material and cultural histories. 16 War damage to the forest 
motivated foresters and others to limit war's ecological impact, while the Vichy 
regime's ideological preference for cultivated land threatened to radically 
transform the French countryside. Furthermore, forests were simultaneously 
14 Ellen Stroud. 'Does Nature Always Matter? Following Dirt Through History: History and 
Theory Theme Issue 42 (December 2003). 76. 79-81. 
U Russell. War and Nature. 2. 
16 Russell and Brady highlight the interconnections between ecological and human histories 
during wartime. Russell argues that 'nature was an important ally on the home front. supplying 
food and raw materials for industry. Ideas about nature also served the war effort. They helped 
frame and express views of the enemy, oneself. and the proper interaction between the two.' War 
and Nature, 117. Brady suggests that nature acted as both 'material object and as intellectual 
idea' during the US Civil War. Brady. 'Wilderness of War: 423. 
8 
Chapter One 
physical and imaginative spaces, acting as a site of natural resource extraction 
and places of supposed individual and national regeneration. 
An amalgamation of these material and cultural histories unites the 
ecological concerns of scientists, such as Arthur Westing, interested in the 
impact of weapons on ecosystems, with human geographers' analyses of how 
war transforms space and how spatiality influences warfare. 11 These ecologies 
and geographies of war advance understanding of military control over the 
environment, .the direct and indirect ecological impacts of war. and the ways in 
which distance and territoriality both shape and are shaped by war. However. 
ecologists tend to neglect social aspects of war, while human geographers often 
overlook ecological changes. And both could pay more attention to historical 
context. Environmental history, therefore, addresses these imbalances by 
drawing together the human and ecological dimensions of the war-environment 
relationship within an historical context. 
Environmental history contributes to, complicates, and challenges the 
assumptions of these existing literatures in other ways. This is particularly true 
for ecologies of war, which focus on the awesomely destructive power of nuclear 
and chemical weapons leading them to portray nature as a mere victim. 
Consequently, they advance "declensionist" narratives (or downward spiral 
accounts of human interference with the natural world) as they portray the 
17 For ecologies of war. see J. P. Robinson. The Effects of Weapom on Ecosyslems (Oxford: 
Pergamon Press for the United Nations Environment Programme. 1979); Arthur Westing. 
Ecological Consequences of the Second Indochina War (Stockholm: SIRPI. 1976); Idem. 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Environment (London: Taylor & Francis, 1977): and Idem. 
Warfare in a Fragile World. For geographies of war see Colin Flint (ed.). The Geography of War 
and Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): Dolores Hayden, 'Landscapes of Loss 
and Remembrance: The Case of Little Tokyo in Los Angeles.' in Jay Winter and Emmanuel 
Sivan (eds.), War and Remembrance in the Twenlielh Century. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 142-3; Michael Hefferman, The Meaning of Europe: Geography and 
GeopolitiCS (London: Arnold. 1998): Patrick 0' Sullivan and Jesse. W. Miller, The Geography of 




expansion of weaponry in the twentieth century as an acceleration of humanity's 
environmental mismanagement. War becomes yet another indicator of just how 
far humans have fallen from an Edenic "state of nature." 18 Yet environmental 
historians have shown how nature's regenerative processes survive military 
activity. Even in nuclear testing sites in the American West, fauna thrives on land 
that military exclusion zones protect from encroaching suburbanisation and 
tourism, while some military installations (unwittingly) encourage wildlife. 19 
Furthermore, long-term predictions of ecological deterioration in the Persian 
Gulf have since been revised, whilst large mammals have again been spotted on 
the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Vietnam, one of the areas that suffered most from 
defoliation. 20 
Furthermore, environmental history highlights that the ecological impact 
of war is historically contingent rather than a mere disruption to nature's 
supposedly predictable patterns. When assessing ecological disruption, Westing 
and J. P. Robinson rely on the approach of "old ecology," which regards nature 
as an orderly system running along the predictable processes of succession. 
18 On "declensionism," see White, 'Afterword: 105-6. For damning critiques of military 
management of the environment, see Anne Ehrlich and John W. Birks (eds.), Hidden Dangers: 
Environmental Consequences of Preparing for War (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. 1990); 
Tom H. Hastings, Ecology of War and Peace: Counting the Costs of Conflict (Lanham. MD: 
University Press of America. 2000); Susan D. Lanier-Graham, The Ecology of War: 
Environmental Impacts of Weaponry and Warfare (New York: Walker, 1993); Joni Seager. Earth 
Follies: Feminism. Politics and the Environment (London: Earthscan. 1993); and William 
Thomas. Scorched Earth: The Military's Assault on the Environment (Philadelphia. PA: New 
Society Publishers. 1995). For a defence of military environmental management. see Kent 
Hughes Butts, 'Why the military is good for the environment: in Jyrki KakOnen (ed.), Green 
Securitv or Militarized Environment (Aldershot: Dartmouth. 1994).83-109. 
19 See' John Wills. "'Welcome to the Atomic Park": American Nuclear Landscapes and the 
"Unnaturally Natural.'" Environment and History 7 (200 1),460-64. For another example of eco-
systems surviving military activity. see Peter Coates, . Amcbitka. Alaska: Toward the Bio-
Biography of an Island.' Environmental History 1/4 (October 1996): 20-45. On nuclear testing in 
the American West and its environmental (and social) consequences, see Mike Davis. 'Dead 
West: Ecocide in Marlboro Country.' in Valerie J. Matsumoto and Blake Allmendinger (eds.), 
Over the Edge: Remapping the American West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 
339-69; Carole Gallagher. American Ground Zero: The Secret Nuclear War (Cambridge. Mass.: 
MIT Press. 1993); and Valerie L. Kuletz. The Tainted Desert: Em'ironmental and Social Ruin in 
the American West (New York: Routledge. 1998). 
20 Addressing Em'ironmental Consequences ofH"ar, 10. 
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balance, and climax. Consequently, they measure the extent of war damage 
according to the length of time it takes for an ecosystem to return to its "origina1~~ 
(or climax) state. 21 However, ecologists and others have since revised 
interpretations of a stable natural world, emphasising instead unpredictability, 
contingency, and historical change. 22 I show how environmental war damage 
resulted in the opportunity for the state to modernise and rationalise the French 
landscape, rather than restore pre-war conditions. 
As well as informing understanding of the ecologies and geographies of 
war, environmental history contains the potential to influence political, social. 
economic, and cultural histories of war by highlighting that nature matters during 
wartime. While gender historians have shown the centrality of gender relations to 
historical narratives of war, environmental historians of war have yet to 
demonstrate the importance of nature and human-nature relations during wartime 
to the wider discipline of history. 23 This is a missed opportunity, as 
environmental history presents new historical narratives on war (such as wartime 
nature protection), and alternative ways of examining existing ones (such as the 
relationship between landscape, war, and identity). Furthermore, an attention to 
materiality (to follow Stroud) could potentially revise existing concepts such as 
.4total war." Roger Chickering argues that 4total war requires total history' given 
that 4the impact of warfare on society and politics has become all-embracing.' 24 
21 Robinson. Effects of Weapons. 30-1; and Westing. Warfare in 0 Fragile World. 10. 
22 White notes a convergence between recent ecology and historiography: 'ecology began to look 
more and more like history: contingent. shifting, explicable less by predictive laws than 
backward-looking stories: 'Afterword: 105-6. See also Donald Worster. 'Nature and the 
Disorder of History: in Reinventing Nature? Responses to Postmodern Deconstruction Michael 
E. Soule and Gary Lease. eds .. (Washington D.C.: Island Press. t 995).65-85. 
23 Joan W. Scott shows how a gender analysis transforms histories of war in 'Rewriting History: 
in Margaret Randolph et 01 (eds.). Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars (New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 1987).21-30. 
24 Chickering. however. warns against an uncritical use of the "total war" label as it is all too 
easily deployed as a pan of a master narrative that leads inevitably to the gas chambers of 
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And although Hew Strachan acknowledges the importance of terrain for armies 
in his analysis of total war, he fails to develop this line of inquiry and does not 
consider other ways in which the environment relates to war. 25 Yet as long as the 
environment remains largely neglected, it is debatable whether or not historians 
can truly claim to produce "total histories" of "total war.,,26 I contend that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to write a "total" history of wartime France without 
paying attention to nature. Even during a war that. at first glance. had few 
environmental dimensions, nature mattered. 
Vichy historiography: history not quite from the ground up 
According to Marc Olivier Baruch, the historiography of the ""dark years" 
is "now the most scrutinised, deciphered, and dissected period of contemporary 
France.' 27 Initially, the Vichy regime itself was the centre of attention. 
Historians lent intellectual support to the drive to unify and heal the social 
divisions that war had intensified. downplaying those aspects of Vichy which 
were most harmful to France's damaged self-esteem. Most (in)famously, Robert 
Aron's Histoire de Vichy (1954) advanced the so-called "shield theory," which 
Auschwitz. 'Total War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept,' in Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger 
Chickering, and Stig FOrster (eds.), Anticipating Total War: The German and American 
Experiences 1871-1914 (New York: Gennan Historical Institute/Cambridge University Press, 
1999),27. 
:!~ Hew Strachan. 'Total War: The Conduct of War 1939-1945,' in Roger Chickering. Stig 
FOrster, and Bernd Greiner (eds.), A World at Total War: Global Conflict and Ihe Politics 0/ 
Destruction 1937-1945 (Washington D.C.: Gennan Historical Institute, 2005), 33-52. 
26 Russell is perhaps alone in examining the links between nature and total war in any great detail 
when he argues that 'the control of nature formed one root of total war, and total war helped 
expand the control of nature to the scale rued by modem environmentalists.' Russell. War and 
Nature. 2. See also pp. 95-118. 
27 Marc Olivier Baruch. Servir I'Etatfranfais: I'administration en France de 1940 Q 194-1 (Paris: 
Fayard, 1997). 3. The two-volume series edited by Jean-Pierre A.zema and Fran~ois Bedarida. La 
France des annt!es noires. Tome 1: de la de/aite Q Vichy and La France des annees noires. Tome 
2: de l'occupaJion Q la Liberation (Paris: Seuil, 1993), attests to the vast array of research areas, 
as does Hanna Diamond and Simon Kitson (eds,), J'ichy. Resistance. Liberation: New 
Perspectives on Wartime France (Oxford: Berg. 2005). 
12 
Chapter One 
held that Petain had acted in • good faith' to spare France the full brunt of 
Occupation. Aron portrayed the aging First World War veteran in a sympathetic 
lig~t, whilst blaming Pierre Laval for Vichy'S worst excesses and arguing that 
anti-Semitic measures, such as the 1940 Statut des Juifs, were designed to save 
French Jews from German persecution. 28 It is easy to attack Aron's scholarship. 
but at the time his portrayal of Vichy met with a receptive audience. 29 Other 
historians, however, were more critical of Vichy. German historian Eberhard 
Jackel used archival material based in Germany to demonstrate that France was a 
partner and not just a helpless victim in its dealings with the Nazi regime. 
however unequal the relationship between the two. 30 
But it was another foreign historian. Robert Paxton, who fundamentally 
transformed interpretations of Vichy, demolishing the "shield theory" in the 
process. 31 Paxton's Vichy France: Old Guard New Order (published in 1972) 
placed Vichy within 'indigenous French history,' rooting it in the tensions of the 
1930s and assessing the regime's legacy in the postwar era. Furthermore, Paxton 
restored agency to Vichy. arguing that the regime had actively attempted to 
remodel French society; 'Vichy was not a band aid. It was deep surgery. To an 
extent unique among the occupied nations of Western Europe, France went 
beyond mere administration during the occupation to carry out a domestic 
28 Robert Aron. Histoire de Vichy 1940-1944 (paris: Les Productions de Paris, 1954). 165-9,363. 
Laval was twice deputy prime minister (vice-president du Conseil) of Vichy, from July 1940 to 
December 1940 and from April 1942 until the regime' s demise in August 1944. 
29 Henry Rousso points to Histoire de Vichy's lack of footnotes, its reliance on private. 
unverifiable sources. and Aron's close relationship with the establishment figures he writes 
about. The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944. Trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991 [1987]).245-7. 
30 Most damagingly, JAckel argued that Vichy had room for manoeuvre and introduced its 
legislative programme without undue German pressure. Eberhard JAckel, La France dans 
I 'Europe de Hitler (Paris: Fayard. 1968), 126, 324. 
31 Although Paxton echoed many of JAckel's arguments. his work is hailed by historians as the 
vanguard of a revolution in Vichy historiography. See Jean-Pierre Azema "The Paxtonian 
Revolution.' in Sarah Fishman. Lee Downs. Laura Sinanoglou loannis. Leonard V. Smith. and 
Robert Zaretsky (eds.). France af War: richy and fhe Historians. (Oxford: Berg. 2000). 13-20. 
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revolution in institutions and values. ~ 32 Paxton' s success was based on the 
quality of his scholarship and Vichy France' s opportune publication at a time 
when French society was generally receptive to interpretations of Vichy that 
challenged established views. 33 
Extensive research has uncovered the political, economic. social. gender. 
and cultural histories of this period building on Paxton' s ground breaking work. 
Following Paxton, historians have concentrated on the more shameful aspects of 
war and Occupation, such as the histories of collaboration and French 
persecution of the Jews. 34 Others have shown how Vichy's policies affected 
such areas as cultural life and gender relations. 35 Meanwhile. in the 1990s. 
32 Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-44 (London: Barrie and 
Jenkins, 2001 [1972]), 20, 49. 
33 For more on the French reception of Paxton see John F. Sweets, 'Chaque livre un evenement: 
Robert Paxton and the French, from briseur de glace to iconoc/aste tranquil/e.' in Fishman et ai, 
France at war, 21-34. 
34 For collaboration, see Bertram M. Gordon, Collaborationism in France during the Second 
World War (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1980); and Pascal Ory, Les 
co//aborateurs, 1940-1945 (Paris, Seuil, 1976). Post-war literary interpretations of collaboration 
are covered in Alan Morris, Collaboration and Resistance Reviewed: Writers and the mode retro 
in Post-Gaullist France (Oxford: Berg, 1992). For Jewish persecution and resistance to it, see 
Carmen Callil, Bad Faith: A Forgotten History of Family and Fatherland (London: Jonathan 
Cape,2006); Philippe Joutard, Jacques Poujol, and Patrick Cabanel (eds.), Cevennes: Terre de 
refuge (Montpelier: Presses du Languedoc/Club Cevenol, 1994)~ Lucien Lazare, Rescue as 
Resistance: How Jewish Organizations Fought the Holocaust in France (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996); Lawrence D. Kritzman (ed.), Auschwitz and After: Race, Culture. and 
"the Jewish Question" in France (New York: Routledge, 1995); Michael R. Marrus and Robert 
O. Paxton. Vichy France and the Jews (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995 [1981]); Renee 
Pomanski, Jews in France during World War II (Hanover NH and London: University Press of 
New England, 2001); Donna Ryan, The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseille (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1996); and Susan Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French. and the Jews (New 
York, Basic Books, 1993). 
l5 On culture. see Michele C. Cone. Artists under Vichy: A Case of Prejudice and Persecution 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 1992); Michele C. Cone. French Modernisms: 
Perspectives on Art before, during, and after Vichy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001); Pierre Darmon. Le monde de cinema sous I 'occupation (Paris: Stock. 1997); Evelyn 
Ehrlich, Cinema of Paradox: French Filmmaking under the German Occupation (New York: 
Columbia University Press. 1985); Pascal Dry. Le petit nazi i1/ustre: vie et survie de Temeraire 
(1943-1944) (Paris: Nautilus. :!002 [1979]); and Jean-Pierre Rioux (ed.). La vie culturelle sous 
Vichy (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1990). On gender. see Karen Adler. Jews and Gender in 
Liberation France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003): Luc Capde\i1a. 'The Quest 
for Masculinity in a Defeated France. 1940-1945: Contemporary European History 10/3 
(November 2001): 423-45: Francine Muel-Dreyfus, Vichy and the Eternal Feminine: A 
Contribution to a Political Sociology of Gender, Trans. Kathleen A. Johnson (Durham. N.e. and 
London: Duke University Press. 200 1 [1996]); Miranda Pollard. Reign of I'irtue: Mobilising 
Gender in J 'ichy France (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998): and Paula 
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rejuvenated histories of the resistance emerge<L stressing its plurality and 
geographical and social context. 36 Social histories, however, have moved 
beyond the emphasis on resistance and collaboration to examine ""even' day" life 
'" . 
and the strategies adopted for survival. They have stressed the difficult choices 
that individuals faced and the actions they took to accommodate, sun'ive. or 
subvert, Vichy and German authorities. 37 In particular. Philippe Burrin defines 
the ambivalent attitude of accommodation as 'a sense of constraint, material self-
interest, personal compliance, and ideological convictions or connivance.' 38 
Although the focus of this historiography has progressively drifted downwards. 
moving from the Vichy regime to embrace social and cultural histories of 
everyday experience, resistance, and racial persecution it has stopped short of the 
ground itself. 39 
At times, environmental considerations can be discerned amongst the 
focus on resistance, collaboration, and social experiences. This can be seen, for 
example, through analyses of Vichy's 'back to the land' philosophy, wartime 
rural history, and the geographical context of the maquis (the rural resistance 
Schwartz, ""Paritsanes" and Gender Politics in Vichy France,' French Historical Studies 16/1 
(Spring 1989): 126-51. 
36 Jean-Marie Guillon and Pierre Laborie (eds.), Memoire eI histoire: la Resistance (Paris: 
Editions Privat. 1995); H. R. Kedward, In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern 
France 1942-/944 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003 [1993]); Fran~ois Marcot (ed.), La 
Resistance et les Fran~ais: lutte armee et maquis (Paris: AnnaJes Iitteraires de I'Universite de 
Franche-Comte, 1996); and Jacqueline Sainclivier and Christian Bougeard (eds.), La Resistance 
et les Fran~ais: Enjeux strategiques et environnement social (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de 
Rennes, 1995). 
37 Hanna Diamond, Women and the Second World War in France 1939-/948: Choices and 
Constraints (Harlow: Longman, 1999); Sarah Fishman, We Will Wail: Wives of French Prisoners 
of War. /940-/945 (New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press, 1991); W. D. Halls. The 
Youth of Vichy France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); Lynne Taylor. Between Resistance and 
Collaboration: Popular Protest in Afodern France. 1940-/945 (Basin~stoke: Macmillan. 2(00): 
Dominique Veillon. Vivre el survivre en France /939-/94":' (Paris: Editions Payot & Rivages, 
1995); and Richard Vinen, The Unfree French: Life Under the Occupation (London: Allen Lane, 
2006). 
38 Philippe Burrin. Living with Defeat: France under the German Occupation 1940-1944 
(London: Arnold, 1996 [1995]). 3-4. 
39 For instance. nature is barely mentioned in Julian Jackson's detailed synthesis of secondary 
literature on the "dark years." France: The Darlc Years 1940-/944 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 200 1). 14-20. 
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units that sought refuge in France's mountains and forests and which took their 
name from maquis vegetation).4o Elsewhere, there are limited and mainly 
anecdotal references to animals, such as refugees on the 1940 exode comparing 
their sorry plight to those of abandoned farm animals and tales of wolves 
escaping from the Paris zoo. 41 
But the main focus is never on the natural environment itself. Even when 
Fran~ois Boulet argues that from 1943 onwards the 'French mountains became 
an historical .actor' as they offered possibilities for refuge and resistance, his 
approach remains overwhelmingly anthropocentric. 42 Similarly. Alice Travers' 
account of Vichy's policies and representations of mountains concentrates on 
sport and youth movements, rather than the mountains themselves. 43 Likewise. 
Hilary Footitt's brief description of D-Day landscapes is analysed vel)' much 
from the soldiers' point of view. while Daniele Voldman's histol)' of postwar 
landmine clearance operations takes little account of the actual terrain upon 
40 For 'back to the land' philosophies, see Jackie Clarke. 'Homecomings: Paulette Bernege, 
Scientific Management and the Return to the Land in Vichy' in Diamond and Kitson, Vichy, 
Resistance. Liberation, 171-82; Christian Faure, Le projet culturel de Vichy (Lyon: Presses 
Universitaires de Lyon, 1989); and Jean Vigreux, Le vigne du Marechal Petain ou un faire-valoir 
bourguignon de la Revolution nationale (Dijon: Editions Universitaires de Dijon, 2005). For rural 
France. see Isabel Boussard. Vichy et la corporation pays anne (Paris: Presses de la fondation 
nationale des sciences politiques. 1980); Michel Gervais. Marcel Jollivet, and Yves Tavernier. 
Histoire de la France rurale. Tome 4: lafin de La France paysanne de 1914 a nos jours (Paris: 
Seuil. 1976); Bertram M. Gordon. 'The Countryside and the City: Some Notes on the 
Collaboration Model during the Vichy Period,' in Fishman et al. France at War. 145-60; and 
Don Kladstrup and Petie Kladstrup. Wine and War: The French. the Nazis, and France's 
Greatest Treasure (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2001). For the resistance, see Ian Higgins. 
'France, Soil, and Language: Some Resistance Poems by Luc Berimont and Jean Marcenac,' in 
H. R. Kedward and Roger Austin (eds.), Vichy France and the Resistance: Culture and Ideology 
(London: Croom Helm. 1985): H. R. Kedward. 'Rural France and the Resistance: in Fishman et 
al. France at War. 125-43: and Kedward, In Search of the Maquis. 
41 For the exode. see Andrew Shennan. The Fall of France: 1940 (Harlow: Pearson Education. 
20(0). 8. For the wolves. see Richard Cobb. French and Germans, Germans and French: A 
Persona/Interpretation o/France under Two Occupations 1914-1918 1940-1944 (Hanover NH: 
University Press of New England for Brandeis University Press. 1983). 128-31. 
41 Fran~ois Boulet. 'Montagne et resistance en 1943: in Guillon and Laborie. Memoire el 
histoire. 261-69. See also Gilbert Garrier. 'Montagnes en resistance: reflex ions sur des exemples 
en Rh6ne-Alpes: in Sainclivier and Bougeard. La Resistance et les Franfais. 207-~0. 
~) Alice Travers. Politique el represenlations de la montagne sous J "ichy: 10 montagne thJuc:atrice 
J 940-1944 (Paris: L' Hannattan. 200 1 ). 
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which the mines lay. 44 In addition, while Voldman and others have worked on 
wartime urban destruction and the postwar reconstruction of the built 
environment, the natural environment's physical transformation and 
reconstruction has been left untouched. 45 
Similarly, regarding memories of the war. the analytical focus rests 
mainly on films, legal trials, and political scandals. 46 Work on memorial 
landscapes largely consists of inventories of memorials or focuses on the role of 
memorials and museums in the production of memory. ~7 Although Sarah 
Farmer's Martyred Village is sensitive to landscape concerns. its primary focus is 
on the human effort to preserve memory rather than landscape itself. 48 Accounts 
of memorial landscapes in other national setting recognise the importance of 
place and space when analysing memorials. 49 However, most of the memorials 
44 Hilary Footitt, War and Liberation in France: Living with the Liberators (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillian, 2004), 39-48; and Daniele Voldman, Le deminage de France apres 1945 
(Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1998). 
45 Daniele Voldman. La reconstruction des villes fran~aises de 1940 a 1954: histoire d'une 
politique (Paris: L 'Harmattan, 1997). See also Hugh Clout, 'Ruins and Revival: Paris in the 
Aftennath of the Second World War,' Landscape Research 29/2 (April 2004): 117-39; Nicola 
Lamborne, War Damage in Western Europe: The Destruction of Historic Monuments During the 
Second World War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 200 I); and Reconstructions et 
modernisation: la France apres les ruines 1918 ... 1945 ... (paris: Archives de France, 1991). 
46 Memories of war are perhaps more readily associated with the landscapes of the First World 
War. For the British, poppies have become a symbol of the loss of life in the trenches, while 
Germany commemorated its dead within sacred groves. See George L. Mosse. Fallen Soldiers: 
Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 107-25. 
47 For war memorials. see Serge Barcellini and Annette Wieviorka, Pass ant, souviens-toi! Les 
lieux du souvenir de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale en France (Paris: Pion. 1995). For museums, 
see Marie-Helene Joly, 'War Museums in France,' in Sarah Blowen. Marion Demoisser, and 
Jeanine Picard (eds.), Recollections of France: Memories. Identities and Heritage in 
Contemporary France (Oxford: Berghahn, 2000), 33-5; and Daniel 1. Shennan. 'Objects of 
Memory: History and Narrative in French War Museums. French Historical Studies 19/1 (Spring 
1995): 49-74. For Holocaust memorials, see Peter Carrier. Holocaust Afonuments and National 
Memory Cultures in France and Germany since 1989 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn.2005); 
and Caroline Wiedmer. The Claims of Memory: Representations of the Holocaust in 
Contemporary Germany and France (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 1999). 
48 Sarah Fanner. Martyred village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane 
(Berkley CA: University of California Press. 1999). 
4C) As Nuala Johnson argues, 'the space which ... memorials occupy is not just an incidental 
material backdrop. but in fact inscribes the statues with meaning.' 'Cast in Stone: Monuments. 
Geography. and Nationalism,' Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 13 (1995). 51. 
For more on the links between landscape and memory see Tim Cole. Holocallst City (New York: 
Routledge. 2003). 221-4Q~ Kenneth Foote. Shadowed Ground: America's Landscapes of Violence 
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analysed are located in urban rather than natural environments. Furthennore. 
when memory and "natural" landscapes are considered together. nature is often 
treated as an unproblematic backdrop to human memories. 50 An important 
exception, however, is Andrew Charlesworth· s and Michael Addis' research on 
the 'ecological landscapes' of Holocaust sites, in which they show that the 
preservers of memory are forced to grapple with nature' s dynamism and develop 
ecological management strategies in an attempt to maintain historical 
"authenticity." 51 Following Charlesworth's and Addis' lead, I focus in chapter 
seven on the connections between memories and "natural" landscapes. including 
the role of nature in preserving memories, and the impact of nature processes on 
memorial sites. As such, chapter seven demonstrates the continuing relationship 
between war and nature in postwar France. 
There are two possible explanations for why an environmental history of 
the "dark years" has not yet been written. Firstly, environmental modifications 
and human experiences of landscape during the Second World War in France 
have been overshadowed by the devastation of the First World War. It is 
relatively well known how four years of trench warfare in North and Eastern 
France led to the destruction of vast swathes of farmland, forests, and villages. 
necessitating an extensive postwar programme of environment reconstruction. 52 
and Tragedy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003 [1997]); Brian Ladd. The Ghosts of Berlin: 
Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1997); Jay Winter, Sites of Memory. Sites of Mourning: the Great War in 
European Cultural History (Cambridge, 1995, 2003); and James E. Young, The Texture of 
Memon': Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: University of Yale Press, 1993). 
$(I See, ·for example, Simon Schama. Landscape and Memory (London: Fontana. 1996). 
" At the Auschwitz site nature acts in surprising ways; the increasing mole popUlation means that 
'molehills of grey ash and white bone' disrupt newly created lawns. Andrew Charlesworth and 
Michael Addis, 'Memorialisation and the Ecological Landscapes of Holocaust Sites: the Cases of 
Auschwitz and Plaszow: Landscape Research 27/3 (2002): 229-51. 
~2 For this environmental destruction. see Jean-Paul Am~ ·Guerre et milieux naturels: les forets 
meurtries de I'est de la France 70 ans apres Verdun: L '£Space Geographique 3 (1987): 217-33; 
and numerous chapters in Corvol and Amat. Foret et gllerre. For postwar reconstruction. see 
18 
Chapter One 
Given the appalling material conditions of trench warfare~ it is unsurprising that 
historians and others detail how soldiers responded to and, in the case of trench 
gardens, resisted, the environment of mud, shells, barbed wire, and rats in which 
they lived and fought. 53 In comparison, it is assumed that the Second World War 
resulted in little, if any, environmental modification and left few physical traces. 
Voldman contends that even though the countryside was 'not spared' by the 
Second World War, the damage inflicted upon it was 'proportionately much less 
than during the First World War,' while Orner Bartov makes the case that bar a 
number of 'discreetly placed' memorials there is no 'physical. plastic presence to 
remind one of Vichy which even remotely compares with the massive memorials 
and vast cemeteries of the First World War, nor for that matter, with the 
concentration camps in Germany.' 54 However. as my thesis argues, 
environmental modification of the natural environment during the Second World 
War was substantial. Although Bartov is correct to suggest that there is no site to 
compare with the scale of cemeteries and concentration camps, the physical 
traces of the Second World War pepper the contemporary French landscape. 
The second reason to explain the absence of environmental histories of 
the "dark years" is that human suffering and deaths would seem to far outweigh 
considerations of nature. Social histories outline the range of hardships that faced 
Hugh Clout, After the Ruins: Restoring the Countryside of Northern France after the Great War 
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1996). 
~J Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1975); 
Mosse. Fallen Soldiers. 107-25; and Martin Warnke, Political Landscape: The Art History of 
Nature, Trans. David McLintock (London: Reaktion Books, 1994 [1992]). 60-2. 72-4. On trench 
gardens. see Kenneth I. Hepland. Defiant Gardens: Making Gardens in Wartime (San Antonio. 
TX: Trinity University Press. 2006), 21-59. For postwar attempts to make meaning of the trench 
landscape, see Mandy S. Morris. 'Gardens "For Ever England": Identity and the First World War 
British Cemeteries on the Western Front,' Ecumene 4/4 (October 1997): 410-34; and David W. 
Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism: Pilgrimage and the Cummemoration of the ureal War in Britain. 
Australia and Canada, 1919-1939 (Oxford: Berg. 1998). 
~ Voldman, Reconstruction des villes lranfaises. 17: and Orner Bartov. 'Trauma and Absence: 
France and Germany. 1914-45: in Paul Addison and Angus Calder (eds.). Time 10 Kill: The 
Soldier's Experience of War. (London. Pimlico. 1997). 350. 
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the Frenc~ including coping with absent prisoner of war husbands, severe food 
shortages, and daily compromises and humiliations experienced under the 
Occupation. While Robert Gildea questions how ""dark" the "dark years" actually 
were, the overall picture of the war years in unsurprisingly bleak. 55 This is 
especially true for those groups singled out for persecution by the Vichy regime 
and Nazi authorities, such as French and "foreign" Jews, who faced internment 
on French soil and deportation to the concentration camps of Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, the postwar creation and destruction of the redemptionary myth of 
resistance, controversies surrounding collaboration, the articulation of Jewish 
memories from the 1970s onwards, and the trials of former Vichy jonclionnaires. 
such as Maurice Papon, attest to the difficulties the French have faced in coming 
to terms with their past (which Henry Rousso memorably diagnoses as a "'Vichy 
Syndrome"), meaning that considerations of the environment have been 
obscured. 56 
However, the environmental history of the war does not diminish human 
suffering. 57 Instead, it adds to our understanding of the hardships faced by the 
French during the Occupation. Not least, German timber requisitions deprived 
SS Robert Gildea, 'Les annees noires? Clandestine Dancing in Occupied France,' in Ceri Crossley 
and Martyn Cornick (eds.), Problems in French History (Basingstoke: Palgrave. 2000), 197-212. 
See also Robert Gildea, Marianne in Chains: In Search of the German Occupation of France. 
1940-45 (London: McMillan. 2003). 
S6 The key text on French memories of Vichy is Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome. See also Eric 
Conan and Henry Rousso. Vichy. un passe qui ne passe pas (paris: Fayard, 1994); Richard 
Golsan. Vichy's Afterlife: History and Counterhistory in Postwar France (Lincoln. NB: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2000); Pieter Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic 
Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe 1945-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Nancy Wood, Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Postwar 
Europe (Oxford: Berg, 1999). For the "reawakening" of Jewish memory. see Maud S. Mandel. In 
the Aftermath of Genocide: Armenians and Jews in Twentieth Century France (Durham NC and 
London: Duke University Press. 2003); and Joan Wolf, Harnessing the Holocaust: The Politics of 
Memon' in France (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. 2004). For a critique of the "Vichy 
syndro~e" analysis. see Bertram Gordon. "'The Vichy Syndrome" problem in History,' French 
Historical Studies 1912 (Autumn 1995),495-518. 
~7 As Robinson argues. ·there are numerous examples in history. both recent and ancient. of 
human societies suffering appallingly from military assaults on their natural environment.' 
Effects (?f Weapons on Ecosystems. 6. 
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the French of natural resources that were desperately needed for heating, 
cooking, and transport, while the harsh natural environments of F Tench 
internment camps accentuated the suffering of internees, who were buffeted by 
winds all year round, frazzled by the sun in summer, and floundered in mud 
during the winter. 58 The destruction of the environment also saddened some 
observers. Flying over northern France, noted author and pilot Antoine de Saint-
Exupery lamented seeing houses and forests burning as the Gennan army 
advanced. 'The sense of everything changes. Three hundred year old trees that 
shelter your family home block the firing range of a twenty-two year old 
lieutenant. So he sends in fifteen men to destroy history' s work. In ten minutes. 
they consume three hundred years of patience, sun, and life under the shade.' 59 
But nature could offer some solace from the war and trying personal 
circumstances. One observer noted in 1942 how 'the study of nature is calming 
in this infernal century in which we live. It makes us better and keeps our hearts 
intact.' 60 An environmental history of war, therefore, augments human wartime 
histories, even if it is entirely understandable if the latter have overshadowed the 
fonner. Having attempted to explain why Vichy historiography has neglected 
environmental considerations, I tum now to the neglect of the war years within 
French environmental history. 
~8 I recount this history in . Places of Persecution: Towarels an Environmental History of 
Internment in Provence,' a paper presented at the Society for the Study of French History's 
annual conference. University of Southampton. 4-5 July 2005. For general histories of internment 
camps. see Jacques Grandjonc and Theresia Grundtner (eels.). Zone d'ombres /933-/945: exil el 
inJernement d'Allemands et d'Autrichieru dans Ie sud-est de 10 France (Aix-en-Provence: 
Editions Alinea and Erca. 1990): Anne Grynberg, Les camps de 10 honte: les internees juifs des 
camps fram;ais, 1939-/9././ (Paris: Editions de la decouverte, 1991): and Denis Peschanski. "La 
France des camps (1938-1946): PhD diss. University of Paris I (2000). accessed at 
http://histoire-sociale.univ-parisl.frlDenis.htm . 
~9 Antoine de Saint-Exupery, Pi/ole de Guerre (Paris: Gallimard, 1942). 89-90. 
60 Frederic Gaymard. Camargue (Marseille: R. LafTont. 1942), II. 
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French environmental history and the "dark years" 
Although it was in 1942 that the tenn environnemenl was reportedly first 
coined in France, environmental histories of French have so far overlooked the 
Second World War. 61 Consequently, there is a gap between environmental 
histories of the pre-war and post-war eras. On the one hand, Tamara Whited"s 
study of mountain forestry policy and Caroline Ford's overview of French nature 
conservation and preservation movements end just before the outbreak of the 
Second World War. On the other hand, the analyses of Michael Bess, Gabrielle 
Hecht, and Sara Pritchard on the relationship between technology. society. and 
the environment focus on the post war period. 62 My thesis, therefore, aims to 
bridge the chronological divide between these studies. 
In seeking to integrate the war within existing narratives of the French 
environmental history in the twentieth century, I aim to contribute to 
understanding of both continuities (such as forestry policy) and changes (such as 
the expansion of uncultivated land during the war). This is important, as the war 
represents a turning point in contemporary French environmental history. Both 
Bess and Hecht identify the changes the war brought to the relationship between 
society" technology, and the environment. The war had starkly exposed the 
61 Albert Demangeon used the tenn "environnemenf in an unpublished work. See Jean-Louis 
Tissier, "Du milieu a I'environnement: I'emergence d'un concept dans Ie discours des geographes 
fran~ais.' in Rene Guilbot Neboit and Lucette Davy (eds.). Les fran~ais dans leur environnemenl 
(Paris: Editions Nathan. 1996) 19. 
b~ Michael Bess. The Lighl-Green Society: Ecology and Technological Modernity in Franct.'. 
/960-2000 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 2003); Caroline Ford. "Nature. 
Culture and Conservation in France and her Colonies 1840-1940,' Pasl and Present 183 (May 
2004): 173-98; Gabrielle Hecht. The Radiance of France: l\f'uclear Po ..... er and Salionalldentity 
after World War /I (Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1998); Sara Pritchard, 'Reconstructing the 
Rhone: The Cultural Politics of Nature and Nation in Contemporary France. 1945-1997: French 
Historical Studies 27,4 (Autumn 2004): 765-99: and Tamara L. Whited. Foresls and Peasant 
Politics in Modern France (New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 2000). 
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deficiencies of France's political, social, and economic structures and forced 
their reconsideration with subsequent environmental effects. Bess and Hecht 
show how the French state mobilised technology to ensure France's 
independence and grandeur. 63 Chapter six demonstrates that a similar 
development occurred during the reconstruction of the environment itself; the 
introduction of the Fonds Forestier National in 1946 was intended, in part to 
increase national self-sufficiency, thereby ensuring France's independence. 
One r~ason for the lack of environmental histories of the war is that 
constructions of an essentially peaceful French countryside remain strong within 
the academy and society. 64 According to Armand Fremon~ the French 
countryside has been crafted "with understanding gentleness rather than massive 
attack: not for nothing is the country known as la douce France: The cultivation 
of French soil was conducted "without violence to nature's rhythms' with 
apparently no 'warfare against the soil: 65 For Simon Schama, meanwhile, la 
douce France describes "the sweetness of a classically well-ordered place where 
rivers, cultivated fields, orchards. vineyards, and woods are all in harmonious 
balance with each other.' 66 The trope of la douce France hardly creates a 
conducive atmosphere for considering the role conflict plays in shaping the 
French environment. 
Another reason for the lack of environmental histories on the Second 
World War is that relatively few French and non-French historians work on the 
63 Bess, Light-Green Society. 20; and Hecht Radiance of France, \-3. 
M There are some exceptions, such as Arnat and Corvol's Foret et glierre and Peter McPhee's 
Revolution and Environment in Southern France J 780-1830: Peasants. Lords. and Murder in the 
Corbieres (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 125-6. 
6.5 Armand Fremont, "The Land: in Pierre Nora (ed.), Realms of Memory: Rethinlcing 'he French 
Past. Volume 2: Traditions. Trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press. 
1997). 25. 
66 Schama. Landscape and Memory. 1 S. 
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environmental history of France. 67 This is especially true in comparison to the 
number of historians researching U.S. environmental history, and the burgeoning 
body of environmental histories of Germany. 68 Perhaps this relative weakness is 
understandable in the country that is the birthplace of Rene Descartes, the 
philosopher who segregated the world into the human and the non-human and 
asserted that the former were the 'masters and possessors of nature,' and where 
rural history is traditionally well represented in academia. 69 So while some 
historians of rural France have researched the relationship between the military 
and the peasantry and others have analysed rural history during the Second 
World War, the same cannot be said for environmental historians. 70 
67 McNeill notes that French scholars are 'poorly represented in the ranks of environmental 
history. 'Observations,' 29. Similarly, Jean-Paul Deleage argues that French ecologists have been 
less influential than their English-speaking colleagues. Une histoire de l'ecologie (Paris: Seuil. 
1991), 13. Recent overviews of French environmental history include Michael Bess, Mark Cioc. 
and James Sievert, 'Environmental History Writing in Southern Europe,' Environmental History 
5/4 (October 2000): 545-56; and Caroline Ford, 'Landscape and Environment in French 
Historical and Geographical Thought: New Directions,' French Historical Studies 24/1 (Winter 
2001): 125-34. 
68 For Gennany, see David Blackboum, The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the 
Making of Modern Germany (London: Jonathan Cape, 2006); Franz-Josef BrUggemeier, Mark 
Cioc, and Thomas Zeller (eds.), How Green Were the Nazis? Nature, Environment, and Nation in 
the Third Reich (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005); Mark Cioc, The Rhine: An Eco-
Biography, 1815-2000 (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2002); Lekan, 
Imagining the Nation in Nature; Thomas Lekan and Thomas Zeller (eds.). Germany's Nature: 
Cultural Landscapes and Environmental History (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
2005); and ChristofMauch (ed.), Nature in German History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004). 
69 Descartes quoted in Peter Coates, Nature: Weslern Altitudes since Ancient Times (Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 1998), 75-6. Philosopher Luc Ferry offers a contemporary defence of Cartesian 
humanism in his attack on deep ecology, which he argues is a continuation of Nazi ecology. See 
The New Ecological Order, Trans. Carol Volk (Chicago: The Chicago Press, 1995). For critiques 
of Ferry. see Bess. Light-Green Society. 130-40; and Kerry Whiteside, Divided ,"'alures: French 
Contributions to Political Ecology (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 2002), 3. For the strength 
(and weaknesses) of rural history in France. see Ford., 'Landscape and Environment: 125: and 
Susan Carol Rogers. 'Natural Histories: The Rise and Fall of French Rural Studies,' French 
Historical Studies 1912 (Fall 1995): 382-97. 
70 Gervais. Jollivet and Tavernier describe the world wars as the 'capital events in the history of 
rural France: Histoire de la France rurale. 12. For links between rural France and the militar)'. 
see Craig Gibson .. The British Anny, French Farmers, and the War on the Western Front 1914-
1918: Past and Present 180 (August 2003). 175-240: Gerard de Pu)mege. "The Good Soldier 
Chauvin,' in Pierre Nora (ed.). Realms of Memory: Rethinking Ihe French Past. Volume J: 
Traditions. Trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press. 1997). 332-60: 
and Eugen Weber. Peasants inlo Frenchmen: The Modernisation of Rural France 1870-1914 
(London: Chatto and Windus. 1979),298-9. 
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The state of environmental history in France, however. is not as bleak as 
these observations suggest. According to Genevieve Massard-Guilbau~ there is 
life in French environmental history, even ifhistorians interested in this area tend 
to work in isolation from others researching similar themes. Alluding to comic 
strip hero Asterix, Massard-Guilbaud argues that the ingredients for a successful 
French environmental history are already in place, waiting to be mixed together 
to form the 'magic potion.,71 As if to offer encouragement to their French 
colleagues, English-speaking environmental historians suggest that these 
ingredients have existed for a good many years in France. pointing to French 
geographers and Annales historians as forerunners of contemporary 
environmental history. 72 Not least, Lucien Febvre's stress on the mutual 
relations between humans and the environment seems to have provided the 
blueprint for contemporary environmental history back in the 1920s: 
To act on his environment, man does not place himself outside it. He does not escape its 
hold at the precise moment when he attempts to exercise his own. And conversely the 
nature which acts on man, the nature which intervenes to modify the existence of human 
societies, is not a virgin nature, independent of all human contact; it is a nature already 
profoundly impregnated and modified by man. There is a perpetual action and reaction. 
The formula "the mutual relations of society to environment" holds equally good for the 
two supposed distinct cases. For in these relations, man bOth borrows and gives back. 
whilst the environment gives and receives. 73 
71 Genevieve Massard-Guilbaud, 'De la "part de milieu" a I'histoire de I'environnement' Le 
Mouvement Social 200 (July-September 2002), 71-2. 
72 Crosby •. Past and Present of Environmental History.' 1183. 
73 Lucien Febvre. A Geographical Introduction to History. Trans. E.G. Mountfield and 1H. 
Paxton (London: Kegan Paul. Trench. Trubner & Co .• 1925).361. On the Annales historians. see 




This statement contains at least two of the traits of contemporary environmental 
history; the interconnectedness of humans and nature and the stress on a highly 
modified "natural" environment. 74 
However, while environmental history owes much to the innovations of 
Annales historians it appears misleading to fashion them into avant-garde 
environmental historians. 75 As Massard-Guilbaud points out, the Annales largely 
failed to realise Febrve's formula of "the mutual relations of society to 
environment" and tended instead to focus on one half of this equation at the 
expense of the other. 76 Moreover, when the two halves are considered in tandem 
the environment becomes static to the point where its history is almost denied. 
For Braudel, the interlocking history of humans and the environment 'is almost 
imperceptible ... a history in which all change is slow. a history of constant 
repetition, ever-recurring cycles.' He 'could not neglect this almost timeless 
history, the story of man's contact with the inanimate.' 77 In contrast. more recent 
accounts of the French environment have stressed the constantly changing 
physical landscape and evolving cultural meanings of nature. 78 
74 There is also a degree of similarity between Febrve's thesis and those of contemporary French 
green theorists. With regards to the latter, Whiteside argues that they 'elaborate green thought 
more often by reciprocally problematizing "nature" and "humanity" than by rerming distinctions 
between them.' Divided Natures, 3. Emphasis in original. 
75 McNeill. 'Observations,' 14-5. 
76 Massard-GuiJbaud, ' "Part de milieu" a I'histoire de l'environnement,' 67. Compare, for 
example. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie. Times of Feast, Times of Famine: A History of Climate 
since the veal' 1000. Trans. Barbara Bray (London: George Allen & Unwin. 1972) with Marc 
Bloch. F;ench Rural History: An Essay on its Basic Characteristics, Trans. Janet Sondheimer 
(London: Routledge and Regan Paul. 1966 [1931]). 
77 Femand Braudel. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. 
Trans. Sian Reynolds (London: Collins, 1972). 20. 
78 Bess, Light-Green Society; A. Cadoret (ed.). Protection de la nature: histoire et ideologie. de 
la nature a I'environnement (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1985); Xavier de Planhol and Paul Claval, An 
Historical Geography of France. Trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1988); Pierre DeriOz. Rene Neboit-Guilhot, and Jean Renard, 'Des espaces ruraux fragiles et des 
paysages en mutation,' in Neboit-Guilhot and Davy (eds.), Lesfran~'ais dans leur environnement, 
145-81: Jean-Robert Pitte. His/oire du paysage franr;ais: de la prehis/oire a nos jOllrs (Paris: 
Editions Tallandier. 2003 [1983]); and PritchllJ"d 'Reconstructing the Rhone.' 
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War and occupation ushered in new attitudes to nature and heightened 
existing ones. Throughout this period there was a strong emphasis on the 
productivity of the land. The material conditions in post-defeat France infonned 
the Vichy regime's war against "wasteland," while shortages after Liberation 
placed productive land at premium. Similarly, Vichy attempted to boost forestry 
production, as did the post-1944 republican governments and both launched 
reforestation schemes that aimed to increase the forests' capacity. 
However, "wild," largely unproductive landscapes were also invested 
with new meanings during the war. The most striking aspect of this history was 
the reinvention of the maquis. This fonn of Mediterranean vegetation was 
considered a worthless landscape before the war, but rural resisters' adaptation of 
its name transformed it into a landscape that was valued for protecting French 
democratic values during the Occupation. This appreciation of the maquis shows 
the power of war to transfonn cultural constructions of landscape, as well as 
revising common assumptions that the French only value domesticated land. 
Paxton, for instance, argues that 'for Americans, it is the frontier and the 
wilderness that serve as reservoirs of moral values ... In the United States, the 
land is most sacred where the individual is most unfettered. In France. the land is 
most sacred where the human community is most intact.' Possibly displaying an 
American affection for wilderness, Paxton critiques France' s apparent obsession 
with cultivated land and suggests that instead of "lamenting the supposedly idle 
·'fallow:' France could rejoice in increased game. the recovery of rare plants and 
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animals, more recreational possibilities, and more natural beauty in marshes, 
brushy edges, and moorlands.' 79 
But as the histories of the maqUls and the campaIgn to save the 
Camargue's supposed wild landscape suggest, the French appreciate landscapes 
that do not resemble la douce France. My region for this study. the South East of 
France, was partially chosen to enable me to focus on the "wilder" aspects of the 
French landscape, such as the Camargue wetlands, Vercors mountain range. and 
the Mediterranean forest of Provence. 
Introducing my case study 
Scale vanes widely in environmental histories. At its widest. it 
encompasses the global, such as McNeill" s account of worldwide ecological 
transformations during the twentieth century. 80 At the other end of the spectrum, 
Dan Flores favours bioregional histories that analyse . deep time in a single 
place.' 81 Both these approaches have their particular strengths and weaknesses. 
The global approach recognises the immense scope of environment changes. 
while place-centred studies draw out longue duree history within an ecologically 
coherent and bounded space. However, the former approach threatens to swallow 
up local detail and difference and relies heavily on secondary literature, while the 
latter runs the risk of isolating places from wider natural and social contexts. 
19 Robert. O. Paxton. French Peasant Fascism: Henry Dorgeres's Greenshirts and the Crises of 
French Agriculture, 1929-1939 (New York. Oxford University Press. 1997). 181-3. For a critique 
of America's fascination with wilderness. see Willliam Cronon. 'The Trouble with Wilderness or. 
Getting Back to the Wrong Nature: Environmental History III (January 1996): 7-28. 
110 McNeill, Something New Under the Sun. 
II For Flores. 'natural geographic systems.' such as ecosystems. 'are the appropriate settings for 
insightful environmental history: Dan Flores. 'Place: An Argument for Bioregional History,' 
Environmental Historr Re1'iew 18/4 (Winter 1994).6. 10. 
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Richard White offers a way out of a possible methodological impasse when he 
suggests that environmental histories must engage with multiple scales (global~ 
national, and local) as this takes into account the complexity of the past and the 
fact that lives are lived on intermeshing scales. 82 
With these considerations in mind - and in line with the growth of place-
centred studies within Vichy historiography 83 - I treat South Eastern France as a 
regional case study (an area that extends from the Southern Alps to the 
Mediterranean coastline, flanked by the Rhone to the West and the Italian border 
to the East). An environmental history of the whole of France lies beyond the 
scope of this study, yet this region makes a particularly useful case study for both 
its ecological and political variety. Ecologically. this area contains a range of 
forest types, from the beech trees of the prealpine Vercors to the Mediterranean 
forests that hug the Provencal coastline. Furthermore, the region experienced 
numerous political and military authorities between 1940 and 1944; it formed 
part of the "Unoccupied" Zone governed by the Vichy regime and was 
subsequently under both Italian and German Occupation (see map two). 84 
Apart from isolated Alpine battles with Italian troops in June 1940, the 
region was largely free of sustained military combat until the Allied landings of 
August 1944. As such, the region allows for an analysis of both the indirect and 
82 Richard White, 'The Nationalization of Nature,' The Journal of American History 86/3 (1999). 
Accessed at http://historycooperative.press.uiuc.edufjournalsljahl86.3/white.html, 8. 
83 See. among others. John Sweets, Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986): and Robert Zaretsky. Nimes at War: Religion. 
Politics. and Public Opinion in the Gard 1938-1944 (University Park. PA: The Pennsylvania 
State University Press 1995). Kedward's In Search of the Maquis also stresses the importance of 
~Iace. 
The administrative departemenJs under study are the Alpes-Maritimes, Basses-Alpes (now the 
Alpes-de-Hautes-Provence). Bouches-du-Rhone. DrOme. Hautes-Alpes. Isere, Var. and Vaucluse. 
Following the defeat of France, these departements lay in the Unoccupied Zone. Between June 
1940 and November 1942. Italy annexed the frontier area of the Alpes-Maritimes. before taking 
control of the whole of region in November 1942. The expanded Italian Zone lasted until 
September 1943. after which it was subsequently occupied by the Gennan anny. For the social 
and political history of this region during the war. see Jean-Marie Guillon. 'La France du Sud-
Es~' in Azema and Bedarida. France des annees noire,'\.· lome 2. 159-76. 
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direct ecological ramifications of warfare. Where necessary. however. I draw on 
notable examples from outside this region, such as the Tron~s forest in central 
France. In terms of war damage, the South East suffered less than regions such as 
Alsace and Lorraine. However, without further research into other areas of 
France during the war, it is hard to say with any certainty how representative my 
case study is of the environmental history of the '''dark years.·~ 
Uncovering the environmental history of this region necessitated 
consulting a ~ide range of sources. Perhaps the most important repository has 
been the archives of the French Forestry Administration (Administration des 
Eaux et Fon~ts 85) at both a national and departemental level. In several cases 
(such as in the Var departement), these documents have only just become 
available for consultation and have proved invaluable for uncovering the history 
of forestry policy, war damage, and the relationships between foresters and 
occupying forces. Unfortunately, these documents have not revealed all aspects 
of forest history. Not least, they are silent on why foresters drifted towards the 
resistance (it is, of course, unsurprising that foresters omitted mention of any 
clandestine activity from their official reports). 86 Other administrative records 
consulted at both a national and local level include those of the Chantiers de la 
Jeunesse youth movement and the Direction de deminage (landmine clearance 
service). Government reports, such as the Commission consultative des 
dommages et des reparations (CCDR). were vital in assessing environmental war 
., In 1940 Pierre Caziot, Vichy Minister for Agriculture. renamed Eaux et Forets as the Direction 
des Forets. de la chasse et de la peche (it reverted back to its previous name in 1943). For 
simplicity's sake, I refer to Eaux et Fortts as the Forestry Administration throughout my thesis. 
The administration was governed by five general administrators who oversaw the work of 
conservators, inspectors. and subinspectors. The day-to-day policing of forests fell to general 
I.uards and gardes particu/iers. See Whited. Fo~esls and Peasa~1 ~olilics in :\fodern France. 31. 
Documents in the Haute-Alpes' archives depaTlemenla/es mdlcate that m the late 19405 the 
head of the Forestry Administration requested infonnation on foresters' resistance activity. I was 
unable to locate the final result of this surve) . 
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damage. The CCDR's fmal report was published in 1951 and was based on 
information gathered during the war, covering such areas as architectural. 
industrial, agricultural war damage, as well as the impact of war on forests and 
hunting. However, it is necessary to recognise potential problems with its 
findings. Not least, the accuracy of war damage statistics must be questioned 
given the administrative upheaval in postwar France and the difficulty in 
accurately assessing the extent of war damage on the ground. In 1946, a Genie 
Rural official recognised that it was difficult to accurately assess war damage to 
the countryside. 87 And, as Voldman points out, the CCDR' s findings followed 
the 'logic of victors' seeking to reclaim what they had lost during the war. 88 
To complement my use of state sources, I have consulted wartime books 
on the forest, agriculture, and the Camargue, as well as various periodicals, such 
as the journals of the Club Alpin Fran~ais, Jeunesse et Montagne youth 
movement, and forestry organisations. The archives of the Societe nationale 
d'acclimatation de France (now the Societe national de la protection de la 
nature), cast light on the Camargue' s wartime history. In addition, memoirs 
written by Vercors maquisards bring to light resistance attitudes towards the 
mountain environment. As I have not had the time to consult resistance memoirs 
from other parts of France (and in the absence of a general account of the 
resistance's construction of nature), I do not claim that the Vercors memoirs are 
necessarily representative of resisters in other mountain environments. 
Another way that I have tried to capture history "from below" is through 
talking to those who lived through the war, including maquisards. foresters, and 
a fisherman from the Camargue. Given time constraints and the ever-dwindling 
17 CHAN F 10 7103 Ch ief Engineer. Genie Rural. . Evaluation prov isoire immediate des 
dommages agricoles causes par la guerre.· 21 May 1946. 
III Voldman. Reconstruction des villesfranfaist'.'i. 28. 
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numbers of individuals who lived during the war. oral history has not formed a 
major part of this work. It has, however, been helpful in gaining a sense of 
firsthand experiences of the past (albeit ones that are necessarily mediated by the 
passage of time and distortions of memory). In addition to talking to 
contemporaries and consulting documentation, I have visited many of the sites 
described in this thesis to uncover physical traces of the war on the ground and 
assess the creation of landscapes of memory. 
My thesis is structured both chronologically and thematically. Chapter 
two deals with the immediate aftermath of defeat in 1940 in Vichy France. while 
chapters three to five explore the environmental history of the "dark years" 
through a focus on three different types of habitats; forests, marshes, and 
mountains. While there is some overlap between these habitats (for instance. 
many forests are located in mountainous areas), this structure shows how war 
affected different habitats in different ways. Chapters six and seven deal with the 
aftermath of the war, respectively exploring the postwar reconstruction of the 
environment and landscapes of memory. These last two chapters have a wider 
geographical and chronological focus than the four previous ones; chapter six 
considers environmental reconstruction throughout France between 1944 and 
1955. while chapter seven analyses the relationship between nature and memory 
across the postwar period. 
Following on from this introduction, chapter two examines how military 
defeat in 1940 and subsequent material shortages forced the French to fall back 
on the country' s natural resources. Along with ideological considerations. these 
shortages informed the Vichy regime's war against hwasteland'" and its attempt 
to cultivate as much French soil as possible. including land that had ne\'er been 
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cultivated. I assess the aims and ultimate failure of this cultivation drive through 
a focus on reforestation. This chapter highlights the material basis of the 
"National Revolution" and how war alters the relationship between society and 
the environment. 
Chapter three recounts wartime forest history, examtmng changes to 
forestry policies, Vichy'S political appropriation of the forest and the Forestry 
Administration's attempt to uphold its forestry management principles in the face 
of increased forest fires and the activities of occupation soldiers, as well as the 
resistance's reclaiming of forests from Vichy. By outlining the forest" s 
interlocking material and cultural histories, this chapter shows how the forest was 
essential for the continuation of any semblance of normal life and how it became 
a site of political manipulation for both republican (the resistance) and anti-
republican (Vichy) forces within French society. 
At the same time as foresters sought to conserve French forest resources. 
the SNAF battled to preserve the Camargue wetlands. a site renowned for its 
natural beauty and scientific importance. Maintaining the integrity of its nature 
reserve was no easy matter for the SNAF as the Vichy regime sought to intensify 
agriculture and the French, German. and Allied air forces successively used the 
wetlands as an aerial training zone. The biggest challenge. though, came when 
German authorities planned to flood the Camargue for defensive purposes. The 
SNAF. however. was largely successful in protecting the Camargue. aided by the 
unpredictability of the Camargue's climate. As well as tracing the history of 
nature protection in wartime. this chapter highlights the inconsistencies of Vichy 
policies. as the regime viewed wetlands as both a site of tradition and an area ripe 
for agricultural modernisation. 
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Moving up in altitude from the flat expanses of the Camargue, chapter 
five outlines the mobilisation of mountains between 1940 and 1944. In the wake 
of defeat and restrictions placed on the French military, mountains became a 
substitute means for restoring and strengthening male bodies and identities 
through youth groups such as Jeunesse et Montagne. The rejuvenation of 
masculinity was portrayed as part of the redressement (or renewal) of France 
under Vichy, but the regime did not enjoy a monopoly over the mobilisation of 
the mountain landscape. Just as it did in the forest. the resistance began to 
reclaim mountain space as its own by deploying mountains as refuges and 
military bases. This mobilisation reached its ultimate conclusion in the Vercors. 
where maquisards revelled in their personal rejuvenation in the pure mountain 
air and where their leaders attempted to mould the mountain range into a 
supposedly impenetrable "natural fortress." This mobilisation backfired. 
however, when German forces invaded the fortress, massacring maquisards and 
civilians alike, and damaging the area's physical environment. 
Postwar reconstruction is the main theme of chapter six, as war provided 
the opportunity to modernise the environment. I analyse how state officials 
strove to manage the continued pressures on natural resources that came from 
Allied troops and French civilians. The focus then shifts to removing the 
explosive traces of the war and returning land to productivity through landmine 
clearance (the ease of which varied according to the type of terrain). In the long 
term. the French state undertook the reconstruction of the environment along 
planned and productivist principles (in line with wider societal developments). 
This was a response to the extent of war damage. as well as long standing 
anxieties concerning rural depopulation and deforestation. Postwar reforestation 
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under the FFN scheme, however, was much more successful than that undertaken 
by Vichy after the defeat. 
Whereas chapter six outlines the removal of war's physical traces. 
chapter seven analyses the preservation of memories within the natural 
environment and the coupling of resistance memories with forests. maquis. and 
mountain landscapes. In part, preservers of memory associate memories of 
resistance with these landscapes as it reflects their wartime history. but the 
recourse to nature is also an attempt to naturalise and enshrine memory. 
Furthermore, the case of the Vercors demonstrates the ways in which resistance 
memorials engage with their environment to re-create wartime experiences and 
perpetuate memories. In contrast, sites associated with shameful or humiliating 
aspects of the war (such as internment camps) have been allowed to slip into 
obscurity within the landscape. Yet, the relationship between nature and memory 
is far from straightforward as weather and vegetation threaten to transform sites 
of memory. The creation of these landscapes of memory highlights the continued 
mobilisation of the natural environment for human ends and nature's 
unpredictability, both of which are important themes within this environmental 
history of the "dark years." 
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The War on "Wasteland": Remaking the French Landscape 
The speed of France's military and political collapse in the summer of 1940 
shocked the French. Within six weeks of invading Holland and Belgium on 10 May 
1940, Hitler's armies had reached Paris, throwing France and its government into 
chaos. On 22 June] 940, after First World War hero Marshal Philippe Petain had 
taken control of the government, an armistice was signed between France and 
Germany. 1 As a consequence, French territory was fragmented: Germany annexed 
Alsace-Lorraine, attached the Nord and Pas-de-Calais deparlements to its military 
command in Bruxelles, restricted access to the English Channel and Atlantic 
coastlines, and took control of the Northern half of France (see map I). In the 
Southern or "free" zone, Petain's authoritarian government established its base in the 
spa town of Vichy and pursued a policy of state collaboration with Nazi Germany. 
The Vichy regime formulated a domestic agenda in reaction to France' s 
supposed decline under the Third Republic. Trumpeting the values of Famille. 
travail. patrie ("Family. Work, Fatherland'), Vichy's '"National Revolution" aimed 
to rejuvenate French society by encouraging a return to the allegedly "natural" 
I For recent work on the fall of France. see Julian Jackson. The Fall of France: The .~·a=i Invasion of 
1940 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2004); and Peter Jackson. 'Returning to the Fall of France: 
Recent Work on the Cause and Consequences of the "Strange Defeat" of 1940.' Modem and 
Conlemporary France 1214 (November 2004): 513-36. 
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communities of fami1y, workplace, and region. 2 The French soil, as both a material 
reality and an imaginative concept, was a key component of this attempt to remake 
France. As prominent regionalist writer Henri Pourrat argued. the only way for 
France to revive itself was 'through the earth' (sur la terre). After military defea~ 
what else did France now possess other than its soil; 'here is wounded France, but on 
her knees and with her bloody hands, doesn't she come to touch the earth?' 3 An 
important component of the "National Revolution," therefore, was the promotion of 
"back to the land" philosophies and policies. Petain and traditionalists within the 
Vichy regime intended the retour a la terre as a means of rediscovering "1rue" and 
"eternal" France, and as a way of rejuvenating the nation through a return to 
tradition and authenticity. 4 Physical vigour. moral enhancement. and a sense of the 
immutable, natural, hierarchical communities that supposedly formed the French 
nation were among the lessons the French were to glean from the soil. 
Historians have outlined in detail the cultural history of the "National 
Revolution" and its "back to the land" rhetoric, stressing its lack of coherence and 
the fact that it was mainly advanced by the reactionary, traditionalist clique 
surrounding Petain. In contrast, I focus here on the Vichy regime's attempt to 
physically transform the French landscape for both practical and ideological reasons. 
2 As Jackson argues. 'such communities supposedly offered "real" freedoms unlike the abstract and 
hollow rights vaunted by liberals.' France: The Dark Years, 149-54. Paxton stresses that the 
"National Revolution" and Vichy policies arose from French initiative rather than German pressure. 
See Vichy France. 136-45. 
3 Henri Pourrat. L 'homme a la beche, histoire du Paysan (Paris: Flammarion. 1940). 282. 
4 As Philippe Burrin argues. for Vichy "the defeat provided a unique opportunity to rediscover [the) 
bedrock [of "eternal France"], and the best way to do that was to promote a return to the soil.' 
"Vichy.' in Pierre Nora (ed.). Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past. Volume I: Co~llicts 
and Divisions. trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press. 1996). 194. For 
Muel-Dreyfus. "back to the land-ism" was an attempt to revert France to cyclical time. the time of 




It is hard to ascertain which of these was more important to the regime and, in many 
ways, the two objectives overlapped. Cultivating more land was a way of morally 
rejuvenating France while providing desperately needed resources. Vichy tried to 
remake French society through the soil and endeavoured to remake the land itself. 
There was, therefore, a significant material basis to the "'National Revolution" and 
"back to the land-ism." 
Although it was never announced as such (and it is unwise to ascribe too 
much coherence to Vichy's political agenda and policies 5), the Vichy regime 
launched a war against "wasteland." This campaign was in response to the severe 
material shortages post-defeat, as well as a bid to revitalize French society through 
transforming the landscape. Petain and traditionalists within the regime believed that 
44true" France was rural France, and re-cultivating the landscape was a way of 
returning the country to its essential character. 6 For Vichy, "wasteland" (or la 
friche) had no place on the French landscape. It provided few natural resources or 
foodstuffs and was a sign of the decline of rural. peasant France under the Third 
Republic. In effect, Vichy aimed to cultivate all of French soil, including land that 
had always been uncultivated. 
The strategies in the war against "wasteland" were manifold as the desire to 
eradicate friche motivated both traditionalists and technocrats within the regime. 
Vichy's creation of a corporatist countryside. its promotion of "back to the land" 
S Shennan stresses that the "National Revolution" lacked a coherent ideology. as it was expounded 
through twenty speeches given by Petain which were intended to act as a stimulus for others. Andrew 
Shennan. Rethinking France: Plans/or Renewal 1940-1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1989). 
t 9-20 Paxton emphasis that 'Vichy was not a "bloc'" and was made up of 'competing visions.' Vichy 
France, 139. 
b For more on rightwing constructions of "true France," see Herman Lebovics. True France: The 
Wars over Culturalldentin', 1900-1945 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 1992). 
38 
Chapter Two 
values through propaganda, and its support of small scale farming are the most well 
known of its rural policies. But the regime's large scale public works to reclaim and 
re-cultivate land were also essential weapons in the war against ·~asteland.·· as was 
reforestation, a policy widely supported by foresters who had a longstanding distaste 
for areas of "uncultivated" forest, such as maquis (their preference for mature forest 
over scrubland during the war was evident in forest fires reports). Ultimately, 
Vichy's campaign to remake the French countryside failed as the extent of 
"wasteland" actually increased between 1940 and 1944. Furthermore, rural 
resistance units invested maquis with a sense of national purpose, transforming it 
into a centre of alternative power to the Vichy regime and. as Kedward points out. 
offering a more subversive interpretation of "back-to-the-Iandism." 7 
As this chapter shows, war and occupation increased the importance of 
cultivated land and intensified longstanding attempts to eradicate uncultivated land. 8 
Yet even an authoritarian regime like Vichy failed to increase the surface area of 
cultivated land, suggesting that the land was not as malleable as Vichy assumed. 
Ideologically and materially, Vichy's war on '~asteland" was a failure, despite an 
increase in market gardening. 
7 Kedward, In Search o/the Maquis. 115. 
8 For Bloch. writing in the 1930s. one of the principal features of the long-term history of the French 
countryside was the struggle to cultivate the land. On land clearance in the Middle ages. which Bloch 
describes as the . great work of clearing waste.' see Fn'nch Rural History. I ~-16. 
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"Back to the land-ism" in Vichy France 
Vichy was not alone in its hostility towards '~asteland.'· In 1936. the 
Gennan National Socialist party launched a "Battle for Production" to increase 
Gennany's self-sufficiency in the event of war (motto: "Change wasteland into 
arable land!"). This fonn of "inner colonization" aimed to reclaim two million 
hectares of marshes and other "wasteland" and transfonn them into productive 
fannland by 1940. 9 Once war broke out in 1939, populations in other countries. 
such as Britain, were encouraged to "dig for victory." The material and geographical 
realities ushered in by military defeat in 1940 forced the French to go "back to the 
land" and extract the maximum amount of foodstuffs and other produce from their 
soil. 
The main reason that France had to seek a fonn of autarky was not war 
damage caused during the fall of France, even if the landscape had not emerged 
unscathed from the conflict. Allied forces had flooded parts of northern France to 
protect their retreat at Dunkirk (a tactic which the German anny reproduced in 1944 
to prevent Allied landings in the area) with subsequent destruction of farmland. \0 
Soldiers had also consumed natural resources. Troops stationed near the Italian 
frontier in the Alpes-Maritimes, for instance. used wood for heating. cooking, and 
constructing communication posts. II Such damage was relatively minor. however. 
9 Thomas Lekan, • .. It Shall Be the Whole Landscape!" The Reich Protection Law and Regional 
Planning in the Third Reich: in BrUggemeier. Cioc. and Zeller. How Green Were the Ncris? .92. 
10 Commission consultative des dommages et des reparations. DommQges subis par IQ France et 
I·Unionf,.an~Qise dufait de IQ guerre el de /'occupation ennemie (1939-1945) (Imprimerie Nationale. 
1951). 10 vols. vol. 1. 218. 
II See Arthur Dugelay. 'Les deboisements et les reboisements dans les Alpes-Maritimes (suite): 
Re .. 'Ue de la Geographie alpine 3112 (1943).153. The Forestry Conservator in Lille also reported that 
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and it was material constraints and ideological convictions that informed Vichy' s 
cultivation drive. 
The main reason for material shortages in Vichy France was the division of 
the country and the severing of supply arteries. Under the terms of the armistice and 
the division of France into separate zones, the Unoccupied Zone lost sixty-six 
percent of France's cultivated land, seventy-five percent of its mining and industrial 
facilities, ninety-seven percent of its fish stocks, sixty-two percent of its cereals. and 
seventy percent of its potatoes and milk. 12 As these figures starkly demonstrate. 
Vichy France was cut off from the main centres of French industrial and agricultural 
production. Certain southern departements, such as the Var, where agriculture was 
concentrated on wine and olive oil production, faced extreme food shortages, which 
began to bite from the winter of 1940-41 onwards. 13 In addition. France endured a 
British naval blockade, depriving it of imports from its colonies and other countries. 
This had severe implications for the French economy. which was heavily reliant on 
imported goods. On the eve of World War Two, France was the world's largest 
importer of coal and ninety percent of wood for paper production was imported from 
Finland and the USSR. 14 The Germany war economy also had designs on French 
foodstuffs, industrial output. and natural resources. By 1944, Germany was annually 
French troops had cleared forests to build anti-tank defences and create sight lines between 1936 and 
1939. CACAN 198880470/172 M. Volmerange, Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. UHe. 'Possibilite 
par volume des Forets Franyaises,' 28 June 1947. Maginot Line defences had also entailed 
environmental modification. as 'long broad riders), were cut through forests in order to improve the 
line of fire from the fortifications. Vivian Rowe, The GreaJ Wall of France: The Triumph of the 
Maginot Line (London: Putnam. 1959). 11-12. 
I:! Rod Kedward. Resistance in Vichy France: A Study of Ideas and Motivation in the SOllthem Zone 
1940-1942 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1978). 18. 
o Dominique Veillon and Jean-Marie Flonneau (eds.), Le temps des restrictions en France (/9J9-
1949) (Paris: Cahiers de I'IHTP nos. 32-33. May 1996).12-16. 
I .. Alan S. Milward. The New Order and the French Economy (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals. 1993 
[1984]). 34; and • Les forets et la guerre: expose fait Ii r Academie d' Agriculture Ie 20 Decembre 1939 
par M. J. Jagerschmidt,' L 'Action Fore.ftiere et Pisicole. No. 33. December 1939. I. 
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seizing six to eight million quintals of grain, drinking two to three million hectolitres 
of French wine, and consuming 135,000 to 270,000 tons of meat (for Germany's 
requisition of French timber resources see chapter three ).15 
In response to these material shortages, Vichy France attempted to maximise 
available natural resources and cultivate as much of its territory as possible. As a 
consequence, land deemed unproductive came under attack. A booklet produced by 
the Ministry of Agriculture led the assault, boldly stating that 'it is no longer 
permitted to leave any parcel of land uncultivated~. 16 Petain himself claimed that 
each newly cultivated area of "wasteland" 'will become a new source of riches for 
our country which is currently deprived, due to the defeat, of its natural resources.' 
17 In another speech he urged that 'it is necessary that [farmers] take as much from 
the earth as she can give. All fallow land must be re-cultivated, even if the soil is 
barren. Yields must be increased despite all the difficulties.' 18 In post-defeat France. 
the government called on the land to provide more. 
As well as presenting a severe challenge for the regime and society, the 
material conditions in post-defeat France represented an opportunity to remake the 
landscape. Defeat provided the chance not only to make existing farmland more 
productive but to cultivate land that had never been cultivated. Celebrated 
etymologist Albert Dauzat's Le village elle paysan de France (1941) argued that 
now was the time to ~ go further and finish the exploitation (mise en valeur) of all 
IS Paxton. Vichy France. 143-44. On France's incorporation and contribution to the German war 
economy. see Milward. New Order and the French Economy. 
16 Ministere de I' Agriculture. Edition de Secretariat General a I'Information et a la propagande. 
Agriculteurs, voici ce qu 'en un an Ie gouvernemenl du Mankhal a/ail pour vous [n.d.]. 29. 
17 Jean Thouvenin. D'ordre du Mankhal Petain: documents officiels rellnis et comment.? ... (Paris: 
Sequana 1940). 29. 
1 B Quoted in Jean-Claude Barbas (ed.). Phillippe Petain: discours ala F ram;ais /7 juin / 940- ~n amil 
1944 (Paris: Albin Michel. 1989). 107. 
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cultivatable soil.' Long-abandoned soil or land that had never been cultivated should 
now be developed. According to Dauzat, only rocky land was unsuitable for 
cultivation and all other habitats could be successful1y transfonned into productive 
land. Marshes could be drained and the vast scrubland of the Massif Central (which 
'serves no purpose apart from hunting') replaced with rye crops, pine and silver 
birch forests, or pastures. Elsewhere, sheep could graze on underused heathland 
enabling France to become an exporter of wool. 19 Dauzat's vision was one of 
unrelenting cultivation, with only clusters of rocks breaking up France's fertile fields 
and forests. It is hard to determine how much direct influence ideas such as Dauzat" s 
exerted on government policy. Nonetheless, it is clear that they helped to legitimise 
Vichy's war on "wasteland." 
Beyond the need for greater food production. however, other meanings were 
associated with the cultivation of French soil. The Vichy regime promoted a "'back 
to the land" movement as a way of restoring French society. The retour a la terre 
was designed to lead to individual and national renewal, as being close to the land 
supposedly produced healthier bodies and minds, far removed from the vices of the 
city (for the specific case of forests and youth groups see chapter three and for 
mountains see chapter six). In the words of the Minister for Peasant Restoration 
(Restauration Paysanne), working the land would "give a taste for work and healthy 
country traditions to young people who have been as deeply marked by living in the 
cities as adults.' 20 
19 Albert Dauzat. Le village elle paysan de France (Paris: Gallimard. 1941). 210-1 t. 
20 Quoted in Pierre Bernard. • La mission de restauration paysanne au service de la terre par 
I'apprentissage agricole de la jeunesse: Le Petil Marseillais. 10 February 1942. located in ADBDR 
188 W 19. 
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This, however, was not the first time in French history that contact with 
nature had been advanced as a healthier alternative to urban life and modernity. In 
fact, Vichy both tapped into and expanded the ruralist critique of modernity and 
industrialisation that had emerged between the world wars. 21 Charles Rearick 
highlights how youth movements in interwar France promoted hiking. cycling. and 
camping as an antidote to urban life and a way for young people to experience 
freedom, adventure, and camaraderie. 22 Foresters and tourist operators also stressed 
nature's redemptive qualities, one arguing that 'to bring the city dweller back to the 
open air, this uprooted person often intoxicated by the vitiated atmosphere and 
sophisms of a totally debilitating milieu, to put him back in immediate contact with 
the soil, the love of which remains so profoundly anchored to the heart of the 
peasant, is a work of public health and social pacification.' 23 The difference in 
Vichy France was that the government made a concerted effort to convert such ideas 
into state ideology and policy. 24 
Yet Vichy did not enjoy a monopoly over "'back to the land" ideas. The 
Jewish youth movement Eclaireurs israelietes de France (ElF) declared a retour a 10 
terre for its members in the summer of 1940, at which time its leaders instructed 
their followers to 'cultivate the earth, sow and harvest, plant trees. and gather fruits.' 
:!I See Romy Golan, Modernity and Nostalgia: Art and Politics in France between the Wars (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995). I return to these critiques in chapter four. 
2:! Charles Rearick, The French in Love and War: Popular ClIlture in the Era of the World Wars 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 154-71. Similar movements arose elsewhere in Europe. 
For the case of Gennany. see Lekan, Imagining the Nation in Nature. 130-38. 
~ Tourist operator quoted in Rearick. French in Love and War, 157. See also J. Demorlaine. 'La 
renovation du tourisme: son influence sur la foret.' Revue des Eaux et Forets 77/10 (October 1939): 
846-48. 
:! .. The regime even exported its "back to the land" philosophy to France's colonies. See Eric T. 
JeMings, Vichy in lhe Tropics: Pelain's National Revolution in Madagascar. Guadeloupe. and 
Indochina. 1940-1944 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2(01), 108-9. 
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25 The ElF, which was founded in 1923, had identified rural life and the cultivation 
of "wasteland" as a means of renewing minds, bodies, and spirits to create the next 
generation of Jewish leaders, even if, according to Lucien Lazare. it 'adopted its 
vocabulary' to fit with the post-1940 "back to the land" atmosphere in France. 26 
However, in other ways, the ElF's views clashed with those of Vichy, as there was a 
religious, sometimes Zionist, thread running through its work; one of ElF's leaders. 
Leo Cohn, saw the organisation's aims as 'the dual ideal of the return of Jews to the 
earth and the return of Judaism to Jews.' 27 
During a period when Nazi and Vichy anti-Semitism thrived, working the 
land in remote' comers of the French countryside provided a much-needed place of 
refuge. As the ElF leaders argued, the '"'return to the soil, which has been desirable 
for many years, has now become a necessity. A very large number of workers and 
intellectuals will no longer have any possibility of living. The problem is particularly 
acute for the Jewish youth of France, following the elimination by the Germans of 
the Jews from Alsace and the East.' 28 
In a parallel movement, artists who faced persecution from Vichy and 
German authorities discovered the benefits of going "back to the land" as they lay 
low in the French countryside. 29 Nor was a "back to the land" philosophy inherently 
reactionary. As Jackie Clarke highlights, members of the rationalization movement 
25 Amy Latour, La resistancejuive en France 1940-1944 (Paris: Stock. ,1970). 30. 
2t. Lazare. Rescue as Resistance. 61-2. See also Alain Michel, 'Les Eclaireurs israelites de France 
dans la Tarn: in Jacques Fijalkow (ed.), Vichy. les Juifs et les justes: /'exemple du Tarn (Toulouse: 
Editions Privat. 2003), 163-77. 
:!7 Quoted in Michel. 'Eclaireurs israelites de France,' 168. The movement's leaders compared their 
communities to kibbutz in Palestine and the ancient Jewish tradition of working the land. See Latour. 
Resistance juive en France. 30. 
~ Quoted in Lazare, Rescue as Resislance, 62. 
:!Q Cone describes this as an 'uncanny return to the soil.' See Arti.~1S IInder Vichy. 89- 115. 
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working within Vichy France, such as Paulette Bemege, recommended a "return to 
the land" so that society could evolve towards more rational forms of social 
organisation. 30 
Under Vichy, however, the maIO form of "back to the land" discourse 
centred on a reactionary celebration of the French peasant. It is important to note, 
however, that there was nothing inherent about the right-wing appropriation of 
peasants. For although the peasantry had been courted by Henri Dorgeres' fascist 
party Defense Paysanne (which portrayed itself as the protector of peasants and their 
values), left-wing politicians had also wooed rural France in the 1930s. 31 Not least. 
Shanny Peer demonstrates how the Popular Front appropriated rural values and 
identities and incorporated them into its progressive vision. 32 Vichy's praise of the 
peasant erased such progressive interpretations of the peasant to construct an 
"eternal" French identity that was rooted in the soil. In addition, the "National 
Revolution's" peasant rhetoric gave ideological credence to the regime's cultivation 
drive. 
For Petain and other Vichy traditionalists, cultivating France through the 
efforts of the peasantry represented a way of restoring the nation's true "rural" 
identity and the source of its strength. According to Petain, France was an 
)0 See Clarke, • Homecomings,' 171-82. 
31 For more on Dorgeres' movement see Paxton, French Peasant Fascism. 
J:! One left-wing argument held that France's rural character enabled the nation to modernise a la 
fran~aise and meant that the country could reap the benefits of modernity. while retaining its rural 
and artisan traditions. See Shanny Peer, France on Display: Peasants, Provincials and F ollclore in lhe 
1937 Paris World's Fair (Albany: New York Press. 1998), especially 3-4. 53. Brett Bowles also 
shows how communists and socialists in the 1930s appropriated the ruralism of Marcel Pagnol's 
films in 'Politicizing Pagnol: Rural France. Film. and Ideology under the Popular Front: French 
History 19/1 (March 2005): 112-42. For a wider consideration of political ideology and rural identity 




'essentially agricultural nation,' and ensuring its renewal meant restoring the 
peasantry, the section of society that was closer to the land. 33 This view was shared 
by others. For Charles Cornu, France was great before she became an industrial 
nation. The country 'grew by the application of the peasantry, inspired by the ... 
concern of every French peasant [to] enlarge his patrimony.' Vichy was therefore 
right to encourage the 'tradition of the earth. ' 34 According to agricultural 
commentator Marcel Braibant, Petain was correct to declare a 'halt. or even a 
reversal, to the path of excessive industrialisation' as France simply couldn't 
compete with other nations more favourably endowed in terms of population and 
natural resources. France would fare best playing to her strengths and developing an 
economy centred on agriculture; 'all our energies must therefore strain towards a 
turnaround (redressement) of our destiny through the development and the 
intensification of the nation's agriculture.' 35 
"Back to the land" rhetoric portrayed the soil as representing authenticity in 
opposition to the city, a supposed hotbed of corruption, immorality, unfettered 
individualism, and class conflict. As Petain famously remarked in a speech on 25 
June 1940, 'the earth doesn't lie.' 36 Philosopher Gustave Thibon, known for his 
Catholic, monarchist, and pro-peasant views, took up this theme in Retour au reel, 
arguing that the "earth doesn't make vain promises.' Instead, she simply produces 
"humble goods [i.e. cereals. fruits, and vegetables] ... which merge with men's flesh 
)3 Quoted in Marcel Braibant. La France. Nation Agricole: Regards sur Ie passe. Perspectives 
d'avenir (Paris: Les Documents Contemporains. 1943). 15. 
:w ADBDR 188 W 19 Charles Cornu. 'L'aventure agricole: extract from Deux Mondes. 1 Februal') 
1941 (Clermont-Ferrand: Imprimerie Moderne. 1941). 3. 
3S Braibant. La France. Nation Agricole. 15-17. 
)t> Quoted in Noel d'Ornans. us Jeudis du ManchaJ (Paris: Editions de la G.P. 1943), 30. Nicolas 
Atkin highlights the ironic fact that Parisian intellectual Emmanuel Berl came up with the phrase. 
Pe/ain (London: Longman. 1998). 103. 
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and blood.' For Thibon, the peasant himself merged with the land. Knowing what to 
plant according to the seasons produced a 'sort of symbiosis between the earth and 
man.' Life on the soil 'constantly reminded [peasants] of nature's order: making 
them socially and biologically superior to townspeople. Moreover, nature's rules 
were tamperproof and acted as a test for the human character. It was impossible for 
humans to fool the earth; 'you plant cabbages' and when those cabbages arrive they 
are 'the reality against which you are judged, without appeal.' 37 
Conflict was absent from this view of nature, which, in tum, shaped the 
peasantry. According to Joseph de Pesquidoux, a regionalist poet and member of the 
Academie fran~aise, this was shown in the way peasant generations succeed one 
another. As the father passes away, the son takes stewardship of the land and "life 
begins again without interruption ... along the rhythm of the seasons, this rhythm of 
nature in which the seed splits only in order to germinate.' 38 As these comments 
show, ~'back to the land" rhetoric made the peasant part of nature and, as Christian 
Faure argues, they took on 'affective and moral' meanings along with other material 
realities such as ~the earth, wood, iron or stone,' 39 
It is unclear how far "back to the land" rhetoric spread beyond ruralists like 
Thibon and de Pesquidoux. Nonetheless, re-establishing the privileged place of the 
peasant within French society was a pressing task for Petain, traditionalists within 
the regime, and their supporters. In their view, the Third Republic had overseen a 
n Gustave Thibon. Retour au reel: nouveaux diagnosilics (Lyon: H Lardanchet. 1943). 5. 31. 
38 Joesph de Pesquidoux. Pour fa Terre (Toulouse: Editions du Clocher. 1942), 28. 
3Q Faure. Projel culturel de Vich.,v. 124. Such rhetoric also served to symbolically exclude Jews from 
the landscape and justify their subsequent internment and deportation. As Lawrence D. Kritzman 
argues. "the figure of the Jew represented the anli-producleur. the urban monied individual. the 
antithesis of the noble French peasant whose rural existence was idealized for its settled life. rooted in 
the values of the earth: 'Introduction: In the Shadows of Auschwitz. Culture. Memories. and Self-
Reflection,' in Kritzman. A uschwilZ and After. 2. 
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decline in peasant farming, thus exacerbating the exode rural (long-term internal 
migration from the countryside to the city). 40 De Pesquidoux lamented the 'crazy 
law' of the forty-hour working week which encouraged young people from the 
countryside to 'desert the soil' for the secure wages of industrial labour and the 
'liberty and pleasure' of the city. 41 For him, and others, this was indicative of how 
France had turned its back on the countryside. According to this view. national 
decline was the inevitable result which had directly contributed to the defeat. .J2 
Peasants were to be the foot soldiers in the war against "wasteland," ensuring 
the cultivation of French soil and. by extension, the renewal of France.43 Images that 
appeared as part of the National Revolution's propaganda portrayed the peasant as 
an in-defatigable warrior bent on cultivating the soil and producing the food that was 
so desperately needed to fill French stomachs. One, produced by the Corporation 
paysanne shows a peasant stranding firm, clasping his pitch fork as though it were a 
weapon. 44 
The land itself would supposedly help then in this task. Vichy posited that 
the peasants had gleaned wisdom and strength from the soil. According to de 
40 Between 1911 and 1925 three mill ion hectares of cultivated land were abandoned. Vergeot et 
Aube, Rapport sur Ie probleme agricolefran~ais: donnees et solutions (Paris: 1944). 
41 De Pesquidoux. Pour la Terre. 14. 
42 Marc Bloch. historian. army veteran. and resister. argued the opposite. He contended that before the 
war the French had sunk into a ·soft atmosphere of lethargy.' wallowing in their charming rural past, 
and were more interested in clinging onto their heritage than building a modem nation. France's 
refusal to move with the times meant that everything was now lost; 'the donkey-cart may be a 
friendly and a charming means of transport, but if we refuse to replace it by the motorcar. where the 
motorcar is desirable, we shall find ourselves stripped of everything - including the donkey.' Marc 
Bloch. Strange Defeat: A Statement ql Evidence Written in 1940. Trans. Gerard Hopkins (London: 
Oxford University Press. 1949). 37, 149. 
4:\ The modem myth of the stoic and hardy peasant fighting for France on either farmland or 
battlefield dates back to at least the Napoleonic Wars. See de Puymege. "The Good Soldier Chauvin,' 
332-60. 
44 Images de la France de Vichy 1940-1944: images assen-ies et images rebelles (Paris: La 
Documentation fran~ise, 1988), 39. 
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Pesquidoux, even when nature was cruel, such as when storms threatened the 
harvest, she taught the peasant the importance of tenacity and a deep-rooted 
acceptance of the natural order. Nature nourished, protected, tested, and educated the 
peasant, fashioning him into the eternal guarantor of the survival of the French 'race' 
and 'people.' 45 
Just as the tenacious peasant-soldier had saved France during the battle of 
Verdun during the First World War, Vichy traditionalists argued that the peasant 
was now one of the foundations of France's renewal after the defeat. As Pierre 
Caziot, Minister for Agriculture until April 1942, informed the peasants, 'in the 
immense task of national recovery... the part that falls on you is the largest and 
heaviest.' 46 Vichy ideology sought to galvanise the peasantry in its mission of 
national renewal. Government literature claimed that Petain and Caziot had launched 
their agricultural and "back to the land" policies because they 'wanted to clear away 
the ruins and lay new foundations in order to rebuild on a solid base. It was more 
than a restoration. It was a revolution, or at least a renovation.' They aimed, the 
passage continued, to restore the peasant to his 'true place in French society' and 
return agriculture to its 'former strength.' 47 But rhetoric alone could not ensure the 
cultivation of France, and Vichy introduced practical measures so that its '''back to 
the land" ideology would be matched by changes on the land. 
4S De Pesquidoux. Pour la terre. 23-26. 
46 Pierre Caziot. • Apres I'orage .. .' in Agriculteurs. mici ce qu 'en un an Ie gou\'ernement du 
Manchal a/ail pour vow, 5. Caziot. an agricultural economist before the war. who ~laimed that his 
family farm stretched back five or six centuries, had long favoured and supported fanuly farms as the 
basis of the rural economy. See Paxton. Vichy France. 204. 
47 La terre de France allend ses paysans prisonniers de guerre: renseignemenls el consf!ils (Paris: 




"Back to the land" rhetoric was accompanied by laws designed to encourage 
cultivation. The law of 27 August 1940 prescribed an inventory of all land that had 
been abandoned for more than two years and allowed individuals and families to 
take charge of the vacant land to re-cultivate the soil. The law recognised that it was 
'more difficult' to re-cultivate abandoned soil than it was to farm land in 'a normal 
state of production.' So those wanting to become cultivators had to prove their 
competence and technical knowledge. Ideally. they should have already worked the 
land, either on their own farms or those of their parents, as well as being of French 
nationality and holding full civic and political rights. 48 However. not just anyone 
could take charge of a piece of French soil. In order to establish the good character 
of would-be cultivators, Prefects asked gendarmes to conduct 'investigations of 
morality' into their nationality, family background. knowledge of agriculture, and 
financial situation. 49 Their "'morality" established. the beneficiaries of the law 
enjoyed a nine-year concession of the land, of which the first three years were rent 
free, as well as access to low interest loans. 50 
The cultivation imperative took precedence over property rights and if a 
landowner refused to concede abandoned land the Prefect could hand it over to a 
concessionary by decree. In the words of Caziot. "the general interest of the country 
dominates. Abandoned land must be re-cultivated. even against the wishes of its 
48 ADBDR 188 W 39 Ministere de I' Agriculture. Direction de la Production agricole et des Echanges. 
Service de la main-d'oeuvre agricole. 'Dispositions concernant les cultivateurs or anciens 
cultivateurs.' 7 November 1940. 1-2. 
~Q See various gendarme reports in ADV 14 M 3513. 
so 'Dispositions concernant les cultivateurs or anciens cultivateurs: 2-3. 
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owners.,51 The law did open up new possibilities to re-cultivate land. To take one 
example, the Director of Agricultural Services in the Bouches-du-Rhone evoked it to 
press for the removal of 200 hectares of 'wood and ga"igue' at Les Milles, near 
Aix-en-Provence, to render the land farmable.52 
The law, alongside other measures that Caziot introduced (such as making it 
easier to obtain credit to rebuild farmhouses), reflected his long standing support for 
small scale family farming. But other visions for agriculture, in particular 
corporatism, had gained strength during the economic depression of the 1930s. The 
influence of interwar corporatists, such as Jacques Le Roy-Ladurie (who became 
Minister for Agriculture in April 1942) and Louis Salleron. resulted in the creation 
of the Peasant Charter (Charte paysanne) and Peasant Corporation (Corporation 
paysanne) on 2 December 1940 with the aim of establishing and overseeing 
agricultural self-regulation within a controlled market. 53 For Vichy. a major 
attraction of the corporatist model lay in the fact that it supposedly combated 
individualism and class antagonisms (thereby ensuring social order), as well as 
apparently supporting peasants as they battled to cultivate France. 54 
SI ADBDR ] 88 W 39 Pierre Caziot to Prefects, 'Concession d'exploitations abandonnees: 6 
December 1940, 1. 
51 ADBDR 188 W 39 Directeur des Services Agricoles des Bouches-du-Rh6ne to Prefet des Bouches-
du-Rh6ne. 'Terres abandonees, Domaine de la Tour d' Arbois,' II November 1940 . 
. n Paxton, Vichy France. 204-9. The Corporation claimed to protect the interests of the peasantry and 
shield it from the exploitation and dominance of 'high fmance.' Commission nationale d'organisation 
paysanne. Delegation generale a la propagande, . Le Marechal, les paysans, la corporation,' quoted in 
Boussard. Vichy et la corporation paysanne. 85-86. For an overview of peasant organisations in 
twentieth century France see M. C. Cleary, Peasants, Politicians. and Producers: The Organisation 
~f Agriculture in France since /9/8 (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1989). 
~ The corporatist model was introduced into other areas of rural life. with the aims of increasing 
production and combating individualism. The law of 28 June 1941 reorganised hunting along 
corporatist lines because 'game is part of the country's weaJth which hunters themselves must 
develop through collective effort' (according. to a report submitted to Petain). ADV 1790 W 56, 
'Rapport au Marechal de France. Chef de rEtat F~s: extract from Journal Officiel. 30 July 
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As well as the peasantry, youth groups were to undertake the cultivation of 
the land, a development that echoed the creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps 
during the 1930s as part of President Roosevelt's New Deal for the United States. 55 
The Compagnons de France, created in July 1940 by Henri Dhavemas, an Inspector 
of Finances, aimed to 'contribute to the material and moral reconstruction of the 
nation.' One of the ways in which the Compagnons' leadership sought to realise this 
aim was by sending its recruits to work on the land, including forestry work and land 
reclamation. 56 
The Chantiers de la Jeunesse was another youth group that used outdoor 
work as a form of moral and material rejuvenation. Created by General de la Porte 
du Theil to avert a collapse of public order during the demobilisation of demoralised 
soldiers after defeat and to indoctrinate French youth with the values of honour. 
patriotism, and self-sacrifice, the Chantiers grouped together young men who would 
otherwise have been conscripted into the army for an eight-month stage in rural 
camps. The recruits were to work for the 'reconstruction of the country [and] their 
own virile formation through a healthy and joyous life in contact with nature.' In all, 
100,000 recruits passed through the forty-three Chantiers camps in France and 
Algeria between 1940 and 1943. 57 De la Porte du Theil claimed that through 
1941. 'Lois no. 2673: loi du 28 June 1941 relative a l'organisation de la Chasse: Chapter Three 
outlines the corporatist structure that was introduced for the forestry sector. 
ss The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) sent over three million young men into the countryside to 
carry out conservation work, transforming the landscape and the recruit's bodies in the process. As 
Neil Maher argues, both the CCC's leaders and its members believed that outdoor. manual labour 
strengthened their bodies and rehabilitated their masculine identities. Neil M. Maher .. A New Deal 
Body Politic: Landscape. Labor. and the Civilian Conservation Corps. Environmental Hislory 7/3 
(July 2002): 411-34. 
Sf> See Halls. Youth of Vichy France, 267-8. 
S7 ADI 21 J 58 [n.Li 'Chantiers de jeunesse' [n.d.]. The figure of 100.000 is from Robert O. Pax~ 
Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshall Pelain (Princeton 1'J: 
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removing young men from the 'city's deleterious influence~ and occupying them 
with 'works in the general interest' he would transform the most able into leaders 
and the rest into 'healthy, honest men.' All would share the same patriotic faith in 
France. 58 As W.D. Halls argues, de la Porte du Theil had a firm conviction that 'an 
outdoor life, where both at work and play the body was exposed to the elements, 
elevated man spiritually.' 59 
In certain places the Chantiers lent a hand to farmers, while in others. they 
carried out their own cultivation work. 60 To take one example of the latter. the 
Chantiers leadership approved plans to defricher (clear) lIe Levant, an island ofT the 
Provencal coast, as its lore-cultivation will constitute a very striking work. worthy of 
the Chantiers de la Jeunesse [as it will have] a truly spectacular character.' 61 A 
Chantiers press release praised the work of such 'pioneers,' as they cultivated 
abandoned islands and cleared copses and scrubland 'where for generations no-one 
had laid a hand.' Elsewhere, the press release continued, Chantiers recruits cleared 
away heather and brambles that had claimed previously cultivated fields and drained 
marshes to restore long-lost 'fertility' to the land. According to the press release, 
these young men knew that restoring France's landscape was a long-term task but 
one that was urgent and contributed to the 'material resurrection of a ruined 
Princeton University Press, 1966),205. The Chantiers fell under the authority ofVichy's Secretary of 
State for Youth Affairs, but essentially remained in 'military hands,' according to Paxton. I consider 
the Chantiers' forestry work in chapter three. 
S8 CHAN AJ 39 177 General de la Porte du Theil, Les Chantiers de Jeunesse (Ministre de 
l'lnformation [n.d.]). 6-8. 
SQ Halls. Youth qfVichy France. 190-1. 
60 For the aid to farmers. see Roger Austin. 'The Chantiers de la Jeunesse in Languedoc 1940- t 944' 
French Historical Studies 13/1 (Spring 1983). I 12. 
61 CHAN AJ W 166 Mouery. Commissaire General Adjoint. for General de la Porte du Theil. 'Note 
pour Messieurs les Commissaires Regionaux. 5 August 1941, 1-2. 
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country.' 62 Elsewhere, Chantiers groups rebuilt farms, installed drainage works and 
restored land to pasture. 63 In all, between November 1941 and November 1942 the 
Chantiers reportedly cultivated 1,800 hectares of uncultivated land.64 
Between 1940 and 1942, Vichy was prepared to tolerate French Jews 
cultivating the land. By 1942, the Eclaireurs israelietes de France was running seven 
farms over 226 hectares. Their agricultural activity was supported by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, which from May 1941 provided salaries for three leaders at each centre. 
allowances for recruits under twenty years of age (and ~exclusively of French 
nationality'), as well as clothing and equipment. 65 Individual state officials were 
also supportive, such as the one who visited the ElF group at Charry (Tam-et-
Garonne). Charry's leader, Issac Pougatch, described the struggle to clear and 
cultivate fifty-nine acres of "wasteland" as a ~war' which the ElF were happy to 
wage: 
To labour!. .. [That is] the dream of our men. What is ordinary for each peasant's son 
represents the ideal of these young Jews bent on re-conquering the soil. Whilst the girls. 
dazzled by the castle. imagine its future improvement, the men are in love with the soil of 
Charry. The harder. the bumpier, the more clayey [it is], the more it motivates them. 
Cultivate! To be cultivators! To transform this waste into a field of wheat! 66 
According to Pougatch. these young Jewish men and women saw the land as if 
through the ~eyes of a peasanf and they managed eventually to clear ten acres and 
b2 CHAN AJ 39 1 • Bulletin de presse du secretariat general de la jeunesse.· 4 March 1941, 1-2. 
6.1 CHAN AJ )9) 'Les Chantiers de la Jeunesse' [n.d.]. 
64 CHAN AJ :lQ 1 'Contribution ala chronologie des Chantiers de jeunesse' [n.d.], 39. 
bS Lazare. Rescue as Resistance, 60. . 
()() Issac Pougatch. Charr),: vie d'une communawe (Neuchitel: Editions de la Baconniere, 1946). 14. 
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create a pasture for cows (Charry was also reputed to produce the best wheat in the 
area). When a government official arrived to requisition what he thought was a 
wasteland, he was reportedly so pleased with the ElF' s work that rather than taking 
their land he offered to assist their agricultural labours. 67 In the end, however. as its 
anti-Jewish persecution strengthened, the Vichy regime was no longer prepared to 
tolerate the ElF, forcing the communities to disband and go underground (in October 
] 943 the ElF's leadership issued an order for the movement to go underground, 
although some groups had already taken to the maquis). 68 
The war against "wasteland" was also conducted in the urban landscape. 
Despite its apathy for urban areas (in rhetorical terms at least), the Vichy regime 
extended its cultivation drive into France' s cities and government propaganda urged 
city-dwellers to turn their gardens into vegetable patches: "every garden must 
contribute to the prosperity of the country. Do your bit for the national effort. 
Produce plenty. Sow good grains.' 69 The law of 18 August ] 940 decreed that all 
available urban land be used for gardening, while the law of 25 November ] 940 
added a financial incentive, providing a 150 Franc payment for gardens created 
between November 1940 and April 1941. Ie Petit Proven~al newspaper supported 
the government's plans for urban agriculture, organising competitions for workers' 
gardens and printing images of the successful urban gardeners on its front page. 70 
Vichy heralded its own success in this field and claimed that urban gardeners had 
67 Ibid. 15-19: Latour, Resistance juive en France. 32. In general, Lazare notes that peasants were 
surprised by the quality of the ElF's produce, given the difficult land they worked on. Rescue as 
Resistance. 60. 
bIl Kedward, In Search qf the Maquis, 284; Michel, 'Eclaireurs israelites de France.' 173: and 
Pougatch. Charry, 187. 
tR Quoted in Veillon. Vivre et Survivre en France. 171. 
70 Le Petit Prownfa/. 2 June 1942. I. 
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cultivated 45,000 hectares and that the number of urban gardens had risen from 
487,000 to 732,000. These urban gardens, Vichy insisted, constituted a 'work of 
huge social significance. ,71 As well as encouraging individuals and groups to 
cultivate the soil, the Vichy regime launched a programme of large-scale public 
works intended to cultivate hitherto uncultivated land. 72 
Les grands travaux: draining marshes and replanting forests 
Vichy identified marshes as wasteland ripe for cultivation. 73 The 
government announced its intentions to drain and cultivate marshlands in the 
Limagne area of the Auvergne, at Saintonge in the Charente-Maritime departement, 
and in the Vendee (for the Camargue see chapter four). 74 The Albens wetlands in 
the Savoie departement were also targeted. The draining of A lbens had got 
underway in the eighteenth century but (according to Josette Reynaud in the Revue 
de /a Geographie a/pine) it took the defeat of 1940 and the need for cultivated land 
to spur on the work. The draining of Albens had three aims; to provide work for the 
unemployed, increase cultivated land by 800 hectares, and purify ("assainer') the 
local climate (for Reynaud it was ~beyond doubt that once the swamp has 
disappeared the fog that is so harmful to delicate crops ... will substantially diminish 
71 Agriculteurs, voici ce qu 'en un an Ie gouvernement du Marechal a/ail pour vous. 29. 
72 The regime also attempted to cultivate land through large-scale public works in the French colony 
of Indochina. See David Biggs, 'Managing a Rebel Landscape: Conservation. Pioneers. and the 
Revolutionary Past in the U Minh Forest. Vietnam: Environmental History 10/3 (July 2005). 
accessed through www.historycooperative.org. 12. 
73 A similar development occurred in Nazi Gennany. As Blackbourn notes. the efforts of the Reich 
Labour Service during the Battle for Production led to the draining of wetlands. such as the 
Oldenburg high moors. Conquest 0/ Nature. '271. 
74 Agricllltc?IIrs. voici ce qu 'en un an Ie gouvernement du Marechal a/ail pour vow. 3~. 
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or disappear'). By 1943, the state had overseen the redirection of the Deisse River 
and begun draining the marshland, allowing for the planting of vegetable crops (with 
mixed results). 75 
Government planners also turned their attention to the Crau, a 600km2 rocky 
plain situated between the towns of Istres and Aries in the Bouches-du-Rhone. 
Writing in 1927, British economist and writer Hugh Quigley described the area, 
which was created by rocks and pebbles deposited from the Alps. as "a wilderness of 
marshes whitened with salt from stagnant lagoons, burned by the sun. a mosaic of 
bleached pebbles where the water had receded.' For Quigley. the Crau was 
'untamable,' a 'land of mystery and even repulsion,' although the sunrises and 
sunsets sometimes displayed 'a sublimity beyond the power of a dream: 76 
Government planners had little time for such romantic views of the Crau' s wildness 
and re-imagined it as a fertile, agricultural plain, setting out to develop 35,000 
'sterile' hectares through irrigation works. The Compagnie Nationale du Rhone 
(CNR) was to carry out the work, under the auspices of Genie rural officials. In a 
related project, the government envisaged draining water from the Vaccares in the 
Camargue, as well as using water from the Rhone to irrigate sections of the Gard 
departement. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, these projects bore witness 
to its' incessant efforts to recuperate (recuperer) the maximum possible of cultivable 
land.' 77 And although Le Petit Provenfal newspaper recognised the obstacles the 
project faced and the likelihood that only 12,000 hectares would be cultivated before 
7S Joesette Reynaud. • Actualite: Ie dessechement des marais d' Atbens (Savoie).' Revue de la 
Geographie a/pine 3213 (1944). 501-4. 
7b Hugh Quigley. The Land qflhe Rhone: Lyons and Provence (London: Methuen & Co .. 1927). 12-
13. 
77 Agr;c:ulleurs. voici ce qu 'en un an Ie gouvernement du Marechal a/ail pour vow. 31-34. 
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1947, it welcomed the government's effort to tum the 'desert' into a 'fenile plain' 
that would serve the 'common good.' 78 
However, there was local opposition to the plans for the Crau. The Under-
Prefect of ArIes questioned the project's value, panicularly as it directed resources 
and manpower away from up-and-running agricultural concerns. He argued that the 
project was a matter of 'long-term speculation' and: 
It would be mad to demote to second place our preoccupations with land that is currently 
exploited and where the yields are both immediate and sure in order to consecrate all our 
available resources on projects that are undoubtedly grandiose but from which we will not 
see the results for at least five or six years, assuming all goes well. Famine will seize us by 
the throat from next winter onwards, if we don't produce [enough food] beforehand. 79 
The Under-Prefect's hostility to the CNR's developmen~ of the Crau highlights that 
within the Vichy regime there co-existed different strategies for the best way to 
cultivate and organise the French countryside. Caziot favoured small-scale farming, 
Le Roy-Ladurie corporatist structures, while others supported a centrally-planned 
agricultural policy. However, the guiding principle of the necessity to cultivate 
remained unquestioned. 
Another large-scale project undertaken by Vichy was reforestation. In cenain 
places, only reforestation could make land productive and Vichy legislated in its 
favour. As I show in chapter three, there was an increased demand for timber 
78 • La fertilisation de la Crau.' Le Pelit ProvenfaJ. 26 June 1942. I. 
79 ADBDR 188 W 19. Under-Prefect of Aries to Regional Prefect. Marseille, 22 April 1942. After the 
war. his successor again challenged the 'industrial methods and concepts' of the Cl'R's plans for the 
Crau. calling for a development inspired by the 'experience of the people of the Crau.' ADBDR 150 
W 187. Under-Prefect of Aries to Prefect of Bouches-du-Rhone, 16 January 1945. 7-8. 
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products and firewood in Vichy France, which forestry production struggled to meet. 
As a consequence, the Ministry for Agriculture called for "an extension of the 
forested area of our country.' The level of forestation must be increased "as quickly 
as possible.' 80 The government introduced practical measures with this aim in mind. 
establishing a Comite Central de Reboisement (Central Committee for 
Reforestation) in May 1941, while the Forestry Administration developed a 
programme of grands trauvaux reportedly worth 350 million francs in 1941 (200 
million francs were to be spent in state forests and 150 million francs to restore land 
and reforest in mountainous areas). Specific projects were also identified. Plans were 
afoot to 'cultivate' ('mise en valeur,) several thousand hectares of uncultivated land 
at Montgane Noire in the Haut-Languedoc through the establishment of plantations. 
Reforestation was also to 'regularise the water regime' of the Argout. Herault, Orb. 
and Aude rivers which "periodically' flooded the plains.S) 
Moreover, the law of 21 January 1942 elevated reforestation to "a work of 
general interest' (,travaux d'interet genera/') and made reforestation obligatory in 
zones determined by ministerial decree. 82 In the same month, commissions at the 
communal level assumed powers to decide which uncultivated land was only 
suitable for reforestation. This established, the commissions could instruct 
landowners to establish reforestation plantations, otherwise the state would take over 
the land and oversee reforestation. Arthur Dugelay. Forestry Inspector in Nice, 
welcomed such legislation. For despite his "very keen desire' that abandoned land be 
returned to its original cultivated (i.e. farmed) state he doubted whether this was 
80 Agriculteurs, voici ce qu 'en lin an Ie government du Mancha) a/ail pOllr vow. 34. 
81 Ibid. 35. 
K~ uS Eala el Foreis du 12e au 20e siecie (Paris: C'NRS. 1987),631. 
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possible in the Alpes-Maritimes given the 'number, location, isolation, and 
dispersion' of the parcels of uncultivated land. Therefore, for much of this land. 
reforestation would become obligatory under the new law. This was a relief for 
Dugelay, as he found 'nothing more distressing than the sight of land that has been 
uncultivated and unproductive for so many years.' 83 
Just as they were drafted in to cultivate France's fields, the Chantiers de la 
Jeunesse were to take on much of the burden of replanting France's forests. As 
Petain personally informed Chantiers recruits; 'we must reforest, we must rebuild.' 
84 Their reforestation labours including restoration work after forest fires in the 
Luberon hills in Provence where the Chantiers' "immense and methodical work' and 
their planting of over 500,000 pine trees breathed new life into the 'sorry mass of 
stones and dry grass' (according to a press release). Elsewhere, Chantiers groups 
worked on reforestation plantations near Montpellier, where they had acquired 
13,000 hectares to reforest. 85 But it was not just the higher echelons of the French 
state, such as Petain, who identified the need to reforest, as Vichy's reforestation 
drive dovetailed with long-standing concerns of forestry officials, who joined the 
battle against uncultivated land. 
Foresters versus maquis 
8.1 Dugelay. 'Les deboisements et les reboisements dans les Alpes-Maritimes.' 164. . 
804 CHAN AJ 39 56 Bulletin periodique officiel des Chantiers de la Jeunesse, no. 89, 30 Apnl 1942, 1-
IQ w 
8.S 'Bulletin du presse du secretariat general de la jeunesse'; and CHAN AJ' 166 Joubert. 




During the "phoney war," foresters had highlighted how reforestation could 
transform uncultivated land. Philippe Baudy recommended that swamp cypress be 
extensively planted on 'marshy lands' in Southern France, as this would prove 
profitable and augment France's timber supplies (swamp cypress, for instance. had 
been already introduced in the Bouches-du-Rhone in the 1870s from the deltas of 
Florida). This planting would also improve soil, thereby 'cleaning' marshland and 
'replacing sad swamps with beautiful and healthy plantations.' 86 A. Joubert also 
urged a 300,000 hectare extension to forests in the Massif Central. This would make 
France self-sufficient in wood for paper production, as well as stopping the 'rural 
exodus' by providing jobs.87 Likewise, another forester made the case for planting 
Aleppo pine in Provence as this species adapted well to the strong winds and 
shallow limestone soil of Mediterranean France. He did concede. however, that it 
would take centuries for the Provencal forest to return to its "natural" state. 88 
Foresters, then, welcomed Vichy's reforestation campaign, as, since at least 
the nineteenth century, they had been deeply concerned about deforestation, 
especially on mountain slopes, to which they attributed flooding on the plains and in 
the cities. Back in the 1860s, laws on reforestation aimed to reclaim uncultivated 
land. As Tamara Whited argues, 'the economically marginal forests, the sizeable 
areas of sparse woodland and scrub, would become prime targets of reclamation. to 
be converted into the densely packed. homogenous strands of conifers that fed 
116 Philippe Bauby 'L'utilisation du cypress chauve dans Ie midi de la France: Revue des EaUT el 
Fonts 78/3 (March 1940): 157-170. 
87 A. Joubert. 'Organisation de la foret fran~ise et production des bois papetiers.· Re\'ue des Eau:r el 
Forits. 77/12 (December 1939),978-79. 
88 R. de Carmantrand OLe pin d'alep dans 18 region mediterraneenne: Revue des Eaux el F01-eIS 78/4-
6. (April-June 1940). 223-30. 
62 
Chapter Two 
foresters' dreams.' 89 Scrubland, such as maquis, was regarded as unwanted 
"wasteland" and a sign of extensive deforestation of full-growth forest. 
In many ways, maquis, garrigue, and other forms of Mediterranean 
scrubland epitomised foresters distaste for "wasteland." The origins of the tenn 
"maquis" are commonly believed to lie in the Corsican word macchia which alludes 
to the 'rough aspect of a terrain' that is 'covered with diverse and many-coloured 
shrubs.' 90 Maquis vegetation comprises of trees, shrubs, and plants that can 
withstand the twin hardships of poor soil and long dry spells that characterise the 
Mediterranean climate. 91 While the tenns "maquis" and "garrigue" are often used 
interchangeably, both were associated with degraded Mediterranean forest before the 
war. 92 In fact, the status of maquis still divides experts today. Some consider it to be 
the result of extensive deforestation of a once great Mediterranean forest through 
agriculture, pasturing, war, and timber cutting, while others argue that maquis is all 
that can grow in the arid climate and so represents "climax" vegetation. 93 
89 Whited. Forests and Peasant Politics in Modem France, 63. 
90 Herve Harant and Daniel Jarry, Guide du naturaliste dans Ie Midi de la France: la garrigue, Ie 
maquis, les cultures (Neuchatel and Paris: Delachaux & Niestie, 1987), 136. 
91 Common trees include oaks, Spanish Broom. and tree heather. Among these species, the oaks are 
particularly sturdy. Typical shrubs and plants include heather, gorse, strawberry trees. juniper and 
lavender. See ibid.; and John R. McNeill, The Mountains of the Mediterranean World: An 
Environmental History (Cambridge and New York: University of Cambridge Press, 1992). 17-19. 
92 There is some confusion over the origin of the term garrigue. See Clement Martin, La garrigue et 
ses hommes: une societe tradititionalle (Montpellier: Espace-Sud, 1996), 17; and Christiane Corre. 
La garrigue: etude d'un milieu (Montpellier: Centre Regional de Documentation Pedagogique, 1979). 
3. According to J. V. Thirgood garrigue is a "lower form' of maquis formed of low shrubs such as 
rosemary, myrtle, and lavender. See Man and the Mediterranean Forest: A History of Resource 
Depletion (London: Academic Press, 1981). 14. However, R. Tomselli argues that maquis is 
'evergreen and generaJly so thick as to be impenetrable' where as garr;gue is 'discontinuous' and 
grows on drier soil. See "Degradation of the Mediterranean maquis.' in MAB Technical Noles 2: 
Mediterranean Forests and Maquis: Ecology, Conservation and Management (Paris: UNESCO. 
1977), 40- I . 
93 For the former view, see McNeill, Mountains of the Mediterranean World. 2. 17. 266-70: 
Thirgood, Man and the Mediterranean Forest. 58-61: and Tomselli. 'Degradation of the 
Mediterranean maquis,' 40. For the latter. see A.T. Grove and Oliver Rackham. The Nature (~f 
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Before the war, French foresters agreed with the first interpretation of 
maquis, treating it as a manmade fonn of vegetation that should be transfonned into 
farmland or mature forest. Articles published in the Revue des Eaux et Forets during 
the 1930s embodied foresters' unfavourable opinion of maquis. Writing in 1934, 
Josias Braun-Blanquet argued that surviving pockets of Mediterranean ··climax" 
forests were more stable than areas of maquis. These green and Holm oak forests 
provided surrounding soil and vegetation with shelter from the arid winds of the 
Midi, thereby helping to retain more moisture. "Climax" oak forests in the 
Mediterranean, therefore, 'fonned an indivisible biological ensemble of a perfect 
harmony.' 94 An article published five years later in the same journal drew similar 
conclusions using the forest of Saint-Baume in Provence as an example: 
In a very confined space, several steps apart, we find plant formations of which one, the 
. wood of Sainte-Baume, is a balanced forest, almost a virgin forest (foret primitive) with 
varied species. giving an abundant cover in summer, a sensation of freshness and harmony. 
while the neighbouring forests are constituted of Aleppo pines dominated by shrubs that 
seem to attract fire ... [The latter forest] is the result of a regressive series of stages during 
which generations have pushed back the primitive forest as a result of management errors.' 
95 
Whereas the balanced "primitive" forest offered shade from the Provencal sun and a 
sense of hannony, scrubland served only to encourage forest fires. 
Mediterranean Europe: An Ecological History (New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
200 1 ). 9-1 O. 57-61. 
Q4 Josias Braun-Blanquet. • Association vegetale climatique et climax du sol dans Ie midi 
mediterraneen.· Revue des Eaux et FlJrl!ts 7211 (January 1934). 1-7. 




Similarly, Alpine geographers unfavourably contrasted the verdant, heavily-
forested northern slopes of the Vercors with the massirs dry, ga"igue-covered 
southern slopes. Philippe Arbos located the Col de Rousset as a transitional point for 
the Vercors' climate and vegetation. On crossing it, Arbos wrote, one 'finds oneself 
transported from one nature to another, from the misty or cloudy atmosphere of the 
North to the clear and sunny sky of the South, from the land of pear and apple trees 
to that of almond and olive trees, from rich and green grasses to grey [andes or 
denuded slopes.' 96 Jules Blache also contrasted the northern Vercors' ·wooded 
slopes' and 'green valleys' covered in 'mist and snow' with the southern Vercors' 
'bare slopes' that baked under the 'harsh light of the South.' 97 For Blache. the 
garrigue that clung to the southern slopes of the Vercors was nothing more than a 
'vast marginal desert' where the cover of vegetation was so ·scraggy' that it was 
possible to see 'bare soil' between the shrubs. 98 As well as displaying a clear 
aesthetic preference for Alpine "'full-growth" forests. these influential geographers 
blamed the Mediterranean-style vegetation for contributing to the depopulation and 
relative economic backwardness of the Southern Vercors. 
Signs of continuing official devaluation of maquis between 1940 and 1944 
can be gleaned from forest fires reports in Provence. In these reports, care is taken to 
differentiate between areas of forest and maquis. For instance, in his evaluation of a 
fire in the commune of Mandelieu in the Alpes-Maritimes, the Forestry Inspector 
Qt, Philippe Arbos, La vie pastorale dans les Alpes !ranfaises: etude de geographie humaine (Paris: 
Librairie Annand Colin. 1922). 31. 
97 Jules Blache. Les Massifs de /0 Grande-Chartreuse et du Vercors: etude geographique. Tome I: 
Geographie phl'siqlle (Grenoble: Editions Didier et Richard, 1931). 394. 
Q8 See Jules BI~che. Les massifs de /0 Grande-Chartreuse el du Vercors: etude geographiqJlt.'. Tome 
II: Geographie humaine (Grenoble: Editions Didier et Richard. 1931). 12. 
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carefully distinguished between damage to forests and to maquis, noting how the fire 
spread across 'areas of pines and mimosas interspersed with wasteland and shrubs ... 
One can't really say that this is "real" forest.' 99 Foresters and gendannes 
discounted damage to maquis because the vegetation possessed little economic 
value. Commenting on a fire that spread across 65,000 hectares in the Bouches-du-
Rhone, a high-ranking gendarme wrote that 'it should be noted that a large part of 
this area defined as forest is in fact covered with prickly bushes of an often 
negligible value. There were, however, very large damages caused to [those areas 
of] forest which deserve this name (dignes de ce nom).' 100 This was a typical 
attitude. One gendarme, describing another fire in the Bouches-du-Rhone. observed 
that the 'area covered by the fire ... is completely uncultivated. The terrain is scrubby 
(broussailleux) and strewn with prickly broom. An uncultivated and long abandoned 
vineyard ... suffered a bit during the fire; but there is no damage.' 101 This attitude 
was also shared by the mayor of La Turbie in the Alpes-Maritimes who. when 
reporting a fire in his commune. noted that there was 'little damage' as it was 
"mainly bushes that fell victim to the flames.' 102 The implication behind the 
language used in forest fire reports was that only damage to "real" (and therefore 
QQ ADAM 521 W 57 Villiers, Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets, Nice Ouest, 'Rapport: incendie de forets. 
incendie du 30 juillet sur la Commune de Mandelieu,' 1 August 1941. 
100 ADBDR 76 W 33 Lieutenant-Colonel Bergognon to Prefet Regional, 'Rapport sur les causes 
survenus dans la region de Marseille dans Ie courant de r et¢ 1942,' 4 September 1942. 
101 ADBDR 76 W 33 H. Franques. 'Proces-verbal relatant des renseignements sur un incendie de 
colline survenu au quartier du Baou a V itroII es. • 27 August 1940. 
102 ADAM 521 W 57 Maire de la Turbie to Prefet des Alpes-Maritimes. 'Rapport sur une incendie qui 
s· est declare dans la Region du Mont Bataille,' 29 July 1943. For similar cases see ADAM 521 W 57 
• Adjoint de Maire de Roquebome-Cap-Martin to Chef du Service Departemental des Incendies de 
Forats. 18 April 1944; Maire de Mougins to Chef de Service r>epartemental des Incendies de Forets, 
19 July 1944. The commune of Carros. however. did want to protect its wooded areas from fire. for 
although they consisted mainly of economically unimportant copses they were of . great interest' to 
tourism in the area. See ADAM 521 W 57 Commune de Carros. 'Extrait de registre de deliberations 
du conseil municipal. objet: protection des forets communales contre r incendie. demande de 
subvention.' 8 November 1942. 
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productive) forests mattered. Maquis was already damag~ "uncultivated" land so 
further fire-related damage was of little importance. 
Moreover, foresters and other officials actually blamed scrubland for 
encouraging forest fires. The Gendarme Commander in the Var explicitly held 
maquis responsible for fuelling forest fires; 'the varoise forest, uneven in the 
extreme and divided by deep ravines, is, in many places, in the state of maquis. 
Copses and dense shrubs fill the undergrowth, line roads and railways, and provide 
easy fuel for the fires which can take on considerable proportions.' 103 The Forestry 
Conservator in Nice was presumably of the same mind as in a report on fire 
prevention measures he called for the 'total removal of maquis' in certain places to 
prevent the spread of fire. In particular, maquis must be removed when it lay close to 
houses and other property. 104 
Such attitudes obscure the fact that maquis was not wholly unproductive 
during the war. Agricultural engineer Philippe Olmi identified Spanish Broom (a 
plant that thrived in areas of maquis and which was commonly perceived as 
·useless... even harmful') as a suitable replacement for unattainable fibres 
desperately needed by the French textile industry. Spanish Broom grew in its 'wild 
state' throughout Provence, so it was simply a matter of harvesting and cultivating 
103 ADBDR 76 W 33 Chef d'Escadron Hurtrel. Commandant la Compagnie du Var. 'Rapport sur les 
incendies de foret dans Ie departement du Var, 29 August 1942. 
104 ADAM 109 W 8 M. Delahaye, Conservateur des Eaux et Forets, 'Rapport: incendies de Forets,' 8 
May 1941. Such attitudes towards maquis persisted into the postwar period in the publication Le 
reboisemenl par les particuJiers. a 1947 guide for landowners planning to reforest their property. This 
guide drew attention to frequent forest fires in the Maures and Esterel massifs where 'maquis ... is 
unfortunately abundant and is the essential cause for the propagation of fire.' P. Dutilloy and G. de la 
Serre. Le reboisement par les parliculiers. Ditieme partie: region medile"aneenne. partie orientale 
de la chaine des Pyrenees el Corse (Paris: Association Nationale du Bois. 1947). 52. 
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its seeds. Olmi urged the Chantiers de la Jeunesse to carry out this important task. 105 
In addition, rural communities secured firewood and wood charcoal in the maquis, 
and, as Clement Martin highlights, Holm oak acorns were used as a replacement for 
coffee (a memory which stilI leads to a 'grimace' among those unfortunate enough 
to have tasted it). 106 
Foresters welcomed the wartime reforestation drive as a means of ridding the 
French landscape of "uncultivated" woodlands. As with farmland. re-cultivating the 
forest was linked to national renewal. Voices within the forestry sector identified 
reforestation as part and parcel of rebuilding defeated France. "Just as a country 
which deforests is a country which dies, a people who want to be reborn are a people 
who reforest,' wrote J. Jagerschmidt in L 'Action forestiere et pisico/e, just after the 
defeat. He urged communes and private forest owners to reforest their land (with the 
aid of the state) in order to exploit areas of heath land, maquis. and abandoned 
agricultural land. According to Jagerschmidt, reforestation was inseparable from 
national reconstruction; 'our duty, in the forestry domain as in all others, is to 
collaborate with the work of redressement. of reconstitution.' 107 In an article 
entitled ·Problem of the day: the crusade for reforestation' in Le Bois National. 
Georges Merlin argued that degraded forests were evidence of France's wider 
decline under the Third Republic. After years of neglect. France's formerly tree-
covered mountains now stood 'wounded, ravaged, eaten away by water.' leaving 
only 'bare rocks' on display. For Merlin, these mountains were ·silent witnesses. but 
lOS Philippe Olmi, 'Chronique rurale: Ie Genet d'Espagne.' Jeunes de Provence: revile des Chonliers 
de la Jeunesse Fran~aise de Provence, No.2. December 1941, 23-6. 
lOb Martin. La gamgue el ses hommes. 38. 
107 J. Jagerschmidt. 'Le programme forestier de la France qui va renaitre: L 'Action /orestiere et 
piscicole. 39/40 (July 1940). 1. 
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how expressive, how accusatory, how damning for a regime [the Third Republic]! 
Formal and constantly present proof of its weaknesses and powerlessness.' Merl in 
called for a crusade to be launched to tell the French that a 'wooded region IS a 
beautiful, fertile, and rich region.' 108 
State foresters were active in this reforestation crusade. Dugelay explicitly 
linked reforestation with Vichy's "back to the land" ideological posturing. "The 
return to the soil... appears as a primordial factor of the balance which must mark 
the reconstruction of our country' he told members of the Society of Letters. 
Sciences, and Arts of the Alpes-Maritimes in 1942. He argued that the expansion of 
forested areas would bring greater prosperity to the mountains 'particularly at a time 
when forests take on more and more importance in the national economy.' 109 In a 
1943 article in the Revue de fa Geographie alpine, Dugelay took the opportunity to 
highlight how during the troubling times of war and occupation, France was now 
reaping the benefits of previous reforestation drives, noting the irony that peasant 
communities that had objected to reforestation plantations fifty years ago now relied 
on the wood these plantations provided. 110 
Between 1940 and 1944, books and other publications urged France to 
reboiser and provided detailed technical advice on how to do so. Associations in 
favour of the forest that had gained in strength in the 1930s, such as the Association 
nationale du Bois and the Societe fran~aise des Amis des Arbres. produced 
lOR Georges Merlin, 'Probleme du jour: croisade pour Ie reboisement.· Le Bois National. Vol. 7. No. 
17, 5 September 1941, 273-4. 
109 'Seance du Samedi 28 Mars 1942, 'Conference de M. I'lnspecteur des Eaux et Forets Dugelay sur 
Ie retour a la terre et probleme sylvo-pastoral dans les Alpes-Maritimes.' in Annales de la Sociele des 
Letlres. Sciences. & Arts des Alpes-Maritimes 36 (1941-1943), 17-18. Dugelay fleshed out his 
argument in a series of articles starting with 'Le retour a la terre et Ie probleme sylvo-pastoral dans les 
Alpes-Maritimes.' Revue des Eaux el F orels 8) 14 (April ) 943): 14) -53. 
110 Dugelay. 'Les deboisements et les reboisements dans les Alpes-Maritimes (suite): 154. 
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publications lauding reforestation's positive effects. 111 As well as providing 
information on what tree species thrived in different regions, foresters explicitly 
linked reforestation with the drive to cultivate France. In Guide du reboiseur (1941 ). 
L. Padre, a retired Forestry Conservator, argued that it has become: 
More and more necessary, urgent even, to take the maximum and best parts from the French 
soil, as well as exploiting (mettant en valeur) all unproductive ground. [and] increasing the 
yields of all land which, for diverse reasons, can produce more and better. Reforestation is. 
certainly, one of the best and most sure ways of obtaining these improvements. II:! 
In the same publication, 1. Demorlaine, another high-ranking, retired forester, argued 
that 'the exploitation of uncultivated land is more than ever necessary in France, 
especially since the disastrous war [of 1939-1940] that we've just endured.' 
According to Demorlaine, half a million hectares of land that belonged in the main 
to private landowners were ripe for reforestation. 113 The support that foresters lent 
to the battle against wasteland is illustrative of how Vichy's cultivation drive 
dovetailed with existing concerns about "uncultivated" land and how "back to the 
land-ism" extended beyond France's fields. Yet the regime's war against 
"wasteland" ultimately ended in failure. 
Losing the war on wasteland 
III Societe fran~aise des Amis des Arbres. Guide du reboiseur (Paris: Pierre Andre. 1941): and 
Association nationale de Bois. Le Reboisement par les Particuliers. Qualrieme Partie. Region des 
Alpes (1941). There was a Le Reboisement par les Parliculiers for every region in France. 
II. L. Padre. 'Preface,' Guide du reboiseur. I. 
I\) J. Demorlaine •. Avant propos,' Guide du reboiseur. 3-4. 
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In La France en friche (1989), journalist Eric Fottorino laments that war 
creates the ideal conditions for the encroachment of uncultivated land; • it is always 
in times of conflict that fa friche spreads most naturally. With the men gone. the 
women are only able to cultivate land closest to the village, leaving fertile soil to be 
abandoned.' 114 This seems to have been the case in Vichy France as between defeat 
and Liberation approximately three million hectares of cultivated land were lost. 
According to a 1944 report, the number of 'ploughable' hectares had dropped from 
19,600,000 to 16,270,000 hectares (out of a total land area of 52,780,000 hectares). 
An expansion of pastures, other grasslands, and market gardening accounted for just 
over half of this loss, but 'uncultivated land' had nevertheless increased by 
1,600,000 hectares 115 (see figure one). 
Figure 1: Distribution of land 1938-1944 (in hectares) 
Type or land 1938 1944 Percentage or Percentage or 
territon' in 1938 terri ton' in 1944 
Ploughable land 19,600 000 16,270 000 374 30.8 
Grasslands (fields. pastures 11,240.000 12.870,000 21.3 24 -t 
etc) 
Market~ardeni~ 420.000 620, 000 (1943) 0.8 12 (1943) 
Vineyards 1,575.000 l. 500, 000 2.9 2.8 
Diverse 450,000 460,000(1943) 0.8 0.9 (1943) 
Wood and forests 10.135,000 10,100,000(1943) 19.2 19.1 (1943) 
Uncultivated territory 9.360,000 10. 960, 000 (1943) 17.8 20.8 (1943) 
(heathland. uncultivated land) 
and others 
Total 52,780 000 52,780,000 100 100 
Source: CHAN 207 AP 163 Vergeot and Aube. Rapport sur Ie probleme agricole /ran~ais: 
donnees et solutions (Paris: 1944), 51. 
As the surface area given for market gardening. forests. diverse land. and 
uncultivated soil dates from 1943, it is likely that these figures actually under 
114 Eric Fottorino. with Jean-Pierre Benoit, La France en Jriche (Saint-Amaud-Moutrond: Lieu 
Commun. 1989). 16. . .. 
lIS Vergeot et Aube. Rapport sur Ie proh/eme agricole /rtJl'lfais. Jean-Pierre Azema p~vl.des Similar 
figures in 'Faire face ala destruction de 18 guerre de 40: in Reconstructions et modernIsatIOn. 35. 
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estimate the expansion of uncultivated land. This is because levels of timber 
requisitions, material shortages, and military combat increased as the Occupation 
continued. Yet even allowing for statistical error, it is clear that la friche expanded 
during the war. 
The modification in land use during the war seems to have had some 
unintentional environmental benefits. Claude-Marie Vadort suggests that the 
expansion of uncultivated land benefited bird species (that were no longer so 
disturbed by harvesting), while the lack of fertilizers led to an increase in plant 
biodiversity. 116 Although Vichy succeeded in increasing the surface area of some 
forms of cultivated land, such as market gardening, it seems that, overall, its war 
against "wasteland" met with failure. Why was this? 
Manpower problems were undoubtedly a factor as French agriculture 
suffered a severe shortage of experienced labourers; 55,000 farmers were killed in 
1939-1940 and approximately 500,000 farmers and farm workers were prisoners of 
war in Germany (in all, France's farms lost thirteen percent of their male agricultural 
workers). 117 Other factors were also responsible. From autumn 1941 onwards, a 
. persistent drought' hit France, compromising harvests and adding to food 
shortages. 118 The postwar Commission consultative des dommages et des reparations 
(CCDR) also blamed the German authorities for failing to keep "nuisance animals' 
under control, which had 'regrettable consequences' for agriculture. According to 
116 Claude-Marie Vadort. Guerres el environnemenl: panorama des paysages el des ecosyslemes 
bouJeverses (Paris: Delachux et NiestJe. 2005). 234. 
117 Gervais. Jollivet. and Tavernier. Hisloire de La France rurale. 93. 
118 R. Roussel •• ActuaJite: a propos de quatre annees de secheresse, 1942-1945: Revue de la 
Geographie alpine 3412 (1946): 313-18; and J. Sanson and M. Padre, 'Actualites: 1a secheresse des 
annees 1942-1949 en France.' Revue de la Geograpme alpine 38/2 (1950). 269-403. 
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the CCDR, the Germans had failed to destroy enough 'nuisance animals.' Wild Boar 
populations, for instance, had increased three times in number with resultant crop 
damage. 119 
The scale of agricultural war damage was huge. In 1951. the CCDR 
estimated that damage to farmland itself was worth over five billion francs and the 
destruction caused to harvests, farm buildings and infrastructure by combat. German 
requisitions, and war-induced dilapidation came to almost seventy three billion 
francs. In addition, livestock worth approximately four-and-a-half billion francs had 
been requisitioned or destroyed and 690,000 horses parted from their owners. These 
losses represented six-and-a-half percent of the total number of horses in France, 
which created severe problems for under-mechanised French farms. 120 Moreover. 
the severe material shortages that necessitated the greater exploitation of French soil 
worked against the cultivation drive. Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine 
deprived the rest of France of fertilizers, a particularly acute loss given the difficulty 
of importing them from elsewhere. Insecticides were also lacking, and "'pests," such 
as the Colorado Beetle, thrived. The solution to this problem - sending 
schoolchildren out to fields to hunt beetles - was far from effective. 121 As these 
examples indicate, war and occupation had severely undermined French agriculture. 
As a post-Liberation government report put it, war's impact "hit Val de Saire's 
119 Commission consultative des dommages et des reparations, Dommages subis par La France el 
/'Unionfranfaise dufait de la guerre el de /'occupalion ennemie (/939-/945) (Imprimerie Nationale. 
1951), 10 vols. Vol. 7. Monograph P .A.6 . Prelevements allemands de produits agricoles: oeufs. 
volailles. gibier' (lmprimerie nationale. 1947). 25. 
I~ Commission consultative. Dommages subis par fa France. vol. I. xiv. 234-239. 
121 Gervais Jollivet, and Tavernier. Hisloire de la France rurafe. 93. 
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grazing farms as well as those of Picardy, the alpine huron as well as Vendee 
smallholdings, [and] Caen's wheatfields as well as Alsacian vineyards.' 122 
Away from the fields, despite some practical measures achieved during the 
wartime reforestation campaign (such as the Forestry Administration's purchase of 
areas of friche for reforestation in the Alpes-Maritimes during 1941 123), the attempt 
to reforest France seems to have emphatically failed. Writing in 1944, respected 
geographer Raoul Blanchard considered that after the laws of January 1942 foresters 
'had been too preoccupied for us to imagine that a single hectare of [forest] has been 
added to the total after this date.' 124 Indeed. it seems that the January 1942 
reforestation legislation was applied in an extremely limited fashion. 125 And as I 
show in chapter three, war damage, fire, and overproduction actually led to a 
contraction of forest areas. 
In forests that experienced war damage, it seems that maquis made advances. 
in the short term at least. A scientific report into vegetative regeneration after forest 
fires in the Marseille region during July 1942 concluded that those species 
associated with maquis~ such as Holm oak, regenerated well after the passage of fire 
(it took six to eight years for a Holm oak grove to reconstitute and between twenty-
five and thirty years for a forest of Aleppo pine). 126 Elsewhere, a 1953 war damages 
report on the Charleval communal forest on the edge of the Luberon massif recorded 
121 CHAN F 10 7102. Commission de legislation des dommages de guerre, Sous-Commission agricole. 
Pres. Gouverneur General-adjoint aux dommages de guerre, 'Expose fait et questions posees a la 
Sous-Commission: 4 July 1945. 1. A huron is an alpine herdman' s cottage. and commonly has room 
for cheese-making and a room for living. 
123 See files in ADAM 521 W 22. 
124 Raoul Blanchard, 'Deboisement et reboisement dans les Prealpes fran~ises du Sud: Revue de 10 
Geographie alpine. 3213 (1944), 372. 
12$ Eaux el (orelS du J 2e au lOe siecie. 642. 
126 L. Ber~er. Feu\' de collines el vegetation: documents pour les carles de.\ productions \'t!getales. 
serie France-Mediterraneenne. Tome: Provence. Vol. I.. No. I. (1943), 8. D. 
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how aerial bombardments on 22 August 1944 destroyed 235 hectares of forest and 
thirty five hectares of thickets (taillis). Since the fire, the pine forest had failed to 
regenerate. Instead, a maquis of Kermes oaks and broom had thrived. l27 
When assessing responsibility for the failure to cultivate France. it seems 
only fair to stress that Petain and his government could do nothing about drought 
conditions and very little about war damage. However, the terms of the Armistice 
that Petain signed locked France into an unequal relationship with Germany, leaving 
the latter country free to exploit the former's agricultural resources. Ironically then, 
one of the Vichy's foundations - state collaboration with Germany - undermined the 
regime's attempts to transform France's landscape. 
On a more imaginative level, the model of rural France that Petain and 
traditionalist Vichyites promoted held little appeal. Only 1,561 families took up 
"back to the land" credits to cultivate abandoned farms, of whom 409 failed to make 
a success of it. 128 An article in the official publication of the Chantiers de la 
Jeunesse also noted that some people found that the "theme of the retour a la te"e' 
had been promoted to 'excess' and the over-repetition of the message had led to a 
loss in its efficiency. 129 Furthermore, the Second World War had sharply exposed 
the gap between French agriculture and modern mechanised technology, convincing 
1:!7 The emergence of the maqu;s was unwelcome and Charleval's mayor was keen for the forest to be 
replanted as it was 'one of the commune's rare resources, as well as being a place of promenade. 
beauty. and relaxation for the inhabitants.' See ADBDR 51 W 73 G. Leitzelement, . Dommages de 
guerre: rapport d'expertise. no. de dossier CA-44949-AG reconnaissance des lieux 28 et 29 October 
] 953'; and ADBDR 5 I W 73 R. Gaston. Maire de Charleval to Delegue departemental de la 
Reconstruction et de rUrbanisme. Marseille. 5 October 1953. 
118 Paxton. Vichr France. 208. 
12Q CHAN AJ 39 55 P. B .• 'L'agriculture fran~se. fin septembre 1941: Bulletin officiel des Chanliers 
de la Jeunene. No. 61. 16 October 1941. t. 
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many peasants of the urgent need for agrarian modernisation. 130 In the postwar 
period, France moved towards an agricultural model founded on state planning, 
specialisation, intensification, and mechanisation. The seeds of this change were 
sown between 1940 and 1944, as the technocratic strand of the Vichy regime gained 
the upper hand over petainiste traditionalists and the corporatist model. 131 
Peasants also proved unresponsive to Vichy "back to the land" rhetoric. 
According to Kedward, the regime's '''retour a la terre" as a high-minded cultural 
concept was broken on the hard realities of peasant obduracy and subversion: 132 
Peasants (along with other sections of French society) were unresponsive to Vichy 
rhetoric and wanted help developing modern farming techniques not romantic 
evocations of rural life. 133 Furthermore, they regarded state officials as "alien city 
people' only interested in requisitioning their food and land and saw the Peasant 
Corporation as a coercive state organisation. Therefore, peasants tried to keep their 
distance from it. especially as it became increasingly a mechanism of state control 
over the agricultural sector as worsening food shortages required greater state 
intervention. 134As Jean-Pierre Azema notes. like the rest of the National Revolution, 
h b d· b .. d I' 135 'seldom can there ave een greater Iscrepancy etween mtentlons an resu ts. 
Furthermore. peasant communities played a pivotal role in rural resistance activity. 
Kedward highlights how. after 1942. peasants sheltered young men escapmg 
130 Gervais Jollivet. and Tavernier, Histoire de la France rurale. 101. 
III Cleary. Peasants. Politicians. and Producers. 103; Paxton, Vichy France. 352; and de Planhol and 
Claval, Historical Geography of France, 444-9. 
132 Kedward. In Search of the Maquis. 144. 
133 H. R. Kedward, Occupied France: Collaboration and Resistance. 1940-19·/-1 (Oxford: Blackwell. 
1985).24. 
1).4 Gordon. 'Countryside and the City. 'in Fishman et ai .• France at War. 146-7: and Paxton, richy 
France. 209. 
m Jean-Pierre Azema. From Munich 10 the Liberation /938-1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984 [1979]). 62. 
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compulsory labour in Germany and provided food and other support to maquisards. 
For Kedward, this instance of peasant resistance inverted the regime's "back to the 
land" philosophies and was a 'shu~der of life' from a 'taciturn peasantry.' 136 
The war on "wasteland" was also lost in the sense that rural resistance 
movements adopted the name maquis from 1943 onwards, therefore investing what 
was largely viewed as a degraded landscape with new meanings. 137 Maquis did have 
some admirers in pre-war France, including writers who celebrated its romantic and 
sensual qualities. In Paysages de Provence, Alphonese Donnadieu remarked on the 
'exquisite scent of maquis and pine trees' which 'follow and intoxicate' him when 
he leaves Provence. 138 Jean-Louis Vaudoyer also praised maquis as . austere, 
efficient, quasi-immortelle vegetation, which seeins to hardly nourish itself on water 
but on fire.' The Mediterranean hills on which it grew constituted an 'heroic 
landscape' and, according to the time of day. the Provencal sun would render the 
hiBs' bare summits 'pink, lilac, [and] blue like crystals. ,139 It was not just French 
writers who were seduced by the maquis' charms. In 1933. Susanne Day commented 
that 'the sweet, pungent odour [of Mediterranean vegetation] is the breath of 
Provence, woven into the fabric of her being. ,140 
136 Kedward, ln Search of the Maquis. especially 115.233. 
m Boulet suggests that "maquis" was first used as a label for partisan fighters in 1941 with reference 
to the Balkans. See 'Montagne et resistance: 267. According to Kedward, hmaquis" was more 
distinctive than "bois." ""foret." or "montagne," and was specific to the countryside ("franc-tireur' and 
"group franc" were already associated with urban resistance). In addition. "maquis" suggested combat 
and rebellion without the negative connotations of refractaire and so 'quickly established a hold over 
the imagination of all those involved in revolt.' As a consequence, the tenns "maquis" and 
"maquisard" "entered the history and language of Resistance with an effect which is difficult to 
imagine.' Kedward.ln Search of the Maquis, 29-30. 
1311 Alphonese Donnadieu. Paysages de Pro'Ve,!ce. la cole des Maures de Toulon au Golfe de Frejus: 
.fie ... caJanqlles. ses forils. ses iles d 'Or (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault. 1932). Preface. 189. 
139 Jean-Louis Vaudoyer, Beautes de la Provence (Paris: Bernard Grasset. 1928).11. 137. 




But maquisards were the first group within mainland French society to invest 
maquis landscapes with national purpose. 141 For a start, as Kedward argues, the 
maquis liked to think of themselves as the 'vanguard' of French society in 
opposition to Vichy, laying claim to 'a higher morality and patriotism.' 141 As the 
war and occupation continued, the maquis' legitimacy and importance grew. 
especially after the introduction of the deeply unpopular Service du Travail 
Obligatoire (STO) in February 1943, which sent young French men to work German 
factories. As a consequence, maquisards widened the geographical context of 
maquis as they did not restrict their resistance activities to areas of maquis defined in 
the botanical sense. Prendre Ie maquis referred to resistance in places as diverse as 
Alpine mountains, the hills of Brittany, or the plains of northern France. 143 This 
emergence of diverse and localised resistance groups throughout France brought the 
maquis out of the dry Mediterranean region and gave it a national reach and 
significance. 144 
Ironically, however, maquis landscapes were not necessarily the best place 
for maquisards to shelter. Although areas of maquis offered good cover and were 
difficult for Vichy's milice and German troops to enter, there were disadvantages. 
Not least. food and water supplies could be scarce. 145 Forestry camps were a better 
141 On Corsica, maquis is both bound to and reinforces the island's singular identity especially since 
its conquest in 1775 when the phrase became increasingly widespread as vanquished rebels took to 
the scrubland. Jean-Dominique Poli. 'Maquis, genie du lieu: in Laurence J. Lorenzi (ed.). Le maqu;s 
corse, d 'a pres les lexles anciens el modernes (Paris: L 'Hannattan, 2002). 49-51. 
142 Kedward, In Search of lhe Maquis. 107. 162. 
143 Ibid. 30. 
144 The maquis label even spread beyond France's borders into distinctly un-~editerranean Belgium. 
See Femand Desonay. Maqllis des Ardennes el de che= nous (Bruxelles: Editions du Mouvement 
National Beige. 1947). . 
14~ Christian Durandet. Les maquis de Provence (Paris: Editions France-Empire. 1974). 122-9. 
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prospect, providing excellent shelter, employmen~ and a semblance of legality for 
maquisards (see chapter three). 
In 1938, Ernst Benevent described maquis and Mediterranean scrubland as 
'rebel lands,' resisting all attempts to cultivate and control them. 146 The resistance's 
appropriation of the maquis gave new meaning to notion of 'rebel lands,' and shows 
how "wasteland" challenged the Vichy state on a political and social level. At the 
same time, maquis and other types of "wasteland" showed their rebellious nature by 
resisting Vichy's cultivation drive. The reinvention of the maquis points to the 
multiple failures of Vichy's war on "wasteland," attesting to the fact that nature and 
the meanings attached to it resisted easy manipulation during the war. In addition, it 
highlights the tensions between productive and "wild" land which increased during 
the war due to material constraints, as well as the ways in which the resistance 
reclaimed control of the countryside from Vichy. These themes are evident in the 
wartime history of France's forests. Vichy struggled to cultivate fields, drain 
marshes, and reforest, and it encountered serious problems when it tried to boost 
forestry production. Maquisards also challenged the regime's political appropriation 
of the forest environment. 




'The Age of Wood': Forests in Wartime France I 
In Jean Giono's short story The Man Who Planted Trees the narrator wanders 
across a 'landscape of unparalleled desolation' in 'the ancient region where the 
Alps extend into Provence.' In this dry, sparsely populated region he meets a 
serene shepherd, Elzeard Bouffer. who has selflessly taken it upon himself to 
plant thousands of trees in the arid soil to save this region that was dying from a 
"lack of trees.' After five years in the army during the First World War and 
desiring 'to breathe some fresh air,' our narrator returns to find that whilst he was 
fighting in the trenches the good shepherd was sowing "beautiful birch 
plantations.' When war breaks out again in 1939, their remote location saves the 
shepherd's trees from being turned into fuel and the war passes Bouffer by; "he 
didn't even know about it. .. going peacefully on with his task, ignoring the 1939 
war just as he'd ignored the war of 1914.' Over the years, Bouffer transformed 
the 'wilderness' into a 'healthy and prosperous' region where water, wildlife, and 
villages burst into life. nourished by the trees and where a . soft and scented 
breeze' replaced the 'rough and arid gusts' that once swept across the 
. ., 
mountruns.· 
I A version of this chapter appears as Chris Pearson. 'The Age of Wood: Fuel and Fighting in 
French Forests. 1940-1944: EnvironmenJal History 11 (October 2006): 775-803. 
:2 Jean Giono, The Man Who PlanJed Trees (London: Harvill Press. 19(5). The story originally 
appeared in the 1950s and has since been published in countries as diverse as New Zealand. 
Kenya. Finland. and the United States. Giono's own wartime history is somewhat murky and 
after the war he appeared on a 'black list' of writers who had collaborated. See Pierre Citron. 
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In Giono's tale the trees avoid the ravages of war, allowing them to exert 
their healing influence on the region. In reality, however. France' s forests did not 
escape the Second World War and between 1940 and 1944 they were 
overexploited and transfonned into sites of combat and political appropriation. 
Forests were an integral component of France~s wartime history and were 
essential to ensure the continuation of the economy and "everyday" life. When 
one forester claimed in 1942 that 'having seen the age of iron we are today 
experiencing the age of wood,' his observation was by no means unjustifed. 3 
The surface area of forests in France before the war has been put at 
10,135,000 hectares (or approximately one fifth of national territory). 4 But 
although forests feature prominently on the French landscape, their wartime 
history is under-researched. 5 Using the forests of South Eastern France as a case 
study (with some reference to other sites, such as Tron~ais forest in the Allier 
departement) this chapter outlines the history of French forests during the "dark 
years," from both material and cultural perspectives. 6 
I argue that forests constituted a vital source of replacement products at a 
time of severe material shortages and, as a consequence, the Vichy government 
'Giono pendant la deuxieme guerre mondiale,' Jean Giono 12 (1979): 16-33; and Richard J. 
Golsan, French Writers and the Politics of Complicity: Crises of Democracy in the 1940s and 
1990s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006),77-101. 
~ Rene Diderjean, '11 faut reboiser. Le Bois. 25 January 1942, 1. 
4 Vergeot et Aube. Rapport sur Ie probleme agricole fran~ais, 51. 
5 The war years feature in broad overviews of French forest history, but the coverage is 
descriptive rather than interpretative and lacks a solid empirical base. See Louis Bame, His/oire 
de lafore/fran~aise (Paris: Arthaud, 1983); and Eaux e/ Forets du 12e au 20e siecle. 
6 Environmental histories of war have so far approached the relationship between wood and war 
through the lens of resource depletion and changes to forestry management. Missing from these 
accounts are localised variations and inconsistencies. as well as the cultural significance of 
forests during wartime. See Judith A. Bennett. 'Local Resource Use in the Pacific War with 
Japan: Logging in Western Melanesia,' War and Society 21 (May 2003): 83-118; McNeill. 
'Woods and Warfare in World History,' 388-410; Richard P. Tucker. 'The World Wars and the 
Globalization of Timber Cutting: in Russell and Tucker Na/llral Enemy, Natural A/~v. 110-41; 
and West. 'Forests and National Security: 270-94. On forests in Provence. see Martine Chalvet. 
'L'invention de la fo~t mediterraneenne de la fin du XVIIle siecle aux annees 1960: PhD diss. 
University of Aix-en-Provence I. (2000): and ForelS perdues. /OI'e/s retroUl'cs (Marseille: 
Archives departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone. 1997). 
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strove to increase their productivity. But forests were not just material spaces as 
traditional elements within the regime, including Peta~ imbued the forest with 
meanings associated with their "back to the land" rhetoric. However, from late 
1942 onwards, resistance movements began to physically and imaginatively 
reclaim the forest from Vichy, turning it into a space of revolt and subversion. 
Alongside these changes, the history of forests in wartime France contained 
elements of continuity. Vichy's material and cultural mobilisation of the forest 
was the latest manifestation in a long tradition of state forest control. while the 
French Forestry Administration struggled to uphold its policy of amenagement 
and its regulation of France's forests. This was no easy task as German and 
Italian armies wrought havoc among the trees, challenging French control of the 
forest and undermining Vichy's production drive. Increased numbers of forest 
fires also posed a problem for the Forestry Administration. as did military 
combat in the forest. As the years passed, Vichy's and the Forestry 
Administration's hold on the forest weakened as the occupation armies' grip 
tightened, meaning that forests suffered more and more from the effects of over-
exploitation, fire. and combat. Despite elements of continuity, therefore, these 
four years - a blink of an eye in the life of a forest - ushered in significant 
economic. political. cultural, and ecological changes to France' s forests. 
Creating the productive forest 
After French military defeat in summer 1940. severe material shortages 
meant that the forest played a vital role in ensuring the continuation of any 
semblance of normal existence. Wood-derived products seeped into all areas of 
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the economy and "everyday" life. In the words of Charles Colomb, General 
Director of the F orestry Administratio~ 'today the French turn a look charged 
with hope towards their forests ... almost everyone expects something from [them] 
that will help them survive these difficult times: householders need fuel for their 
fireplace; farmers, litter for their animals; bakers, wood for their ovens; tanners, 
bark for their leather; transporters, wood or wood charcoal for their gazogenes: 
and, finally, industrialists [need] raw materials... for their businesses.' 7 As 
Colomb's remarks indicate, wood kept the French warm and baked their bread, 
as coal and oil supplies were limited or non-existent. As such, war and 
occupation "turned the clock back" and the French rediscovered wood's 
traditional importance as a fuel. Furthermore, alongside this more customary use 
of wood, forests provided more specialised replacement products for industrial 
materials that were 'particularly deficient.' 8 
Severe petrol shortages posed a particular problem and wood stepped into 
the breach in the form of gazogene (regarding motor cars and other means of 
transport, the gazogene system refers to the conversion of wood or wood 
charcoal into gas using a metal furnace attached to the vehicle in order to power 
the engine). 9 In 1936, Petain had published a leaflet in favour of gazogene, in 
which he argued that 'the industrial production of the gas of the forests could 
contribute to the revival (redressement) of the French economy [and] could 
immediately provide precious support for national defence.' \0 And in 1938, La 
gaz de forels promoted gazogene fuel. urging the French to realise the potential 
7 Charles Colomb, • Preface. ' in Roger Blais and Gerard Luzu, Les metiers de /0 foret (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1941). 3-4 . 
• ADD 61 W 6 Pierre Pucheu. Secretaire d'Etat a rInterieur. Pierre Cazoit. Secretaire d'Etat a 
I' Agriculture. Lehideux. Secreta ire d'Etat a la Production Industrielle to Prefets Regionaux et 
Prefets oepartementaux •. Reparition des bois.' 10 January 1942. 
9 For a fuller explanation of the gazogene system see Veillon, Vivre et Survil're en France. 194. 
10 Quoted in £aux el Forels du J 2e au 20e sii!cJe. 629. 
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of the 'gas of the forest.' 11 In his preface to the boo~ Andre Liautey. Under-
Secretary of State for Agriculture, even made the bold claim that trees 
'henceforth appear as an inexhaustible source of energy.' 12 In the same year. 
Liautey's immediate superior, Henri Queuille, called for the development of 
gazogene in the face of economic competition in Europe that forced countries 
like France to fall back on their own natural resources. 13 
But it was only after 1940 that gazogene, a fuel previously only used to 
power forestry vehicles, began to be taken seriously. Motoring associations 
organised exhibitions promoting 'the gas of the forest' and Vichy introduced 
measures to encourage drivers to convert their vehicles. 14 Gazogene vehicles did 
not work as smoothly or efficiently as petrol-powered ones, but, as one 
eyewitness remembers, 'at least they ran.' 15 Ifis therefore no surprise that wood 
and wood charcoal production for gazogenes increased from pre-war figures of 
approximately fifty thousand tons a year to almost half a million tons in 1943. 16 
The case of gazogene amply illustrates that wood had become the . substitute par 
excellence' during the war. 17 
Both state and private foresters revelled in the rediscovered importance of 
wood and there was a sense of satisfaction that after years of indifference the 
II A. Lepoivre and G. Septembre, La gaz des forets: carburants forestiers gazogenes (Paris: 
Societe nationale d'encouragement a l'utilisation des carburants forestiers, 1938). 
12 Andre Liautey, 'Preface: la foret fran~aise accumulateur d'energie,' in ibid. II. 
Il 'Congres inter-regional du gaz des forets: Revue des Eaux et Forets 76/10 (October 1938),816. 
14 'Actes officiels: Revue des Eaux et Forets, 79/9 (September 1941). 689. For promotional 
activities in favour of gazogenes see ADBDR 194 W 29 Andre Huart, President de r Automobile-
Club de Marseille & Provence to Conservateur des Eaux et Forets, Aix-en-Provence. 2 April 
1941; and Veillon. Vivre et Survivre en France 1939-1947, 194. 
15 Interview with Elvio Segatto. Pizan~on. 3 August 2005. Tapes and notes in author's possession. 
16 Commission consultative des dommages et des reparations. Dommages subis par /a France et 
/,Un;on franfaise du fa;1 de /a guerre el de /'occupation ennemie (1939-1945) (Imprimerie 
Nationale. 1951). 10 vols .• Vol 6 Monograph M.P.18. 'Prelevements allemands de matieres 
premieres: bois et produits forestiers.' (Imprimerie nationale. 1947). 29. 
17 CACAN 19800470/168 Formery. Inspecteur General des Finances. Commissaire du Pouvoir to 
Vice-Amiral. Commissaire General du Pouvoir. 'Quelques observations sur I'approvisionnement 
en bois.' 24 March 1942. I. 
84 
Chapter Three 
French finally appreciated the forest. One article in L 'Action forestiere et 
piscicole, the official publication of the Comite d' entente de la foret fran~aise et 
de I 'union nationale des syndicats de I' etang, detailed, with evident glee. how 
military defeat had brought about the 'revenge ~ of the forest. After years of 
neglect, the forest now saw 'coming back to her, anxious and distraught, all those 
who abandoned her. [But] she is good and without bitterness. She will provide 
the wood that is now indispensable so that we can eat our daily bread and keep 
away the cold this winter.,18 Foresters nurtured the notion that the forest was 
forever ready to make the necessary sacrifices to ensure France' s survival. One 
argued that 'in times of crisis, it's always towards the forest that the nation turns 
to demand ever varied and ever increasing sacrifices.' 19 Another concurred. 
arguing that after military defeat "the French forest. symbol and refuge of the 
soul of the country, is ready, once more in our history, to serve and to save' the 
nation. 20 Wood, asserted Le Bois National. was now 'as important to the 
, h . , 21 
country s economy as w eat, meat, WIne or potatoes. 
The pressure on the forest and the importance of wood was recognised 
beyond the specialist forestry press. In Provence, newspapers drew public 
attention to the fact that the high level of forest fires endured by the region might 
threaten wartime forestry production. Stories relating the destruction wrought by 
the latest fires jostled for space on front pages alongside reports on the progress 
of the war in Russia or North Africa. 22 A front page editorial in Le Petit 
18 'La revanche de la foret,' L 'Action foresliere et piscicole. No. 43. October 1940, I. 
19 Charles de Lassuchette, 'L'organisation Forestiere au sein de la Corporation Nationale est 
realise: L 'Actionfores/iere et piscicole. No. 72. March 1943. 
20 J. Jagerschmidt. 'Le programme forestier de la France qui va renaitre,' L 'Action forestiere et 
piscicole, Nos. 39-40. July 1940, 2. 
)1 Henri Rieuf. 'Organisation forestiere: mobilisation des ressources forestieres.· Le Bois 
National, No. 35. 15 December 1941. 393-96. 
22 For example. see • Active par un vent violent Ie feu ravage les bois dans les Bouches-du-
Rh6ne.· Le Petit Provenfal. 16 July 1942. I. 
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Provent;al called for a state-led and state-financed plan to coordinate and ensure 
the reforestation of Provence's fife-ravaged forests. In making its case, the paper 
reminded its readers of the long-tenn importance of the forest as a measure 
against landslides and floods as well as the current importance of wood: "today ~ 
everyone realises the primordial role of wood and its derivatives... in the 
national economy. ,23 
As another commentator in Le Petit Var newspaper noted, France can "no 
longer afford. any wastage and must call on all the resources of the country: the 
forest is one of our greatest riches and its intensive but rational exploitation will 
give us unappreciable benefits ... the organisation of the fight against destructive 
fire is therefore one of the most important questions of the moment.' 24 The 
Prefect of the Alpes-Martimes agreed: ~each year vast areas of forest and 
woodlands fall victim to the flames. Today more than ever it is necessary to 
ensure the security of the departement's forestry resources. In effect. if s the 
national interest which is at stake and demands it.' 25 
With increased expectations placed on the forest. the Vichy government 
reorganised French forestry structures in a bid to boost production and 'mobilise 
the country' s forestry resources.' 26 Most significantly. the law of 8 August 1940 
obliged all owners of forests over ten hectares to exploit fifty percent more wood 
than normal and set fines for every undeclared or unexploited hectare of 
woodland. The law also enabled the Forestry Administration to fix an annual 
:!J • Apres les incendies de forets iI faut reboiser.' Le Petit Proven~al, 18 July 1942, I. 
24 Louis HenseJing. 'Nos ffirets [sic] brulent: Le Petit Var. 8 September 1940.4. 
:!~ ADAM 521 W 50 Prefet des Alpes-Maritimes to Conservateur des Eaux et forets. 'Incendies 
de forets - Lutte - Organisation: 10 March 1942. On a local level. mayors felt frustrated by 
inefficient fire-fighting activity. especially as forest flTeS threatened to have . considerable 
repercussions on the regional economy.' ADAM 521 W 57 Colonel Martinet, Maire de Cannet. 
to Prefet des Alpes-Maritimes. 'Organisation de la lune contle les incendies de forets: [n.d.]. 
26 Agriculteurs. voici ce qu 'en un an Ie goul'ernemenl du Marechal a fail pour \'ous. 6; and Eaux 
et Forets du 12e au 20e siecle, 628-9. 
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volume of timber to be extracted from the forest and divide up this production 
among private forest owners. 27 This law strengthened the Third Republic ~ s 
decree of 20 January 1940 that obliged landowners with more than ten hectares 
of wood to declare timber production possibilities to the authorities and to set a 
date for its realisation. Failing that, the state was entitled to requisition the timber. 
28 With these laws, Vichy increased state control over private forests~ which 
made up approximately two-thirds of France's forestry resources. This again 
strengthened laws and structures introduced by the Third Republic during the 
"phoney" war, such as the creation of the Comite du bois et des produits 
forestiers (Committee of Wood and Forest Products), which was charged with 
organising military timber supplies. 29 
Like farming (see chapter two). the forestry sector was brought in line 
with Vichy'S vision of a corporatist society. The law of 13 August 1940 on the 
organisation of forestry production introduced a corporatist forestry structure 
giving the state greater control over felling, permits, prices, and the stocks in saw 
mills. Groupements interprofessionnels forestiers (Inter-Professional Forestry 
Groups) or GIF were created in each region, consisting of two forest proprietors, 
two timber merchants, and two state foresters, and were given responsibility for 
assessing the state of timber resources and fixing prices and distribution. 30 
Private foresters were obliged to carry GIF-distributed professional cards, broken 
into different categories for forest owners (cards A and B). workers in saw mills 
(card C), charcoal burners (card D), and producers of wood for gazogenes (card 
27 'Loi fixant la possibilite i exploiter chaque annee par tous les proprietaires: in • Actes 
officiels: Revue des Eaux et Forets 78/7-9 (July-September 1940). 334; and Eaux e/ Forels du 
Ile au 20e siecie. 630. 
21 • Deeret relatif i la production forestiere en temps de guerre.' L 'Ac/ion fores/;ere el pisicole. No. 
35, February 1940. 1. 
29 Eaux et Forel!i du Ile au JOe siecie. 628. 
30 See' Actes officiels.· 336-7. 
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E). Only those owners with less than ten hectares of forest and those supplying 
local, rural communities were exempt. 31 In February 1943 the corporatist 
character of the forest was strengthened when the Comite intersyndical de la 
foret privee (Inter-syndical Committee of Private Forests) was incorporated into 
the Corporation paysanne. 32 
Vichy tightened forestry regulations but its control over French wood 
resources was incomplete. As the Secretary of State for Industrial Production 
admitted, 'the wood on the border of roads, rivers, canals, bocages. hedges etc ... 
is infinitely disseminated and there is no question of making an inventory [of 
these resources] and centralising them on the national scale.' 33 This wood was 
too dispersed and marginal to interest the central state and was left for small rural 
communes (of under 10,000 inhabitants) to supply themselves with fuel. The 
Regional Prefect of Lyon suggested that these communities should 'make the 
maximum effort to obtain wood from river banks, hedges, and parks etc.' 34 
To meet the growing demand for wood, more and more workers were 
dispatched to the forest. As well as boosting forestry production, this migration 
to the forest corresponded with the regime' s "back to the land" ethos and soaked 
up young unemployed men who might otherwise be a source of potential unrest. 
Charles Colomb, the Forestry Administration's Director General, summed up this 
attitude, arguing that forest exploitation both "ensures work for the demobilised 
and those workers fired from munitions factories, and ... prepares the "return to 
.11 ADBDR 194 W 25 'Aide-memoire sur )es cartes professionelles G.I.F.' [n.d]. 
32 'L 'organisation de )a foret privee: Revue des Eaux el/or.ilS 82/4 (May. 1944), 264-80. . 
33 ADD 61 W 6 Secretariat d'Etat 8 la Production Industnelle to Repartlteur, Chef de la Section 
du bois de I'Office central de Repartition des Produits Industriels, 'Decision M6 du 1 aout 1942.' 
34 ADD 61 W 7 Prefet Regional to Prefets de la region de Lyon. Conscrvateurs des Eaux et Forets 
de la region de Lyon, 'Reparition des bois de feu.' 28 March 1942. 
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the soil.'" 35 The Chantiers de la Jeunesse youth movement brought thousands of 
young men to the forest where it provided them with a patriotic education and 
manual labour. The Chantiers' founder, General de la Porte du Theil (who was 
the son of a forestry official and an 'outdoorsman of long standing·3~ boasted 
that his recruits supplied 'a large quantity of the wood and wood charcoal needed 
by the country.' 37 His claim was not unfounded; in 1942 alone the Chantiers cut 
440,400 tonnes of wood and produced 13,000 tonnes of wood charcoal. 38 An 
article in L 'Effort praised the determination of Chantiers detachments who 
worked tirelessly in Cluny forest chopping wood and producing wood charcoal 
to supply Lyon for the approaching winter. Throughout the forest. the journalist 
reported, the young arms of the Chantiers recruits 'pushed back and gave a slap' 
to the 'cold, with its old face of hatred and menace.' 39 However. despite the 
Chantiers' efforts, wood supplies failed to meet demand. 
Forestry production problems 
The failure to match timber supply with demand highlights the 
discrepancy between the Vichy regime' s intentions and material realities. France 
desperately needed to boost forestry production (its timber imports dropped from 
2,400,000m3 to 100,000m3 during the war), but statistics provided by the 
Commission consultative des dommages et des reparations (CCDR) suggest that 
J.5 ADV 1790 W 122 Charles Colomb to Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Aix-en-Provence, 
'Travaux d'ameliorations pastorales et forestiere,' 5 October 1940, I. 
36 Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy,205 . 
. 17 CHAN AJ 39 166 General de la Porte du Theil to Prefet de rHaute-Loire, 21 November 1941. 
.18 CHAN AJ 39 168 Mourey. Commissaire General-Adjoint for General de la Porte du Theil, 
'Note pour les Commissaires regionaux concernent remploi ~e la, ":,ain d'oeu~: 4 May 1943. 
39 CHAN AJ )9 166 An~ Tissier. 'Pour que les Lyonnals n alent pas froid les Jeunes des 
Chantiers travaillent fenne,' L 'Effort, 6 October 1940. 1-3. 
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construction and industry-grade timber production did not nse significantly 
during the war in comparison with pre-war figures. For although there was an 
increase in production in 1942 and 1943 (see figure one), it did not offset the 
shortfall created by the massive drop in timber imports. 40 And on a local level. 
forestry production rates in the Marseille region were unable to match the 
Forestry Administration's predictions (see figure two). 
Figure 1. Forestry production in metropolitan France (raw timber in m1 
Average pre-war 
production (in 87 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 
departements) (2- semester) (1-
semester) 
Wood for 




industry 3,056,000 1,179,000 2.358,000 3,335,000 3,014,000 1.876.000 
(paper, leather 
etc) 
Totals 10,008,400 4,889,500 9,779,000 11.384.000 10.689.000 5.876.000 
Source: Commission consultative des dommages et des reparations, Dommages subis 
par la France et l'Union/ran~aise dufait de fa guerre et de /'occupation ennemie 
(1939-1945) (lmprimerie nationale, 1951), 10 vols. Vol. 6 Monograph M.P.IS 
'Prelevements allemands de matieres premieres: bois et produits forestiers (lmprimerie 
nationale, 1947), 11. N.B this table doesn't include figures for the Nord and Pas-de-
Calais departements, nor those in the annexed regions of Alsace and Lorraine. 
Figure 2. Production figures for the Marseille region, 1 October 1943 to I April 1944 
Prediction for exploitation Volume actually exploited Percentage actually 
from 01110/43 to 01104/44 from 01110/43 to 01/04/44 exploited 
Departement Construction- Firewood Construction- Firewood Construction- Firewood 
grade timber (steres) grade timber (steres) grade timber (steres) 
(mJ) (mJ) (mJ) 
Alpes- 12,000 82,500 8,000 66,500 63% 85% 
Maritimes 
Basses-Alpes 10.000 115,000 4,100 35,000 50% 27% 
Bouches-du- 15.000 105.000 15.000 78,000 100% 75% 
RMne 
Gard 4,000 150,000 2,000 76,000 50% 50% 
Hautcs-Alpes 12.500 27.500 8.000 9,000 63% 33% 
Var 100.000 300.00 ~O.OOO 150.000 40% 50% 
Vaucluse 5,000 97.500 3.600 72.000 60% 70% 
Source: ADBDR 194 W 5 • A batage prevu et realise du 1-10-1943 au 1-4-1944' [n.d.] 
~o The pre-war production possibility was 10,OOO.OOOm3 and the warti~e average 1 0,617 ,3~3 ~3 
(based on the years 1941-1943 and excluding Eastern and Northern departements). CommiSSIOn 
consultative. Dommages subis par la France et l'l..'nion/ran,'aise. Vol. 6. 5. II. 
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Vichy was well aware of these production problems. In March 1942 a 
governmental report highlighted that the 'country can't meet its wood needs' and 
that 'stocks have fallen to almost nothing.' 41 Mines needed forty percent more 
wood than they were receiving in order to produce at capacity, and there were 
problems replacing railway sleepers and wagons. In addition, wood was lacking 
in the cities 'to such an extent' that 'worse social dangers' threatened to strike in 
the coming winter. 42 
The problems hampering forestry production were multiple. For a start, 
Vichy's control over the forest was incomplete. The regime's legislation 
excluded owners of forests of under ten hectares, a policy criticised by Formery. 
Inspector General for Finances, as it allowed these owners 'the unbelievable 
privilege. .. [of] being able to leave an indispensable resource unused, or even 
sell it as they wish on the black market.' 43 This was no small matter as the wood 
from these forests was 'particularly important' for firewood. 44 
To make matters worse, the GIF forestry card system did not always 
work smoothly. The Forestry Inspector in the Var lamented that almost all 
forestry exploiters were 'completely uneducated' about Vichy's reorganisation of 
the sector, while in the Bouches-du-Rhone. a government official admitted that 
that the 'majority' of forest owners were unable to provide accurate and complete 
statistics, either deliberately or through ignorance. 45 As well as highlighting the 
fact that forestry statistics need to be treated with a degree of caution. these 
41 Formery. 'Quelques observations: 1. 
42 Ibid. For the situation in Grenoble see ADI 2101 W 28 'Proces-verbal de la reunion du 8 
janvier 1942.' See also CHAN AJ 39 54 'Prescriptions et Directives du Commissaire Generat.· 
Bulletin periodique officiel des Chantiers de /a Jeunesse. No. 54, 18 August 1941. 1-5. 
43 Formery. 'Quelques observations: 4 . 
.... Pucheu el al. • Reparition des bois.' 
4~ ADV 1790 W 130 Boutiere. Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Draguignan. 'Rapport trimestriel 
sur )'activite de I' Adm in stration, II October 1943. 2; and ADBDR 194 W 30 ContrOleur Jure 
Bartoli. 'Rapport de verification dans la rassort de la 26e conservation des Forets du 5 au 21 
fevrier 1942. departement des Bouches-du-Rhone.· 8. 
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observations also suggest that some forestry exploiters tried to by-pass official 
controls. In fact, some private forestry exploiters bought cut wood in order to 
speculate on the rising prices on the black market. In addition, according to the 
General Secretary of the GIF Central Committee, some new forestry exploiters 
had an 'incurable inaptitude' for the occupation. As a consequence. the forestry 
card system was reformed in an attempt to protect experienced exploiters and 
prevent speculation on wood stocks. 46 
Manpower shortages represented one of the biggest problems. There was 
a lack of experienced woodcutters (approximately thirty five percent of French 
woodcutters languished in German prisoner of war camps) and the new 
bucherons were apparently unable to replicate the expertise of professional 
lumberjacks. 47 In the case of the Chantiers, tool shortages and the location of 
their designated felling sites (which were often in remote and inaccessible 
places), hampered efficiency and exposed tensions with the Forestry 
Administration. 48 
At the heart of the matter lay a conflict between the forest's material 
functions and its supposed educational value for French youth. This friction 
intensified in August 1941 when the Minister for Agriculture stipulated that 
forestry production needed to increase threefold and that the Chantiers were to be 
46 ADBDR 194 W 25 G. Perdrizet, Secretaire General du Comite central, and Charles Colomb, 
Directeur General des Eaux et Forets. President du Comite central des Groupements 
interprofessionnels forestiers. to Conservateurs regionaux des Eaux et Forets. ~sidents. des 
Comites regionaux de gestion. presidents des comploirs departementaux des p~Ults fOres~l~rs, 
'Lettre Circulaire No. 144: contr6le des nouvelles deliverances de cartes professionelles-Revision 
des cartes anterieurement attribuees.· 25 April 1944. 
47 CACAN 19800470/168 Charles Colomb. 'Note sur les refonnes necessaries au developpement 
de la production forestiere.· 21 March 1942, 1. 
48 See 'Prescriptions et Directives du Commissaire General,' 1-5: and CHAN AJ ~q 56 
'Prescriptions et Directives du Commissaire General,' Bulletin "eriodique officiel Jes Cht.lnlien 
de iaJermesse, No. 129. 1 June 1943.521-24. 
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the main source of this production. 49 Foresters, however, accused the youth 
movement of privileging moral and social education over forestry work., even 
suggesting that some groups purposely ignored their instructions. 50 On the other 
hand, the Chantiers' leadership complained that 'the majority of [forestry] 
Conservators ... see [the Chantiers] solely as producers of wood charcoal, 
whereas the overall aim that we strive towards is to make men and national 
propaganda through the example of a reborn patriotism. It is better. surely. to 
warm the he&,rts of French people waiting for a rallying call than to warm their 
bodies.' 51 In tum, the Chantiers leadership had their own grievances and accused 
forestry officials of being 'generally too parsimonious' and not "taking into 
account the important contribution that [the Chantiers'] exploitations provide." 52 
This dispute highlights the tension between ideological concerns and more 
practical pressures which plagued Vichy's political programme (in chapter two. I 
outlined how material constraints undermined Vichy's cultivation drive). In the 
end, however, production imperatives overruled nationalistic education and the 
Chantiers leadership agreed that 'today. above all else, we must assure the 
country's survival.' As a consequence, Chantiers groups were told to spend less 
time on education in order to boost their forestry production. 53 
However. it seems that the heart of the production crisis lay less with the 
actual felling of trees than distribution and transportation problems. For instance. 
49 CHAN AJ 39 166 Mourey, Commissaire General Adjoint. for General de la Porte du Theil. 
'Note pour Messieurs les Commissaires regionaux. 5 August 1941. 1-2. 
so R. Berthon. 'De quelques reflexions sur Ie probleme de la main d'oeuvre forestier.· Revue des 
Eaux el Forels 81/9 (September 1943).489-93. 
SI CHAN AJ 39 168 Colonel bervete du Genie. Commissaire General Adjoint des Chantiers de la 
Jeunesse, to Pierre Salvat. lnspecteur-General des Eaux et Forets. 4 August 1941: and CHAN AJ 
~9 168 Commissaire General des Chantiers de la Jeunesse to lnspecteur-General des Forets. 6 
August 1941. . . ~2 CHAN AJ 39 168 Commissariat General des Chantiers de la Jeunesse. Service forestler. 
'Compte-rendu.· 20 August 1941. 
~3 CHAN AJ 39 54 'Prescriptions et Directives du Commissaire General: 3. 
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in the Unoccupied Zone, 335,296 out of 818,557 steres (or cubic metres) of 
timber destined for Gennan troops remained in the forests during the winter of 
1940-1941. 54 In addition, other governmental departments and occupation 
soldiers frequently requisitioned forestry vehicles, making it hard for state and 
private foresters to transport timber out of the forest and into urban areas. To 
make matters worse, horses employed in the forests were too undernourished to 
work long hours. 55 
Nonetheless, it seems that French forests were heavily over-exploited 
during the war. In March 1942 the Touring Club of France infonned the Minister 
of Agriculture of a 'vast enquiry' that it had recently conducted on threatened 
heritage sites. During this survey, numerous correspondents had expressed 
concerns over the intensive deforestation that is 'in part justified by current 
circumstances.' 56 Similarly, an article in Le Bois National debated whether or 
not to 'praise or deplore [the Chantiers'] exuberant activity' as it led to premature 
timber exploitation, even in areas of 'virgin forest' that were normally left 
unexploited. 57 Postwar figures support the overexploitation thesis, especially for 
firewood production. The CCDR estimated that controlled. commercial firewood 
production rose from pre-war levels of 10,000,000 steres to 18,000,000 steres, 
but admitted that the actual figure was more likely to be closer to 45,000.000 
steres. 58 According to Jean Collardet. Director of Studies at the Ecole Su¢rieure 
du Bois in Paris. c1earcutting had occurred in the forests of Landes. Nonnandy, 
Sol CACAN 19771461141 'Prestations en bois de cbauffage etTectuees aux troupes d'o¢ration. 
hiver 1940-1941.' ~~ See Fonnery. 'Quelques observations: 1; and various reports in ADBDR 194 W 25. 
S6 CACAN 19800400126 General d' Annee Dosse. Administrateur Delegue du Touring Club de 
France en Zone libre to Ministre de I' Agriculture, 27 March 1942; and CACAN 19800400,'26 
Arbaud. Inspecteur-Adjoint des Eaux et forets. Grenoble. 'Coupes abusives: Chablis.' I April 
1942. ~ 
S1 Paul Durand. 'D'une decade al'autre: Le Bois National. 14 Year. No.8. 15 March 1943,95. 
sa Commission consultative. Dommages subis par /a France. Vol. 6, 48-9. 
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Brittany, Vosges and Jura and production of wood for cooking and heating had at 
least doubled, depleting coppices, hedges, and roadside trees. 59 
The intensity of forestry exploitation varied across France. Forests 
located near urban centres were more likely to be over-exploited; certain ones in 
the Paris region were exploited over ten years in advance of the date prescribed 
by the Forestry Administration (the national average was two years in advance 
during the Occupation). 60 It also seems that where German authorities had 
greater access to forests, such as in the annexed region of Alsace and Lorraine. 
the more they were exploited. The Forestry Conservator in Strasbourg 
highlighted in 1947 that 'over five years the Germans exploited our forests ... 
without taking any account of amenagement.· This uncontrolled felling meant 
that foresters in the Alsace 'had never faced such a daunting yet indispensable 
task' as they set about repairing the damage.61 In contrast, officials reported little 
or no damage to forests in the departements of Loiret, Hautes-Pyrenees. 
Pyrenees-Orientales, and Savoie. 62 
Yet generalisations can prove deceiving. Between neighbouring 
departements there were substantial differences in levels of forest exploitation. 
For instance, in central France, production had not exceeded the prescribed 
possibility in Allier and Cher, whereas in neighbouring Indre the exploitations 
S9 Henry S. Kernan, 'War's Toll of French Forests: American Forests 51 (September 1945).442. 
60 Commission consultative. Dommages subis par la France. Vol. 6. 25. 
61 CACAN 198804701172 Pol. Loppinet. Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Strasbourg. 'Rapport.' 
28 July. 1947. 
62 CHAN F 10 7103 Ingenieur du Genie Rural. Haute-Pyrenees. to Inspecteur-General du Genie 
Rural. 'Estimation des dommages de guerre causes aux biens agricoles,' 27 June 1944; CHAN F 
10 7103 Ingenieur en chef du Genie Rural to Ministre de I' Agriculture. Delegation a la 
reconstitution agricole. Orleans. 10 April 1946; CACAN 19880470/172 Fourcaud. Conservateur 
des Eaux et Forets. Carcassonne. 'Possibiltes par volume des forets: departement des Pyrenees-
Orientales: 16 June 1947; CACAN 19880470/172 J. Guinaudeau Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets. 
Nogent-sur-Vernisson. 'Possibilite par volume des forets soumises au regime forestier: 19 June 
1944; and CACAN 19880470/172 Parlier. Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Chambery, 
'Possibilte par volume des forets fran~aises: 20 June 1947. 
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had been 'clearly abusive' and the 'balance' of the forests "strongly 
compromised,' according to the Forestry Conservator. 63 There were also 
differences in production within departements. For the Alpes-Maritimes, Arthur 
Dugelay suggested that there was a big increase in fIrewood and wood charcoal 
production, although this slowed down production of construction grade 
timber.64 
Although the extent of unregulated felling is difficult to assess accurately. 
it seems that contemporary observers were horrified by the situation. In addition 
to the Touring Club report, a 1944 article in L 'Action forestiere et piscicole noted 
how 'one remains stupefIed that nothing has been done to limit the damage 
caused by a stupid and ferocious deforestation, to the point where the individual 
has lost all sense of moderation and even children cut, fell, uproot. and destroy 
anything that comes to hand.' 65 
Over-production also led to other forest damage, such as an increase in 
forest fIres in Mediterranean France between 1940 and 1944, especially during 
1942 and 1943. 66 While this increase can in part be attributed to drought and 
general material shortages, over-production was a major factor. 67 A forestry 
63 CACAN 19880470/172 Dublois de la Sabloniere, Conservateur des Eaux et Forets, Bourges, 
'Possibilite par volume des forets fran~aises, anm!e 1947-1948: [n.d.]. 
64 ADAM 521 W 30 Arthur Dugelay, Conservateur des Eaux et Forets, Nice, 'Centenaire du 
Ranachement du Comite de Nice a la France: resultats acquis de 1860 a nosjours' [n.d.]. 
6S Henri Vergnaud, 'Une croisade qui s'impose,' L 'Action foresliere el piscicole, No. 87, June 
1944. 1. 
66 See Daniel Alexandrian and Fran~ois Binggeli, L 'ecologie prend Ie maquis: foret, biomasse. 
energie. compost (Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1984), 12-13; and ADV 1790 W 130 'lnspection de 
Draguignan: Statistiques des Incendies de forets de 1941 a [date missing]: [n.d.]. For historical 
overviews of forest fifes in Mediterranean France, see Marcel Faure, 'Les incendies de foret dans 
I'histoire: quelques le~ons du passe,' Foret mediterraneenne 912 (1987), 189: and Jean-Claude 
Istre. 'Y avait-i1 moins d'incendies de forets autrefois?' Foret medile"aneenne 811 (1986).67-9. 
For wider considerations of forest fires, see Stephen J. Pyne. Fire: A Brief History (London: The 
British Museum Press. 200 I): and Les ecologists de I'Euziere. Le feu dans la nature: mythes el 
reali/es (Prades-Ie-Lez: Editions les ecologists de l'Euziere [n.d.]). 
67 Local people were sometimes reluctant to risk ruining irreplaceable clothes and shoes ban ling 
forest fires. and food shortages may also have discouraged some individuals from helping. given 
that fire-fighting 'demanded a huge expense of energy'. See ADBDR 76 W 33 Lieutenant-
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official in Nice believed that wartime over-exploitation of the forest was "without 
doubt' a major cause of forest fire outbreaks in 1941. 68 Wood charcoal posed a 
particular problem as charcoal burners used ovens in the heart of the forest. To 
make matters worse, they were often inexperienced and neglected to survey their 
furnaces properly, at least according to a Gendarme report in the Var. 69 An 
angry Forestry Inspector in Draguignan emphasised the absurdity of allowing 
charcoal burning in the summer, noting that to produce 4,000 tons of wood 
charcoal, charcoal burners had destroyed over 300,000 cubic metres of wood; 
'under the pretext of maintaining production, are we going to push unlawfulness 
to the point of destroying the raw material [needed for] production?' He called 
for action against 'the idleness and individualism' of local popUlations, sanctions 
against the irresponsible instigators of the fires, and a fight against administrative 
inertia. The Inspector admitted that this was not a 'placid' report but one written 
'under the still burning impression of a disaster that is currently ruining this 
beautiful pays, previously one of the most wooded of France.' 70 In a further 
report, the same Inspector stated that local town halls were allowing too much 
charcoal burning in the forests, thereby 'compromising for twenty-five years the 
Colonel Bergognon. Commandant provt. la 15e Legion de Gendannerie to Prefet Regional. 
• Rapport sur les causes survenus dans la region de MarseilJe dans Ie courant de I' ete 1942: 4 
September 1942. 2: ADV 1790 W 130 Boutiere. lnspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Draguignan. 
'Rapport: devastation de la partie orientale des Maures: 9 August 1943; and ADBDR 76 W 33 
Chef d'Escadron Hurtrel. Commandant la Compagnie du Var. 'Rapport sur les incendies de foret 
dans Ie departement du Var: 29 August 1942. For food shortages see ADAM 109 W 8 Le chef 
du Service departemental des Incendies de Forets. 'Directives Generale pour la lune contre les 
inc en dies de forets dans Ie cadre des groupements de communes.' 9 May 1 9.t..t. 
68 ADAM 521 W 50 Inspecteur Principal des Eaux et Forets. Nice Ouest. 'Exploitations et 
incendies: lettre de M. Autran: 19 February 1943. 2. 
69 Hurtrel •. Rapport sur les incendies de foret.· 
70 ADV 1790 W 130 Boutiere. 'Devastation de la partie orientale des Maures: 
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production of wood and wood charcoal.' 71 These were by no means isolated 
cases. 72 
Forestry officials lobbied local authorities to put in place measures to 
limit the damage charcoal burners and other forest workers caused~ especially "at 
a time when the necessity to safeguard our forestry resources is becoming more 
and more apparent.' 73 In addition, the Forestry Administration made 
representations to local authorities asking for state funds to combat fires and for 
tougher action to be taken against those responsible for starting fires. 7 .. A 1941 
forestry report called for the implementation of 'draconian discipline' concerning 
the use of fire in the forest; 'constant surveillance and rigorous sanctions' should 
be applied against both civilian and military offenders,' it argued. 75 Local 
authorities did heed such warnings and introduced measures to prevent forest 
fires. The Prefect of the Var ordered that gazogene owners must only load and 
empty fuel into their vehicles at a distance of over 200 metres away from the 
forest (increased to 400 metres during the summer). 76 
71 ADV 1790 W 130 Boutiere, Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets, Draguignan. 'Rapport trimestriel 
sur I'activite de I' Administration,' 11 October 1943,2. 
72 For other examples of charcoal burners starting forest fIres see ADAM 521 W 57 Commissaire 
de Police de Vallauris to Prefet des Alpes-Maritimes, Service des Incendies de Forets, 'Feu de 
foret.' 5 June 1943: ADAM 521 W 57 Adjoint delegue de Maire de Peille to Chef de Service de 
Incendies de Forets, 27 June 1943: and ADBDR 76 W 33 Chef d'Escadron Tainturier. 
Compagnie de Vaucluse; 'Rapport sur les incendies de forets dans Ie departement de Vaucluse: 
29 August 1942. 
73 ADAM 521 W 57 Beaucerie, Garde-General des Eaux et Forets, Nice Ouest. 'Rappon: 
Carbonisation en foret: demande de renforcement des precautions imposees pour eviter les 
incendies,' :!5 April 1942. 
74 ADAM 521 W 50 V ill iers, Inspecteur-Principal des Eaux et Forets, Nice Ouest. • Rapport: 
exploitations et incendies. lettre d'Autran. 19 February 1943: and ADAM 521 W 57 Villiers. 
Inspecteur-Principal des Eaux et Forets, Nice Ouest. 'Rapport: depenses causees pour la 
surveillance, la protection et la lutte contre les incendies de Forets: subvention au departement.· 3 
December 1943. 
75 ADAM 109 W 8 Conservateur des Eaux et Forets, 'Rappon: incendies de Forets: 8 May 1941. 
I. 
76 During hot weather. ga:ogene owners were obliged to carry five litres of water and a fire 
extinguisher. ADV 1790 W 125 Prefet du Var to Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Aix-en-
Provence, • Forets: circu lation des vehicles a gazogene: :!4 September t 940; and ADV 1790 W 
125 'Etude sur les measures a prendre [illegible] la lutte contre les incendies de forets' [n.d.). 
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Controlling fire during the "dark years" was a difficult yet vital task. For 
although heightened forestry production increased the likelihood of forest fIres. it 
was also undermined by them. Consequently, one Forestry Inspector described 
frre-fIghting as a battle: 
In our opinion, the site of a forest fIre should be treated like a battlefield and the fight 
[against it] organised along the principles of a veritable strategy. It must be as defensive 
(preparation of fallback positions through the creation of firebreak trenches. waiting for 
the fIre in these positions, etc .... ) as it is offensive and immediate ... in short, fire. 
especially in areas broken up by valleys and cliffs, is an ... enemy ... which must be the 
object of constant surveillance and fought with direct and rapid measures. n 
In the eyes of state foresters, fIre threatened both the forests' productivity and 
future survival, and its intensifIcation between 1940 and 1944 represented a 
serious challenge to their ability to control the forest. But fIre was just one of the 
Forestry Administration's "enemies" as it battled to maintain and manage a 
planned forest during the war. 
Amenagement in wartime 
In 1940, the Forestry Administration declared itself ready to serve France; 
~the forestry corps. severely depleted (durement touche,), is not defeated. Au 
contraire, it must play an important role in the reconstruction of the country.' 78 
The administration's ranks were indeed depleted. In the long tenn, it had lost 
n ADAM 521 W 50 V ill iers. Inspecteur-Principal des Eaux et Forets. Nice Ouest. 'Rapport: 
Organisation de la lutte contre les incendies de forets.· 6 August 1941. Le Bois National also 
described fire as a 'fearful enemy.' Paul Durand. 'D'une decade 8 I'autre: Le Bois Nalional. 14'" 
Year. No. 12.25 April 1943. 141-2. 
711 'Chronique forestier: 323. 
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thirteen percent of its officers in the First World War yet still had responsibility 
for reforestation programmes, Alpine restoration, the regulation of hunting, and 
monitoring water pollution in interwar France. 79 The 1939-1940 war further 
depleted its ranks; five of its staff were reportedly killed in combat and sixty 
taken prisoner of war by Germany. 80 This was a considerable number for an 
administration with a staff of 678 in 1935. 81 
F or state foresters, serving the nation implied the continuation of their 
forestry management principles. Since at least Colbert's 1669 forestry ordinance. 
the Forestry Administration had pursued a policy of forest amenagement. which 
Tamara Whited describes as a strategy of 'organising a forest for a specific 
purpose,' such as timber production or preventing landslides. With these aims in 
mind, foresters employed the tire-et-aire method, which divided the forest into 
areas of exploitation to be felled in rotation, leaving mature trees standing to 
ensure forest regeneration. 82 While it may make claims to be an objective 
science, it is important to bear in mind that amenagement is based on the 
forester's self-declared ability to assess the long term utility and health of the 
forest and prescribe the necessary measures to ensure its development. 83 
The principle of amenagement stood in opposition to traditional peasant 
practices in the forest, in particular the pasturing of animals and "gardening" (or 
jardinage). a technique geared to local woodland conditions. Peter Sahlins argues 
that during the nineteenth century the Forestry Administration believedjardinage 
79 Whited. Forests and Peasant Politics in Modern France. 181-2. 
ao 'Chronique forestier: Revue des Eaux et Forets 78'7-9 (July-September 1940).323. 
II Gerard Buttoud, Les Consen'oteurs des Eaux-et-Forets sow /a Troiseme Republique, 1870-
1940 (Nancy: Laboratoire d'Economie foresti~re de l'Ecole nationale du Genie Rural et des Eaux 
et Forets. 1981), 12. 
12 Whited, Forests and Peasant Politics. 22-3. . 
13 See Robert Pogue Hmison. Forests: The Shado ..... of Civilisation (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992). 117. 
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produced a disorderly and ravaged 'forest' whereas amenagemenl created order 
and regulated the forest. In other words, as Sahlins continues, it involved laying 
'boundary markers and carving up rationally, geometrically, in a pure Cartesian 
logic, the space of the forest.' 84 By the 1930s, some foresters had recognised that 
jardinage had a role in maintaining forests on mountain slopes, but as a whole 
the administration privileged "ordered" and "rational" forestry management to 
ensure production and guarantee the future of the forest. 
Yet between 1940 and 1944, the demands on the forest threatened to 
undermine its future. Arthur Dugelay, Forestry Inspector in Nice, argued that it 
was 'legitimate' to feel worried about the intensification of forestry production 
which threatened the 'production of the next few years as well as the future' of 
forests in the Alpes-Maritimes. There was hope in areas where forestry 
exploitation was carefully controlled and forest cover was thick, but as 
woodlands in the Alpes-Maritimes were often sparse and impoverished it seemed 
to Dugelay that their 'future has been clearly compromised.' 85 
Amenagement, however, proved itself flexible during the "dark years." 
Despite concerns, such as those of Dugelay, that wartime over-exploitation 
compromised the future of some forests, foresters adapted amenagement to meet 
the increased demands that economic conditions placed on the forest. 
Instructions were sent to conservators at various points instructing them to 
'subordinate the application of amenagemenl to the current necessities of 
production.' 86 
... Peter Sahlins. Forest Rites: The War of the Demoiselles in Nineteenth-Cenlury France 
(Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1994). 50-53. . . .. 
U Dugelay. 'Les deboisements et les reboisements dans les Alpes-Manttmes (suite). 166. . 
16 CACAN 198004701168 Conservateur des Forets. Chef du 2eme Bureau. 'Note pour MonSIeur 
I'lnspecteur-Adjoint Proust. reponse 6 la demande de renseignements du 17 avril 1 94~. relative 
au rapport No. 33 du Commissaire du Pouvoir Forme!')": 21 April 1942. 
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And on a local level, it seems that foresters were well aware of the need 
for productive forests, and so opened up forestry camps and involved themselves 
directly in forestry production. They were ready, in the words of the Conservator 
in Grenoble, 'to make, when needed, the necessary sacrifices for the general 
interest.' 87 At times, this placed them in dispute with local communities. In the 
town of Pradet in the Var, the organiser of local fuel supplies wrote to the 
Secretary of State for the Interior in December 1941 asking permission to chop 
down a forest which 'in winter totally obscures sunlight and keeps the houses in 
[a state] of extraordinary humidity, which can not be countered due to the lack of 
fuel.' Notably, local forestry officials only opposed the move because the forest 
belonged to private owners. They suggested, instead, that wood be taken from 
the communal forest, even though it needed time to rejuvenate. While they were 
prepared to tolerate 'some abuses from the forestry point of view" in light of the 
economic situation, they covered their backs with instructions from the Director 
General of the Forestry Administration reminding them that . it is momentarily of 
an absolute vital necessity for the country to intensify wood production by all 
available means and we are obliged to put the needs of production before all 
other considerations." 88 Elsewhere, the mayor of Mougins (Alpes-Maritimes) 
complained that an 'entrepreneur" was chopping down trees along the Route 
Napoleon thereby 'prejudicing the beauty of the landscape." The local forestry 
17 ADI 2109 W 64 Gobert. Conservateur des Eaux et Fo~ts. Grenoble. to Prefet de rIsere. 
'Rapport: bois de feu.' 19 May 1944. 
I. ADAM 521 W 9 Inspecteur des Fo~ts. Chef de Service. Toulon to Lambert. Secretaire du 
Comptoir des Produits Forestiers. Draguignan. 'Commune de Pradet: besoins en bois de 
chauffage.· 29 December 194 I . 
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official dismissed the complaint as the change to the landscape would only be 
temporary. 89 
At times, adapting amenagement to increase production placed the 
Forestry Administration in conflict with others who pressed for the preservation 
of France's forests. Commenting on the afore-mentioned Touring Club survey, 
one forester stressed that no 'abusive felling' had taken place in state forests, 
even if the administration had modified the timber cutting regime to increase 
production. Consequently, he felt it was 'unfair to say that the designation of cuts 
made by our service is abusive, above all at a time when the intensification of 
forestry production is demanded of us.' 90 
More significantly, the Forestry Administration opposed calls in 1942 to 
create a 500 hectare nature reserve in Trom;ais forest (the reserve's advocates 
claimed that this would preserve an area that displayed the . character of the true 
French forest'91). Foresters argued that the existence of a forest entirely free from 
human intervention was 'essentially theoretical' and, in economic terms, 
Tron~ais was 'one of the jewels of the French forest economy.' 92 They 
prioritised the current demands of the wartime economy as the forest needed to 
be "used and adapted to satisfy our needs with regard to current contingences,' 
and, in the end, the Tron~ais proposal was rejected.93 This decision displeased 
Jacques Chevalier. a self-appointed defender of Tron~ais, who believed that the 
reserve would have been '"particularly opportune at this moment when our forest 
89 ADAM 521 W 7 Caubel, Inspecteur-Adjoint des Eaux et Forets, Nice Ouest, 'Rapport: 
commune de Mougins. reclamation de Monsieur Ie Maire,' 12 November 1940. 
90 Dosse to Ministre de I' Agriculture; and Arbaud. 'Coupes abusives?' 
91 CACAN 19800400/15 Secretaire General and President. Societe d'Emulation du Bourbonnais 
to Jacques Chevalier. 7 July 1941. 
92 CACAN 19800400/15 Directeur de l'Ecole NationaJe Forestiere to Directeur General des 
Fo~ts. Chasse et Peche •. Projet de reserve naturelle en foret de Tron~is,' 27 April 1942. 
93 Ibid: and CACAN 19800400/15 Directeur General des Eaux et Fo~ts to Pierre Salval. 
Inspecteur General des Eaux et Forets. 'Constitution d'une reserve naturelle dans 18 forel 
dominale de Tron~ais.· 3 June 194:!. 
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is subjected to intensive exploitations.' 94 As the case of Tron~is demonstrates. 
amenagement was not a synonym for forest preservation. 95 
However, more dirigiste elements within the government attacked the 
effectiveness of the Forestry Administration and amenagement. In March 1942. 
Formery produced a report questioning the administration's competence. arguing 
that it was overwhelmed by events and unable to exert its authority over private 
foresters. Most damagingly, Formery believed that its inefficiency was holding 
back forestry production. He went so far as to suggest that 'perhaps [France] 
needs a wood dictator.' Formery explicitly attacked amenagement. stating that 
forestry 'conservators mustn't be so miserly, and they must forget the peacetime 
principles of "amenagement." It is no longer the time to fear the destruction of 
the [forest].' Given workforce and transportation problems, Formery argued that 
it was time to abandon felling in remote places, even if prescribed by forest 
management principles. Instead, foresters 'must - even against the wishes of the 
owner - exploit to the maximum. down to the ground, all that is close to roads, 
sawmills, and railway stations.' 96 
In contrast, traditionalists within the government lauded the Forestry 
Administration's stewardship of French forests. Caziot argued that it was 
'without doubt the sole administration that is superior to private owners for the 
management of our heritage. Only it can conceive long plans and steadfastly 
maintain them over the centuries.' 97 Caziot' s comments are predictable, as the 
94 To be fair to Chevalier. he did recognise the reasons behind the intensification of forestry 
production. CACAN 1980040011 5 Jacques Chevalier to Pierre Salvat. Inspecteur General des 
Eaux et Forets. 15 July 1942. 9' In the nineteenth century. tensions had already existed between foresters and preservationists 
with regard to Fontainebleu forest. See Ford 'Nature, Culture and Conservation.' 183-4. 
% Formery. 'Quelques observations.' 1.4-6. . 




Forestry Administration lay within the Ministry of Agriculture, but they clearly 
expose the tensions between traditionalists and technocrats that lay at the heart of 
the Vichy regime. 
Through the Forestry Administration, Vichy aimed to turn the forest into 
an increasingly regulated space to maximise forestry production. As such. its 
vision of the forest seems to correspond with James Scott's argument that states 
reduce forests to sources of revenue and resources. According to Scott. the state's 
vision of the forest excludes its social uses and meanings (as a space for hunting, 
pasturing, worship, and refuge) treating it solely as "an economic resource to be 
managed efficiently and profitably.,98 While Scott's analysis is relevant to Vichy. 
it is also reductive, as traditional elements within the regime located meanings in 
the forest that went beyond production concerns. For Vichy, the forest was both 
an ideological and productive space. Moreover. between 1940 and 1944, the 
forest became a site of ideological contestation as both Vichy and the resistance 
appropriated it for political ends. In both cases, Forestry Administration officials 
played a role, demonstrating that they weren't solely motivated by apolitical, 
technocratic principles of forest management. I turn first to Vichy'S mobilisation 
of the forest. 
Vichy in the forest 
The Vichy regime incorporated the forest into its '''back to the land" ethos 
making it a traditional. stable place to be mobilised as part of its plans to morally 
regenerate France. Jacques Chevalier, conservative philosopher and Minister for 
9& James C. Scott. Seeing Like a Siale: How ('erlain Schemes 10 Impro\'e Ihe Human Condition 
Have Failed (New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1998). 11-13. 
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Public Instruction between December 1940 and February 1941. considered that 
'life in the forest is the most healthy there is for the body and the soul~ freeing us 
from the artifices of modern society.' 99 He suggested that "etemal~' France 
resides in the forest. The forest, therefore, constituted: 
A living symbol of tradition, perpetuating history; old France is preserved better here 
than anywhere else; the present unites effortlessly with the past. In the silence and depth 
of the forest centuries replace one another, slowly, continuously, in the same way that 
the oak's sapwood binds a new layer to those of springs and autumns past 100 
For Chevalier, trees represented a link between France's past and present and 
acted as a guarantor of French traditions. Chevalier's musings on trees and 
tradition are by no means uncharacteristic of the symbolic appropriation of trees. 
As Douglas Davies suggests, the tree is 'a living entity, spanning many human 
generations. As such it avails itself as a historical marker and social focus of 
events.' 101 
In keeping with Vichy'S ruralism~ forestry associations strove to 
incorporate the forest within the "National Revolution:' Just after the defeat, 1. 
Jagerschmidt. the General Secretary of the Comite des forets argued that the 
forest was a 'refuge of [the] old principles' of Travail, Famille, Patrie. For 
Jagerschmidt, the forest epitomised the working spirit that the regime tried to 
foster because 'woodcutters and charcoal burners laughed at the paid holidays 
9Q Jacques Chevalier, La forel de Tron~ais en Bourbonnais (Paris: Editions de la Chronique des 
Lettres fran~aises. 1940), 2. 
100 Ibid. 6. 
101 Douglas Davies. 'The Evocative Symbolism of Trees.' in Denis E. Cosgrove and Stephen 
Daniels (eds.), The Iconography of Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic RepreJt!nlalion. Design. 
and Use of Past Environments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1988). 34. See also 




and forty hour week that the [Third Republic] wanted to impose on them.' Forest 
workers did not need to be told to work 'from sunrise to sunset.' Family and 
forest also went together, according to Jagerschmidt because the forest was a 
'symbol of tradition ... of which the evolutionary rhythm exceeds several times 
the length of human life, [so] chimes perfectly well with the notion of the family, 
the linking of successive generations.' Furthermore, it was in the depths of the 
forest that the country's 'heart' belonged. 102 It is unclear whether such rhetoric 
represents deeply held beliefs or lip service to the newly-installed regime. Either 
way, the forest's politicisation is evident. The irony was, however. that such 
"back to the land" rhetoric simultaneously politicised the forest and constructed 
it as a space of "natural" (and therefore apolitical) values and traditions. 
In a similar way to the peasant. the bucheron (or woodcutter) was 
constructed as a patriotic figure labouring to regenerate France. Working in the 
forest was one way to strengthen male bodies and remake masculinity in post-
defeat France (see also chapter five). 103 Two state foresters, Roger Blais and 
Gerard Luzu, published a guide to the 'tough school' (rude ecole) of the forest, 
which presented forestry work as the most 'radical' return to the land and 'an 
integral part of rural reconstruction.' Blais and Luzu highlighted the 'physical 
and moral enrichment' the forester gleaned from the forest, 'contributing to the 
affirmation of values and personal autonomy within the framework of nature's 
laws and collective life.' In contrast to the comforts offered by the city and the 
forty-hour working week, life in the forest was 'hard and healthy' and 
102 J. Jagerschmidt. • Le programme forestier de la France qui va renaitre: L '.4. c/ion !oresliere el 
piscicole. Nos. 39 and 40. July 1940. 1. 
10:1 Elsewhere. foresters had also been linked to "ideal" forms of masculinity. Kevin Hannam 
argues that the forest officer in India matched Victorian ideals of masculinity through their 'virile 
stoicism and muscular endurance.' See 'Utilitarianism and the Indian Forest Service.' 
Environment and His/ory 6f.! (2000): 222. 
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woodcutting a 'noble and free occupation.' Blais and Luzu also called for the 
forestry profession to confonn to the principles of 'social spirit and true 
hierarchy as outlined by the head of state.' 104 In addition, a 1943 article in Revue 
des Eaux et Forets argued that 'living in nature~ is the 'best schoor and working 
in forestry teams countered individualism and selfishness, as it cultivated the 
I· . f ' 'fi d h . , 105 qua ltles 0 sacn Ice an c anty. In both cases, the vision of forest life 
chimed with Vichy's assumption that hard work was redemptive and served a 
national purpose. 
Likewise, the forestry work of the Chantiers de la Jeunesse contained an 
ideological dimension as it was supposed to ensure young men' s moral and 
physical regeneration. The Chantiers leadership viewed the forest as a safe and 
wholesome place, distant from the supposed immorality and decadence of 
modem society that reached its zenith in the city. From the outset~ the Chantiers 
strove to remove its recruits from the 'deleterious influence of the towns' by 
making them camp out 'in the great outdoors (en pleine nature). in the middle of 
the forest, hidden from all fonns of trouble or agitation.' 106 
The forest supposedly held important lessons for these young men, as it 
did for the rest of society. At Tron«rais, Group One of the Chantiers dedicated a 
tree to their leader, Commissaire Furioux. In his speech during the ceremony. 
Forestry Inspector Desjeux pronounced that 'it is through the living example of 
the forest, an example of tradition, continuity. and grandeur that [Furioux] 
wanted to impress on all those who had the honour of obeying [his] orders.' In a 
similar vein, Forestry Conservator Pascaud used his speech to identify the 
104 Blais et Luzu. Metiers de 10 foret. 5. 56-8. 61. 
105 Berthon. 'De quelques reflex ions sur Ie probleme de la main d'oeuvre forestier.: 489~93. 
106 CHAN AJ )9 166 • Allocution prononcee devant chacun des Groupements (18 RegIon) de la 
Jeunesse Fran~ise (du Ie et lie 800t) - 30 a 35 Groupements-16.000 hommes: [n.d.): and CHAN 
AJ ~9 177 de la Porte du Theil. Les Chon/iers de 10 Jeunessc. 6. 
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forest's exemplary demonstration of 'solidarity.' In particular, the oak tree 
towering serenely above surrounding trees protects them so that they grow to 
share the 'light in which he bathes.' 107 Addressing the Chantiers, Pascaud 
continued: 
This solidarity of all plants, is it not the image of the best of societies where the leader 
must dominate in his pre-eminence while feeling himself surrounded. supported. [and] 
aided [by his fol1owers]? Ifhis entourage fails h~ he succumbs. whatever his qualities. 
Let us remember this example at a moment when divisions lie in wait for us. 108 
There was, however, some discrepancy between the regime's rhetoric and the 
reality of forest life. The Chantiers' leaders were well aware of the young men's 
indifference, even outright hostility, to their new role as woodcutters. A 1943 
report recognised that the early "competition for output' and the Chantiers' 
"mentality of explorers out to discover new lands' had since dissipated. Instead. 
the men no longer recognised the 'usefulness of their work' and the leadership 
itself admitted that 'forestry work, interesting at first quickly becomes 
monotonous, [and] tedious. Their hearts are not in the felling. Boredom is the 
dominant characteristic.' 109 The joys, it seems, of being a woodcutter were lost 
on those forced to work in the forests. 
Nonetheless, the image of the stately oak leading and protecting his 
followers was a popular one. Yvonne Esteinne's illustrated story La belle hisloire 
d'un chene (1943) compared France to a forest that had just been struck by a 
fierce storm. During the storm. trees swayed alarmingly in the wind and petrified 
birds and animals rushed to find shelter: · all the forest is unhappy. It looks for 
107 Chantiers de 18 Jeunesse. Groupement No. I. Inauguration en foret dominale de Tronfais du 
chene dedie au commissaire Furioux. fondaleur de groupement no. I. 22 November 1943. 
101 Ibid. 
109 CHAN AJ 39 S6 'Prescriptions et directives du Commissaire General.' Bulletin periodique 
officiel des Chan/iers de laJelinesse. No. 129, I June 1943.529. 
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help.' Help came from the forest's leader, a ·tall, solid. upright tree' who fears 
nothing and protects its charges. In case her young readers had missed the 
analogy, Esteinne moved the story onto contemporary events, noting how during 
the military defeat the French had fled from the enemy and its bombs 'like the 
rabbits of the wood.' But luckily for France there was hope: "there existed, as 
well, in the forest of France - because men [sic] resemble trees - a tall. beautiful 
oak, already old but so valiant that he stood strong to protect everybody. And this 
tall, beautiful oak was called Marshall petain.' Helpfully, the Petain oak tree 
carefully explained where the forest had gone wrong and how it should reform 
itself. 110 
This ideological appropriation of the forest perhaps reached its high point 
in Tron~ais where an oak tree was named after Petain on the initiative of 
Chevalier (his godson) and in the presence of forestry officials. Like the 
supposedly exceptional qualities of Petain, the oak tree chosen to bear his name 
stood out from the rest; it stood thirty-five metres high, was 260 years old, and 
boasted good foliage. During the naming ceremony, Petain unveiled a plaque 
bearing the words "Chene Marechal Petain" and made three marks on the tree 
with a Forestry Administration hammer. On one level, this event· can be 
interpreted within the framework of the cult of personality created around Petain, 
who admitted that he hoped that he would be able to 'remain as upright as this 
tree in order to be able to devote [himself] to the service of the country.' The 
ceremony also implied that petain. like his oak tree, embodied the latest in a 
vulnerable line of strong, upright men devoted to France. As Chevalier noted 
110 Yvonne Esteinne. illustrated by M. de MontfaJcon, La beile hislOire d'un chene (Grenoble: 
Editions de 18 Revue "Les Alpes," 1943). 
110 
Chapter Three 
during the ceremony, 'who could doubt a country which produces such trees and 
such men?' 111 
But beyond the construction of Petain's cult of personality. it is not too 
fanciful to see this marking of the tree as a performative device to reinforce the 
importance of the forest and the state's claim to govern it. The occasion also 
served as a reminder of the forest's historical role as "saviour~' of France. During 
the ceremony, Chevalier reminded his audience that this ancient forest provided 
wood for the navy in 1793 and timber for the army in 1917. 112 Caziot. in a 
speech prepared for the ceremony, also emphasised that the forest was a 
productive space of 'exceptional value for the material reconstruction of the 
country.' 113 Now that France had crumbled under German invasion, Tron~ais 
(and other forests) were to enable the nation to recover its former glory. 
Furthermore, the ceremony suggested that Tron~ais, which the state had 
replanted in the late seventeenth century, was physical evidence that France 
could rebuild itself under Vichy'S guidance. Caziot called for a contemporary 
display of determination equal to that of foresters who had replanted Tron~ais: 
The state of the Tron~ais forest in 1670, was it not the image of France today, of the 
ravaged France, morally demolished by more than half a century of hideous demagogy? 
The war then added its own disasters. Today. everything must be remade, morally and 
materially. It is a fearsome task and one which demands long and patient effort as the rot 
runs deep. But the base has remained healthy and solid and allows for hope ... On this 
III Chevalier, La foret de Tron~ais, 155. See also Inspecteur Dubois de la Sabloniere. 'Le 
marechal Petain en Foret de Tron~ais.' Revue des Eallx et Forets. 79/2 (February 194). 126-7. 
112 Chevalier, La foret de Tronfais. 154. 
III Apparently. the speech was not delivered during the ceremon~ ~ue to time constraints .. It was. 
however. published in the Revue des Eaux e/ Fore/s. See 'VISlle de la Foret domanlale de 
Tron~ais: 59-60. The productive nature of the forest was also high~ighted by the Ch~tiers. de la 
Jeunesse. who claimed that for them Tron~s 'evokes [our] wo~ In the forest and In particular 




solid base, which is the foundation of France, we can. in the image of Tron~ais. remake 
a vigorous and healthy France. The oak which bears [Petain's] name must be a lesson 
and a symbol for everyone. 114 
In this speech, Caziot compared the Third Republic with the damaged pre-l 6 70 
forest, but suggested that all was not lost because the forest' s essential nature 
(like France's) had remained intact. There is also a sense that the forest's and 
France's "true" essence lay beneath the surface of democracy and modernity. 
waiting to be recovered and restored. Such an assumption supports Herman 
Lebovics' analysis of the right-wing construction of "True France:' a 'discourse 
[that] employs the essentialist determinist language of a lost hidden authenticity 
that, once uncovered, yields a single. immutable national identity.' 115 
Yet the forest's political symbolism need not be reactionary. Vichy's 
appropriation of the oak tree echoed previous state manipulation of this species. 
Ironically, given Vichy'S hostility to the French Republic, in the years following 
the French Revolution, oaks were moulded into "Liberty Trees." And like Vichy, 
revolutionary governments elevated the oak to the status of a "beacon tree: 
controlling (and sheltering) surrounding trees. 116 Moreover. French resistance 
units occupied the forest's physical and symbolic space, transforming it into a 
site of resistance and reclaiming it from Vichy. 
II" 'Visite de la Fo~t domaniale de Tron~is: 59-60. 
lIS Lebovics. True France. 9. 
116 Andree Corvol. "The Transfonnation of a Political Symbol: Tree Festivals in France from the 
Eighteenth to the Twentieth Centuries.' French History 4/4 ( 1990).463-5. 
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The resistance reclaims the forest 
As the Occupation dragged on, resistance fighters identified the forest as 
a place to seek refuge and a base from which to oppose the Vichy regime and the 
occupier. In some ways this manifested itself symbolically. At Tron~ais in 
February 1943, a resister reportedly scaled Petain's oak, replacing the plaque 
bearing the Marshall's name with the following: 
Chene Gabriel Peri 
French Patriot 
Shot by the Nazis. 117 
Consequently, Petain's oak is now officially known as the 'Oak of the 
Resistance.' liS But beyond this symbolic act, the resistance reclaimed the forest 
in more material ways. 
The wartime economy and Vichy's attempts to boost forestry production 
ironically aided the resistance as the increased number of forestry camps 
provided excellent cover. The resistance therefore had a physical presence in the 
forests as camps provided shelter and employment for young men evading 
compulsory labour in Germany. as well as for foreign refugees, Jews escaping 
deportation. and other would-be maquisards. One important example is the 
Pelanq forestry camp in the Var. created by Daniel Ungemach r~Benedicte"). Dr 
Paul Schmierer. Roger Taillefer and Inspector DuChamp of the Forestry 
117 Roger Chassaingt. La vie en/orel de Tronrais de juin 1940 a oClobre 1944 (Nice: published 
by the author. 1999). 102. Chassaingt dismisses reports that resisters opened fire on Petam's oak. 
Ifl 'La foret de Tron~s: Office National des Forets website, 
http://www.onf.fr/foretldossierltroncais/3-pl.htm. consu Ited 10 November 200 5. 
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Administration. 119 Under the scheme they devised, Benedicte hired employees 
and fed and lodged them, while the Forestry Administration covered salaries and 
bought the timber and wood charcoal that the camp produced. And although 
Pelanq didn't generate much revenue, it did become something of a flagship 
forestry camp in the Var. 120 Tensions did, however, exist between the camp's 
leaders and the Forestry Administration, as the former accused the latter of not 
providing enough material support and of 'shamefully exploiting' them. 121 
Leaving asid~ these differences and the fact that the camp never fought as a unit 
(although many of its members took part in Liberation battles). all bar one the 
Pelanquois survived the war. As such, according to a Forestry Inspector who 
visited the camp, 'the unique experience of the state-run camp of Pelanq was an 
exceptional success as muchfrom the human as the forestry point of view: 122 
In the Vercors, forestry camps and charcoal burning operations provided 
cover for those trying to keep a discreet profile. As Philippe Hanus notes. many 
of these clandestine workers subsequently .. entered into dissidence' and became 
active in the resistance. 123 For instance, the Ambel farm forestry camp on the 
massif s western flank was a large-scale venture where up to 150 men could be 
employed at anyone time, many of whom were Polish and Jewish refugees. 12.t 
But although these new forestry workers lived outside the law, this did not mean 
that the rules of the forest were totally disregarded. At the Geves maquis camp in 
119 For more on the background to the camp see Jean-Marie Guillon, 'La Resistance dans Ie Var: 
Essai d'histoire politique.' PhD diss. University of Aix-en-Provence (1989). Part 3. Chapter 2. 5-
6. "Benedicte" was the fonner leader of the Marseille section of the Centre americain de secoUtS. 
120 ADV I J 240 'Le Pelanq selon Benedicte,' November 1983.5-7.20. 
121 Taillefer was particularly critical. See ADV I J 240 'Le Pelanq selon Taillefer: May 1983. 
122 Quoted in 'Le Pelanq selon Benedicte: 23. Emphasis in original. 
12l Philippe Hanus. Je suis ne charbonnier dans Ie Vercors: petite histoire des hommes dans la 
foret (Lans-en-Vercors: CPIE Vercors. 2000). 122-3 
12~ Ironically. a Gennan company took over the exploitation at Ambel in February 1944 so the 
maquisards' timber production fed the Gennan war machine. ~ee ~bid. 123-4. See also Lieutenant 
Stephen. Vercors: Premier Maquis de France (Valence: Impnmene Nouvelle. 1991).26.86-7. 
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the Vercors, felling was reportedly conducted with the advice of forestry guards 
who selected which trees to cut to maintain the forest~s 'balance.' 125 
The examples of Pelanq and the Vercors are suggestive of the ways in 
which the figure of the bucheron was incorporated into the resistance. subverting 
Vichy'S politicalisation of the woodcutter. There were, however, similarities 
between the attitudes of resisters and Vichy propaganda towards life in the forest. 
Both recognised that the life of the bucheron was demanding. According to 
Taillefer, daily life at Pelanq was extremely difficult. Food and water were in 
short supply and there were 'numerous injuries.' Consequently. heroism and 
fortitude manifested themselves in the camp less in its role as a maquis than in 
the 'bloody hands of our inexperienced biicherons.' 126 Benedicte was more 
positive, celebrating the bucheron's noble character and his 'hard but pure' work. 
which was somewhat reminiscent of Vichy rhetoric. 127 
Like Vichy, some resisters recognised the transformative qualities of life 
in the forest. For instance, Lieutenant Stephan. an experienced woodcutter and 
resister at Ambel, believed that the "rude life of the forest' was an effective 
preparation for fighting the occupier. 128 Certain resisters also shared the notion 
with Vichy that working in the forest was a connection with "authenticity." For 
instance, one young maquisard at Ambel explained to Stephan why he was so 
attracted to the life of the bucheron: 
In Hanus. Je suis ne charbonnier dans Ie Vercors. 124. 
126 Quoted in 'Le Pelanq selon Benedicte: 13. 
127 One member of the camp apparently wrote to Benedicte in 1945 admitting that he would 
'happily exchange [his] current situation to go back to the time when [he] was a bucheron.' 'Le 
Pelanq selon Benedicte: 13-4.35. For a wider exploration of the ideologica~ links betwee~ Vichy 
and the resistance, see Christopher Flood. 'Petain and de Gaulle: Makmg the Meanmgs of 
Occupation.' in Valerie Holman and Debra Kelly. France at War in the TM'en~i~th Cenl.ury: 
Propaganda. Mylh. and Melaphor (New York: Berghahn.1000). 88-110; and Domtnlque Veillon. 
'The Resistance and Vichy' in S. Fishman el al. France al War. 161-77. 
121 Stephan. VercOl's.26. 
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One feels better for being in contact with concrete realities. To know exactly what is in 
front of you; to battle against demanding difficulties, but ones which don't deceive [you]; 
to measure, each day, your victory against a beautiful and noble material; to have the 
feeling that this adversary [the tree] against which you are going to measure yourself has 
waited for you for perhaps a century; [and] that nature has nourished it with its sap, rain. 
wind ... is that not beautiful? 129 
But although there were similarities between Vichy and the resistance's symbolic 
appropriation of the woodcutter, their aims were diametrically opposed. The 
former was designed to support the regime, the latter to bring it down. 
Numerous foresters were present at the naming of the Chene Petain in 
November 1940, but as the years passed increasing numbers of them turned 
towards resistance. Although it is difficult to assess the full extent of this 
resistance activity, there are some clues. The May 1945 edition of Revue des 
Eaux et Forets lists five foresters (of Inspector and Inspector-Adjoint ranks) 
killed by the 'enemy' between the armistice and Liberation. Although 
unconfirmed, presumably the reason for many of these deaths was resistance 
activity. Subsequent issues of the journal carried obituaries of foresters • killed for 
France' (morts pour la France) while Lieutenant-Colonel Daviron praised the 
'most precious support' that foresters had offered to the resistance. such as the 
'concealment of military officers and refractaires. the installation of camps, and 
the provision of transport and materials.' 130 On a local level, a 1948 report on 
resistance and foresters in the Hautes-Alpes suggested that "almost all forestry 
officials helped resistance organisations.' acting as mountain guides, liaison 
agents. and camp organisers. In addition, forestry buildings served as resistance 
129 Quoted in ibid. 27. . . 
DO 'Chronique forestier,' Revue des Eaux el ForelS 83/5 (May 1945). 294. 'Chromque forestler. 
n6crologie: morts pour 18 France.' Re\'Ue des Eaux el Forels 83/7 (July 1945).419-22. 
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headquarters and bases and at least six foresters in the departemenJ bore arms 
against German troops. 131 As the report came from within Forestry 
Administration ranks, it should be treated with caution, although there is 
corroborating evidence from the Brian~on area that foresters assisted resistance 
activity. 132 
The transformation of the forest into a site of resistance was not without 
precedent. As Robert Pogue Harrison argues, European forests have sheltered 
'outcasts' of all kinds since at least the Middle Ages. 133 Similarly. Philippe 
Barrier argues that the history of outlaws and (pre-Second World War) resisters 
indicates that forest is 'not only a base for alternative society (contre-societe). 
but in times of trouble, a place of real counter power.' 134 More specifically. in 
nineteenth-century France, Sahlins shows how peasants in the Ariage 
transformed the forest into a place of revolt against state and business interests. 
The War of the Demoiselles was another example of how the forest became a 
• site of revolt and subversion by alien and opposed elements of the structured, 
hierarchical social order.' 135 
It is difficult to identify direct causal links between these various histories 
of resistance. but it is clear that rural resisters added a new chapter to the forest' s 
subversive character. Moreover, the participation of state foresters in resistance 
131 ADHA 1042 W 3 Cusin. Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets, Gap-Est, 'Rapport: documentation 
~ur I'Histoire de la Guerre.· 10 June 1948. 
32 See ADHA 1042 W 3 Adjoint-delegue for the maire de Brian~on, 'Documentation pour 
I'Histoire de la guerre,' 7 June 1948. 
m Harrison, Forests: The Shadow o/Civilisation, 61. 
134 Philippe Barrier, Foret /egendaire: conIes. Iegendes. coutumes. anecdotes sur les /orets de 
France (Evreux: Christian de BartilJat. 1991). 164. In other wars. resistance fighters and refugees 
have also taken to the forest for cover. On Vietnam. see Biggs. Managing a Rebel Landscape.' 8-
II; and Stevens. The Trail. On Jews in Eastern Europe during the Holocaust see Nechama Tee. 
'Jewish Resistance in Belorussian Forest: Fighting and the Rescue of Jews.' in Ruby Rohrlich 
(cd.), Resisting Ihe H%cawil. (Oxford: Berg. 1998). 77-94. Vadort estimates that twenty 
conflicts took place in forests across the world in 2005. Many of these involved rebel groups. 
such as the Karen in Myanmar (Burma). Guerres et environnemenl. 182-3. 
135 Sahlins. Forest Riles. :!9-30. 
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activity is a new development in this history. Previous revolts, such as the War of 
Desmoiselles, were often against the forestry administration, whereas during the 
Second World War foresters used their position as agents of the state to subvert 
the regime and oppose foreign occupation. And, beyond such ··classic ,. resistance 
activity, state foresters also . opposed the actions of Italian and German troops 
whom they perceived as undermining forest amenagement. 
Occupying the forest 
Occupation armies and foresters held different conceptions of the forest. 
F or the former it was a place to carry out manoeuvres and secure firewood, while 
for the latter it was a space to control and regulate. These wildly divergent 
attitudes clashed repeatedly between 1940 and 1944 (I discuss post-1944 tensions 
between foresters and Allied forces in chapter six). A major obstacle confronting 
foresters' ability to manage the forest was the establishment of military exclusion 
zones, which restricted the movement of forest fire surveillance teams rendering 
fire-fighting difficult if not impossible. 136 Although soldiers sometimes helped 
extinguish blazes (one town mayor praised the 'splendid attitude' of a 
detachment of Italian troops, including their "drive, calmness, energy. and 
determination' 137) they were, in general, an obstruction to forest fire controls 
and the enforcement of other regulations. 
136 See ADAM 521 W 57 Lieutenant Lafforgue, Chef du Service des Incendies de foret to 
Commandant Chaudiere, Officier fran~s de liaison pres de noyau Italien de liaison et contrOle. 
~Renseignements sur )'organisation du dispositions de protection contre les incendies de forets.' 
[n.d.]; ADAM 521 W 57 President de la Delegation speciale de Castellar to Prefet des Alpes-
Maritimes. 'lncendie de 3 aoOt 1943: ADAM 521 W 57 Maire de Luceram to PrCfet des Alpes-
Maritimes. 'Incendie de 3 aoOt 1943.' 6 August 1943. 
137 ADAM 521 W 57 Maire de Turbie to Prefet des Alpes-Maritimes. 'Rapport sur une incendic 
qui s'est declare dans la region du Mont Bataille: :W July 1943. 
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Foresters feared that without their presence In the fores~ local 
communities and peasants would commit endless forestry offences. In Monaco' s 
hinterland, an Italian commander took it upon himself to deny foresters access to 
the forest. The latter complained that this "interdiction ... considerably hampers 
surveillance of [state forests]" making it 'practically impossible to regulate 
offences.' 138 Another forester reported that once Italian soldiers had withdrawn 
for the winter months from their posts in the Haute Vallee de la Vesubie. locals 
had seized the chance to cut wood in the forest with no restrictions as foresters 
did not have the right to enter the forest (presumably in their capacity as French 
officials). 139 
The changing geopolitical situation caused problems for foresters. For 
instance, the redrawn Franco-Italian border paSsed through the communal forest 
of St-Etienne-de-Tinee and a recently replanted state forest. Foresters feared 
arrest if they inadvertently crossed the line, yet suspected that . certain 
delinquents' among the local population would not display a 'similar prudence: 
Instead they would take advantage of the lack of official surveillance to illegally 
fell trees and pasture their animals in the forest, thereby compromising recent 
plantations and provoking landslides. Foresters asked the French-Italian 
Armistice Commission to consider granting them access to patrol the forests 
(particularly as they represented no military interest) or, if that measure proved 
unacceptable. ensure that Italian troops increased their surveillance of the forest. 
Otherwise, the consequences of uncontrolled pasturing alarmed foresters; 'the 
state has spent huge sums [of money] on these correctional works and planting 
138 ADAM 521 W 5 Bergogne. Inspecteur-Adjoint des Eaux et Forets. Nice-Ouest. . Autorities 
militaries italiennes: interdiction d'acces dans la region du Col de BraDs,' 8 May 1943. 
119 ADAM 521 W 6 Bosio. Inspecteur-Adjoint des Eaux et Forets, Nice-Est. 'Rappon: delits en 
zone occupe,' 1 December 1941. 
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trees on this land ... animals are likely to kill these trees and their passage 
compromise the stability of the recently laid down soil. leading to falling rocks.' 
This threatened to block a major road below. 140 
These concerns need to be seen in the light of foresters' longstanding 
belief that peasant practices compromised the health and future of mountain 
forests, yet they demonstrate how the presence of occupation armies added a new 
twist to these tensions between the state and peasant communities. 141 The case 
also shows the belief widely held by foresters that an unregulated forest would 
inevitably degrade. 
In the eyes of foresters, occupation soldiers, like peasants. were 
undisciplined forest users. Military felling dictated by short term concerns 
conflicted with the long-term-ism of amenagement, and the Forestry 
Administration tried to bring military felling under some kind of control. Yet 
foresters had limited means at their disposal. One forester recognised that they 
were unable to prevent troops from taking timber as and when they needed it. 
Instead. he argued that their role should be to advise and select the trees to be 
felled; "this designation by a competent technical service will enable us to avoid 
wasting forestry resources that is inevitable with all troops untrained on the 
subject, whatever their nationality: He recommended that Italian troops should 
consult French foresters when they wanted wood and, in those zones which were 
out of bounds for military reasons, the Italian forestry service should regulate 
140 ADAM 521 W 6 Leroy. Inspecteur-Adjoint des Eaux et Forets charge de !'interim de 
I'inspection a Nice-Est. 19 June 1943. 
141 See Whited. Peasant Politics in Modern France. Geographers in interwar France also accused 
the peasantry of contributing to deforestation. See, for instance. Arbos, La vie pastorale dans les 
Alpes fran~aises. 41. Foresters in other European countries also believed that peasant activity led 
to forest degradation and that only they could ensure the long-tenn management of this resource. 
See A. S. Mather and J. Fairburn, . From Floods to Reforestation: The Forest Transition in 
Switzerland: Environment and History 6/4 (2000): 399-421: and Gerhard Weiss. 'Mountain 
Forest Policy in Austria: A Historical Policy Analysis on Regulating a Natural Resource.' 
Environment and History 7/3 (200 I): 335-55. 
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c. st I" 142 lore ry exp OltatlOns. It seems that he favoured foreign control over these 
areas rather than a state of anarchy to emerge in the forest. Similarly. another 
inspector recognised that the Forestry Administration could not prevent troops 
from making unexpected cuts, but at the very least foresters should 'ensure that 
these exploitations were done in the least damaging way to the forest and that the 
timber taken was inventoried as precisely as possible.' 143 
However, army units could be deliberately obstinate. withholding their 
identities from foresters who challenged their unauthorised felling, making it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the felling to be regularised and paid 
for. 144 Moreover, a lone forester was physically no match for an army unit. One 
Forestry Inspector, obviously shaken after an encounter with a German patrol 
and its dogs, feared a future 'accident or incident' and refused thereafter to patrol 
that particular forest. 145 Some of the only options available to foresters were 
complaining to military commanders and writing reports detailing forest abuses. 
In the Alpes-Maritimes, foresters filed numerous reports on the Italian soldiers' 
illegal felling. For instance, a report filed in November 1943 complained that the 
Italian troops cut wood 'without any control.' 146 This became a recurrent 
complaint; the Forestry Inspector in Draguignan described such felling as 
142 ADAM 521 W 6 Conservateur des Eaux et Forets to Prefet des Alpes-Maritimes. 24 May 
1943. 
143 ADAM 521 W 6 Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Nice Ouest., 'Note de service.' 26 January 
1943. 
144 See. for example. ADAM 521 W 6 Leroy. Inspecteur-Adjoint des Eaux et Forets charge de 
l'interim de l'inspection a Nice-Est., 'Rapport,' 24 June 1943; and ADAM 521 W 6 Michel. 
Garde des Eaux et Forets. Mougins. 'Proces-verbal de constat no. 6: 5 August 1944: 
14' ADHA 1043 W 74 Allouard. Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Brian~on. 'Rapport' 15 October 
1943. 
146 ADAM 521 W 6 Conservateur des Eaux et forets. Nice. 'Note de Service: ravitaillement en 




'absolutely arbitrary and irregular.' 147 Although at times troops cut wood 
'according to the rules of sylviculture,' it seems that the 'richness and ease of ... 
exploitation' was more likely to dictate where and when timber was extracted 
from the forest, at least according to the Forestry Inspector at Embrun in the 
Hautes-Alpes. 148 
Soldiers also proved themselves to be extremely inconsiderate among the 
trees. On one occasion in the Breil-sur-Roya communal forest, Italian troops 
were so careless when transporting timber out of the forest that they damaged 
young plantations on the edge of the forestry road. 149 Such carelessness could 
have serious repercussions. Not infrequently. blazes broke out during troop 
manoeuvres and military exercises and at times foresters blamed fires on the 
'imprudence of passing Italian troops.' 150 
Perhaps most gallingly, occupation troops undermined foresters' previous 
reforestation work. Italian troops stationed on Mont Boron in Nice caused 
damage through unauthorized felling and allowing their mules to roam freely 
throughout the forest. Foresters were understandably aggrieved by the situation 
as they had painstakingly replanted Mont Boron from 1860 onwards turning it 
into 'a fine success story of Aleppo Pine reforestation on very dry terrain.' The 
Italian troops had therefore destroyed years of investment and hard work. 
147 ADAM 521 W 6 Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets, Draguignan, to Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets, 
Nice, 7 July 1943. 
148 ADHA 1043 W 74 Arnaud, lnspecteur des Eaux et Forets, Embrun. 'Rapport: occupation par 
les ltaliens: coupes abusives,' 4 September 1942; and ADHA 1043 W 74 Conservateur des Eaux 
et Forets, Gap to Inspecteur General des Eaux et Forets, 9 April 1942. 
149 ADAM 521 W 6 Fevrier. lnspecteur-Adjoint des Eaux et Forets. Nice. 'Rapport.' 17 March 
1943. 
I~O For the Alpes-Maritimes see ADAM 521 W 52 'Bulletin de renseignements sur l'incendie 
constate Ie 20 juillet 1943'; ADAM 521 W 52 'Bulletin de renseignements sur l'incendie constate 
Ie 5 janvier 1944'; and ADAM 521 W 57 Commissaire de Police de Vallauris to Preret des 
Alpes-Maritimes. Service des Incendies de Forets, 'Feu de foret.' 5 June 1943. For the Bouches-
du-RhOne see ADBDR 76 W 33 Gendanne nationale, 15e legion, compagnie des Bouches-du-
RhOne. No. 180512 'Confinnation message telephone ce jour 9 juillet 1943 a 19h: For the Var 
see ADV 1790 W 130 Millischer. Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Draguignan. 'Rapport 
trimestriel: 23 October 1942. 
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.Forestry officials realised that they couldn't question the actual presence of 
troops on Mont Boron, but they did request that soldiers consult them before 
modifying the forest in an effort to conciliate 'military aims with the interest of 
the forest.' 151 
It was not only forestry officials who expressed concern over the soldier' s 
actions. The Institut National d' Action Sanitaire protested demands made by 
Italian troops for timber from the grounds of its sanatorium at Vallauris, arguing 
that 'it seems essential that this forest .. .is saved in its entirety' because of the 
'influence it can have on the treatment of the ill.' 152 Local communities were 
also deeply concerned about occupation armies' forays into the forest. In July 
1943, the town council of St-Sauveur in the Alpes-Martimes feared that the 
Italian army planned to clear-cut forests in the parts of their commune which 
now lay in Italy. The council argued that the scheme threatened the village's 
economic future, would lead to landslides, and would destroy the commune's 
'forest character' (ambiance forestiere).' 153 Overall. Italian occupation forces 
had reportedly damaged 350 hectares of state forests in the region through 
requisitions and 'abusive felling,' although total damage to the region' s forests 
would have been higher as this figure excludes private forests. 154 
lSI ADAM 521 W 6 Joesph Ezojani and Roger Millo, 'Proces-verbal de delit, 22 March 1943; 
and Beaugerie, Garde-General des Eaux et FOl-ets, Nice-Ouest, 'Rapport: coupes et dommages 
causes par les troupes italiennes.' 25 March 1943. The Italians were not the first troops to have 
threatened this particular forest. A 1904 Eaux et Forets report criticised the 'damage and abuses' 
carried out by French soldiers. ADAM 7 M 795 Salvador, Inspecteur-Adjoint des Eaux et Forets. 
Nice. 'Rapport: manoeuvres: 9 November 1907. 
152 In this case. the Italian authorities withdrew the requisition demand stating that they always 
tried to obtain wood through 'amicable cessions.' ADAM 521 W 6 Gerard Estradier to 
Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Nice. 27 April 1943: and letter from Lt-Colonel Clementin. 
Detachment de Liaison pres la lYe Annee italienne. 18 May 1943. 
IS) ADAM 521 W 6 Maire de St-Saveur. 'Extrait du registre des deliberations du Conseil 
Municipal de la commune de St-Saveur. seance du II juillet 1943: exploitation par r autorite 
italienne de la foret du Bois noir.' 
1S4 Commission Consultative des Dommages et des Reparations. Evalualion des Dommages !fub':'i 
par /0 France du fail de 10 ~erre et de I'occupalion ennemi (I 939-1 945}. Part imputable Q 
I'/Iolie (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale. 1946).68. 
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As well as acting as a reservoir of natural resources. the forest was also a 
strategic site for occupation troops. In terms of forest conservation this could cut 
both ways. On the one hand, forests provided camouflage and soldiers demanded 
their conservation, for example along strategic routes. In the forest of Blausac in 
the Alpes-Maritimes, Italian troops asked for the abandonment of a felling 
operation due to 'camouflage reasons,' and also demanded the maintenance of 
tree cover above and below the 'strategic route' of Col de Braus. 155 But on the 
other hand, military imperatives sometimes dictated the removal of trees. On at 
least one occasion Italian troops reportedly felled trees to make 'obstacles 
intended to prevent enemy planes [from] landing.' 156 More seriously, at Trets in 
the Bouches-du-Rhone, a forest fire raged across 800 hectares in August 1943. 
At first, officials thought that Germans forces started the fire to disperse a maquis 
unit that had assembled in the area. A 1947 report. however, dismissed this 
theory, suggesting instead that the fire was started to create sightlines for German 
soldiers surveying strategic routes in the area. The reconstruction cost of this 
military modification came to twelve million francs. 157 
Occupation troops presented a sustained challenge to the Forestry 
Administration's control over France' s forests. Having already been forced to 
adapt their principle of amenagement to meet spiralling demands for forestry 
production, foresters saw their sovereignty slip away as occupation armies 
tightened their grip on French territory and resources. As the Occupation 
progressed, regulating the forests became more and more of a frantic exercise in 
I" ADAM 521 W 5 lnspecteur des Eaux et Forets charge de l'interim de l'inspection de Nice 
Ouest to Bensa. 20 April 1943; and Contes. Brigadier des Eaux et Forets to Inspecteur des Eaux 
et Forets. Nice Ouest. 22 April 1943. 
156 ADAM 521 6 Inspecteur-Adjoint des Eaux et Forets. Nice Ouest. to Conservateur des Eaux et 
Forets. Nice. 6 July 1943. 
m ADBDR 5 I W 25 Service dommages assimiles. dossier CA 42.442 Ag. 'Incendies de foret du 
19 au 23 aoOt 1943: 2 June 1947. 
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damage limitation. Huge quantities of wood bypassed the Forestry 
Administration, ending up on the black market or into the hands of occupation 
armies. Both Italian and German armies illegally requisitioned wood through 
their own felling or buying timber directly from French merchants. As one 
Forestry Conservator admitted in 1941, 'in reality the quantities of wood 
requisitioned by the Germans are much greater [than state records indicate] 
because direct buying from private exploiters is frequent.' 158 In May 1942. the 
Secretary General of the GIF Central Committee wrote to Oberlandforstmeister 
Haussman, the head of the German Forest Service, to complain that "a certain 
number of German organisations have already undertaken forestry 
exploitations ... under irregular conditions [and] without any declaration.' 159 In 
response to such pressures, the German army issued an Ordonnance on 12 
August 1943 in an attempt to regularise the situation, but this appears to have had 
little effect. 160 
The quantity of wood purloined by the German army was enormous, and 
their demands for French timber continued even after the D-Day Landings in 
June 1944. 161 According to the CCDR (whose findings need to be treated with a 
degree of caution), Germany misappropriated over twenty six million cubic 
IS8 CACAN 19771461141 Deslandres, Conservateur des Eaux et Forets, Amiens. to Directeur 
General des Forets, de la Chasse, et de la Peche, 'Etat d'avancement de la livraison du chauffage 
aI' Armee d' occupation.' 25 September 1941. 
159 For instance, in the Seine-Inferieur departement the German military cut over 200 hectares of 
timber. CACAN 19771461/41 Secretaire General, Comite central des Groupements 
Interprofessionels Forestiers to Oberlandforstmeister Haussmann. Chef du Service Forestier 
Allemand, 'Exploitations forestieres par des Services Allemands' 27 May 1942. 
160 For the Ordonnance see CACAN 19771461141 Comite central des Groupements 
interprofessionels forestiers to Conservateurs regionaux des Forets. Controleurs generaux de la 
Production forestiere. presidents des Comites regionaux de Gestion de la Zone Nord. . Lettre-
circulaire. exploitations de bois sur pied et achats de bois abanus effectues par les Unites et 
Services allemands.' 21 August 1943. 
161 CACAN 19771461/41 Pour Ie Gouverneur Militaire, Le Chef de I'Administration Militaire. 
Par Ordre. Haussman to Comite central des Groupements interprofessionels forestiers .. Enquete 
sur I'acheminement de bois brut pour carburants solides et de bois de feu dans la region 
parisienne: 23 July 1944. 
125 
Chapter Three 
metres of construction and industry-grade timber worth over eight billion francs 
of 1938 value (figures three and four). 162 
~igure 3. German requisitions of wood for construction and industry (raw timber 
ID m~ 
Direct Impositions 1940 (2'" 1941 1942 1943 1944 Total 
semester) 
Imposed on France 1,915,627 3,831,254 3,355,869 4,310,354 3.585,675 16.998.959 
EXpOrted to Germany 195,737 379,474 490,480 69,155 292.946 1.427.792 
Exported to Eastern 
-
500 65,000 110,000 18.000 193,500 
departments 
EXpOrted to Belgium 
-
11,500 30,000 18,000 15,000 74.500 
Total (direct 2,111,364 4,222,728 3,941,349 4,507,689 3,911,612 18.694. -;51 
impositions) 
1ndirect impositions and 993,307 1,986,615 2,170,538 1,810.593 829,086 7.790./39 
'achats libres ' 
Total 'German 3,104,671 6,209,343 6,111,887 6,318,282 4.740.707 26.484.890 
misappropriatioDs' 
(bois detournil 
Source: CommIssion consultative des dommages et des reparations. Dommages subis 
par la France et l'Unionfran~aise dufait de la guerre et de l'occupation ennemie 
(1939-1945) (lmprimerie nationale, 1951), 10 vols. Vol. 6 Monograph M.P.18 
'Prelevements allemands de matieres premieres: bois et produits forestiers (Imprimerie 
nationale, 1947),24. 
Figure 4. German impositions (global figures in thousands of francs, cork excluded) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Totals 
Wood for 1,100,737 2,209.050 2,810.888 3,176,102 3.567,701 12,864.480 
Industry and 
Construction 
Forest fuels - - 217.155 976.635 1.661.733 2.855.523 
Fire wood 43.908 87,818 99.530 90.481 119,040 440.777 
Resinous 149,180 200,370 313.460 281,540 950 945,500 
products 
Total fnnes, 1,293,825 2,497,238 3,441,033 4,524,758 5,349,426 17,106,280 
1947 value 
Total francs 904,772 1,451,880 1,703,481 1,925,428 2,057,471 8,043,032 
1938 value 
Source: Commission consultative des dommages et des reparations. Dommages subis 
par la France et I'Unionfran~aise dufait de la guerre el de l'occupation ennemie 
(1939-1945) (lmprimerie nationale, 1951), 10 vols. Vol. 6 Monograph M.P.lS 
'Prelevements allemands de matieres premieres: bois et produits forestiers' (Imprimerie 
nationale, 1947). 72. 
These enormous requisitions deprived French society of badly needed wood. as 
well as contributing to the overexploitation of France's forests between 1940 and 
1944. Moreover. these figures confirm that, as in other areas, Vichy" s policy of 
collaboration with Germany secured few advantages for France. especially as the 
war progressed. 
162 Commission consultative. Dommuges subis par la France ell·Unionfran~aise. Vol 6. 7:'. 
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Fighting in the forest 
As well as being productive and political spaces, forests became arenas 
for military combat. Local authorities in Provence had recognised the dangers 
Allied bombing raids posed to forests and agriculture since at least 1941. 
identifying a 'grave danger' of combat-related fires, particularly during the 
summer, and issuing instructions on how to deal with incendiary devices. On a 
national level, the Vichy government shared these concerns. 163 In 1942, the head 
of the gendarmerie in the Bouches-du-Rhone even suggested that foreign and 
anti-government elements were behind the upsurge in forest fires: 
It is inadvisable to reject a priori the hypothesis of concerted action, executed to order, 
with the aim of creating difficulties for the [Vichy] regime. No information supports 
these presumptions, but can we really believe in the complete passivity of French 
extremists, Polish or Spanish miners from the Gardonne or Greasque coalmines, [or] 
former militants, too compromised to try to obtain an armistice from the government, 
who are no doubt familiar with the sabotage attempts recently committed in the mine 
shafts? Aren't forest fires easier to start, and with less risk? 164 
In fact, such logic was counter-intuitive. for once resistance groups began to seek 
shelter in forests it made no sense for them to deliberately destroy the vegetation 
that provided their cover. Rather. German forces used fire to flush out the maquis. 
On the Canjuers plateau in the Haut-V ar during August 1944. German soldiers 
16.1 ADAM 109 W 8 Prefet des Alpes-Maritimes to Sous-Prefect de Grasse and Maires des Alpes-
Maritimes, 'Engins incendaires utilises par certains aeronautiques.' [n.d.]; and ADAM 109 W 8 
Ministre Secretaire d'Etat a la guerre to Prefets, 'Programme de defense passive.' 17 April 1941. 
164 ADBDR 76 W 33 Grassy. Chef d'Escadron. Commandant la Compagnie de Gendannerie des 
Bouches-du-Rh6ne. 'Rapport sur les nombreux incendies allumes dans les fo~ts du depanement 
depuis Ie debut de juin 1942.' 29 August 1942. Richard Tuck~r also suggests that refugees and 
resistance fighters lit forest fires to thwart German operations. See 'World Wars and the 
Globalization of Timber Cutting.' 122. 
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armed with shells and flame-throwers, ignited vegetation to drive out resistance 
units. A maquisard bore witness to the ensuring inferno; 'I have never seen such 
a fire. It was like hell. I'm certain that no insect could have survived on Canjuers. 
Then it was the tum of assault troops who "cleaned" each camp with flame-
throwers. From where we were it was a spectacle that was at once fascinating 
and tragic. Every one of us imagined how we would have met our end in this 
deluge of flames.' 165 
As the case of Canjuers illuminates, regular army units had the potential 
to cause more damage to the forest environment than the resistance. Allied plans 
to invade the Provencal coast in August 1944 placed forests directly in the line of 
fire. During the planning stages of the landings, Allied strategists studied the 
forests that clung to the Mediterranean coast. According to the Inter-Service 
Topographical Department, forests could provide useful cover. although, in 
general, they represented an obstacle to rapid troop movement. For instance. 
progress through the 'well-forested.' Esterel massif would be 'slow and difficult" 
and at the landing of Port de l'Avis 'cross country movement by infantry would 
be slow and difficult on account of the broken and hilly country which for the 
. d'th thi k' c. ,166 most part IS covere WI c pme lorest. 
Furthermore, Allied planners took very seriously the threat posed by 
forest fires. According to Admiral Andre-Georges Lemonier, former chief of 
French Naval Forces, plans were afoot to ignite Provence's forests before the 
16S Quoted in Durandet. Maquis de Provence. 215. Vadrot suggests that the Gennan anny lit fIres 
to flush out resistance units and destroy their cover in Fontainebleu forest. Gue"e5 et 
environnemenl. 219. . 
166 National Archives. London. WO 252/198 Inter-Service Topographical Department. 'France-
Mediterranean Coast: Special Report on Coast. Beaches. and Exits from Toulon to the Franco-
Italian Border including abridged descriptions of the small ports of Sl Tropez. St. Raphael. 
Cannes. Antibes. Villefranche. and Monoco: 18 March 1943. For the histof)' of the Allied 
Landings see Arthur Layton Funk. Hidden A/~v: The French Resistance. Special Opera/i0m, .. and 
Ihe Landings in Soulhern France. 1944 (New York: Greenwood Press. 1992): and Philippe 
Lamarque. Debarqllement en Provence: IS aOlit 1944 (Paris: Le Cherche-Midi. 2(03). 
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landings in order to avert the possibility of forest fIres that could restrict troop 
movement. Lemonier was horrified at the very ide~ fmding it 'hard to subscribe 
in advance to the systematic destruction of our beautiful Provencal forests.' 
Luckily for Lemonier (and the forests) Allied command renounced this idea and 
there was a heavy downpour before the landings, reducing the chance of fire. 167 
Writing in 1980, Colonel Alfred Martin-Siegfried, Vice-president of the Union 
regionale du Sud-Est pour la sauvegarde de la vie, la nature. et de 
l'environnement (Regional Union of the South East for the Safeguard of Life. 
Nature, and the Environment), stressed that this near-miss was a timely reminder 
of 'the value, vulnerability ... and fragility [of our forests] and an incitement to 
redouble our efforts to preserve ... and reconstitute the Var's forests that 
emerged unscathed from Operation Anvil almost forty years ago.' 168 
But Provence's forests did not emerge unscathed from the landings. 
Allied aerial and naval bombardments damaged trees and started fires; a postwar 
forestry report on the Port-Cros island lamented the 'ravages' of war, as 
bombardments against fortifications had ignited surrounding trees. 169 Allied 
bombardments of roads in the VarIed to forest fires, while the Allied landings 
reportedly caused fifteen million francs worth of damage to the region's cork 
trees. 170 German troops also used forest fires as a defensive tactic. In Gemenous 
in the Bouches-du-Rhone. retreating German soldiers set fire to the communal 
forest, which was apparently 'one of the most beautiful [forests] in the 
167 Andre-Georges Lemonier, Cap sur La Provence (Paris: Editions France-Empire. 1955), 82. 
161 Alfred Martin-Siegfried. 'Le debarquement allie sur les cotes varoises: Forei 
Mediterraneenne 2/2 (December 1980). 209-10. See also Alfred Martin-Siegfried. 'Strategie et 
environnement: Ie debarquement allie sur la cate varoise. aoOt 1944: un desastre evite de justesse' 
La Cohorle 75 (July 1982). 21-24. 
169 ADAM 521 W 31 Loudes. 'Rappon sur la foret de Pon Cros: [n.d.]. 
170 ADV 37 J 7/5 'Quelques fait relatifs 8 la Liberation de Signes 19 800t 1944. note prises au 
jour Ie jour par M. Nauwellaer,' [n.d.]; and Commission consultative. Dommagcs subis par fa 
France. Vol. 6, 53. 
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"" ' t ' 171 S' '1 I . uepar ement. lmI ar y, In the commune of Roquefort-la-Bedoule, Gennan 
forces lit a fife in order to slow down advancing Allied units. I n In all. at least 
2,769 hectares of Provencal forests were partially or completely damaged during 
the Allied invasion. 173 Yet there were marked differences across Provence and 
forest damage was worse in coastal areas. Across the land-locked Vaucluse 
departement, only twenty hectares of forests were strewn with bombs, craters. 
and military installations. 174 In contrast, the Var had 19,7500 hectares of mined 
and crater-riddled forests. 175 
Elsewhere in France, military combat impacted on the forest. Much of the 
Allied offensive in Lorraine was fought in the forest, where both Allied and Axis 
forces used the forest for defensive cover and to assemble troops before 
launching attacks. 176 In the Vosges, mines covered 29,000 hectares of forest. 
while 258,000,000 francs worth of damage had reportedly been caused to the 
Moselle's forests and 50,000,000 to the Bas-Rhin's. 177 The forest's 
transformation into a site of combat impinged on its productive functions; the 
CCDR estimated that bombardments, clearcutting, and munitions explosions had 
destroyed or rendered unusable approximately 3,500,000 steres of firewood. 178 
171 ADBDR 51 W 69 Arbuad. Ingenieur-PrincipaJ des Eaux et Forets. "Rapport: commune de 
Gemenos- Dommages de Guerre. demande de transfert d'indemnites'. 25 April 1957; and 
Etienne Olivier. "Proces-verbal de constat de rapport d'expertise.· 4 December 1947. 
m ADBDR 51 W 73 Rapport d'enqueteur agricole, Dossier CA H1917Z, 5 December 1953. 
173 The figure of 2,769 hectares comes from an analysis of Forestry Administration files in the 
Archives departementales of the Alpes-Maritimes, Bouches-du-Rhone. and Var. 
174 CHAN F 10 7103 Ingenieur du Genie Rural, Avignon. to Inspecteur-General du Genie Rural. 
'Estimation provisoire immediate des dommages agricoJes causes par la guerre dans Ie 
departement.' May 1946. 
175 CHAN F 10 7103 lngenieur en chef du Genie rural to lnspecteur-General du Genie Rural. 
'Evaluation provisoire des dommages agricoles causes par la guerre.' 30 March 1946. 
176 0' Sullivan and Miller, Geography 0/ War/are, 76. 
177 CHAN F 10 7103 Ingenieur en chef du Genie rural to Inspecteur-General du Genie Rural, 
'Reconstitution agricole,' 17 June 1946; Inspecteur-General du Genie Rural to Secretaire-General 
de la Commission consultative des dommages et reparations. 23 September 1948. 
171 Commission consultative, Dommages subi.'i par /a France. Vol. 6.,44. 
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During the combats of 1944 forests became both sites and casualties of 
military conflict. Fighting in the forest overrode its productive and ideological 
functions and was wholly incompatible with foresters' amenagement principles. 
This is illustrative of how, throughout the "dark years," different factions within 
France struggled to maintain control of the forest, but were ultimately thwarted 
by the dominance of occupation armies. 
This intensive human activity left an ecological footprint. After the war, 
reports suggested that war damage to the forest had been considerable and 
diverse; foresters recognised this diversity by breaking down war-related damage 
into three main areas; losses from bombs, fires, and mines; partial or total 
destruction of forestry buildings; and over-exploitation. 179 After an investigation 
conducted with Regional Conservators (and reported in the CCDR), the Forest 
Administration's Direction General estimated that thirty million cubic metres of 
undressed construction- and industry-grade timber had been damaged by "acts of 
war' (such as bombardments, clearcutting, fires, and artillery damage) and that 
this damage spread across 400,000 hectares (including 250,000 hectares in the 
Landes forest in South Western France).180 Collardet concurred, contending that 
approximately 400,000 hectares of forest had been directly or indirectly damaged 
through "bombings, explosions, and combat: 181 Given that before the war 
forests in France covered 10,700,000 hectares, the figure of 400,000 hectares 
represented just under four percent of France's forest. 182 Although this figure 
179 ADHA 1043 W 74 Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Gap. 'Note: dommages de guerre: 24 
May 1945. . 
180 Commission consultative. Dommages subis par la France. Vol. 6 .. 44. For the creation of the 
Landes forest in the nineteenth century see Bess. Lighl-Green Society. 262-3. 
181 Kernan. 'War's Toll of French Forests: 442. 
182 France. of course. was not the only European country to have experienced transformation to 
its forests during the war. Czechoslovakia. Poland. Italy. and the United Kingdom were among 
those countries to have greatly increased production. This had also been the case in neutral 
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may seem small, it is important to recognise that it was double the number of 
hectares of forest damaged in combat during the First World War. 183 Moreover. 
the figure of 400,000 hectares does not include civilian and military 
overexploitation of the forest for firewood and other products. The actual figure. 
therefore, is likely to be much higher. 
As this chapter has shown, forests mattered during the war, not least 
because they provided natural resources which were essential to the continuation 
of everyday life. But this is only one aspect of this history as forests were 
simultaneously productive spaces, sites of combat, and places of identity 
formation. These conflicting uses and visions of the forests challenged each other 
between 1940 and 1944 and tensions existed between the forest's productivity 
and its sustainability, foresters' management principles and the immediate needs 
of occupying forces, as well as between Vichy and the resistance. The forest. 
therefore, was not the safe, depoliticalised space constructed by Vichy. Yet, the 
forest was not the only type of habitat that was invested with ideological and 
productive functions during the war. Vichy simultaneously portrayed the 
Camargue wetlands as a place of tradition and stability and strove to increase its 
agricultural productivity. And, just as foresters had attempted to protect forests 
from the demands of war, so too did nature preservationist groups battle to shield 
the Camargue from war' s pressures. 
Switzerland. See CACAN )9880470/176 Minutes of the Commission Euro¢ene des Forets et 
produits forestiers. Premiere Session. Geneva. 1-12 July 1948. 
183 Four years of conflict during the First World War destroyed approximately 200.000 hectares 
of woodland in North Eastern France. See Tamara L. Whited. 'France.' in Encyclopedia of World 
Environmental History. 3 vols .• vol. 2 F-N, Shepard Krech III. John R. McNeill. and Carolyn 
Merchant. eds .• (New York: Routledge. 2004). 558-9. 
132 
Chapter Four 
The Camargue between War and Peace 
In 1948, Henri Marc, Carle Naudot, and Victor Quenin, three members of the 
Confrerie des Gardiens de Saint-Georges-en-Arles, published Terre de 
Camargue, a collection of photographs depicting the Camargue landscape, 
accompanied by texts in both French and Provencal. The photographs, taken 
during the years of war and Occupation, presented a timeless image of the 
Camargue landscape, including its extensive coastline, sand dunes, wind-beaten 
trees, wild horses, majestic bulls, and exotic-looking gitans (Roma or gypsies), 
who had gathered in May 1942 to celebrate their annual pilgrimage to the village 
of Saintes-Maries-de-Ia-Mer. For Marc, Naudot, and Quenin, the Camargue was 
a 'flat land of infinite horizons, a land of sun and wind with its vast etangs 
(lagoons), its marshes, its gleaming effiorescent salt pans, a land of mirages, of 
hunting, where the bull is king, a land of love and traditions.' These marshlands 
were the home of a · restful wildness (une reposante sauvagerie)... and a 
melancholic charm [which] is perhaps the last refuge of everything that was once 
Provence.' According to the authors of Terre de Camargue. the wetland's 
solitude was to be celebrated and treasured In a century dominated by 
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materialis~ particularly as the region had held onto its 'mystique and wild 
(sauvage) character.' I 
Terre de Camargue presented the region as an oasis of tradition, solitude, 
and wildness, a landscape oblivious to the mechanised, global warfare raging 
around it. No signs of human conflict are visible in the book~s photographs. War 
is absent from these serene images. But war and occupation did not leave the 
Camargue untroubled, although this episode has not been studied in detail. 2 This 
is an oversight as the "dark years" represented something of a "crisis point" for 
the Camargue. 
Although the wetlands were, by 1939. the result of centuries of human 
modification, traditionalist writers and nature preservationists constructed them 
as a wild, virginal landscape worthy of protection for its Provencal traditions. 
aesthetic beauty, and scientific significance (the area was, and still is, particularly 
famed for its varied bird life, including flamingos). For the Camargue's 
defenders, war and occupation threatened to irreversibly transform the region's 
character; the Vichy regime sought to domesticate the area through modernising 
its agriculture, and French, German, and Allied forces identified the Camargue' s 
apparently empty expanses as suitable for aerial training grounds. This military 
mobilisation of the marshlands culminated in the German army's plans to flood 
the Camargue to prevent Allied planes landing in the event of an invasion. 
Ultimately, the efforts of the Societe nationale d'acclimatation de France (SNAF), 
which ran a nature reserve centred on the Vaccares elang, and nature's own 
(unintentional) resilience. combined to ensure that the Camargue emerged from 
I Henri Marc. Carle Naudot. and Victor Quenin. Terre de Camargue (Grenoble: Arthaud. 1948). 
12. 110-13. 
2 For instance. the period from 1940 to 1944 is not given extensive consideration in Bernard 
Picon' s L 'espace elie temps en C amargue (Aries: Actes Sud. 1988). 
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the war relatively unscathed. The SNAP's wartime activity highlights that nature 
mattered to some (admittedly small) sections within society, and that this concern 
motivated them to expend considerable energy on preserving landscapes at a 
time of hardship and upheaval. 
While the Camargue' s wartime environmental history is interesting in its 
own right, it also exposes wider historical processes. For a start, it highlights the 
contradictions of the Vichy regime, which simultaneously sought to modernise 
the Camargl\e and preserve its traditions. F or although its war against 
"wasteland" (see chapter two) prescribed conversion of the Camargue's 
uncultivated land into productive farmland, Vichy incorporated the wetlands in 
its "back to the land" rhetoric and classified the area as a 'natural monument.' In 
addition, the regime built an internment camp at Saliers modelled on a 
supposedly traditional Camargue-sty Ie village in order to "stabilise .. 
(sedentariser) France's Roma population. The fact that Vichy valued the 
Camargue's supposed wildness suggests that "back to the land" rhetoric did not 
centre solely on "domesticated" nature, such as farmland. 
Moreover, the Camargue's wartime history addresses questions of 
nature's "agency" and the difficulties that humans sometimes face when 
incorporating the natural world into their political and military strategies. The 
Camargue's climate directly contributed to the failure of Vichy~s aims for the 
Saliers camp and helped undermine German submersion plans. While I do not 
suggest that nature purposely set out to thwart human actors. this unpredictability 
suggests that the natural environment was not a static, neutral backdrop during 




This chapter begins by tracing the Camargue' s pre-war creation~ before 
examining Vichy's contradictory policies towards it (including the establishment 
of Saliers camp), which leads onto an analysis of the SNAF's campaign to 
protect the wetlands. I end with the role nature played (alongside material 
shortages) in thwarting German submersion plans. 
The Cam argue before 1940 
The Camargue was fashioned through a combination of natural and 
human factors. The wetlands stretch over 145,000 hectares and form an 
approximate triangle with the Mediterranean as the base and the Grand and Petit 
Rhone rivers as the two sides, reaching a point at ArIes in the north. During the 
Flandrain period of the Upper Pleistocene, the Rhone created the Camargue by 
depositing alluvial silt and sands. As a consequence. the area is extremely flat, 
dropping only a few centimetres per kilometre from ArIes to the coast (the 
highest points are its sand dunes at approximately four metres above sea level). 
The Camargue possesses a Mediterranean climate, namely hot, arid summers and 
cool. wet winters, with variable rainfall. The combination of high temperatures 
and strong winds, such as the mistral, results in a deficit of water; on average 
500mm of rain fall each year while 1,500mm of water evaporates. As a 
consequence, salt aquifers rise to the surface, privileging sansouire vegetal 
associations that can withstand the high salt content. 3 
.3 This description is based on Patrick Duncan. Horses and Grasses: The Nutritional Ecology of 
Equids and their impact on the Camargue (New York and London: Springer. 1992). 23-5; Luc 
HotTmann. 'An Ecological Sketch of the Camargue: British Birds. 5119 (September 1958).321-2: 
and Picon. Espace el Ie temps en Camargue. 27-34. Hoffmann describes sansollirc as 'a plain 
partly subject to seasonal flooding and covered with glasswort (Alhrex:nemum and Salicornia). A 
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Human activity has strongly shaped the physical development of the 
Camargue. Bernard Picon outlines how, in the pre-Roman e~ the Camargue. 
then covered by forest, provided hunting and fishing opportunities, as well as 
timber for the seafaring Phoenicians. From Caesar's establishment of ArIes in 46 
B.C.E., various waves of agricultural settlers subsequently pioneered the 
Camargue's cultivation, leading, by the Middle Ages, to deforestation, drainage 
projects, and the implementation of irrigation and flood defence systems ... War 
also moulded the Camargue landscape as the formerly thick forests of oaks, elms. 
and pines supplied wood for naval ships. 5 
The inhospitable climate and soil meant that the Camargue proved hard to 
"tame" and remained sparsely populated. From at least the thirteenth century 
onwards, secular and religious landowners had sought to drain and cultivate the 
marshes and, from the sixteenth century, mas (or farmhouses) began to appear in 
the landscape. However, it was the large-scale drainage works of the nineteenth 
century that transformed the Camargue most profoundly and enabled its more 
extensive cultivation. 6 
These drainage projects were part of a nationwide scheme to reclaim 
coastal marshlands which was initiated by Napoleon I. In 1855 and 1870 Ponts et 
Chaussees, the government hydraulic service, reconstructed dikes along the 
Rhone and built a sea wall to protect the Camargue from river flooding and high 
sea levels, whilst digging drainage ditches down to the coast to drain marshland. 
In all, 30,000 hectares were reclaimed in the nineteenth century. restricting saJt-
steppes and lagoons to the low-lying southern part of the Camargue around the 
system of brackish pools. temporary or pennanent. mostly inter-communicating. intersects this 
plain' (323). 
Picon. £Space elie temps en Cama~gue. 35~2. 
, Femand Benoit. La Camargue (PariS: Henn Laurens. 1933). 10. 
b See Picon. £Space elie temps en Cam argue. 43-53. 
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Vaccares etang. 7 The result of these human modifications is that the Camargue' s 
contact with the Rhone and the Mediterranean is now controlled by a system of 
pumps, meaning that the environment has become 'completely artificialised.' 8 
As a consequence, an intricate system of dyke, drains, and pumps now maintains 
the "natural" habitat of the Camargue. By the twentieth century. the Camargue's 
environment was conducive to the development of salt extraction industries and 
cattle breeding, which, unlike agriculture, were economically viable on the 
sansouire. 9 
Despite these human modifications, the Camargue' s landscape appeared 
wild and hostile. Writing in 1933, Fernand Benoit. an eminent archaeologist of 
the Provence region, portrayed the Camargue as "a landscape of infinite 
desolation.' Its ' atmosphere [was] saturated with humidity,' and its heat. salt 
lagoons, and etangs reflected 'infinitely' against "the low coastal skies.' In 
addition, mirages contributed to the region's 'unreal and tragic character: \0 
Benoit's analysis of the Camargue was a distinctive one. for although he 
recognized the Vaccares' claim to be 'one of the richest and most unique natural 
sites in the world,' his attitude towards the Camargue was dismissive. Like others, 
he lamented the modernization of the Camargue, yet located its decline further 
back in the past with the construction of flood defences that turned a well-
forested and irrigated region into a state of 'quasi-desert' and prevented the 
arrival of new alluvial deposits. Consequently. the Camargue was a 'land that is 
7 Hoffmann. 'Ecological Sketch of the Camargue: 322; and Hugh D. Clout,' Reclamation of 
Coastal Marshland.' in Hugh Clout (ed.). Themes in the Historical Geography of France (London: 
Academic Press, 1977). 204-08. A similar process of marsh reclamation emerged in Prussia. led 
by Frederick the Great. David Blackboum. "'Conquests from Barbarism": Taming Nature in 
Frederick the Great's Prussia: in Mauch. Nature in German History. 10-30. 
8 Thieny Lecomte. Christine Le Neveu. Bernard Picon. Jacques Lecomte. 'Au sujet du marais ... · 
in Codoret, Protection de la nature, 52. 
9 Robert Zaretsky. Cod and Bull Stories: Folco de Baronc:elli and the Im'ention of the CamarKUe 
(Lincoln NB. and London: University of Nebraska Press. 2004). 129. 
10 Benoit. Camargue. 5. 
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dying' (une terre qui meurt). Furthermore, the inhabitants of this 'swampy' land 
were subjected to a barrage of 'wind, encroachments from the se~ fevers, and 
mosquitoes.' 11 Benoit's vision of the Camargue corresponds to deep-seated 
"expert" attitudes towards marshes within European culture, which, David 
Blackbourn argues, treated wetlands 'as dark, disorderly corners of nature, where 
vegetation and animal bodies decayed, emitting noxious-smelling and unhealthy 
miasmas.' 12 
However, In contrast to Benoit, other observers in interwar France 
celebrated the Camargue' s contemporary landscape. Paradoxically, they held up 
a landscape which had been thoroughly modernised and "improved" as a place of 
wildness and tradition. As Picon argues, although it was thoroughly 'dyked. 
drained, and irrigated ... it became one of the main national and international 
symbols of nature unsullied (vierge) by any [human] aggression.' 13 Despite its 
long history of human modification, the Camargue was portrayed as untamed and 
otherworldly, especially the Basse-Camargue, the lower reaches of the wetlands. 
In 1933, writer Susanne Day described the area as: 
A land of immense shallow lagoons that gleam and glitter in the sun. of extensive 
vineyards, of fever-breeding marshes, and of salt-encrusted wastes. A land of lonely 
pasturages where graze millions of sheep, of sparse woods whose trees lean over, 
wearied by the wind. and of mirages that cozen the senses and whose strange fantastic 
beauty transports you to a world of Fey. 14 
11 Ibid. 9-10, 16-7. 
12 Blackboum, '''Conquests from Barbarism ... · 14. 
)) Picon. £Space etle temps en Cam argue. 17. 
14 Day, Where Ihe Mistral Blows. 180. 
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Although she wrote of the Camargue' s vineyards and pastures, the effect for Day 
was overwhelmingly one of a wild, exotic landscape. Among the lagoons and 
expanses of sand, Day felt that she had left cultivated Europe behind; 'France 
vanishes and you find yourself in an outpost of Africa.' 15 
French writers viewed the Camargue in a similar way. Robert Zaretsky 
argues that the Felibrige movement (a grouping of poets inspired by Frederic 
Mistral which strove to preserve Occitan language and culture) used the 
Camargue as a 'screen' for their traditionalist musings and construction of 
regionalist identities. In Zaretsky'S analysis, Felibrige writers and Folco de 
Baroncelli, a self-styled aristocratic defender of the Camargue and bull-breeder. 
considered the wetlands as the 'last, unsullied source of a wild and primitive 
Provence.' 16 Its mystery, harshness, and wildness, Zaretsky continues, were 
celebrated as guarantors of 'Occitan nationalism and nostalgia.' Although the 
Camargue was portrayed as a place of fear and confusion, this was treated as a 
positive characteristic and worthy of defending. As Zaretsky argues, "rather than 
walls to protect humankind from the forces of chaos, it is as if the writers of the 
Camargue require these walls to protect the sources of chaos from an outside 
world that threatens uniformity and homogeneity.' 17 
Others felt an urge to protect the Camargue' s strange beauty and charm 
from modernity's supposedly harmful influence. On the eve of the Second World 
War, Tony Bumand, a writer specialising in fishing and hunting. and Joseph 
Oberthilr. a naturalist. writer, and artist, published route la Camargue (1938), an 
introduction to the Camargue's landscape and a passionate plea for its 
preservation. Across two volumes, Burnand and Oberthiir depicted a wild and at 
u Ibid. 185. 
16 Zaretsky. Cock and Bull Stories. 9. 54. 
17 Ibid. 126. 
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times harsh landscape. The Camargue was a salty, 'watery desert' (desert d'eau) 
where 'the mosquitoes and bulls are particularly aggressive' and its 'chann ... 
slightly melancholic.' 18 Nonetheless, the Camargue held a certain beauty for 
those who took the time to look: 
Sad, the Camargue? No! Resigned, but vibrant; languid, but soft and tender, all in 
nuances, in old-fashioned graces that brusquely rub shoulders with ultramodern 
audacities of mood (ton), sound, and hannony, Mysterious? Not even, [instead] ready to 
give herself to those who know how to understand her and put her at ease. [The 
Camargue is ] like those women that no-one regards [and] which new-comers don't 
bother with, but who reveal, to those who notice and seek them out, their radiant grace, 
their sparkling but discreet imagination, [and] their delicate culture. 19 
The comparison between the Camargue and a superficially "plain" but ultimately 
radiant woman, implied that those who are blinded by the superficiality and 
speed of modernity were incapable of appreciating the wholesome and authentic 
things in life. In addition, the feminised Camargue required the protection of men 
determined to uncover her hidden charms and shelter her from others. As a 
consequence, although they recognised that human factors, such as deforestation, 
industry, and war, had created the apparently wild Camargue, Bumand and 
OberthUr demanded that the area be protected against the ravages of the form of 
modernity that had developed under liberal democracy. 
For Bumand and OberthUr. so-called progress, such as agricultural 
intensification and plans to increase wine production, posed a serious threat to 
the Camargue. They interpreted modernity as a pollutant bent on corrupting the 
18 Tony Bumand and Joseph OberthQr, Toute /0 Com argue: volume I (Paris: Editions de la Bonne 
Idee. 1938).3. 7, 
19 Ibid. 75. 
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Camargue's purity. Yet while the physical manifestations of modem life, such as 
telegraph poles, advertisement boards, electricity, petrol stations, and "comfort' 
could be removed, Burnand and Oberthiir held a greater fear of changing 
mentalities and the speeding up of life which would sweep away the old 
traditions, replacing them with the political and social 'virus' of modernity. 
Bumand and Oberthiir hoped that one day the Camargue would be freed from the 
stranglehold of modem society, after which it would be necessary to clean "the 
waste that had accumulated for some years, and simply forbid any new refuse 
being disposed on the Camargue.' Under their plan for the Camargue's future. 
new houses would only be tolerated if built in the "Camargue style;" there would 
no place for industrial installations, electricity pylons, or new roads. Once 
cleaned and protected, they envisaged that poets and naturalists would flock to 
the Camargue, while visitors would pay for the privilege of visiting this 
'ethnological, botanical, and zoological reserve.' 20 
Such arguments need to be seen within the context of a wider critique of 
industrial modernity in interwar France. As Romy Golan argues, these attitudes 
encompassed 'disenchantment with technology,' alienation from modem 
industrial practices inspired by Taylorism, anti-urbanism, and passeisme (an 
entrenched resistance to change and a deep nostalgia for the past). The return to 
a rural. traditional France was prescribed as the alternative. 21 However, whereas 
"back to the land-ism" is normally associated in France with the peasantry and 
agriculture (in other words domesticated nature). the example of the Camargue 
suggests that this is not always the case. Indeed. it was here that "wild" nature 
was presented as an alternative to modernity. Furthermore. the opposition 
20 Tony Bumand and Joseph OberthQr, Toule la Camargue: volume 2 (Paris: Editions de la Bonne 
Idee. 1939).200.204-5. 
21 Golan. Modernit)' and Nostalgia. ix. xi. 
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between tradition and modernity in France is not as clear cut as is commonly 
believed. As Zaretsky argues, traditionalists in the Camargue adopted and 
manipulated modern practices when they called on the state to protect the 
Camargue from the harmful effects of modernity. 22 The modem state was 
paradoxically solicited to protect tradition from the influence of modem society. 
Burnand and Oberthiir called for an 'opposing influence' to be used to 
challenge industrial modernity and for someone to 'fight, put up the barriers. 
desperately maintain all that which makes up the Camargue' s beauty, its moral 
dignity, its physical splendour.' Consequently, they praised the SNAF for 
striving to preserve the Camargue's diverse fauna and flora. 23 Since April 1927. 
the SNAF had managed a nature reserve covering approximately 12,000 hectares 
centred on the Vaccares etang, after coming to an agreement with the Alais. 
Froges, and Camargue company which owned approximately 27.000 hectares of 
the Basse-Camargue for salt extraction (salt ceased to be extracted on the 
territory ceded to the SNAF). 
The SNAF, which was established in 1854 by Isidore Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire, a Professor of Mammals and Birds at the Museum National d'Histoire 
Naturelle in Paris, had strong links with French colonialism. It was originally 
concerned with a practice known as acclimatisation - the introduction and 
adaptation of non-native species into different environments (such as undertaking 
the speculative venture of introducing kangaroos into the French Pyrenees). 24 It 
would be wrong, therefore, to confuse the SNAF's aims with those of modem 
22 See Zaretsky. Cock and Bull Stories. 116-19. 
lJ Bumand and OberthOr. route la Camargue: 2. 185-9. HotTmann provides an extensive 
overview of the Camargue's wildlife in 'An Ecological Sketch of the Camargue: 3~4-47. 
24 Bess. Light-Green Society, 64-6. For a detailed history of the SNAF .. see Michael A .. Osbo~e. 
Nature. the Exotic. and the Science 01 French Colonialism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1994). 
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environmentalism. As Michael Bess argues, 'underlying Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire"s 
efforts lay an unabashedly homocentric vision of the human place within nature _ 
a vision in which a scientist ~ s highest calling was to understand nature" sinner 
workings, the better to harness its bounty toward human ends.' 25 
However, by the twentieth century, the SNAP had come round to a vision 
of nature protection that was more concerned with aesthetic beauty and 
protecting species. As a consequence, it became involved in the establishment of 
'reserves nature lIes , and national parks in both metropolitan France and its 
colonies. 26 Not that this meant that the SNAF had abandoned the scientific study 
of the natural world. According to Gabriel Tallon, a former chemical engineer 
who became director of the Camargue reserve in 1929 and stayed there for 
almost 40 years, the SNAF had two main aims in the Camargue; the protection of 
nature and the promotion of scientific study. 27 
As one of a handful of reserves nature lIes In France, the Resen'e 
zoologique et botanique de Camargue's early years were fraught with difficulties, 
as hunters and fishermen contested its boundaries in the COurtS.28 A visitor to the 
reserve also highlighted how the local population had designs on its feathered 
inhabitants and reportedly 'killed adult birds, collected eggs to make omelettes, 
and even [took] chicks to put in thefricassee.~ 29 
The precarious existence of the reserve was exacerbated by the SNAF's 
limited resources, it being a relatively small organisation (it could claim only 
2~ Bess. Light-Green Society. 65. 
26 Ibid., 69; and Ford. 'Nature. Culture. and Conservation.' 191-3. 
27 Gabriel Tallon. La Reserve zoologique el botanique de Cam argue (Paris: Publications de la 
Societe nationale d'acclimatation de France. [n.d.]). 16. 
28 Caffarelli • Histoire de la reserve de Camargue.' 58. 
29 Docteur A. Rochon-Duvigneuad. 'Une visite a la Reserve de Camargue: l'etTort a faire pour 
son organisation.' Bullelin de la Sodele nalionale d'acciimalalion de France. 7S lh year. no. 8 
(August 1928). 113-5. 
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2,500 members at the start of the twentieth century). As well as managing the 
Camargue reserve, the organisation had also established ones at Neouvielle in 
1935 and Lauzanier in 1936 (the former was in the Pyrenees, the latter in the 
Alps), and published the journal La Terre et fa Vie, which sought to promote 
understanding of nature protection, ethnology, and natural sciences to an 
educated readership. 30 
Yet despite its small size, the SNAF had high hopes for the Camargue 
reserve. Tallon believed that under the SNAF's careful managemen~ the reserve 
would become 'an oasis where birds can frolic in peace, nest in increasing 
numbers, [and] where migratory birds can rest in total harmony.' The reserve 
would also serve, Tallon believed, as a 'centre of radiance (rayonnemenl) for the 
philosophy of nature protection.' 31 The reserve did indeed secure some 
international recognition. Judith Ferrier, President of The Norfolk and Norwich 
Naturalist Society, praised the reserve's achievements. 32 
Somewhat ironically, given the extent to which humans had modified the 
Camargue and that the reserve's very existence depended on the maintenance of 
the system of dykes, drains, and pumps, Clement Bressou, the SNAF's Secretary 
General and director of its reserves, asserted that by banning hunting, the 
collection of bird eggs, tree felling, and agriculture on the reserve, nature could 
30 J.-P. Raffin and G. Ricou, 'Le lien entre les scientifiques et les associations de protection de la 
nature: approche historique,' in Codoret (ed.), Protection de la nature, 64-5. Compared to the 
number and size of national parks in the USA (the first having been established at Yellowstone in 
1872). France had a relatively limited area put aside as nature reserves. In 1861. emperor Louis 
Napoleon had protected 1,097 hectares of Fontainebleu forest as a reserve artistique, while the 
Reserve Naturelle des Sept-lies was created in 1912 on a group of rocks off the Brittany coast. In 
1914, a 5,000 hectare reserve was set up around Mont Pelvoux in the Alpes. See Bess. LighJ-
Green Society. 67-8; and Ford. 'Nature. Culture. and Conservation: 183. For a general 
introduction to the idea of national (and other) parks, see Karen R. Jones and John Wills, The 
Invention of the Park: Recreational Landscapes from the Garden of Eden to Disney's Magic 
Kingdom (Cambridge: Polity Press. 2005). 
31 Tallon. Resen'e zoologique et bolanique de C amargue. 21. 
J:! Judith M. Ferrier. 'President's Address: The Camargue Reserve in Southern France: reprinted 
from the Transactions of the Norfolk and Norwich Naturalist Society. 14,4 (1938). 320-7. Day 
also toured the Reserve. See Where the Mistral Blows. 185-9. 
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'be gIven back to herself, free to develop following her Oml evolutionary 
tendencies, free from the actions of man [sic].' 33 The reserve was something of a 
flagship project for the SNAP. According to Dr. Rochen-Duvigneuad, it covered 
a 'unique region' and would be the 'future glory' of the SNAF if the organisation 
managed to ensure its 'efficient surveillance.' Fortunately, the emptiness of the 
site (' Ie terrain a surveiller est completement desert') gave him hope that it 
would be easy to return it to its 'wild state.' 34 
The reserve's creation and mission was couched in terms of nature 
preservation, which included the sense that nature within its boundaries needed 
protection from the harmful consequences of modernity. Like other European 
nature preservation movements, the creation of the reserve in the Camargue was 
informed, to an extent, by anti-urbanism and unease at the advance of modernity. 
Tallon highlighted how the 'Camargue is extremely menaced by the degradations 
or simply the progress of civilisation.' 35 Bressou wrote of the 'hold (emprises) of 
modem civilisation' over the Camargue and lamented the agriculture and 
factories that had already 'invaded' the northern part of the Camargue. 36 The 
scale of this threat rose in the early 1930s, when the SNAF was forced to battle 
against proposals to drain the Vaccares in order to plant vineyards. Day noted 
how the 'speculator has of late been turning an acquisitive eye' on the reserve 
33 Clement Bressou, "Preface,' in Burnand and ObertbUr, Toute la Camargue: J, ix. 
34 Rochon-Duvigneuad, 'Visite Ii la Reserve de Camargue,' 113-15. 
35 Tallon, Reserve zoologique et botanique de Camargue. 21. There are paraUels here with what 
Paul Sutter observes in the creation of the Wilderness Society in the US, as it reacted to the 
spread of the motor car in the interwar period. This movement, Sutter argues, was . shaped more 
by a collective uneasiness with the enormity of change at a given historical moment than it was 
by the emergence of a new scientific way of looking at nature.' Driven Wild: How the Fight 
against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement (~eattle and Lon~on: 
Universitv of Washington Press, 2(02), 14. Stephen Fox also outlines how American 
conservationists were motivated by a sense of America becoming engulfed by paving slabs and 
cities. The American Conservation Movemenl: John Muir and his Legacy (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press. 1981), 159-61. 
36 Bressou •. Preface.' vi. 
146 
Chapter Four 
and gave her full support to the SNAF's attempts to resist these advances: 'it 
certainly deserves to win, for if its mandate were withdrawn I am afraid there 
would be a massacre of innocents on the Camargue.' 37 
Before the outbreak of war in 1939, it seemed like the reserve was doing 
a good job of preserving the Camargue's natural heritage. In the words of 
Burnand and Oberthiir, the water and skies of the Vaccares now 'spoke of 
rediscovered peace, the state of nature finally recovered.' According to them, the 
reserve was fighting to keep this 'almost virgin area' free from the 'false light of 
progress.' 38 Before 1940, therefore, the Camargue was constructed as a pure and 
wild place of tradition, natural beauty, and scientific importance. which was 
worthy of protection. War, defeat, and occupation threatened to undermine these 
qualities and values. 
Vichy in the Cam argue 
The Camargue posed something of a conundrum for Vichy as the regime 
was tom between its traditionalist urges and the need to maximise agricultural 
production. On the one hand, the Camargue acted as a symbol for tradition and 
rural France which dovetailed with Vichy'S "'retour iz la terre" philosophy. On 
the other hand, Vichy's penchant for cultivated land threatened to destroy the 
Camargue's celebrated landscapes and traditions. In 1942. Marceau Jouve of the 
Union regionale corporative agricole des Bouches-du-Rhone presented the dual 
possibilities of the Camargue to Caziot. The Camargue. according to Jouve. was: 
37 Day Where the Alistral Blows, 189. 
31 Bu~and and OberthUr. route la Cam argile: 2. 196. 199-100. 
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[A] nostalgic land which has greatly inspired poets, an Eden for wildlife hunters. [and a 
place] where flamingos and wild ducks hover throughout the year ... where the sea 
lavender's violet flowers mix with the pink ones of the tamarinds, where mosquitoes 
swarm over the vast marshes from which emerge, every now and then, the horns of a 
wild bul1 of which the black or tawny coats often mixes with the speckled white coats of 
the camarguais horses .... 
But this Rhone delta is also... a rich alluvial land where winemakers abound... and 
where an army of grape pickers is currently working to prepare the next vintage. 
A fertile land, where the cereals grow vigorously. It's also the only place in France 
where rice cultivation is possible, [which] permits both the production of important 
harvests and the desalination of land so that other crops can then grow there. 
The Camargue offers further possibilities of all these types and we could. after draining 
(assainissant) the marshes, recuperate thousands of hectares of wheat. 
In our departement, [the Camargue] is the most specialised region for wine cultivation. 
but it remains a land of future [exploitation] in many domains. 39 
The Camargue offered both wildlife and wildness and wine and wheat. And, as 
Jouve's final comment suggests, the Camargue' s full agricultural capabilities 
were yet to be realised. 
The pressures of wartime intensified earlier debates on agricultural 
expansion and modernisation in the Camargue. especially after Vichy developed 
plans to exploit the wetlands. Such plans caused concern among those who 
wished to keep the Camargue in its current physical state. Writing in 1942, 
Frederic Gaymard identified the grim consequences of the proposals to intensify 
agriculture. If the government gave the go-ahead for boosting agricultural 
production and draining the marshes, the Camargue risked losing its 'current 
39 Marceau Jouve. Rapport sur I'agriculture dans les Bouches-du-RhOne (Marseille: lmprimerie 
Ant. GED. 1942).4-5. 
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physiognomy' leaving only 'an immense cultivated plain like all the other plains: 
the camarguais bulls and horses will be progressively pushed back until they 
finally disappear.' Gaymard's stance, however, was somewhat ambiguous. as he 
acknowledged that it was necessary to 'yield to the demands of the painful period 
in which we live' and he wished Vichy success with its agricultural plans: ·we. 
the friends of the Camargue bend towards the inevitable, but we'll guard a vivid 
memory of this strange land, one of the jewels of our beautiful Provence.' He 
hoped, however, that some parts of the Camargue could keep their individuality 
so that certain regional traditions would be protected. 40 
Vichy'S proposals attracted wider attention. The title of a 1941 article by 
Jean Bazal in the L 'Illustration put the matter starkly, asking • Are we going to 
drain the Camargue?' The Government, the article revealed, planned to lower the 
water level in the Vaccares to encourage drainage from higher fields. while 
fifteen pumping stations were to drain water from lower lying fields. 41 
Although these plans threatened to transform the Camargue landscape 
and destroy the existence of the reserve. they were not without their supporters. 
A later article in the same publication described Vichy's scheme in glowing 
terms. Journalist Paul-Emile Cadilhac argued that the Camargue was 'not just the 
land of bulls, a theme for literature, an emotionally moving landscape. or a 
godsend for hunters,' as it also possessed a long history of agricultural 
exploitation which. thanks to the war. was being revived and extended. Rice 
crops. which had been cultivated long ago in the Camargue. made a return 
because imports from Indochina were impossible. Moreover, these new rice 
crops were being grown mechanically and efficiently. Cadilhac praised the 
40 Gaymard. Cam argue. 24-5,52. 
41 Jean 8azal. 'Un plan de grands travaux: va-t-on assecher 1a Camargue?' L'II/ustration. 
February )941. 105-7. 
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government's renovation of the Camargue' s irrigation systems (which 
necessitated the shifting of over 50,000 cubic metres of earth) and the 
electrification of its pumping stations. This mise en valeur, however, was 
conducted rationally, according to Cadilhac; the most unsuitable land was to be 
left for salt extraction, tourism, and zoological reserves as these activities also 
attracted revenue. 42 Cadilhac integrated these current developments into the 
history of the Camargue, presenting an alternative narrative of the Camargue' s 
history which stressed its successful domestication rather than its wildness. 
Vichy's agricultural schemes had some success. In 1942. 350 hectares of 
rice fields were planted, with an extra 1,000 added in 1943. The harvest for 1942 
came to 1,000 tonnes, which rose dramatically in the immediate postwar era 
(30,000 tonnes in 1949).43 Yet some were unimpressed with these projects. The 
contrast between the photographs 'accompanying Cadilhac's and Bazel's articles 
highlights this split. The images in the former are mainly ones of irrigation canals 
and mechanised farming equipment. A map accompanying this article also 
highlighted the multiple ways in which the nature of the Camargue could be 
tamed and domesticated through agriculture. In the latter, the pictures are of 
wildlife, romantic looking etangs, and 'Le Marquis de Baroncelli, vigilant 
guardian of camarguaises traditions. ' Although Bazal claimed to display 
~complete objectivity' when examining the question of the Camargue's 
42 Paul-Emile Cadilhac. • A la conquete de la terre: I'avenir de la Camargue.' L'II/ustration, 6 
March 1943. 141-43. 
43 Rene Bomio. 'Le riz en Camargue: Science et Vie 383 (August 1949). to:!; and Cadilhac. 'A 
la conquete de la terre: 143. Rice now occupies 12.000 hectares in the Camargue. and. ironically. 
is considered an essential actor in the maintenance of the Camargue's ecosystem as water 
pumped from the Rh6ne for. rice produ~ti~n irrigates. surrounding l~d: See '~a~~ 2000 .en 
Camargue: une place privileglet pour la rlZ1culture et I elevage extenslP.. Bulletm d mformallon 
du Parc naturel regional de Cum argue. No. 35. November 2005. 
l50 
Chapter Four 
amenagement, it was clear where his loyalties lay. 44 His article pointed out 
several problems that the project posed. Only grass and wine would be able to 
grow on the recovered land, and France already produced enough wine. 
Furthermore, the potential transformation of the Vaccares would disrupt valuable 
fish stocks and encourage the already large numbers of mosquitoes~ turning the 
region into a 'centre of paludism.' Bazal also gave an extended interview to 
Bressou, who posed the question; 'what would Marshal Petain think about this 
quarrel between the traditionalists (anciens) and the modems?' Bressou .. like 
Bazal, argued that there was already an overproduction of wine in France and 
any produced in the Camargue would be of 'poor quality'; 'voila all that the 
devastation of our Basse-Camargue, a pure, regional treasure, would bring. ,45 
Other admirers of the Camargue' s landscape also expressed their concern 
at possible changes to the wetlands' natural environment. Baroncelli. for instance. 
protested government plans for a hydraulic project near Saintes-Maries-de-Ia-
Mer. Writing personally to Petain, he opposed the project as the Camargue was 
'an island of beauty, light, poetry, and mirages in the midst of the hideous 
materialism that has been the principal cause of our great calamity.' 46 
The opposition to modernisation of the Camargue assumed national 
proportions. Supporters of the Camargue' s traditions and existing landscape 
mobilised themselves in the capital, forming Les Amis de la Camargue a Paris 
under the leadership of Dr. Joseph BreI. According to BreI, the group's 'sole 
ambition' was to support the 'magnificent efforts' of Bressou in his defence of 
the Camargue. He also offered comfort to the birds and other animals of the 
44 In a 1941 article. Bazal had already praised the Reserve, arguing that it should be 'officially 
aided and encouraged' to protect migrating birds. See 'Defense et illustration de la Camargue: 
Visages du Monde. October 1941. 19. 
45 Jean Bazal. 'Un plan de grands travaux: 105-7. 
46 Quoted in Zaretsky. Coele and Bull Stories. 134. 
~51 
Chapter Four 
Camargue, addressing them directly; 'thin-legged flamingos, scarlet corselets, 
beavers and you, avocets, black bulls and white horses, creatures persecuted by 
the cruelty of men [sic], we set off with courage in the defence of your land.. 
priceless jewel of the Mediterranean! ,47 
The SNAF also mounted a campaign to minimise the effects of the 
modernisation of the Camargue, lobbying Charles Colomb, Director General of 
the Forestry Administration, and Monsieur de Pampelonne. Director General of 
Genie Rural. The campaign appears to have been largely successful. Following a 
report from Pierre Salvat, Inspector General of the Forestry Administration. in 
January 1942, Caziot urged that 'the work of the natural reserve of the 
Camargue. .. be maintained and developed.' Caziot' s verbal support for the 
reserve did not stop there, as he declared that its protection . constitutes a national 
necessity so nothing must be done in the Camargue that would destroy or 
diminish [it].' 48 
It is not surprising that traditional elements of the Vichy regime, such as 
Caziot, came out in support of the Camargue, given that it had become a symbol 
of regional traditions. As Zaretsky highlights, there was a "dovetailing of 
ideological concerns' between Vichy and the defenders of the Camargue. 49 It is 
here that the contradictions of the Vichy regime are laid bare. At the same time 
that it planned the agricultural modernisation of the Camargue. the regime 
classified the natural reserve among the 'sites and natural monuments of artistic, 
47 Quoted in Bazel. 'Un plan de grands travaux,' 108. 
48 Clement Bressou, • Actes des Reserves de la Societe nationale d'acclimatation de France: 
Commission generaJe des reserves,' in Conferences de /a Societe nationa/e d'acc/imatalion de 
France: Actes de reserves de /a Societe nationaJe d'acc/imatation de France pour 1940 et 194/. 
included in Societe nationa/e d'acclimalalion de France, Conferences. Summer and Autumn 
1941, Winter 1942.40. 
49 Zaretsky. Cocl< and Bull StorieJ. 135. Folklore groups in Aries also thrived in the atmosphere 
created by Vichy's "National Revolution," Faure. Le projel Cll/turd de l'iclr),.77-82. 
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historic, scientific, legendary, or picturesque character' (arrete of 8 June 1942). 
so Thi 1 'fi . s c asS! lcatlon of the Basse-Camargue was the culmination of over a 
decade of campaigning on the part of the SNAF, and built on previous legislation 
concerning the protection of historical and natural monuments, in particular the 
laws of31 December 1913 and 2 March 1930. 51 In October 1943, Abel Bonnard. 
Secretary of State for National Education, wrote to Bressou thanking him for his 
help in protecting this site 'of an exceptional character and beauty [and] of 
unprecedented scientific interest,' which suggests that there was a degree of 
cooperation and respect between Vichy and the SNAF when it suited both their 
interests. 52 Zaretsky suggests that conferring this extra protection on the reserve 
was a way for Vichy to 'pay a small price for its lip service to regionalism.' 53 
While there is undoubtedly some truth in this observation, it appears that there 
were deeper motives behind the classification, which tied in with Vichy's 
attempts to restore France's traditions, and as a consequence, its true character 
and greatness. 
The Basse-Camargue' s classification was part of a wider legislative 
programme of heritage conservation undertaken by Vichy. Laws in 1943 
prescribed inventories of heritage sites and limited the installation of advertising 
boards around protected sites. For the first time in French law, the government 
introduced the notion of a champ de vision around monuments in which 
50 SNPN Paris, Secretary of State for National Education and Youth. 'Arrete du 8 J~e 1942.'. 
~I For an overview of heritage laws in France, see Jerome Fromageau, 'L 'evolution du drOit et 
des institutions a-t-elle ete identique?' in Ecole nationale du patrimoine. Patrimoine culturel. 
patrimoine naturel. co/loque 12 el 13 decembre 1994 (Paris: La documentation fran~ajse. 1995). 
39-49. . ~2 SNPN Secretaire d'Etat a I"Education Nationale. Secretaire General des Beaux-Arts to Vlce-
President de la Societe Nationale d' Acclimatation de France. Directeur General des Reserves. 2~ 
October 1943. 
53 Zaretsky. Cock and Bull Stories. 135. 
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advertisements and other eyesores were to be restricted. 54 In 1941. the Secretary 
of State for National Education reported to Petain that advertising boards were 
the 'most displeasing and tyrannical' form of publicity and offended 'individual 
liberties.' Advertisements undermined the 'good taste' of 'our most famous 
monuments, the picturesque shores and banks of our lakes and rivers, [and] ... 
our magnificent mountain panoramas,' sites which should encourage silent 
admiration and contemplation (recueillement).' Moreover, as the Secretary of 
State reminded Petain, 'the national interest demands more than ever" that 'our 
marvellous country' is 'impeccably maintained (impeccablement tenu).· 55 The 
Secretary of State for Communications also urged the protection of artistic 
monuments and natural sites as France was a 'rural civilisation' and these sites 
would become important for tourism after the war. 56 
Pressure for heritage preservation came from local authorities. In 1943, 
the prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes wanted 250,000 francs to maintain 
'picturesque sites and historical monuments.' The departement's Service for 
Architecture and Urbanism also stressed that more needed to be done than simply 
classifying sites. Instead, it was a case of actively 'protecting them and ensuring 
their potential' (les mettre en valeur). 57 Protecting and promoting natural and 
historical sites was an economic necessity, as communes sought to make the 
most of their surrounding landscapes. Toulon's tourist office devised a novel 
scheme to bring visitors and money to the town after its demilitarisation had 
'4 MAP 80/1/30 Secretaire d'Etat 8 I'Education Nationale to Prefets. Circular no.l11, 9 October 
1943. See also ADAM 717 W 409 Secretaire d'Etat a I'Education Nationale to Prefets. Circular 
no. 107. 12 August 1943. . 
,~ MAP 80/1129 Secretaire d'Etat 8 l'Education Nationale. 'Rapport au Marechal de France. chef 
de l'Etal fran~is: [n.d.] 
56 ADI 170 M 8bis Secretariat d'Etat aux Communications. Commissarait au Tourisme. 'Compte-
rendu stenographique de I'expose fait par M. Henry de Segogne. Commissaire au Tourisme lors 
de la recente installation d 'un Comite regional. August 1943. 1-4. 
" ADAM 717 W 409 Champsaur. 'Rapport du Directeur General: Monuments et Sites 
Pittoresques. Entretien et Conservation - Panicipation du Departement,' Nice. ~5 Sept 1943. 
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deprived it of a major source of income. In effect they proposed a retour a La 
terre in Toulon~ suggesting that the town promote its 'natural riches. which cost 
nothing and if intelligently exploited could become a source of profit for all the 
population.' These natural riches were Toulon's 'incomparable situation at the 
bottom of a marvellous harbour, a real expanse of azure.' The town, protected by 
mountains, also boasted an excellent climate for winter visitors, who could enjoy 
hunting and fishing in and around the town. The tourist office believed it should 
promote holidays that emphasised 'hygiene and salubity' and develop the 
conservation of 'sites, monuments, [and] forests.,58 
In 1943, this legislative programme was portrayed as part and parcel of 
Vichy's rebuilding of France; 'the present law - it must be underlined - is not 
dictated by aesthetic considerations of a purely speCUlative nature but integrates 
itself in the restoration programme to which this government is dedicated.' 59 The 
classification of the Basse-Camargue therefore needs to be treated as a part of 
Vichy's "back to the land" rhetoric and its plans to restore France. Moreover, the 
fact that the Camargue was seen as a wild, unpopulated landscape also suggests 
that we need to revise assumptions that the retour a la terre exclusively targeted 
cultivated land. 
In tenn of nature preservation, the classification of the Basse-Camargue 
was a largely benign outcome of Vichy's "back to the land" philosophy. More 
sinister was its creation of an internment camp for Roma in the northern part of 
the Camargue near the village of Saliers. which was directly infonned by 
58 ADV 2 W 118 Syndicat d'initiative de Toulon, 'Le tourisme au service de la reprise 
economique (suggestions et pro jets): presented to the Prefet du Var, 26 February 1941. 1-3. 
59 MAP 80/1/28 [n.a.] 'Note sur la loi relative a la protection des sites et des paysages.' 3 January 
1943. 
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traditional representations of the wetlands' folklore and landscape. The 
Camargue itself was to aid the "rehabilitation" of the camp's inmates. 
SaUers: a 'gay and harmonious note' in the Camargue? 
Vichy appears to have paid careful attention to the romantic and 
traditional representations of the Camargue when planning Saliers camp. 
Although Vichy propaganda did not directly target Roma communities, it 
conducted a policy of surveillance, control, and eventually internment against 
this marginal and often mobile population, which built on discriminatory laws 
introduced by the Third Republic, such as the law of 6 April 1940 which banned 
'the circulation of nomads ... across the totality of metropolitan territory for the 
duration of the war.' In all, the regime interned approximately 3,000 Roma, some 
of whom were deported to concentration camps in Germany. 60 Saliers camp was 
unique for two main reasons. Firstly, it was the only camp in France established 
solely for Roma. Secondly, it appears to be the sole camp where the natural 
environment was to contribute to the inmates' "re-education." In general, 
locations of internment camps in Vichy France were more influenced by the 
presence of existing camps (often established during the latter days of Third 
Republic) and factors of expediency and urgency than careful considerations of 
the most suitable environment in which to situate the camp. 61 Deliberately or not. 
the natural environments in which the camps were located were often harsh and 
contributed to the internees' misery. For instance. strong winds battered 
60 See Denis Peschanski. Les Tsiganes en France. 1939-1946 (Paris: CNRS. 1994). 39. 72. 
French persecution of the Roma took place within a wider Nazi~led persecutio~ of~.is population. 
See Ian Hancock •. Romanies and the Holocaust: A Re-evaluallon and Overview. In Dan Stone 
(ed.). The Historiography o/the Holocaust (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 2004), 383-96. 
61 Peschanski. "La France des camps.' 106. 
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Rivesaltes camp, Argeles camp was prone to flooding, pervasive sand made life 
all the more unbearable at Saint-Cyprien, and inmates were literally sucked into 
the mud at Gurs. 62 In contrast to the establishment of other camps, Vichy 
carefully chose the location of Saliers; the Camargue' s landscape was to be an 
integral part of the regime's re-educational and propaganda aims. 
Vichy argued that there were 'psychological' as well as 'material' reasons 
to choose a site in the Camargue. Referring to a Roma pilgrimage to Saintes-
Maries-de-Ia-Mer, Jacques van Migom, the architect of the camp, claimed that 
'the gitans consider... this region as the cradle of their race.' Supposedly, 
therefore, Roma would be happy to settle in the area (an argument supported by 
Baroncelli who professed knowledge of the customs of the "nomades" and 
declared himself 'favourable to this projecf). 63 Presumably, van Migom felt that 
the Roma's spiritual connections with the Camargue would encourage them to 
renounce their nomadic lifestyle. As part of this process of creating a stable 
population, the inmates were to engage in work to which they were supposedly 
'particularly suited,' such as basketry. Again, the Camargue was an ideal site in 
which such activity could flourish. The internees were to make use of the area's 
'very rich flora,' exploiting nearby willow, reed and other plants. Plans were 
even mooted to enhance the area's flora by planting more willows. 64 
62 Henri Cadier. avec Ie concours de Roger Benoit, Henri Manen, Monique M: P. Toureille. A. 
Freudenberg, Le Calvaire d'lsrael et la solidatite chretienne (Geneve: Les Editions Labor et 
Fides. [n.d.]). 33-4; Rene S Kapel, Un rabbin dans la lourmente (!940-1944): dans les camps 
d'internement et au sein de I 'Organisation Juive de Combat (Paris: Editions du Centre. 1986),20; 
Joseph Weill. Contribution a I'histoire des camps d'internement dans I'Anti-France (Paris: 
Centre de documentation Juive Contemporaine. 1946). 32. 
63 ADBDR 97 W 24. 'Regroupement en Haute Camargue des nomades de la zone libre: minutes 
of the meeting held on 25 March 1942. Baroncelli considering Roma to have a racial link with 
Native Americans. He was also present at the opening ofSaliers in 1942. See Zaretsky. Code and 
Bull Stories. 135. 
M 'Regroupement en Haute Cam argue des nomades de la zone Iibre.· 
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In addition, Vichy wanted Saliers to act as a propaganda tool; a carefully 
designed camp sensitive to the inmates supposed needs would refute foreign 
criticism of the dire conditions in France's internment camps. Van Migom 
argued that 'above all, Saliers camp must be an instrument of government 
propaganda.' He aimed to give the camp a village-like appearance and make 
allowances for the continuation of family life and respect for the internees' 
'customs and beliefs.' 65 
Van Migom- who was also the Bouches-du-Rh6ne's architect for 
historical monuments - therefore took into account the local landscape, 
designing the camp as a "traditional" Camargue-style village made of huts built 
with local materials. According to his design rationale, a camp of rows of 
wooden barracks would be unsuitable in the Camargue as the government had 
just classified part of the area as a protected natural site. The architect believed 
that his design would 'integrate' Saliers 'into the landscape,~ and that it would 
appear in the Camargue plains as 'a gay and harmonious note.' He also planned 
for the inmates themselves to build the camp using local materials, such as reeds, 
to construct Camargue-style huts (rather optimistically. given their hostility to 
the camp, he envisaged the local population sharing their knowledge of local 
building techniques with the Roma). In addition, flora common to the Camargue 
would form 'hedges of protection against the wind. ,66 
6~ Quoted in Francis Bertrand and Jacques Grandjonc, 'Un "ancien camp de Bohemiens": 
Saliers; in Grandjonc and Grundtner, Zone d'ombres. 292. There were other factors leading to 
the creation of the camp. Gilbert Lesage of the Service social des etrangers believed that the 
creation of the camp would prevent deportation of Roma to Gennany and Eastern Europe. See 
Bertrand and Grandjonc. 'Un uancien camp de Bohemiens": Saliers,' 293. 
66 See Francis Bertrand and Jacques Grandjonc. 'Un ancien camp des bohemiens: SaJiers.· in Les 
Camps en Provence, 167: and 'Regroupement en Haute Camargue des nomades de la zone libre.· 
Camargue huts were apparently in vogue in Vichy France; a report for the Musee national de arts 
et traditions populaires described them as 'one of the most beautiful examples of architecture' 
because of its practicality and economy. See Cabanes· de Cam argue: Documents sur 
158 
Chapter Four 
However, the Camargue-style huts were wholly unsuitable as 
accommodation. As well as being hopelessly overcrowded, the cabins provided 
inadequate shelter from rats and insects. A medical inspector noted that the lack 
of ceilings in the huts meant that their inhabitants were in 'direct contact' with 
the 'parasites and animals' that lived in the roof, and because there was no 
electric lighting in the huts, doors were left open to let the light in, which also 
allowed rats and insects to enter the buildings. 67 The huts also created hygiene 
problems as their thatched roofs posed a fire risk and meant that disinfectants 
could not be used. 68 The Under-Prefect of ArIes highlighted this tension between 
the huts' aesthetics and functionality and urged that before the camp was 
extended a solution that simultaneously reconciled the demands of hygiene and 
'aesthetic concerns' must be found. 69 
It is important, however, not to take the authorities' aesthetic and re-
educational aims at face value as there were more practical - and cynical -
reasons for building the camp at Saliers. One was its relative isolation, away 
from heavily populated areas as officials were keen to avoid contact between the 
Roma and the local population, as they were well aware of the latter's hostility 
towards nomades. 70 The mayor of ArIes reported that he had received protests 
from residents of Saliers who were · extremely upset' at the thought of having 
such 'regrettable' and "dangerous' neighbours. He argued that Saliers. 'one of the 
I 'architecture traditionnelle au debut du x.¥e siec/e (Musee Camarguais: Parc Naturel Regional 
de Camargue [n.d. D. 
67 Quoted in Bertrand and Grandjonc, 'Ancien camp des bohemiens,' in Les Camps en Provence, 
160, 173. Ten to fifteen internees slept in a space designed for one inhabitant and a horse. 
68 ADBDR 97 W 24 Dr. J. Picard. Bureau municipal d'Hygiene, Ville d' Aries, to Sous-Prefet de 
I' Arrondissement d' Aries, 9 October 1943. 
69 ADBDR 97 W 24 Sous-Prefet de l'Arrondissement d'Arles to M. Fourcade, Direction de 
I' Administration de la Police. Secretariat a la Police, Ministere Secretariat de l'Interieur a Vichy, 
13 October 1943. 
70 See ADBDR 142 W 76 Conseiller d'Etat Secretaire General a la Police to Prefet regional. 21 
September 1942; and ADBDR 97 W 24 Sous-Prefet de I' Arrondissement d' Aries to Intendant des 
Services de Police. Marseille, 21 December 1942, 
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most prosperous [villages] of the Camargue' would become "uninhabitable" if the 
camp were built there and that Roma would pose a 'permanent threat" to local 
farms. 71 And some local farmers did fear for their property. One of them. 
opposing plans to extend the camp, argued that it would be unfortunate for 
another property to be 'infested' by the camp. 72 Poor drainage within the camp 
reportedly caused problems outside its boundaries. The inmates had established a 
place to wash their clothes to the south of the camp by setting up barrages in a 
canal to collect water. The head of the local sewerage association complained 
that this would bring a 'grave prejudice' to local agriculture, particularly as 
stagnant water in ditches created problems for farmers in the summer months. 73 
Another reason for the choice of the site was that officials considered the 
land to be worthless and 'absolutely unsuitable' for any kind of agriculture. 74 
The Under-Prefect of ArIes described the site as 'an arid steppe' with an 
extremely high salt content. 75 An agricultural engineer agreed, doubting that the 
terrain was suitable for the cultivation of crops; all that grew there were 
'salicorna, tufts of bulrushes, and some tamarinds.' 76 The uncultivated aspect of 
the Camargue was therefore advantageous for Vichy; building the camp on a 
salty steppe meant that no harm was caused to agriculture. It also conferred a 
purpose to land which would otherwise have been classed as "wasteland." In this 
sense, internment camps incorporated uncultivated spaces into Vichy's project 
for the renewal of France. thereby making the land "productive." 
7. AMA Registre des deliberations du conseil municipal, 'Protestation contre I'etablissement d'un 
camp de Gitans (Commune d'Arles),' 29 June 1942. 
72 ADBDR 97 W 24 Rene Tuelon to Sous-Prefet de I'Arrondissement d'Arles. 2 October 1942. 
73 ADBDR 142 W 76 Monsieur Ie Directeur de l' Association de l' Egout de Saliers, to Monsieur 
Ie Commandant du Camp de Gitans de SaJiers, 24 May 1944. 
74 ADBDR 142 W 76 Sous-Prefet de l'Arrondissement d'Arles to Intendant des Services de 
Police, Marseille, 7 October 1942. I, 
7.5 ADBDR 97 W 24 Sous-frefet de I' AITODdissement d' Aries to frefet des Bouches-du-Rhone, 7 
October 1942. 
76 ADBDR 142 W 76 Letter from M. Nou-de-la-Houpliere. Ingenieur agricole. 26 June 1942. 
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However, the harshness of the Camargue' s natural environment disrupted 
life in the camp and helped thwart the aesthetic ambitions of the authorities and 
its role as a propaganda tool. Saliers was situated near marshlands on a site that 
did not naturally drain well, a problem made worse by poor water and drainage 
facilities. Given the lack of refuse collection, the Under-Prefect of ArIes feared 
that the winter rains would turn the site into a 'cesspit.' 77 Furthermore. the 
remoteness of the camp served to heighten the inmates' sense of isolation. One of 
them remembers that 'we really had the sensation that they placed us here to 
forget about us, to make us disappear, and that we could all die there without 
anyone realising.' 78 
While the Camargue was, and still is, celebrated for its apparently wild 
and remote character, it was not an easy erivironment to live in. Its unique 
climate made life extremely difficult for Saliers' inmates. Temperatures reached 
uncomfortable extremes, especially in the summer months, and the 
aforementioned winds, such as the mistral, hammered across the Camargue, 
often reaching over 100 kilometres per hour (the area is calm only about one-
fifth of the time). In addition, the inmates had to contend with the wetlands' 
twenty-four varieties of mosquitoes. 79 Unsurprisingly, one former internee 
remembers that 'lots of people were ill. The camp was full of mosquitoes. It was 
unbearable.' 80 Mathieu Pernot. a photographer who recently completed an oral 
history project with former Saliers inmates, concludes that the inmates seemed to 
77 ABBDR 142 W 76 Sous-Prefet de I' Arrondissement d'Arles to Intendant des Services de 
Police a Marseille, 7 October 1942. 
78 Quoted in Mathieu Pemot. "Les memoires de Saliers: des archives sedentaires aux recits des 
nomades. t in Mathieu Pemot. Un camp pour les bohemians: memoires du camp d'inJernemenl 
f,0ur nomades de Saliers (Aries: Actes Suds. 2001). 39. 
Duncan. Horses and Grasses. 45: and Tallon. La Reserve zoologique el bOlanique de 
Camargue. 7. 
10 Roger Demetrion. quoted in Pemot. Camp pour les bohemiens. 90. 
161 
Chapter Four 
suffer' the most' from the site's location in the Camargue as they were battered 
by the mistral wind in winter and sweltered under the sun in summer. 81 
In the end, officials realised that the choice of site had been a mistake. As 
the Under-Prefect of ArIes admitted in July 1944: 
Errors were committed not only in the choice of the terrain upon which the camp was 
built, but also in the conception itself of the camp. Situated on the edge of a marsh, the 
terrain itself is a former swamp '" which the least [amount of] rain floods or makes 
sodden. No line of trees shelter it from the dominant winds and the mistral blows with a 
singular violence, especially in winter. 82 
Alongside overcrowding, malnutrition, and the harshness of Vichy's 
discriminatory policy against the Roma, the natural environment of the 
Camargue seriously worsened the condition of the inmates and undermined the 
camp's propaganda and settlement aims. In its conception of the camp, Vichy 
had considered the nature of the Camargue an ally; in the end it proved to be an 
enemy. Meanwhile, the SNAF faced a formidable battle to protect the reserve 
from the activities of both Axis and Allied troops. 
The reserve in wartime 
It seems almost self-evident that nature conservation is one of the first 
casualties of war. National defence, military mobilisation, food and natural 
resource shortages all make the protection of fauna and flora seem like a luxury. 
II Perno!. 'Les memoires de SaJiers: des archives sedentaires aux recits des nomades: 39. 
12 Quoted in Marie-Christine Hubert 'Le campe de nomades de Saliers. 1942-44.' in Pemol 
Camp pour les bohemiens. 28. 
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I· f . 83 Y ft th a re IC 0 peacetIme. et a er e outbreak of war in 1939. concerns were 
expressed in France about the fate of nature. Speaking with regard to France's 
colonies, H. Humbert, Professor at the Museum National d'Histoire Naturelle in 
Paris, addressed the issue at the Academy for Colonial Sciences in February 
1940: 
It can seem, at first sight, inopportune to raise, in the present circumstances. the question 
of the nature protection in our overseas territories. So many problems of capital 
importance demand the attention of the governments of our colonies. that the 
consideration of any subject not relating to immediate exigencies must be almost 
inevitably postponed. 
Is nature protection one of those areas which can be overlooked until the end of the 
hostilities without serious inconvenience in favour of more imperative preoccupations, 
or, au contraire, does it merit retaining, even in wartime, the attention of those 
responsible for the future of our colonies? 84 
For Humbert, nature protection was worth pursuing in war time because in its 
absence 'natives and Europeans' might be tempted to slip back into their 
destructive habits in forests and other habitats. 85 Humbert's concerns were 
echoed across the Atlantic by Henry Baldwin Ward, a professor at the University 
of Illinois, who urged the USA to take steps to conserve its natural resources as 
'totalitarian warfare not only destroys life and scatters the remnants of the people 
but makes levies on natural resources that provide for their extinction.' As a 
consequence. "the greatest problem of the future we face to-day is not merely the 
13 More empirical research is needed on this subject. One exception is Kurk Dorsey, 
'Compromising on Conservation: World War II and American Leadership in Whaling 
Diplomacy,' in Russell and Tucker. Natural Enemy, Natural A/~l'. 252-69. 
14 H. Humbert La proleclion de /a nature dans les lerriloires d'outre-mer pendanl la guerre: 
communicalion /aite a 1'.4cademie des sciences coloniales : J Fevrier 1940 (Paris: Societe 
d'Editions geographiques. maritimes. et coloniales. 1940). I. 
I~ Ibid. 7-8. 
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winning of the war but the condition of the world at its close.' 86 As the example 
of the Camargue shows, Humbert and Ward were not alone in advocating the 
protection of nature during wartime, as the SNAF and its supporters battled to 
protect the reserve from the destructive effects of modern~ mechanised warfare 
and secure its integrity for the future. 87 
In order to galvanise itself and justify nature protection at a time when 
France's present and future seemed so uncertain, the SNAF elevated it to an act 
of patriotic duty. The SNAF would secure France's most important natural sites 
so that the country could benefit from them in peacetime. To accomplish this, its 
Central Council took charge of the reserves and reduced their management to 
'the essential.' According to Bressou, this strategy would ensure that when 
'peace arrives once again, the Societe d' Acc1imatation ... will have succeeded in 
safeguarding some of [France's] most precious natural treasures (quelques-unes 
de nos plus sures richesses nature lies), [and] will be able to usefully contribute 
to the restoration of our most beautiful and dear nation.' 88 
Aside from the plans to modernise the Basse-Camargue, war created a 
multitude of problems for the SNAF. Communications were disrupted between 
its Paris headquarters and its reserves in the Alps, Pyrenees, and Camargue.89 In 
addition, during the phoney war, the Camargue reserve lost one of its guards to 
military mobilisation and Tallon was requisitioned to work in a factory (although 
he was eventually able to transfer back to the region). After defeat in 1940, 
however. the reserve was able to run at full personnel levels again even if. as 
86 Henry Baldwin Ward. 'Warfare and Natural Resources.' Science 2544 (1 October 1943).292. 
87 On the increased mechanisation of warfare. see Daniel Pick. War Machine: The 
Rationalisation o/Slaughter in the Modern Age (New Haven and London: Yale Universit), Press. 
1993). 165-77. . . 
88 Bressou. • Actes des Reserves de la Societe nationale d'acclimatation de France: CommIssIon 




elsewhere in France, problems existed of a material nature; food was in shon 
supply and it was harder to travel around the reserve due to fuel shonages. 
Nonetheless, the reserve staff managed to receive a limited number of scientists 
and other visitors, tag birds, and establish new research stations. 90 
In comparison to the SNAF's alpine Lauzanier reserve, the Camargue 
seemed to be faring exceptionally well in the early stages of the war. Lauzanier 
was totally occupied by Italian troops, denying SNAF personnel access to the 
reserve, which led to increased poaching and damage to forest plantations. 91 
This military occupation followed one by French troops in the late 1930s. who 
had used Lauzanier for target practice, which according to the SN AF, . caused a 
grave prejudice to the tranquillity of the fauna.' 92 
The Camargue, however, faced a massive challenge from that most 
modem of war machines, the aeroplane. This was not a new threat. Just after the 
First World War. Folco de Baroncelli had protested the French air force's use of 
airspace above the Camargue. The French planes had disrupted the Camargue' s 
ecosystem, scaring local bird life. with their noise, including the flamingos that 
bred in the area, and presumably causing injury and death through collisions. 
Outraged, de Baroncelli demanded that 'the responsible authorities give the most 
severe orders that such acts of savagery never again happen.' 93 Even after the 
foundation of the reserve, similar collisions between birds and airplanes 
90 • Actes de la Reserve zoologique et botanique de Camargue.· Conferences de la Socie/e 
nationaJe d'acclimatalion de France: actes de reserves de la Societe nal;onale d'acclimalal;on 
de France, No. 24. 1940-1941, 41-51. 
91 See . Actes de ]a Reserve du Lauzanier.' No.5. 1940-1941. Conferences de la Societe na/ionale 
d'acclimatation de France: acres de reserves de la Societe nationale d'acclima/ation de France. 
No. 24. 1940-1941. 84. 
92 'Actes des reserves de )a Societe nationale d'sccJimatation de France. Commission generale 
des reserves: extraits du proces-verbal de la reunion du 9 decembre 1937,' in Bulle/in de la 
Societe nationa/e d'Qcclimatation de France, 85th Year. January-February 1938. 1. 
93 Quoted in Zaretsky, Cocle and Bull Stories. 118-9. Zaretsky observes that 'in light of the 
slaughter just ended in Europe such rhetoric seems misplaced.' 
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continued to occur. Day reported the story of a German airman who flew at verv 
., 
low altitude across the etang de Fangassieri, the feeding ground for 4.000 
flamingos. Startled, many of the birds flew up, crashed into the plane. and fell 
back into the water injured or dead. According to Day, Tallon had 'made such 
protests in the proper quarters that airmen are now forbidden to cross that part of 
the Camargue.' 94 During the Second World War, however, the problems posed 
by planes returned with a vengeance. 
That the Camargue was continuously earmarked as a suitable location for 
aerial training is no surprise. As the Minster for the French air force noted in 
1938, training sites should be established in areas 'of low population density and 
minor cultivation ... as well as by the coast.' 95 The Camargue fitted the bill 
perfectly and during the 1939-1940 combats, the French air force carried out 
target practice over the wetlands. 96 This development threatened to prevent the 
surveillance of the reserve. as well as dispersing its flamingos and other wildlife. 
However, the reserve was spared by the use of non-explosive shots and the 
"unfortunate events of June 1940' when France was defeated. 97 
Yet the aerial threat to the reserve did not end there. as from January 
1941 onwards French military authorities revived their plans to transform the 
Basse-Camargue into a target zone. Bressou protested this decision. arguing that 
it ignored the reserve's "scientific interest' and threatened to be 'fatal to [its] very 
94 Day, Where the Mistral Blows, 189-90. 
9~ Service historique de l'Annee d'Air (henceforth SHAA) 2 B 153 Ministre de I'Air to General 
Commandant la I" Region Aerienne. Dijon; General Commandant la 2" Region Aerienne, Paris: 
General Commandant la 3- Region Aerienne, Tours; General Commandant la 4" Region Amenne. 
Aix-en-Provence; and General Commandant la 5" Region Aerienne. Alger, . Recherche de 
champs de tir.' 1 July 1938. 
96 Clement Bressou. • Actes de la Reserve zoologique et botanique de Cam argue. No. 25. 1942-
194 7,' La Terre ella Vie. 96111 year. No.2. Numero special (1949).43. 
97 • Actes de 18 Reserve zoologique et botanique de Camargue. No. 24 1940-1941. . in 
Conferences de la Societe nalionaJe d'acc/imatalion de France: Acles de reserves de 10 Socielt? 
na/;ono/e d ·acc.:lima/al;on de France pour /940 el 1941. included in Sociele nalionaJe 
d'acc/imalal;on de France, Conferences. Summer and Autumn 1941. Winter 1942.42. 
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existence,' possibly leading to the 'immediate, total~ and definitive disappearance 
of the Camargue's original avifauna.' 98 Nonetheless, there was some room for 
negotiation with the authorities and the SNAF mobilised to challenge the 
establishment of the firing ground. A petition was sent to the Minister for 
National Defence, as well as to the Minister for the Air Force~ the Minister for 
National Education (who had responsibility for the protection of monuments and 
sites), the Prefect of the Bouches-du-Rhone, and the head of the regional air 
force. In addition, Alais, Froges, et Camargue (which was, strictly speaking. the 
reserve's landowner), the head of the Faculty of Sciences at the University of 
Marseille, and the Forestry Conservator in Aix-en-Provence. as well as local 
associations in the Camargue, joined the protests. 99 
France's scientific community also mobilised itself. drawing attention to 
the reserve's scientific importance, both nationally and internationally. These 
efforts culminated in a motion unanimously passed by the Assembly of Museum 
Professors on 15 February 1941, which described the Basse-Camargue as "the 
most important of the rare natural reserves of our country,' as it sheltered unique 
species of birds and was a major centre of scientific research. The professors 
argued that the establishment of an aerial frring ground would result in the 
"immediate destruction of the fauna and flora which is strictly protected' and 
demanded that these plans "be abandoned.' 100 This campaign ultimately met 
with some success, limiting and shortening the extent of the damages. 
However, it was not just the French air force that had designs on the 
Carnargue as, in turn. the German air force singled out the wetlands for target 
practice. In August 1943 signs appeared on the edge of the Vaccares reading 
98 Bressou. 'Actes des reserves de la Societe nationale d'acclimatation de France,' 37-8. 
99 Ibid. 38-9. 
100 Quoted in ibid. 39. 
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, Aviation firing ground. Access to the etang prohibited. Danger of death.' As if 
to add credence to this warning, planes were spotted dropping bombs over the 
shoreline of the Momes island. 101 Tallon was extremely concerned about these 
plans. Writing to the head of the Faculty of Science at the University of Marseille. 
he outlined the potential consequences of the German air force' s intentions. 
which included the disappearance of avifauna, the destruction of the Rieges 
wood, restricted access to the reserve, and the end of eel fishing in the Vaccares. 
which represented a loss both for the reserve's income and local food supplies. 
102 Tallon expressed surprise at German plans as he had recently received a visit 
from Dr. Panzer, Director of Danzig Museum, German army officer. and 
delegate from the German Office of the Protection of Nature charged with 
liaising with French nature reserves, who had come to the Camargue in order to 
see how the reserve could be protected from 'the current circumstances.' 103 
Increased bombing also threatened to cause more problems for the 
Camargue's gardiens (cowboys) who grazed their herds across the watery 
expanses of the Basse-Camargue. Allied aircraft already made their lives difficult. 
One gardien remembers how after bombing raids over ArIes, Allied planes 
deposited unused bombs over the Vaccares in order to carry less weight on their 
flight back to base. 104 Silt-filled shell holes created an unpredictable terrain and 
crossing the area became a "lottery.' 105 
101 RNC Gabriel Tallon to Leo Kuyten. 21 September 1943. The German air force also planned to 
create an 'exercise terrain' for planes on the neighbouring Crau plain. See AMA H 247 Under-
Prefect of Aries to Mayor of ArIes, 13 April 1943. 
102 ADBDR 76 W 128 Gabriel Tallon to Doyen de la Faculte des Sciences de Marseille. 23 
September 1943, 1. For more on the fishing see RNC Gabriel Tallon to Campagnie Alais Froges 
et Camargue. 7 February 1944. 
103 Tallon to Doyen de la Faculte des Sciences. I. 
104 Rene Jalabert. quoted in Annelyse Chevalier. Le Bois des Rieges: Coeur de /a Ca",argue. 
enJre my the el realile. recits de gardiens. manadiers. pecheurs el autre camarguias ... (Sommieres: 
Editions Arnaud-Gilles. 2004). Le Bois des Rieges. 84. 
I~ Rene Lambert. quoted in Chevalier. Le Bois des Rieges. 125. 
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Like the French and Gennan air forces, US military authorities 
established an aviation firing ground over the Camargue. In February 1945. 
Tallon reported that US planes were targeting the tip of the Mornes Gust as 
Gennan planes had done) and firing machine guns and depositing light bombs 
over a ten kilometre area; 'the consequences are disastrous for the reserve ... in 
particular, the Rieges wood, completely included in the zone, will be destroyed.' 
106 Tallon feared that if destroyed, the wood (which was the only surviving 
Phoenician juniper forest in France) 'would fail to regenerate.' In addition. the 
affected zone lay within the classified area of the Camargue and constituted the 
only un-mined area of the reserve, meaning that once target practice began. the 
functioning of the reserve would effectively cease. \07 The US air force' s 
activities in the Camargue had reportedly already completely chased away the 
flamingos, which had been forced to seek sanctuary elsewhere. \08 
On both occasions, the SNAF campaigned once again to limit the effects 
of the target practice, lobbying both German military authorities and the US 
army. 109 As in 1941. scientists and forestry officials joined the protests. 
demonstrating the reserve's reputation in France and (according, at least, to 
Bressou) overseas. 1 \0 Appeals to Camargue's internationally renowned 
landscape were an important weapon in the defence of the reserve. With regard 
to the German plans, the Minister for National Education. on the initiative of the 
106 RNC Gabriel Tallon to Monsieur Rossigneux, Chef du Contintieux, Compagnie Atais, Froges 
and Camargue. 22 March 1945. 
107 CACAN 19771615n7 Gabriel Tallon. 'Creation d'un camp de bombardement pour les 
aviateurs americains en Basse-Camargue.· 10 February 1945. 
108 CACAN t9771615n7 Conservateur des Eaux et Forets, Aix-en-Provence to Directeur 
General des Eaux et Forets, 'Reserve de la Camargue. champ de tir aerien: 23 April 1945. See 
also Etienne Gallet. Les FlamanJs roses de Camargue (Lausanne: Librairie Payot. 1949). 1~4. 
109 Officials from the reserve wrote to Professor Truger in Avignon and the German Airforce 
commander at Istres. but apparently failed to receive a reply. See Tallon to Doyen de la Faculte 
des Sciences. I. 
110 Bressou. 'Actes de la Reserve zoologique et botanique de Camargue. No. 25.1942-1947: 44. 
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Head of the Faculty of Sciences at the University of Marseille, asked the Gennan 
Authorities to 'respect the character of a site of which the conservation presents a 
general interest which goes beyond the simply national.' III 
Similarly, the Forestry Conservator in Aix-en-Provence reassured Tallon 
that he would do 'everything in [his] power' to help with the campaign against 
the US air force's plans, although he admitted that 'the game (partie) would be 
hard to win as our allies find it hard to accept reclamations of this nature [as] 
they believe the end justifies the means.' 112 Yet on both occasions. it seems that 
the SNAF's efforts met with some success as military authorities issued orders 
restricting the use of the Vaccares, meaning that the damage to the reserve was 
'less important than we had the right to fear: I I3 
The attempts to protect the reserve against the potentially devastating 
effects of the aerial testing zones suggest that nature preservation remained a live 
issue during the war and that France's naturalists and scientists battled to save 
what they could of France's natural heritage. Furthennore. it appears that there 
was some limited room for manoeuvre with French, Gennan, and US military 
authorities on this matter. In this case. as in their attempt to limit modernisation 
of the area's agriculture, the Camargue' s defenders enjoyed some success in 
protecting the landscape against the destructiveness of modem warfare through 
their protests and lobbying. However. they had less room for manoeuvre once the 
Gennany military incorporated the Camargue within its strategy for defending 
France against Allied attack. 
III ADBDR 76 W 128 Ministre Secretaire d'Etat a rEducation Nationale to Prefet Delegue des 
Bouches-du-Rh6ne. 3eme Division. ler Bureau. 'Bouches-du-Rh6ne - Etang de Vaccares: 10 
November 1943. 
112 CACAN 1977161Sn7 Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Aix-en-Provence to Gabriel Tallon. 
IS February 1945. These protests need to be seen within the wider context of Franco-Allied 
relations following the Liberation of France. See Footitt. War and Liberalion. 
IIJ Bressou .. Actes de la Reserve zoologique et botanique de Camargue. No. 25. 1942-19"7: 44. 
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Floods and fortifications: the German army in the Camargue 
The Camargue represented different things to different people. For some, 
it was a cradle of Provencal traditions. For others, it was an unparalleled nature 
reserve. For Vichy modernisers, it was a land of unrealised agricultural potential. 
For the German army, however, it was an area whose natural defences needed 
strengthening. For a start, the Germans laid barbed wire and over 300,000 mines 
in the Basse-Camargue. 114 These defences were complemented by anti-tank 
devices, bunkers, turrets, and artillery posts placed throughout the lower 
Camargue, particularly along its coastline. 115 Mines and other defences served to 
restrict Tallon's and his staffs access to the lower sections of the reserve. as well 
as causing accidents involving humans, bulls, and sheep (although these didn't 
take place on the reserve itself). 116 The mines also caused more indirect 
problems for the reserve as fishermen, who could no longer fish freely in the 
Saintes-Maries-de-Ia-Mer region because of the risk of explosives, requested the 
right to fish in the Vaccares. Tallon resisted this move, citing the paucity of fish 
stocks and claiming that the request was merely a ploy from local poachers to 
gain access to the much-coveted fish of the Vaccares. 117 
Yet, German defences were not necessarily detrimental to wildlife. In 
1949, The Times' special correspondent suggested that the mines had helped 
protect the Camargue's flamingos by keeping them free from human interference. 
114 Ibid. 45. 
115 See Alain Chazene. 'Les defenses aJlemandes en Camargue.' 44-54. Article supplied by Eric 
Coule~ Director of the Reserve Naturelle de la Camargue. 
116 Bressou. 'Actes de la Reserve zoologique et botanique de Camargue. No. 25.1942-1947.' 45. 
117 RNC Tallon to Rossigneux. 
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118 And in the neighbouring Crau, birds used the metre-high stone cairns erected 
by German troops to prevent Allied planes from landing for perching and nesting 
sites. 119 
Yet these (unintentional) benefits to wildlife were outweighed by plans to 
submerge the Camargue. As the war progressed and the threat of an Allied 
invasion of France increased, German forces tightened their control over the 
Camargue. As a consequence, the Camargue was drawn deeper into the total ising 
momentum of modern warfare. German submersion plans threatened to radically 
transform the Camargue' s environment, demonstrating that although the German 
authorities had an officer to liaise with French nature reserves (the 
aforementioned Dr Panzer), military considerations overrode nature protection. 
Plans to flood the Camargue posed a more serious threat to the wetlands' 
survival and threatened to destroy both traditionalist and modernist aspirations 
for the Camargue as a refuge for wildlife and a productive centre of agriculture 
respectively. On 14 February 1944, German authorities requested that the 
Regional Prefect take steps to provoke the flooding of the Camargue (and the 
Vallee des Baux which lay to the north) for 'urgent military reasons,' a move 
which constituted the greatest threat to the Camargue' s environment during the 
war. 120 After consulting the German authorities, the Regional Prefect informed 
Pierre Laval. the head of government, that he believed that German authorities 
118 Special Correspondent. 'A Trip to the Camargue: Main European Gateway for Migrant Birds. 
The Times. 28 May 1949.6. 
119 Hoffman. 'Ecological Sketch of the Camargue.' 344. In 1960, Monica Krippner noted tha~ "no 
one has since bothered to demolish the cairns - indeed why should they? - and so they remam to 
puzzle itinerant travellers who pass this way and to baffle some archaeologist a thousand years 
hence.' Discovering Ihe Cam argue (London: Hutchinson. 1960). 120. 




intended to maintain water levels at winter levels throughout the year, a situation 
that would prove difficult to control. 121 
The flooding scheme threatened to undo the conditions that kept the 
Camargue in its current state. A detailed Ponts et Chaussees report outlined how 
this would happen; the Camargue's environment relied on the gradual draining of 
higher fields and marshes into the Vaccares and ultimately to the sea, a process 
aided by drainage works and canals. For the system to work. the etangs needed to 
be kept at as Iowa level as possible as this aided the drainage of water from the 
higher ground and maintained a sufficiently low table of salty water to permit 
crop cultivation. As high sea levels often corresponded with periods of high 
precipitation, gates in the sea dyke allowed water out from the Vaccares when 
conditions at sea allowed it. The strong northern mistral wind presented an 
additional danger when water levels in the etangs were high, as it could cause 
water to surge over the sea dyke, potentially destroying it, along with the 
valuable salt industries centred on Salin-de-Giraud. 122 The German authorities 
envisaged blocking the gate of the sea dyke, thereby isolating the Vaccares, and 
causing its water level to rise by pumping an increased volume of water from the 
Rhone. 123 
Unsurprisingly, this demand caused grave concerns amongst French 
officials and the SNAF. Tallon believed that mixing fresh and salty water would 
'drastically alter (bouleverserait) all the biological conditions' of the reserve. He 
predicted that the unique Rieges wood and other vegetation would die out. the 
121 ADBDR 76 W 128 J. F. Bussi~re, Prefet de la Region de Marseille, to Pierre Laval. Chef du 
Gouvemement. 22 February 1944. 
122 ADBDR 76 W 128 lngenieur des Ponts et Chaussees de l'Arrondissement d'Arles. 'Note sur 
I'inondation de la Camargue ordonnee par les autorites allemandes d'occupation: 18 March 1944. 
123 ADBDR 76 W 1:!8 Ingenieur du Genie Rural to Directeur General du Genie Rural et de 
I'Hydraulique Agricole. 21 Marth 1944. 
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reserve's buildings would be destroyed, and that the reserve's guards and yisitors 
would be unable to carry out their tasks. As he did in opposition to aviation 
testing grounds, Tallon stressed the scientific and biological importance of the 
reserve which was known throughout the world 'and notably in Germany: 124 
The Bouches-du-Rhone's architect for historical monuments echoed these 
concerns, arguing that the submersion of the Vaccares would result in the 
'complete destruction of the flora and fauna' of the reserve, the protection of 
which was 'indispensable.' In general, any change to the water system in the 
Camargue would 'lead to the destruction of this very interesting region.' 125 
French protests about the destruction of monuments were apparently noted by the 
German authorities. 126 
In addition to the destruction of the reserve. local state officials feared 
that the flooding would necessitate the evacuation of 12,000 people from the 
Camargue, submerge pastureland, destroy cultivated land, threaten cattle 
breeding, and damage the valuable salt industry. 127 This latter point deeply 
concerned officials with responsibility for industry, who believed that the 
flooding would wash the salt pans out to sea, halting production. and resulting in 
the loss of 260,000 tons of salt stocks. They argued that the flooding would 
damage German interests as it would deprive the factories that supplied the 
occupier with products derived from salt (such as bromine). 128 
124 ADBDR 76 W 128 Gabriel Tallon. 'Rapport de G. Tallon sur les repercussions du projet de ce 
territoire.' 25 February 1944. 
125 ADBDR 76 W 128 Architecte departemental des monuments historiques. 'Projet de 
submission partielle de la Cam argue et de la vallee des Baux.· 25 February 1944. . 
126 ADBDR 76 W 128 E. Freiherr von Spielgel. Consul General d'AlIemagne, Marsellle to J. F. 
Bussiere. Prefet Regional de la Region de Marseille. II March 1944 
m ADBDR 76 W 128 Sous-Prefect de I'Arrondissement d'Arles to ?Tefet des Bouches-du-Rhone. 
'Submersions dans la region d'Arles,' 22 February 1944; ADBDR 76 W 128 G. Moyen. Cabinet 
du Prefet de la region de Marseille. 22 February 1944. 
128 ADBDR 76 W 128, Tivolle. Inspecteur General de la Production lndustrielle. Fleu~. 
Ingenieur en Chef des Industries Chimiques. Bureau. Ingenieur en chef des Mines. 'Note urgente 
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An agricultural engineer outlined the dire COnsequences for agriculture in 
the region. If the Camargue' s water levels were artificially maintained at winter 
levels, it would be impossible to cultivate crops and vines, salt levels would rise 
and sterilize the soil, swamps would turn into elangs meaning that they would 
cease to support cattle grazing, and rice production would be unharvestable. 
Furthermore, the engineer predicted that the Camargue risked seeing outbreaks 
of 'malaria' due to the increased number of elangs. Meanwhile. in the Vallee des 
Baux, the 20,000,000 francs that the Vichy regime had recently invested in local 
agriculture would be effectively wiped out. 129 The police also feared that Saliers 
internment camp would be flooded, necessitating the evacuation of its inmates to 
GurS. 130 
These fears and concerns seem to have had little influence on the German 
authorities, suggesting that defensive considerations overrode all others. From 1 
March 1944 onwards, all functioning pumping stations were in action. pumping 
water from the Rhone. Moreover, German units based at Saintes-Maries-de-Ia 
Mer and Salin-de-Giraud took advantage of south easterly winds to open gates on 
the sea dyke, thereby allowing sea water to flow into the Vaccares. These actions, 
reported a Genie Rural engineer. threatened to wreck agricultural interests by the 
massive upsurge in salt water and submerge the salt pans at Salin-de-Giraud. 131 
It then seems that the German authorities bowed to French protests. as they 
sur les repercussions probables de l'inondation de la Camargue et de la Vallee des Baux.· 2 J 
February 1944. 
129 ADBDR 76 W 128 Ingenieur en chef du Genie Rural. Marseille. 'Rapport.' 22 FebruCll) 1944. 
130 ADBDR 76 W 128 Intendant regional de Police to Prefet regional de Marseille. 'lnondation de 
la Cam argue. • 6 March 1944. 
131 Ingenieur du Genie Rural to Directeur General du Genie Rural. 
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allowed dyke gates to be opened when the northerly mistral was blowing in order 
to lower the level of the Vaccares. 132 
Yet by 20 March 1944 the situation was precarious. Due to the pumping 
from the Rhone, water levels in the marshes and fields of the upper Camargue 
had reached the flood levels of winter 1943-1944, necessitating the removal of 
livestock and threatening agriculture. In the Basse-Camargue, the situation was -
for the moment - less alarming, due to fewer pumping stations and the high 
water absorption rates of sandy terrain near Saintes-Maries-de-Ia-Mer. However. 
if the level of the Vaccares rose any further the sea dyke ran the risk of being 
overwhelmed. 133 The local Genie Rural engineer urged the Under-Prefect of 
Arles to advise German authorities that water levels had already reached those of 
winter 1943-1944 (and in some cases had gone beyond them). 134 As these 
reports indicate, the destruction of the Camargue's physical environment seemed 
imminent. 
Nature's resilience 
Throughout the Camargue's wartime history. nature was not a passive 
actor. As indicated. the wetlands' harsh environment disrupted Vichy's plans to 
"re-educate" Roma inmates at Saliers. Furthermore, before the implementation of 
the submersion scheme. nature had offered some resistance to the German troops. 
For instance. soldiers stationed in the Camargue supplemented their diets with 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 ADBDR 76 W 128 J. Anighi de Casanova. Ingenieur du Genie RuraJ to Sous-Prefet de 
I' Arrondissement d' Aries. 22 March 1944. 
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local fauna and gardiens recall how soldiers helped themselves to cattle. 135 But 
German troops were, at times, apparently thwarted by the Camargue' s singular 
environment. Monica Krippner records the memories of one gardien: 
During the war, madame - let me see, it was during the occupation - some German 
officers mounted on Austrian horses, there were sixteen of them, rode into the etang, for 
you know the water is shallow, and on to one of the islands of the Vaccares. They were 
hunting our sanglier [boar], and we saw them go and said nothing for we knew about the 
quicksands, and we knew that their foreign horses had no understanding of our terrain. 
for a Camargue horse would never get caught by a quicksand. Sure enough they 
disappeared - but completely, sixteen horses and men. But who are we to mourn the 
Boche? We guess that they must have reached the island, sighted their wild boar, and 
given chase, and thus they all went into the sables mouvements. With sixteen horses and 
men fighting like crazed ones for their life it must have been all over very quickly but 
not quickly enough to have prevented a terrible death. 136 
Even if allowing for an element of exaggeration, this story nonetheless suggests 
the ways in which nature unwittingly opposed the occupying forces, much to the 
apparent pride of the locals. 
Moreover, on a larger scale, nature combined with material shortages to 
undermine the plans to flood the Camargue. Pumping stations lacked lubricant 
and fuel. In all. over eight tons of coal, 450 litres of gas-oil, and twenty five Htres 
of oil were needed daily. As a consequence of these shortages, many pumps 
remained inactive. 137 On 18 March 1944, the local Ponts et Chaussees engineer 
reported that the 'situation was not serious,' because no cultivatable terrain lay 
m Marcel and Jean Raynaud and Rene Lanbert. quoted in Chevalier. Bois des Rieges. 10 1. 125. 
136 Quoted in Krippner. Discovering the Camargue. 63. 
137 ADBDR 76 W 128 Caillol. lngenieur des Poots et Chaussees de r Arrondissement d' Aries. 




under water and that the 'situation currently remaIns acceptable for French 
interests.' 138 On 7 April 1944, the Head Engineer of Genie Rural noted that due 
to the strong mistral wind (that had blown across the Camargue since the end of 
March) and the poor functioning of pumping stations, the 'situation was no 
longer of an alarming character.' 139 By 10 May 1944 the 'drying action' of the 
mistral (and the poor performance of the pumping stations) meant that the extent 
of flooding had not changed since the beginning of April. 140 
This situation continued to the end of May 1944, when the local Ponts et 
Chausees engineer noted that there was 'nothing particular to signal' as the water 
levels in the etangs were as 'low as possible'and the Saliers, Grand Mer. and 
Pont de Rousty marshes were 'constantly retreating.' This was despite the extra 
fuel German authorities had secured for the pumping stations, as the current hot 
weather meant that there was an 'intense evaporation.' 141 It appears that Gennan 
military authorities became frustrated by their inability to flood the Camargue 
and took further action to provoke its submersion. In June they blocked drainage 
canals between the Pont de Rousty and Grand Mer marshes and the Vaccares in 
order to compartmentalise the Camargue' s water levels according to altitude. 
This. they hoped, would cause flooding in higher areas to spill over into the 
Basse-Camargue. 142 Yet these measures had 'no effect' because of the extreme 
heat, dryness. and evaporation. although officials feared that the situation might 
JJR Ibid. 2. 
139 ADBDR 76 W 128 Reynaud. Ingenieur en chef du Genie Rural to Prefet of Bouches-du-
Rhone. 7 April 1944. 
140 ADBDR 76 W 128 Arrighi de Casanova. Ingenieur du Genie Rural. 'Situation au 10 mai 1944 
des inondations strategiques provoquees par ]es autorites militaires allemandes dans la region 
arlesienne. ' 
141 Emphasis in original. ADBDR 76 W 128 Caillol. lngenieur des Ponts et Chaussees de r 
Arrondissement d'Arles. 'Rappo~' 30 May 1944. 




change in the event of heavy rain. 143 The evidence suggests, therefore~ that the 
Camargue successfully resisted the submersion measures, thanks in no small part 
to the drying influence of the winds and sun that the region was so prone to, as 
well as the earlier lack of fuel. 
Therefore, despite the pressures from agricultural intensification, aerial 
testing zones, and defensive flooding, the Camargue emerged surprisingly 
unscathed from the conflict, with Bressou arguing that the 'war has passed over 
the Camargue reserve without damaging it too much.' 144 Visitors to the 
Camargue in the postwar era also reported little change. In 1947 British naturalist 
G. K. Yeates reported for Country Life that 'to the physical appearance of the 
Camargue ten years have brought no change, despite the war and the occupation 
of the area by French, German, and Allied troops in turn.' The danger of mines, 
however, was more apparent, and 'the fact that the locals scorn the ideas of 
mines does not impress the foreign visitor as much as the casualty records in the 
hospital at Aries.' On the whole, according to Yeates, the . greater part of 
Camargue is as untouched as it was before'; any changes to bird popUlations had 
more to do with natural conditions, such as drought, than the war. 145 Yeates gave 
a similar impression to readers of The Ibis a year later, stating clearly that the 
~war has left few scars on the Camargue,' even if it was 'decidedly unhealthy and 
dangerous' in some areas to bird-watch because of the landmines 146 (the removal 
of landmines across France is covered in chapter six). 
143 See ADBDR 76 W ]28 CailloI. Ingenieur des Ponts et Chaussees de I'Arrondissement d'Arles. 
'Rappo~' 4 July 1944; eaillol. Ingenieur des Ponts et Chaussees de l' Arrondissement d' Aries. 
'Rapport: 31 July 1944; and ADBDR 188 W 19 lngenieur en chef du Genie Rural to Prefet des 
Bouches-du-Rh6ne. 'Situation au 25 juin ]944 des inondations strategiques provoquees par les 
autorites allemandes dans la region arlesienne.· 30 June 1944. 
I~ Bressou •• Actes de la Reserve zoologique et botanique.· No. 25. 46. 
14' G. K. Yeates 'The Camargue Re-visited' COUnJry Life. 5 September 1947,474. 
146 G. K. Yeates. 'Some supplementary notes on the birds of the Rh6ne delta' The Ibis 90 (July 
1948). 426. A 1977 birdwatching guide to the Camargue presented a similar view; 'with the 
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In a similar ve~ Etienne Gallet's 1949 guide to the Camargue' s 
flamingos made little mention of the war's influence on the Camargue (bar 
disruption to the flamingos' nesting in 1944 due to increased aviation activity). 
Gallet described the Camargue, a mysterious 'desert of salt,' in a way that would 
not have been out of place in pre-war descriptions of the wetlands. For Gallet. 
this landscape had a 'special charm' where 'legend and history merged together' 
especially in those places where nature had been left to itself and 'man [sic] had 
not yet introduced his miserable civilisation.' 147 
Such views continued into the 1960s. Krippner argued that in the 
Camargue people lived according to a 'time-table regulated by the sun and the 
seasons' with few of the trappings of modem life. Tourists that visited the 
Camargue supposedly felt a strong connection with the landscape, which 
Krippner attributed to the fact that 'many are experiencing real freedom for the 
first times in their lives and others are recapturing it, and all recognize something 
of value that they have almost lost or never really had.' 148 Similarly. for 
naturalists Jacques Blondel and Luc Hoffmann writing just before the 
establishment of the Parc nature I regional de Camargue in 1970, the Camargue 
was a 'wild. mysterious [and] sometimes hostile land' which until recently had 
"remained almost totally free from modem developments.' Steppes and marshes 
were 4in their primitive state' and this 'virgin and savage Nature' offered the 
return of peace in the summer of 1945, there were still few apparent changes to either scenery ~r 
way of life.' M. Shepherd, Let's loolc 01 the Camargue: An 'Ornitholidays' Guide (Bognor RegiS: 
"Ornitholidays" 1977). 21 . 
• 47 Gallent • Les flam ants roses de Camargue. I t -12. 124 . 
• 48 Krippner. Discovering the Camargue. 156-7. 
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possibility for 'physical and moral regeneration of which modem man [sic] has 
more and more need.' 149 
These comments suggest that for certain observers the Camargue 
continued to act as a refuge of tradition from the modem world, despite the 
extensive human transformations that created the wetlands and its turbulent 
wartime environmental history. The very fact that the wetlands could still be 
celebrated and portrayed as a wild area, suggests that due to the immense efforts 
of the SNAF and the role of nature itself, the Camargue survived the potentially 
devastating ecological effects of modem warfare. Bar a memorial to the Saliers 
camp (inaugurated in February 2006) and remains of German bunkers and other 
defences on the shoreline (see chapter seven), no physical traces of the war exist 
in the contemporary camarguais landscape. 
However, many features of the Camargue's wartime history reappeared in 
the postwar period, such as plans to modernise and intensify agriculture in the 
region and drain the Camargue. 150 Therefore. approximately ten years after 
Vichy modernisers proposed draining the Camargue, Ponts et Chaussees officials 
had to issue reminders that 'the interests of the Camargue' s zoological and 
botanical reserve demand a sufficient level of water in the etangs: 151 
Furthermore. in 1960, Krippner reported that high speed fighter jets flying over 
149 Alexander Library. Zoology Library. University of Oxford. France Box 1938-1952. Jacques 
Blondel and Luc Hoffman. 'L 'originalite et Ie role de la reserve de Camargue'. prepared for 
Bulletin des Reserves Nalurelles el Ornilhologiques de Belgique [n.d. late 1960s1]. 14. 16-7. :!3. 
In this piece. Hoffmann seemingly contradicts his earlier description of the ~argue in . An 
Ecological Sketch of the Camrgue.· in which he placed greater emphasiS on human 
transformation of the landscape. 
150 See Blondel and Hoffman. 'Originalite et Ie role de la reserve de Camargue.· 14. 
151 ADBDR 188 W 21 Dayre. lngenieur des T.P.E.. Ponts de Chaussees. depmement des 




the reserve disrupted bird life, especially when they broke the sound barrier. A 
petition was apparently sent in protest to the French government. 152 
These comments from the 1950s and 1960s indicate that the wartime 
history of the Camargue cannot be viewed in isolation, and needs to be seen 
within the larger context of twentieth-century French environmental history. 
Similarly, the history of mountains during the "dark years'~ cannot be divorced 
from wider notions concerning mountainous landscapes. 
152 Krippner. Discovering the Camargue. 61. 
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Mobilising Mountains in Vichy France 
On 25 October 1941 Marc Augier addressed a gathering of the . Jeunesse de 
l'Europe Nouvelle,' the youth section of the Groupe Collaboration. I Augier had 
been involved with secular youth hostelIing groups in interwar France and would go 
on to edit Le Combattant Europeen, the newspaper of the Anti-Bolshevik Legion, 
and become political officer of the French Charlemagne division of Waffen-SS. On 
that 1941 day in October he focused on his recent ascent of Mont Blanc. :: Upon 
reaching the summit on a glorious autumn day and arriving at "the most tranquil 
place in Europe', he felt liberated from the mundane daily experiences of 
newspapers, gendarmes, and ration coupons, as well as the 'joys of the National 
Revolution, collaborationists' arguments, and those of the anglophiles.' 3 
Yet despite this welcome respite from the annoyances of Vichy France, 
Augier was not tempted to stay at this secluded spot. After all, it was not possible for 
I The Jeunesse de I'Europe Nouvelle was created in May 1941 by Marc Augier and Jacques 
Schweizer (who later became its Jeader) .. Much of its membership was drawn from student circles and 
at its peak in 1943 it had 4,000 members. It was less moderate than its parent organisation. Groupe 
Collaboration, which. according to Bertram Gordon, "carried the most social and intellectual prestige' 
of collaborationist movements. See Collaborationism in France during the Second World War (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press. 1980). 233-8. 
2 Augier had written about his mountaineering expeditions in the Swiss Alps and skiing trips in 
Norway in the journal of the Centre Laic des Auberges de Jeunesse during the interwar period. Ibid. 
255-7. 
, Wiener Library. London. Microfiche 1171 F652. Marc Augier. 'Les jeunes devant I'aventure 
europeenne.· 25 October 1941. 6. 
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an individual to remain alone on the summit. The mountain was too dangerous, too 
demanding, and too difficult an environment in which to survive. This was one of 
the lessons Augier drew from the mountain; 'man [sic] is not made for solitude, the 
mountain tells him to live communally' (la montagne lui fixe fa regie commune). 
The 'solitary alpinist' resembled the 'bourgeois and capitalist Europe of the 
nineteenth century ... [that] lived by a false philosophy [and] followed a negative 
social order where the religion of individualism replaced the rules of the 
community.' This misguided individualism had led to war in ] 914, the kind of war 
that would only cease to exist once 'men' learnt to live by the "law of the [climbing] 
rope.' The mountain also taught Augier two other important lessons. These were to 
see the big picture (as from the summit) and that the only way to achieve real joy 
(similar to that felt by the climber upon reaching the summit after an arduous ascent) 
was through extreme effort and self-sacrifice. According to Augier, the 'complete 
sacrifice of oneself was the only philosophy 'really validated by life,' and one that 
the American people - who supposedly preferred the ease of the cable car to the 
sweat of the climb - failed to understand. For Augier~ the mountain's lessons led to 
one bloody conclusion, namely, the united struggle and sacrifice of European men 
against the evil of communist Russia. 4 Augier and his collaborationist movement 
were not the only ones to draw on mountains for inspiration in wartime France. And, 
like Augier's rhetoric, other groups in Vichy France linked mountains to notions of 
masculinity, war, and male sacrifice. 
Writing during the phoney war, J. Carcagne, editor in chief of the Revue 
alpin of Club Alpin Fran~ais' Lyon section suggested that France's mountains 
4 Ibid. 5- t t. t 5. 30. 
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would 'sleep' during the war, 'indifferent' to the 'divisions' (dechirements) that 
were tearing Europe apart. 5 This was not the case as France did not let its mountains 
'sleep.' In this chapter, I argue that mountains mattered between 1940 and 1944 
because they were mobilised by both Vichy and the resistance as a means of 
fulfilling their political, social, and military aims. 
Mountains mattered in a variety of ways. For a start, they acted as a 
substitute for the battlefield. For Vichy and the Club Alpin Fran~ais (or CAF), they 
became a space in which to revitalise and strengthen the minds and bodies of French 
men in the wake of defeat. As a consequence, both Vichy and CAF promoted 
alpinism during the "dark years." 6 The links between masculinity and mountains 
were most fully realised through the creation of the Jeunesse et Montagne 
movement, under the auspices of the French air force. Jeunesse et Montagne brought 
15,000 young men into the haute montagne as a substitute for military training and 
flying. However, through a case study of maquisards in the Vercors. I argue that 
resistance mythology, like Vichy, identified mountains as a way of rejuvenating 
masculinity. Although historians have paid attention to Vichy's promotion of 
alpinism and the convergences between the resistance and mountains, they have not 
considered the two themes in tandem. 7 
The maquis' presence in the Vercors represents a peak in the mobilisation of 
mountains during the war. In the face of Gennan forces' numerical and 
s 1. Carcagne, 'Pour la Patrie, dans la Montagne,' Revue alpine, 45th Year, No. 3~2. 1939, 74. 
6 Travers outlines in detaiJ the ways in which Vichy's Commissariat general a J'Education generale et 
aux sports promoted alpinism and skiing in Politique et representations. My focus here is on CAF. 
7 On Vichy and alpinism, see Michel Mestre. 'La Montagne et I'alpinisme: vecteurs de I'ideologie 
nationaliste dans les Etats alpins aux XIXe et XXe siecles (1850-1950).' PhD diss. University of Aix-
en-Provence 1 (1989): Travers, PoJitique et representations: and Idem. 'La montagne pervenie: 
L 'AJpe 19 (April-June 2003), 72-80. On the resistance and mountains. see Boulet. '\lontagne et 
resistance en 1943': and Garrier, 'Montagnes en resistance: 207-20. 
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technological superiority, maquisards transformed the Vercors into a '"natural 
fortress," which they envisaged would act as a secure base in occupied France for 
Allied forces during the invasion of France. Ultimately, however. they allowed 
themselves to become over-confident about the level of security offered by the 
Vercors' rugged topography. The Vercors was an exceptional case of resistance and. 
as outlined in chapter seven, it has been transformed into one of the foremost 
symbols of French resistance to Nazi oppression. Nonetheless. it remains a useful 
case study for exploring the links forged between the resistance and France's 
mountains. 
Both Vichy's and the resistance's mobilisation of mountains had material 
repercussions. Part of Jeunesse et Montagne's mission was to develop the mountain 
environment through "improvement works" (such as building new refuges), which 
formed one aspect of Vichy's war against "wasteland." Their activity was the only 
way for Vichy to physically reshape inaccessible mountain spaces and render them 
productive. Therefore, rocky crags and frozen glaciers were not spared Vichy's 
cultivation drive. Meanwhile, the resistance's mobilisation of the Vercors as a 
military base attracted German attacks, which led to material modification of the 
mountain landscape. 
Although my focus in this chapter rests overwhelmingly on men and 
mountains, I do not wish to suggest that there was no female presence at high 
altitudes. 8 Women were part of the history of mountains in Vichy France; they 
lived, worked, and, supported resistance networks in mountainous regions. and some 
8 For an analysis of the relationship between gender and mountains, including female experiences ~d 
gendered representations of mountaineering. see Susan R. Schrepfer. Nature's Altars: Mountams. 
Gender. and American Environmentalism (Lawrence: Lniversit) Press of Kansas. 2005). 
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died as a consequence. My focus on masculinity is dictated by sources and the fact 
that it was men, rather than women, who Vichy and the resistance linked most 
explicitly to the mountains. 
Military defeat, masculinity, and mountains 
The natural environment is a site from which to approach the construction of 
gender identities during the "dark years," which is a perspective that the 
historiography of the period has so far overlooked. War. defeat, occupation. and the 
establishment of the Vichy regime challenged existing gender relations in France. Of 
course, gender relations are arguably repeatedly contested and rarely, if ever. exist in 
a state of tranquillity. 9 Nonetheless, it seems clear that the events of 1940 did mount 
a serious test for gender relations and identities. For a start, there were fewer men on 
French soil as approximately two million French men languished in German 
prisoner of war camps, separating them from their wives, families, jobs, and 
country. to 
As part of its reactionary social programme, the Vichy regime introduced a 
senes of policies designed to restore .. traditional" gender roles based on the 
supposedly natural differences between men and women. Women were to be 
9 As Michael Roper and John Tosh argue. masculine and feminine identities are 'not ... distinct and 
separable constructs. but. .. parts of a political field whose relations are characterized by domination. 
subordination, collusion and resistance.' • Introduction. Historians and the Politics of Masculinit}.· in 
Michael Roper and John Tosh (eds.). Manful Assertions: Masculinities in Britain since 1800 
(London: Routledge. 1991).8. And. as R.W. Connell suggests. masculinities 'come into existence at 
particular times and places and are always subject to change.' Masculinities (Cambridge: Polity Press. 
1995), ) 85. See also Joan W. Scott. Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia 
University Press. 1988). 
10 See Fishman. We Will Wait. 
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maternal reproducers once again, and men strong producers. A series of reforms, 
such as the banning of abortion and revision of marriage legislation, targeted 
women's everyday lives and their bodies. This assertion of tightly defined gender 
roles was presented as part and parcel of France's restoration. 11 
Arguably, male identities entered a particularly turbulent time after 1940. In 
the spring and summer of that year, French men had apparently proved themselves 
incapable of defending their nation - and their wives, mothers, sisters. and daughters 
- from Nazi Germany, ushering in a view of French masculinity characterised by 
images of weakness and failure. 12 As Julian Jackson argues, observers viewed the 
defeat as "devirilising" France, and unfavourable comparisons were made between 
images of 'unhealthy and unmanly' French soldiers and apparently mighty German 
ones. 13 As a consequence, a component of Vichy's plans for the restoration of the 
French nation was the rejuvenation of masculinity. As Luc Capdevila suggests, the 
'appeal to virility' permeated all aspects of French society after the defeat. 14 
Yet rebuilding masculinity was no easy task for the Vichy regime. One way 
for Vichy to recreate a "positive" image of strong French manhood might have been 
to glorify the role of the warrior and appeal to French male military pride. 15 
II Most radically. the law of 15 February 1942 ushered in the death penalty for abortion. Cheryl A. 
Koos. 'On les aura!: The Gendered Politics of Abortion and the Alliance nationale contre la 
depopulation. 1938-1944,' Modern and Contemporary France 711 (February 1999). 29. See also 
Diamond, Women and the Second World War in France; Muel-Dreyfus. Vichy and the Eternal 
Feminine; and Pollard. Reign of Virtue. 
12 Michael Kelly. 'The Reconstruction of Masculinity at the Liberation: in H. R. Kedward and Nancy 
Wood (eds.). The Liberation of France: Image and Event (Oxford: Berg. 1995). 119. 
13 Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 328. 
I .. Capdevila, 'The Quest for Masculinity.' 426-7. 
IS For an exploration of the relationship between the military and masculinity. see David. H. J. 
Morgan. 'Theater of War: Combat. The Military. and Masculinities: in HarT)' Broad and Michael 
Kaufman (eds.) Theorizing Masculinities (Thousand Oaks. CA: Sage. 1994). 165-82. George L. 
Mosse argues that the modem masculine stereotype (which centred on 'so-called manly virtues. such 
as will power. honor. and courage:> survived the horrors of the First World War. and was even 
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However, the humiliating circumstances of defeat, the terms of the armistice and the 
very presence of occupying forces made this an impossible route to follow. For the 
foreseeable future, French men would play no part on the battlefield and the French 
army was reduced to 100,000 lightly-armed, non-conscripted recruits, and conferred 
the sole role of maintaining internal order. 16 As a consequence~ according to 
Capdevila, 'constructive work, rather than war was to be the keynote of the new 
man.' 17 In such away, the renewal of masculinity was linked to a renewal of the 
body. 18 
Much of this "manly" work was to be carried out in the great outdoors, 
meaning that the environment became a site in which French men were to rebuild 
their masculinity. In chapters two and three, I outlined how working the land. either 
in fields or forests, was intended to rebuild male bodies, improve morality. and 
generate a sense of solidarity, as well as contribute to the material resurrection of 
France. Mountains also formed an important part of this process. Vichy mobilised 
them to instil patriotism and the values of effort and sacrifice into (predominantly 
young) French males, alongside other measures, such as re-writing the school 
strengthened by it. "The ideals of courage, sacrifice, and camaraderie - indeed the image of the 
warrior himself - were not touched by ... criticism of this war.' The Image of Man: The Creation of 
Modern Masculinity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4, 108-09. 
16 For the composition of the army under the terms of the armistice, see Christian Bachelier, 'L 'armee 
franyaise entre la victoire et la defaite,' in Jean-Pierre Azema and Franyois Bedarida (eds.), La 
France des annees noires. Tome I: de La defaire a Vichy (Paris: Seuil, 1993), 82-6. Bachelier 
describes the defeat as the "worst disaster' in the history of the French army.' 
17 Capdevila also recognises that the 'armed volunteer' (hailing from all points along the 
collaboration-resistance spectrum) eventually became a key figure in the quest to rebuild masculinity. 
'Quest for Masculinity in a Defeated France,' 428, 433. 
18 As Joan Tumblety suggests, for both Vichy and collaborationists, 'the failure of the defeat, as well 
as the promise of fascist renewal was articulated and focused on the body of the Frenchman himself.' 
See "Revenge of the Fascist Knights: Masculine Identities in Je suis par/oul, 1940-1944,' Modern 
and Contemporary France 7/1 (February 1999), 17, 
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curriculum to teach masculine and feminine values to French boys and girls. 19 The 
rigours of mountain life were also intended to restore men physically. In such away. 
mountains became a surrogate for the battlefield. 
Vichy was hardly original when it mobilised mountains as a substitute for 
war and to test, strengthen, and affirm masculinity. During the first half of the 
twentieth century, American writers had suggested that alpinism and mountain 
climbing were alternatives to warfare, as the pursuit of these activities developed 
strong male bodies and provided a non-violent way for men to express their 
supposedly natural violent urges, as well as experience risk. 20 Vichy's linking of 
nationalism, men, and mountains had other precedents. Victorian climbers, for 
instance, linked the qualities required in mountaineers (such as resilience) with those 
of the successful English soldier. 21 Furthermore, according to George Mosse, in 
post-1918 Germany, mountain climbing was linked to 'individual and national 
regeneration through conquest and domination.' Conquering mountains supposedly 
created men that were 'patriotic, hard, simple and beautiful.' As a consequence, 
mountains were a means for men in Germany's weakened postwar condition to 'find 
battle in the midst of constant danger, struggle in close proximity to death, heroic 
deeds and hard-fought victories.' 22 And as Susan Schrepfer argues, by 1939, a 
common belief within US society held that 'the purpose of mountaineering was to 
prepare men for war.' 23 
19 Paxton. Vichy France. 160. 
20 Schrcpfer. Nature's Altars. 139. 
21 Robert MacFarlane. Mountains of the Mind: A History of a Fascination (London: Granta Books, 
2003). 90- 1 . 
~ Mosse. Fallen Soldiers. 114-19. 
2.1 Schrcpfcr. Nature 's Altars. 146. 
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Moreover, Vichy's mobilisation of mountains had a home-grown 
predecessor. Following French defeat during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-187 I. 
the Club Alpin Fran~ais (CAF) emerged from alpinist and military circles (army 
officers were well represented in its ranks). CAF was intimately tied to patriotic 
sentiments and military values, and one of its aims was to create new soldiers 
through a focus on discipline, patriotism, and attention to physical health. 24 As Jean-
Paul Bozonnet argues, CAF's aims and motto - 'For the homeland through the 
mountain' (Pour la Patrie par la montagne) - were ways of legitimating the 
marginal sport of alpinism and strengthening French nationalism after the 
humiliating loss of Alsace-Lorraine. 25 
CAF's aims dovetailed with those of Vichy and it became a key partner in 
the promotion of alpinism as a way of rebuilding French manhood. But before the 
establishment of the Vichy regime, CAF had proudly displayed its patriotic 
sentiments during the phoney war. As CAF president Leon Olivier told its members; 
'profoundly attached during peacetime to our association's noble and proud motto, 
you are now exclusively in the service of our beloved country and you will serve her 
to the extreme limit of your forces, including injury and, if necessary, death, [in 
order to achieve] victory.' 26 
Through their experience and love of mountains, CAF members had 
supposedly become better soldiers. An article by G. Courtade In La Monlagne. 
CAF's official journal. outlined in greater detail how alpinism had taught its 
24 Mestre. 'Montagne et l'alpinisme.· 97-8 . 
.2~ Jean-Paul Bozennet. Des monts et des mythes: /'imaginaire social de la montagne (Grenoble: 
Presses Universitaires de Grenoble. 1992). 168. 
26 Leon Olivier. 'Pour la Patrie par la Montagne.' La Montagne: Re,,.ue du Club A/pin Fra~ais. No. 
310. October 1939.225-6. 
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members the 'qualities and virtues that the state of war urgently demands of us.' 
Principally, the mountain had acted as a 'harsh and beneficial school. It has given us 
lessons of endurance and virility.' Having given up comfort, suffered hunger and 
thirst, and braved the elements, alpinists had not only improved their muscles but 
'strengthened their souls.' And having freely faced death in the mountains, CAF's 
members would feel no fear in front of the Siegfried Line, nor would they struggle to 
manufacture a sense of solidarity with their fellow soldiers as 'co-operation has been 
one of our unwritten rules.' There were, however, differences between alpinism and 
fighting on the battlefield, Courtade continued. Unlike death in the mountains, death 
on the battlefield 'will have an infinite value and majesty. It will no longer be an 
"accident," but a "sacrifice." We will have died for our country and for justice: 
Furthermore, Courtade reminded CAFs members that alpinism had bred a different 
kind of patriotism. For although alpinists didn't necessarily love their country more 
than other citizens, they 'seemed to love [I:rance] more simply, more naively, more 
naturally, as if the mountain safeguarded a freshness of feeling. ' 27 
It is hard to establish to what extent the values promoted by alpinism 
influenced conscripted mountaineers and instilled in them a more vivid love of their 
country. Some evidence, though. does exist. During the 1939-1940 conflict. CAF's 
Annecy Section produced a Bulletin de Guerre for its mobilised members, which 
presented itself in tenns that would readily appeal to mountaineers; 'if you are at the 
head of the rope, we will strive to be good seconds. and this Bulletin will be the 
27 G. Courtade, 'Pour la Patrie par la Montagne.' La Montagne: Revue du Club Alpin FrallftJis. ~o. 
311. November-December 1939, 258-60. 
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rope.' 28 The Bulletin de Gue"e included space for messages to be passed on 
between mobilised soldiers and their families. However, when soldiers mentioned 
mountains, it was more often in relation to alpine sports or a love of mountains 
rather than the manly qualities and heady sense of nationalism outlined by Courtade. 
For instance, one corporal asked his mother to send his boots and skis so he 
could enjoy the snow, whilst another had the good fortune to be able to see Mont 
Blanc when he woke up one morning, making his 'heart jump' and leading him to 
spend the 'rest of the morning in contemplation.' 29 Another was stationed at a 
'record altitude for the French army' where his unit breathed the 'pure air of our 
mountains.' However, his comrades from Provence struggled with the cold; 'you can 
easily tell that they are not members of the Annecy Section of CAF.· 30 In the first 
two cases, it is unclear how an enjoyment of alpine sports and the contemplation of 
the mountain landscape would be useful in battle. And in the later case, alpinism 
may have enabled CAF's members to endure the cold. but it does not appear to have 
instilled a strong sense of solidarity with their fellow soldiers who were more 
accustomed to the warm Mediterranean climate. 
Furthermore, rather than feel inspired to fight by their love of mountains, 
CAF members appear to have felt disgruntled at being separated from the snowy 
summits. 'What can we do in these barely undulating, immense [plains] in which we 
are stationed? The good weather only makes me miss Savoie and its mountains even 
more: lamented one. 31 Another recruit complained how a recent snowfall made him 
21 Section d' Annecy du Club Alpin Fran~s, Bulletin de Guerre. No. I. 30 October 1939. I. 
2Q Reignier, undated letter; and Jean Granier. undated letter. both quoted in ibid. 3-4. 
30 Raymond Real. undated letter. quoted in ibid. 3. 
]1 Lucien Annchierri. letter dated I October 1939. quoted in ibid. 2. 
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'miss so much the ski slopes' of his 'beautiful Savoie,' while another was 
unimpressed with the low hills of Northern France where 'mud and cold' dominated 
rather than 'snow and mountains.' One lieutenant presumably summed up the mood 
for many when he wrote 'I greatly miss the mountains.' 32 Yet despite this 
discrepancy between CAF's rhetoric and reality on the ground, the organisation 
seized the opportunity to promote the associations between mountains and 
masculinity after the establishment of the Vichy regime. 
CAF and the promotion of alp;n;sme in Vichy France 
After the defeat, some alpinists were removed even further from their 
beloved mountains than members of the Annecy Section had been during the phoney 
war. For those that languished in German prisoner of war camps, alpinism seems to 
have offered moral support. In November 1940, CAF members imprisoned in Oflag 
XVIIA created a CAF unit to "maintain intact the feelings of moral and spiritual 
elevation acquired in the mountain atmosphere.' The group's activities included 
seminars at the 'Universite du Camp' and showing films on alpinism. 33 A similar 
group existed at Oflag VI A, where, according to an article in La Montagne. the 
'love of the mountain [was] a precious comfort for prisoners of war.' This group's 
members created an exhibition in their barracks featuring a recreated panorama of 
Mont Blanc. a reconstruction of a mountain refuge, and a 'model cable car that 
32 Andre Chappaz. letter dated :!9 October 1939; Authossierre. letter dated :!9 October 1939; and 
Edmond Charbonnier. letter dated 8 October 1939. all quoted in ibid. :!-4. 
)] By September 1942 the group had 60 members. See La Monlagne: Revue du Club Alpin Fraw;ai.'i. 
No. 324. January-March 1943. 17. 
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functioned in the middle of the room.' For La Montagne, this exhibition was more 
than 'an intellectual distraction for those alpinists temporally separated from their 
country and mountains' as recalling France's mountains fostered a sense of 
patriotism. 34 
The somewhat touching image of CAF members expressing their love of 
mountains an~ France through an exhibition in a German prisoner of war camp 
illustrates one of the ways in which alpinism, nationalism, and warfare interacted 
after the defeat. Back in France, CAF, and more generally the Vichy regime. adapted 
the convergences between mountains, patriotism, and the body as a means of 
restoring the men of defeated France. In fact, as Alice Travers argues, a consensus 
existed within Vichy France that viewed the discovery of mountains through 
alpinism as a vital part of the physical, moral, spiritual. and intellectual education of 
the young. 35 
Just as Vichy'S interests converged with those of foresters (which had led to 
the introduction of reforestation legislation), so too did it introduce policies that 
were undoubtedly welcomed by CAF. In 1940, Vichy introduced a law to encourage 
ski instruction in schools, opened an Ecole Superieure de Ski et Alpinisme in 
Chamonix in 1941, and the year after. its General Commissariat for Physical 
14 J. Fourcy, 'Nos prisonniers a l'Oflag VI A: La Monlagne: Revue du Club Alpin Fran~ais. No. -:'-:'7, 
October-December 1943,64. Similarly, some French winegrowers in German prisoner of war camps 
planned wine parties and wrote books about wine to keep their spirits up. For one of t.hem. Fn:nch 
wines 'were like a tree we could hang onto. A tree whose roots were deeply anchored In the 5011 of 
our country and whose branches spread throughout the world.' See Kladstrup and Kladstrup, Wine 
and War, 174-89. 
35 Travers. 'Montagne pervertie.· 75. 
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Education and Sport identified alpinism as 'a moral education as much personal as 
collective.' 36 
Perhaps as an ideological gesture or a ploy to improve its institutional 
standing at a time when it was threatened with incorporation into the newly formed 
Federation fran~aise de la Montagne, CAF integrated itself into the "National 
Revolution" and paid homage to petain. This took the form of naming mountains 
after the head of state; CAF members proudly recounted their ascension of the 
northern summit of Aiguille de Blaitiere, which had recently been renamed as 
Aiguille de Marechal Petain. 37 The dovetailing of interests between Vichy and CAF 
was literally cemented when the Pyrenees-Orientales section of CAF erected a 
'commemorative cairn' in honour of Petain in the" Canigou Massif. This cairn. which 
was placed at an altitude of 2,784 metres on 7 August 1941. represented a way for 
CAF (an organisation which 'from the first day had never ceased to show Petain its 
respect and faith in his work of national recovery' according to La Montagne) to pay 
homage to the head of state. 38 
However, the unpredictable mountain climate disrupted proceedings. On the 
first attempt to inaugurate the cairn. bad weather prevented CAF from applying the 
finishing touches and delayed the accompanying ceremony. It was not until 28 
August 1941 that the cairn was completed and the following speech delivered by 
Monsieur Delfau, the local CAF president: 
)6 See Garrier, 'Montagnes en resistance,' 210; Travers, 'Montagne pervertie,' 1'2: and Idem. 
Polilique el represenJations, 151-7. . . 
]7 Camille Claret-Toumier with Jean Mignon, • Ascension de I'arete Nord Ouest de I' Alguille du 
Marechal Petain (Aiguille de Blaitiere) (Sommet-Nord) les 28 et 29 aout.: La MOnJagne: Revue du 
Club Alpin Franfais. No. 320, January-March 1942. 20. 
l8 'Une pyramide Mar6chal Petain dans Ie massif du Canigou. Pardes. 7 aout 1941: La MOnJagne: 
Revue du Club Alpin Fra"fais. No. 320. January-March 1942.21-2. 
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We have constructed [this cairn] by our own hands, with the stones of our mountains. We 
have secured these stones with the ideal cement, made of our enthusiasm, our faith, our 
patriotic fervour, as well as our gratitude (reconnaissance). We call upon the tramontane 
wind and Canigou's eagles to watch over this cairn. The tramontane, because it is the 
cleansing wind that blows away the impurities of the plain [and] the Canigou's eagles. 
because they are the incontestable kings of this solitary realm... They. and only they. are 
worthy of mounting a vigilant guard over this rustic monument which our respect (piete) has 
led us to dedicate to the nation's saviour. 39 
Recalling the Forestry Administration's involvement in the naming of an oak tree 
after Petain in Tron~ais forest (see chapter three), CAF used a simple yet highly 
symbolic means of linking its organisational aims with those of the state. Of course. 
the cairn may have been merely an opportunistic and relatively cost-effective way 
for CAF to ingratiate itself with the Vichy regime. But aside from political 
opportunism, it appears likely that CAF, informed by its long-standing patriotic 
viewpoint, genuinely believed that alpinism was a way of achieving the aims of the 
"National Revolution," namely, the rejuvenation of France. 
After defeat, CAF promoted alpinism and being in the mountain environment 
as a means of rebuilding French masculinity. Paul Lauras, writing in La Montagne. 
identified 'softness [and] the loss of the notion of effort and of the higher sentiment 
of duty' as reasons for 'the worst defeat of [France's] history: CAF, he continued, 
was ready to contribute to the 'resurrection (relevement) of our nation and help to 
39 Quoted in ibid. 21-2. 
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give an appetite for effort to the young generation who will be called upon to restore 
our country's grandeur.,40 
CAF pointed to its history as evidence of its suitability to help with the 
important task of reconstructing masculinity. In La Montagne. Gabriel Bussillet 
recalled how CAF had been created in the 1870s with the aim of 'contributing to the 
reievement of France by bringing young [boys] to the mountain to make them 
courageous and energetic men.' According to BussiIlet, a similar movement was 
now needed following French defeat and so CAF would instruct France' s young 
men to 'go to the mountains ... with fervour.' In return, mountains would reward 
French youth with a 'vigorous body and a new soul.' CAF, Bussillet promised, 
would provide assistance to the young men so that 'from the summit we can 
contemplate together the vast horizons and from this grandiose spectacle will come 
confidence in ourselves and our country: 41 
Local sections of CAF articulated a similar philosophy. In the Pyrenean 
region, Raymond Ritter argued that mountaineers were accustomed to defying 
danger, facing difficulties, and looking to the future. The mountain had already 
'engraved ... vigorous traits' in alpinists and 'taught [them] the virtue of sacrifice.' -l2 
Furthermore, Ritter argued that the mountains were a specifically male space. 
According to him, the mountain environment was physically too demanding for 
female bodies. For although mountains 'improved athletes' bodies' and 
40 Paul Lauras, . Alpinisme familial.' La Montagne: Revue du Club Alpin Fra"fais. No. 315. July-
December 1940.49-57. 
41 Gabriel Bussillet. 'L 'oeuvre du Club Alpin: La Montagne: Revue duo Club Alpin Franfais. ~o. 
319. October-December 1941. 66-8. 
4~ Raymond Ritter. -Pour la Patrie. par la Montagne: Bulletin Pyrineen. No. 235. 1940.266. 
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'strengthened [the] souls' of men, Ritter could not see how they 'prepared 
mothers. ,43 
Women in Vichy France were supposed to be fertile, pure mothers. while 
men were to be energetic, virile leaders, and CAF identified the mountain as an ideal 
means with which to energise French men and make them leaders. An article by R. 
Latarjet in the Lyon Section of CAF's bulletin argued that 'our future duty is to ann 
future generations for an energetic life. With this aim, we possess one of the most 
marvellous means; the mountain.' For Latarjet, the mountain offered two things to 
young men. Firstly, a bond formed between the individual and the mountain. 
'harmonizing' their 'spirits' and making the mountain "the richest and most loyal of 
friends.' And secondly, the mountain was a 'place of individual and collective 
combat' where joy came from overcoming difficulties. Confronting the mountain's 
dangers also led to improved decision making capabilities. 44 
The mission that CAF conferred on mountains drew on long-standing 
notions. In his analysis of the social construction of mountains. Bozonnet identifies 
how they have been linked traditionally to the regeneration of body and soul and 
how ascending the mountain was viewed as a symbolic death of the old world 
leading to the resurrection of a 'new man.' The mountain acted as a testing ground 
for men; a successful ascent marked the climber out as worthy of being counted 
among ""'real men," the heroes, and the elect: In such away, the mountain acted as a 
.. I . 45 
'cntlca space . 
•. 1 Ibid. 212. ,. th 
404 R. Latarjel 'Lajeunesse devant la montagne. Revue Alpme. 46 Year. No. 326. 1940.30-4. 
4.S Bozonnel Monls el mylMs, 31-9.41. 
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The connection between mountains and elitism is an important one. As 
Travers highlights, Vichy tapped into and reinforced existing notions that linked 
mountains with the elite of the nation, even if it did try to widen the appeal of skiing 
in schools. 46 The simple act of being in the mountains was supposed to instruct and 
elevate further France's future leaders. Rene Benjamin, Petain's biographer and a 
writer with strong ruralist leanings, wrote approvingly of the mountain location of 
the Uriage school, which was created by Captain Pierre Dunoyer de Segonzac. a 
former cavalry officer, to produce France's future cadres. In Benjamin's 
sympathetic account of this cradle of French elitism, Uriage' s students lived 
according to the 'sublime poet's notion' of 'moulding leaders high in the 
mountains ... on a marvellous rock that towers above the valley: For Benjamin. it 
was a 'moving notion to literally elevate someone who is to be perfected; to raise 
him, materially, to isolate him in the pure air. on the heights. It's more than 
symbolic. Things act strongly upon the spirit.' 47 However, the Uriage experience 
did not go entirely to plan for the regime, and Georges Lamirand, Vichy's first 
Secretary-General for Youth, blamed the school's remote, mountainous location as 
one of the reasons why Uriage's philosophy and activities became out of step with 
those of the regime (many of its pupils eventually joined the resistance). 48 
It is clear that CAF mobilised mountains to remake masculinity within 
Vichy's larger project of national renewal. However, articles extolling the value of 
mountain life in La Montagne and inaugurating cairns at 2,784 metres only reached 
46 Travers, Polilique et representations. 207-11. . 
47 Quoted in John Hellman. The Knight-Monks of Vichy France: Uriage 1940-1945 (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1997), 77. 




a limited audience, and one that was already receptive to the alpinist ethos. This 
exclusivity reflected the fact that alpinism was a traditionally elitist sport in France 
and elsewhere. As Gilbert Garrier highlights, the paid holidays that French workers 
had enjoyed since 1936 were more likely to be spent by the sea or in the countryside 
than on inhospitable mountain slopes. 49 CAF did, however, attempt to broaden the 
appeal of alpinism in Vichy France, through such means as the promotion of Roger 
Frison-Roche's novel Premier de cordee. 
In this 1943 novel, Frison-Roche, a former alpine guide and war reporter 
who became a prisoner of war before taking to the maquis in the Savoie, related an 
epic narrative focussing on the travails of Pierre Servettaz. a young man from a 
savoyard family of mountain guides. One fateful day, Pierre falls from a rock while 
trying to bring down his father's corpse after a terrible accident in the mountains. As 
a result of the fall. Pierre suffers from vertigo and turns to drink. In the end. 
however, he overcomes his fear and succeeds in climbing the north face of the 
exacting Aiguille Verte. This difficult climb restores Pierre's character. As he tells 
his uncle; 'vertigo, frozen feet, [and] risk were certainly all created to give us a taste 
for life ... life must be continual fight. Woe to all those who don't fight!' 50 Premier 
de cordee is a tale of struggle, determination, and ultimate redemption, in which the 
mountains make, break, and remake men. 51 This portrayal of determination, effort. 
and moral and physical renewal in the testing mountain environment corresponded 
with CAF's promotion of alpinism in post-defeat France. 
49 Garrier. 'Montagnes en resistance.' 210. 
so Roger Frison-Roche. Premier de cordee (Grenoble and Paris: Arthaud. 1963 [1943]). 308-11. 
SI Capdevila wonders if this tale can be seen as a 'metaphor for nationaJ recovery' because it suggests 
that 'France will be re-bom when masculinity has been re-forged.· 'Quest for Masculinity.' .$27. 
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As a consequence, the organisation tapped into the popularity of Premier de 
cordee (which went on to sell over one million copies 52) by helping to convert it 
into a film. Leon Olivier, CAF's president, unsurprisingly lavished praise on the 
cinematic version of Frison-Roche's epic tale (which was directed by Louis Daquin 
and released in January 1944): 
This film will once again stimulate ... the grandeur of those feelings which the conquest of 
the summits inspires. It shows how the love of the mountains virilises young men's moral 
and physical forces, gives them a taste for risk (combined with reasonable prudence), and 
develops in everyone a team spirit which we call the spirit of the rope. S3 
Another article portrayed the filming itself as a feat of alpine ingenuity, meaning that 
over the course of the shoot, the film crew had learnt to become ~vrais montagnards' 
(true mountain people). As a consequence, a ~Iarge breath of pure [mountain] air' 
would blow through France's cinemas. 54 
Furthermore, government figures backed the film's message of determination 
and sacrifice (after all, Vichy's Commissariat general it I'Education generale et aux 
sport [CGEGS] had given the film financial and technical support). At a screening of 
Premier de cordee in February 1944, Jep Pascot, Vichy's General Commissioner for 
Sports, declared that although the regime did not 'want to tum all young French 
people into alpinists or mountain guides .. .it wants them all to acquire the love of 
disinterested effort and the practice of working as a team.' In addition, Pascot 
S2 Bozonnet provides this figure in Des monts et des mythes, 57. 
S3 Quoted in 'Un grand film: "Premier de C'ordee.· La Montagne: Revue du Club Alpin Franfais. No. 
325. April-June 1943. 33. 
s. Philippe Gaussot. 'Pour toumer "Premier de Cordee" les operateurs se sont faits varappeurs,' Trail 
d'Union, Jeunesse Aerienne. No.7. September 1943. 
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continued, the young should follow the alpinist's lead in 'constantly trying to reach 
higher and higher summits.' 55 Other CGEGS publications lauded the film. and the 
organisation was undoubtedly heartened that Petain himself attended a screening of 
the film.56 These, however, were just isolated views of the film. and it is unclear 
whether or not Premier de cordee's more general audience (the film was a popular 
success) treated the film as a homily on the virtues of alpinism or as a welcome slice 
of escapism from the hardships of the Occupation. 
Contemporary documentary films that glorified alpinism also met with 
critical and popular success. Most notably, Marcel Ichac's A l'assaut des Aiguilles 
du Diable, which documented well-respected alpine guide Armand Charlefs 
"assault" on challenging summits in the Mont Hlanc range. won joint first prize at 
the Premier Congres du Film Documentaire held in Paris in May 1943. 57 In 
addition, certain episodes of the commercially successful documentary series La 
France en Marche (produced by Marcel Pagnol's studio in Marseille) portrayed 
mountain themes (for instance, no. 34. "Les hommes de la neige" and no. 55 '''En 
cordee"). 58 According to Louis Tixier-Vignancour, head of radio and cinema within 
Vichy's General Office for Information. La France en marche was designed to 
provide an alternative to German newsreels and relate . important current issues and 
highlight the spiritual and material riches of the French nation while safeguarding its 
S5 Quoted in Travers, "Montagne pervertie: 75. 
56 Travers. Politique et representations. 113-17. . ' . 
S7 CACAN ]976009/1440 'Prix decemces par Ie Premier Congres du Film DocumentaJre. 6 May 
1943. I am grateful to Brett Bowles for this reference. 
sa Brett Bowles. 'Newsreels. Ideology. and Public Opinion under Vichy: The Case of La France en 
Marche.· French Historical Studies 17/2 (Spring 2004). 430. 
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patrimony. ,59 Unsurprisingly, therefore, mountaineering was portrayed by La 
France en marche through the 'motif of regenerating the nation.' 60 
Watching a film or reading a book were not enough, however. to remake 
French masculinity on their own, and Jeunesse et Montagne, one of the many youth 
groups that flourished in Vichy France, took a more direct approach in its use of 
mountains as a substitute for the battlefield and aviation. 
Jeunesse et Montagne 
In 1942, a French army captain proudly related a recent mountaineering 
expedition he had led. Recalling Petain's desire to maintain the virility of French 
soldiers, the captain felt justified in dragging his men up to the summits. After an 
ascent of 3,146 metres he proudly surveyed his men; 'Ah ... the solid, muscular 
thighs of my soldiers! Beautiful bronzed arms emerging from shirt sleeves! Fine, 
sunburnt faces smiling through the sweat!' For the captain, this arduous ascent had 
brought physical and moral benefits; the 'mountain is one of the new ways to give 
the soldier a more virile soul. a better placed heart (un coeur mieux place), and a 
more robust body.' 61 According to Rachel Woodward, geographical context is 
crucial for constructing and expressing masculine identities, and so forms a key part 
of military training. The natural environment becomes 'a challenging location 
against which the soldier-recruit is pitted, and in response to which skills and 
S9 Quoted in Ibid. 424. 
60 Ibid. 430. 
61 Capitaine G ... du 150e R.I .. 'Une Compagnie du 1503 R.1. en montagne: Bulletin pyreneen. no. 
239. 1942. 255-60. 
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identities of the soldier to be are constructed.' 62 This seems to have been the case 
for the jubilant captain and the French army in general. 
As Paxton argues, the armistice army used 'mountain training ... to exalt a 
man's spirit and develop tastes for risk, adventure, and teamwork.' 63 This included 
long, tough, bicycle rides in the Pyrenees and a march up Mont Dore in the Massif 
Central in inclement conditions. 64 The French Air Force also used the mountain to 
achieve similar aims through its youth movement, Jeunesse et Montagne (Youth and 
Mountain). 
Created on 2 August 1940 by army officers from mountain units, such as 
Raymond Coche (a member, along with Roger Frison-Roche, of a 1935 expedition 
to the Hoggar range in southern Algeria) and the French air force, Jeunesse et 
Montagne aimed to deploy the mountain environment to transform its 15,000 
recruits into a virile elite dedicated to the resurrection of France. 65 It came initially 
under the command of Captain Jacques Faure (who had led the French military's 
skiing team at the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games). In many ways Jeunesse et 
Montagne was similar to other Vichy-approved youth groups. as it sought to 
regiment and revitalise young men, and indoctrinate them with a strong sense of 
62 Rachel Woodward. 'Locating Military Masculinities: Space. Place, and the Fonnation of Gender 
Identity in the British Army.' in Paul R. Higate (ed.), Military Masculinities: Identity and the Stale 
(Westport, CT and London: Praeger. 2003). 44-7. 
b3 Paxton. Parades and Politics. 55. 
64 Ibid. 52. 54. 
tIS This figure comes from Mestre. 'La Montagne et alpinisme' 304. After the.~ar, fonner Jeun~ et 
Montagne recruits refonned the association. which exists to this day. organlsmg veterans meetings. 
mountain walks. and skiing stages. among other activities. See 'Epilogue et Re-naissance: Jeunesse 
et Montagne website. http://wwwJeunesse-et-montagne.orgi 
apres _guerrelaujourd'hui.htm. consulted 22 August 2006. 
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~onour, duty, discipline, and a respect for hierarchy (it was effectively a sister 
organisation of the Chantiers de la Jeunesse). 66 
Yet there were key differences. In particular, Jeunesse et Montagne had a 
relatively small membership compared with other youth movements in Vichy 
France. 67 It was harder to become part of Jeunesse et Montagne than Chantiers de la 
Jeunesse (draftees had to be physically fitter) and such exclusivity appears to have 
been part of the appeal for the organisation's leadership. In the words of Maurice 
Bongard, chef of the Pyrenean "Vignemale" groupement, Jeunesse et Montagne 
would create an 'elite of strong and daring men' who would give themselves 
'joyfully and entirely to the cause of national resurrection.' 68 Once again in Vichy 
France, mountains were associated with elitism. Another key difference was 
Jeunesse et Montagne's emphasis on altitudes, as the mountains became a training 
ground in which to make new men, as well as a substitute for the skies. As Coche 
informed recruits in August 1940, Jeunesse et Montagne would be a 'tough and 
simple means to keep intact, even improve, each day your souls and your bodies and 
preserve whole the flame of youth that has irresistibly attracted you towards the 
skies.' 69 The training and activities that its recruits were to receive reinforced the 
btl Halls. Youth of Vichy France. 133-5. Jeunesse et Montagne does not feature in Halls' work on 
Vichy youth movements. 
67 For instance. Compagnons de France had 33.000 members and the Association catholique de la 
jeunesse fran~se boasted 2.300.000 members. Ibid. 148. . 
68 Maurice Bongard. 'Qu'est-ce que "Jeunesse et Montagne?'" Bulletin Pyrer.een. ~o. 237. 1941.6:" 
b9 Raymond Coche. • Appel aux jeunes se destinant a I'aviation.· Jeunesse et Montagne websIte. 
http://www.jeunesse-et-montagne.orglcreationiappel.htm. consulted 22 August 2006. 
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emphasis on altitude; Alpine sports, aeronautical activities (such as repalrmg 
gliders), ar:td work devoted to developing mountain territory. 70 
Jeunesse et Montagne provided its select recruits (aged between eighteen and 
twenty) with a stage in high altitude chalets in the Alps and Pyrenees. For these 
recruits, alpinism was to be the 'hard and beautiful school of man.' 71 Their motto, 
'Faire Face' ('Stand Up To') was designed to encapsulate the values of tenacity and 
fortitude that the mountain fostered. For Bongard, the mountain was a 'tough school' 
in which to 'complete the physical, moral, and civic education of a selection of 
young French men.' There was 'hardly any other means that could compare' with 
the mountain in this task of creating new men. Physically, the sheer effort of living 
at high altitude would serve to 'develop muscles,' the 'pure air' was to "invigorate 
the blood,' and the toughness of life was designed to 'strengthen the body and 
harden it against fatigue, cold, and pain.' Morally, the mountain would push the 
young men to 'constantly surpass themselves' and make them 'love risk and effort: 
And socially, mountain life mitigated against individualism, obliging Jeunesse et 
Montagne recruits to 'live as a team, march in line. and climb in roped teams.' This 
training was complemented by skiing in the winter and alpinism in the summer, 
along with the Hebert method adapted for mountain life. 72 The emphasis on 
70 CHAN AJ )Q 143 General de la Porte du Theil, "Instruction fixant les modalites du fonctionnement 
du Commissariat et des Groupements de Jeunesse et Montagne dans Ie cadre du commissariat 
General des Chantiers de la Jeunesse' 13 September 1943. 3. 
71 ADBDR 46 W 4 [n.a.] Jeunesse et Montagne leaflet [n.d.]. , 
n Bongard. 'Qu'est-ce que "Jeunesse et Montagne?'" 61. "Hebertisme" was dev~loped 10, I~. b)' 
Lieutenant Hebert of the French anny. Ten basic forms of exercise made up a sessIon of Hebertlsme; 
climbing. walking, lifting. running. swimming. jumping. crawling. balancing. throwing. and self-
defence. See Halls. Youth o/Vichy France. 199. 
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collective life among the peaks was intended to break down the class barriers 
between the recruits and teach them to 'get to know, respect, and help each other: 73 
The physical transformation of male bodies in the mountains was a central 
component of the Jeunesse et Montagne philosophy. According to the organisation' s 
medical service, the mountain climate and high altitude improved respiration, 
circulation, and metabolism, as well as increasing appetites and destroying almost all 
types of air-born germs. Furthermore, skiing developed muscles, coordination. and 
respiration (cross country skiing was preferred to the downhill version as the latter 
strained muscles whereas the former steadily increased muscle strength and fitness), 
while alpinism had an even more beneficial effect on the body as it reportedly 
developed 'equilibration, muscle tone, and heightened senses, particularly that of 
touch.' After a stage of six to eight months, it was predicted that a Jeunesse et 
Montagne recruit would gain four to six kilos in weight, demonstrate heightened 
reflexes and decision making capabilities, and enjoy a greater vital capacity. As an 
aesthetic benefit, brown skin pigmentation would 'happily replace the "corpse-like" 
h· k' f . I ,74 w Ite SInO new arnva s. 
More generally, the Chantiers de la Jeunesse boasted of the physical 
improvements of its members, such as weak morbidity rates Oust over one percent 
per 1.000 men per day) and weight gain in seventy-two percent of its recruits. 7S 
73 ADI 21 J 9 [n.a.J 'Groupements Jeunesse et Montagne. Groupement Savoie. Challes les Eaux 
rn.d.]. . 'h r. 
, .. Le Service de Sante. 'Sante et Montagne.' Groupemenls Jeunesse et Montagne: Bul/elln des ( e.,s. 
No. 28. July 1943. 55-8. . ' . • 
75 CHAN AJ JQ 1 [n.a.] 'Contribution a la chronologIe des Chantlers de Jeunesse. [no d.). 
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That living in nature without comfort, taking cold showers, and going bare-chested 
led to a 'hardening of the body' was taken as being almost self-evident. 76 
In addition to becoming bronzed, stronger, and more dynamic, alpinism 
would allow the young men to gain better self-knowledge of their own bodies. As 
Charles Roiron, Jeunesse et Montagne's head of sporting activities, informed its unit 
leaders, every physical movement was crucial in the mountains and the alpinist 
needed to be acutely aware of his own weight and exert complete control over his 
muscles. According to Roiron, 'because it forces us to be aware of each one of our 
muscles, the mountain makes us rediscover ourselves (retrouver nous-memes). It is 
the best remedy for the malaise of modem man, which the experts rightly attribute to 
man's ignorance of his body.' 77 
The manual labour that Jeunesse et Montagne conducted was also designed 
to contribute to the physical and moral renewal of the young men. as well as being 
one of the foundations of France's national recovery. 78 In line with the National 
Revolution's propaganda, work was represented as a unifying activity and 
instructions were directed at Jeunesse et Montagne' s chefs de groupement to use it to 
unite the factory workers, peasants and students that made up their teams. 79 The 
type of work was diverse, and included timber felling on vertiginous mountain 
slopes, an 'arduous and often dangerous' activity. 80 The logging sites assigned to 
Jeunesse et Montagne were frequently located 'high up on abrupt slopes' where the 
7b CHAN AJ 39 1 Etat-major du General de la Porte du Theil, 'Reglement des groupements de 
Jeunesse,' [n.d.], 4. 
77 Charles Roiron, 'Notre ecole: la montagne. a un chef d'equipe: Groupements Jeunesse el 
Montagne: Bulletin des Chefs, No. 22. 15 March 1943. 33. 
78 See C. R. 'Le travail.' Trait d'Vnion, edition speciale de lajeunesse aerienne. No.2. April 1943. 
?9 Roiron 'Notre ecole: la montagne. 32. 
80 'Cou~s de bois: Jeunesse et Montagne.' Trait d'Vnion, edition speciale de la Jeunesse aerienne. 
No.4, June 1943. 
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evacuation of wood was 'often acrobatic.' Despite its dangers and difficulties. the 
mountain-based lumberjacks were reported to enjoy forestry work as they could 
learn new skills, share their experience with their comrades, learn about the forest 
('a seductive and somewhat mysterious universe'), and develop their physical 
strength. 81 
In particular, Jeunesse et Montagne work units were to devote themselves to 
developing tourist facilities in the 'high massifs' and the "exploitation (mise en 
valeur) of the mountain.' 82 This development of mountain space included building 
refuges and chalets, maintaining mountain pastures, and restoring paths and was part 
of a wider programme to develop mountains to encourage tourism. skiing. and 
alpinism and so bring the benefits of these activities to the wider population and 
augment France's international prestige. 83 Within the context of Vichy's drive to 
cultivate and exploit as much as possible of France's territory (see chapter two). 
Jeunesse et Montagne's work seems to have represented the most practical and 
achievable way of domesticating and valorising high-altitude mountain territory. 
Despite the hard reality of manual labour in the mountains, at least one 
commentator within the Jeunesse et Montagne movement held a romantic view of 
mountain life. In a 1943 article entitled 'Pourquoi la montagne?' ('Why the 
mountain?'). Andre Montagnier suggested that with France's aviators deprived of 
their aeroplanes the mountain could now otTer them the silence, adventure. and 
dreams that they once found in the skies. In Jeunesse et Montagne. the 'man of the 
air' and the' man of the mountain' were united and communed . in their same desire 
KI Ibid. 
12 ADBDR 46 W 4 [n.8.] Jeunesse et Montagne leaflet [n.d.]. 
83 Travers. Politique et representations. 79-94. 
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for the infinite' and the need to discover 'unknown and unexplored domains.' With 
their eyes turned towards the skies, the "men of altitude" felt different to those of the 
cities and plains and experienced a sense of 'suffocation' when they descended from 
the heights. But for Montagnier, the mountain was not just a temporary means of 
satisfying the need for altitude but was a 'school of energy~ endurance. and 
camaraderie,' ideally suited to forming the pilots of tomorrow. But in the short term, 
the young men of Jeunesse et Montagne groups nestling in 'lost corners of the 
Haute-Savoie' had left behind the 'obscure towns, their grey offices, their everyday 
worries, and their classes and divisions' to live 'in contemplation' and discover "the 
sense of authentic life.' 84 As this article shows, the mountain was represented as a 
space of adventure, discovery, and realness, a world away from the stifling and 
mundane valleys and cities, even if it was only a temporary alternative to the skies. 
Some within the movement, however, tried to downplay the romantic aspects 
of mountain life. In the face of criticism that Jeunesse et Montagne offered a means 
for its recruits to escape the hardships of life in wartime France, providing them 
instead with the opportunity to practice alpine sports and experience a form of 
romanticised adventure among the summits, the organisation was keen to highlight 
that life in the mountains was not a 'refuge for cowards' but a "test.' In an article 
entitled "Notre ecole: la montagne' ('Our school: the mountain'), Charles Roiron 
outlined the demands of mountain life, that would disabuse critics and potential 
recruits of the view that life was easy in Jeunesse et Montagne. Negotiating steep 
and dangerous mountain paths erased any romantic ideas about the mountain's 
84 Andre Montagnier. "Pourquoi la montagne?' Trail d'Union. edition speciale de la jeunesse 
aerienne. No.1. March t 943. 
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'glaciers and torrents' and the chalets in which recruits lived could hardly be 
described as picturesque with their 'disjointed walls, earth floor, and miserable roof.' 
And where, Roiron continued, was the 'poetry of nights spent in the mountain in the 
cold [and] discomfort, on a hard bed in which a tired body struggles to relax?' It was 
the leader's task to make new recruits accept and take pride in the 'difficult but 
magnificent life, stripped of all romanticism.' 85 
A report by Abbe Pragneres on a Jeunesse et Montagne camp backed up 
Roiron's claim that it was a 'difficult but magnificent life: Pragneres, who visited 
the camp at Pont d'Espagne in January, described how the boys rose at dawn to run 
in the snow in 'light-clothing' and carry out exercises with 'bare torsos: At one 
stage, the weather was so bad that donkeys could not be used to collect food 
supplies, so the Jeunesse et Montagne recruits built an igloo to shelter the animals 
before collecting the food themselves on skis. For Pragneres, this was proof that 
mountain had fostered 'courage and tenacity, a taste for risk, a spirit of sacrifice, 
[and] energy that overcomes all obstacles.' There was also a sense of moral 
improvement in the harsh landscape. Pragneres felt a 'joyful hope' up in the 'white 
silence' of the mountains where new moral heights were being reached. 86 
Sometimes, however, the mountain proved too much of a test. On 25 
November 1943, a Jeunesse et Montagne cohort mounted an expedition to the Lac 
Blanc plateau. Slowed down by inexperienced climbers, the group was forced to 
endure a storm in a makeshift bivouac. The group leader regularly woke his charges 
to prevent them from freezing to death and encouraged them to sing to maintain 
8.S Roiron 'Notre ecole: la montagne.' 
lib Abbe Pragneres. 'Une visite au camp de "Jeunesse et Montagne" au Pont d'Espagne,' Bul/elin 
pyreneen. No. 237. 1941. 74-77. 
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morale and attract rescuers. Their voices were heard, but the storm prevented 
rescuers (including a Wehrmacht detachment) from reaching them. In the end, eight 
climbers died, four disappeared, and nine survived (of which five were hospitalised). 
For Jeunesse et Montagne, the lessons to be drawn from this tragedy were the 
reminder that mountains must treated seriously, that allowances must be made for 
inexperienced climbers weakened by wartime deprivations, and that climbers must 
be aware of the unpredictability of the mountain: 'on the mountain, like in war, 
surprises happen and upset the best laid plans.' 87 
These deaths and the missing climbers seem to have caused a degree of soul-
searching within the organisation's higher ranks. Jeunesse et Montagne's Head-
Commissioner, Andre Roussy de Sales, who had taken charge after Faure's 
departure for North Africa in November 1940, asked whether it was justified to risk 
the lives of young French men, at such a difficult time. He concluded. however, that 
it was worth continuing with mountain training and its 'immense sorrows and joys' 
as it created future leaders and pilots. For him, the deaths became a sacrifice and a 
lesson for the youth of France, showing the importance of collective life and the 
• F aire Face' ethos. 88 
Due to a scarcity of evidence, it is diflicult to determine the extent to which 
the alpinist philosophy of self-sacrifice, physical renewal. tenacity, and the love of 
risk filtered down to Jeunesse et Montagne's recruits. The cahiers produced by some 
units suggest that the young men's lives were dominated by forestry work, fatigue, 
and thoughts of food (punctuated by skiing lessons) rather than testing themselves 
87 'Commentaires sur 18 catastrophe du Lac Blanc (rapport de 18 commission d'enquete de "Jeunesse 
et Montagne"): Jeunesse Aer;enne: Bulletin de Chefs. No. 41. 15 March 1944. 1-5. 
l1li Quoted in ibid. 6-7. 
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. h· 89 
against t e mountam or becoming new men. Lionel Therray, who went on to 
become one of France's most celebrated mountaineers and who took part in Maurice 
Herzog's famous 1950 expedition to the Himalayan peak of Annapuma remembers 
the tough life he experienced in Jeunesse et Montagne which was tempered by the 
'team spirit, atmosphere of good humour, gusto (entrain), camaraderie. [and] 
enthusiasm.' Such was the atmosphere of 'collective exaltation and exhausting 
work' that Therray apparently experienced ~some of the most intense and totally 
happy days imaginable.' While this life equipped Therray with endurance skills that 
proved useful on latter expeditions, others, he believed. suffered from the punishing 
regime, ending up in an exhausted physical state. Consequently. an experience that 
was received initially in an enthusiastic manner descended into a ~sort of hell.' 90 
It seems, therefore, that Vichy's attempt to rebuild masculinity in the 
mountains was somewhat problematic. 91 This reflects wider problems with the 
regime's attempts to rebuild French manhood. Historians, such as Claire Duchen. 
contend that it was only during Liberation that French masculinity was restored, 
through such practices as shaving the heads of female collaborators. 92 More 
specifically, like many other Vichy-sponsored initiatives, the aims of Jeunesse et 
Montagne were ultimately diluted as a result of the difficulties of the moment. Not 
8Q See 'Le cahier de I'Equipe Claude (26 Nov 42- 04 Juin 43)- Le Planet- Centre de Beaufort); 'Le 
cahier des Equipes Vincent I et H- St Guerin- Centre de Beaufort'; and 'Le cahier de l'Equipe Grenet 
(partiel)- St Guerin- Centre de Beaufort.' at Jeunesse et Montagne website. http://www.jeunesse-et-
montagne.org/creationlannexe.html, 26 November 2005, viewed 29 March 2006. 
90 Lionel Terray, Les conquerants de I'inutile: des Alpes a I'Annapurna (Paris: Gallimard. 1961).48-
58. 
91 More generally. Paxton argues that 'it is doubtful that Vichy's efforts to indoctrinate French youth 
bore much fruit: Vichy France. 164. 
92 Claire Duchen. 'Crime and Punishment in Liberated France: The Case of the les femmes tondues.· 
in Claire Duchen and Irene Bandhauer-SchOffinann (eds.) When War was (A'er: Women. War and 
Peace in Europe. 1940-1956 (London: Leicester University Press. 2000). 237. See also Kelly. 'The 
Reconstruction of Masculinity at the Liberation.' 117-28. 
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least, German demands for labour and the STO scheme meant that many recruits 
were forced to leave the mountains to work in factories on the plains below. As well 
as fulfilling labour requirements, this movement to the plains alleviated other 
German concerns. The German authorities had long been suspicious of French youth 
groups carrying out such activities as skiing. Hinting at possible military activity, 
one German memorandum asked, 'by giving instruction in skiing will not other 
interests other than sporting ones be pursued?' 93 In the end, German authorities 
demanded the dissolution of Jeunesse et Montagne units in January 1944, which 
were transformed into 'Detachments de Jeunes Travail1eurs pour Ie Ministre de la 
Production Industrielle.' 94 
The notion of a healthy and uplifting life in the mountains that would create a 
new French elite dissolved into the everyday realities of industrial labour. 
Furthermore, and more worryingly for the Vichy regime. Jeunesse et Montagne 
groups, along with the Chantiers de la Jeunesse, began to be attacked for supplies 
and infiltrated by the maquis.95 This development is indicative of how the resistance 
began to physically and imaginatively reclaim mountain space. 
93 Quoted in Halls. Youth a/Vichy France. 199. 
94 'Aux lecteurs du "Bulletin des Chefs ... • Jeunesse A erie nne, Bulletin des Chefs. No. 40. 15 
February- I March 1944. I. 
9S According to Kedward. ·the transfer of food. clothes. equipment, and recruits from the desertions 
and raids confirmed in a material way the transfer of credibility from Vichy to the Resistance.' In 
Search qf the Maquis. 83. The Jeunesse et Montagne entry on the French version of Wikipedia (~n 
online encyclopaedia) claims that Jeunesse et Montagne recruits formed a large part of the rnaquls 
Constant and the maquis d'Oisans. As this entry is unreferenced. it must be treated with a degree of 
caution. See 'Jeunesse et Montagne,' Wikipedia, http://fr.wikipedia.orglwikiiJeunesse_et_Montagne, 
accessed 23 August 2006. The modem reincarnation of Jeunesse et Montagne claims that thirty one 
former members of the organisation died in the resistance. 'Notre contribution a la resistance,' 
Jeunesse et Montagne website, http://www.jeunesse-et-montagne.orglcreation.annexe.html. consulted 
22 August 2006. For more on the links between resistance and Jeunesse et Montagne. see Travers. 
Politiqllt! el representation.Ii. 241-53. 
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Mountains and resistance 
Just as they did with the forest (see chapter three), the emergence of rural 
resistance movements reclaimed mountain space from Vichy incrementally. As a 
consequence, mountains in Vichy France were integrated into a long history of 
outlaws and oppositional elements seeking refuge in the mountains, in France and 
elsewhere. 96 
France's Jewish refugees had gathered in mountain villages and alpine tourist 
resorts since 1940, taking advantage of the facilities and cover offered by hotels and 
medical establishments (many of which offered "climate cures"), as well as the 
compliance of mountain communities. 97 In the Vercors, Villard-de-Lans sheltered 
numerous Jewish refugees, as well others, such as the 200 students of the Polish 
/ycee in Paris. 98 The mobilisation of mountain space as sites of refuge and armed 
resistance intensified as measures against the Jewish population tightened and the 
STO scheme came into force from 1943. In general, these later arrivals also relied on 
the aid and complicity of mountain communities, who, in tum, appreciated the 
sudden influx of young men to work in the fields and forests that had been deprived 
of labour. 99 At the same time, throughout France's mountainous regions, resistance 
96 For this history. see Bozonnet. Des monts et des mythes. 159. 
97 In certain places. however. there were some tensions between residents and Jewish refugees. As 
many of the new arrivals were wealthy. food prices on the black market soared. Boulet. • Montagne el 
resistance en 1943,' 262-63. . 
98 Gilles Vergnon. Le Vercors: histoire el memoire d'un maquis (Paris: Les Editions de I' Atelier! 
Editions Ouvrieres. 2002). 32-3. 
99 Boulet. 'Montagne et resistance en 1943: 265; and Paul el Suzanne Silvestre. Chronique des 
Maquis de I'lsere, 1943-44 (Grenoble: Presses universitaires de Grenoble. 1995). 35. As Gamer 
highlights. many of the early camps were established between 800 and 1500 metres of altitude where 
the mountain was more domesticated than the rocky, icy summits of the haute montagne. which were 
mistrusted by peasants. STO evaders, and resistors alike. Gamer. Montagnes en resistance.' ::! II. 
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organisations (who had originally considered mountains to be too far from their 
predominantly urban-based activity) began to welcome and organise bands of 
refractaires into maquis units with the aim of conducting sabotage and ultimately 
armed resistance against Vichy and German forces. 
The installation of mountain maquis units IS a complex history with 
numerous variations due to geographical, social, and economic factors. 100 In the 
Vercors, for instance, the socialist Franc-Tireur network was essential in the 
establishment of maquis camps, the first of which was created at Ambel from 6 
January 1943 onwards. 101 Overall, however, the maquis. supported by local 
communities and resistance networks, began to wrestle physical and imaginative 
control of mountain space from Vichy. As the Prefect of the Correze observed in 
1943, 'mountains [ ... ] have become the receptacle of terrorists: 102 But mountains 
were not just end destinations for the resistance. The example of escape routes 
across the Pyrenees is a case in point. Here, mountains represented a dangerous, 
difficult, yet invaluable means to an end; safety in Spain. 103 
So far, no detailed study exists of the maquis' representation and experience 
of the mountain environment, but based on maquisard memoirs of the Vercors it 
seems that key similarities existed with CAF's and Jeunesse et Montagne's 
100 For this history see Boulet, 'Montagne et resistance en 1943: 267-69; Garrier. 'Montagnes en 
resistance: 211-213; and Kedward. In Search of the Maquis, 19-115; Olivier VaHade, 
'L 'enracinement de la Resistance iseroise.· in Jean-Marie Guillon and Robert Mencherini. La 
Resistance el les Europeens du Sud (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999). 191-200. For a specific example 
other than the Vercors see Alain Oalotel. Le Maquis des Glieres (Paris: Pion. 1992). 
101 Vergnon. Vercors, 39-45. 
102 Quoted in Fran~ois Boulet, 'Oeux-montagnes-rnaquis exemplaires dans la France occupCe (1943-
1944): la montagne limousine et la Haute-Savoie.' in Vincent Brousse and Philippe Grancoing, Un 
siecle militant: Engagement(s). Res;stance(s). el Memoire(s) au AX' siecl .. ' en Limousin (Limoges: 
Presses Universitaires de Limoges. 2005). 63. 
103 See Emilienne Eychenne. Montagnes de la peur et de I'esperance: Ie franchissement de la 
frontiere espagnole pendant /a seconde gue"e mondiale dans Ie dipartement de.\' Haule.'1-Pyren,;es 
(Toulouse: Privat. 1980). 
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mobilisation of mountains. 104 For a start, masquisards recorded the experience of 
life in the mountains as a factor in revitalising their masculinity. Pierre Tenant 
revelled to be among the 'young men' with their 'clear and kind faces' dressed as 
'montagnards.' He remembers one day of 'magnificent weather' spent among the 
'ardent youth' of the Vercors who 'impatiently waited for the Allied landings.' 105 
Albert Darier remembers the sun bronzing the maquisards' 'naked torsos' in the 
pure mountain air. In July 1944 he recalls a 'magnificent day. The men. most of 
whom went bare-chested, exposed their already bronzed bodies to the sun.' For these 
maquisards, being in the mountains with the aim of freeing France was a way of 
'learning to become men' (apprentissage d'hommes). 106 The photographs of Marcel 
Jansen, a budding photographer and member of the Maison des jeunes de Romans 
who later joined the maquis, capture groups of young maquisards turning bronze 
under the mountain sun as they transport arms across the massif and learn to use 
their weapons, encapsulating a sense of youthful vigour and freedom (see figure 
three). 107 
As Jansen's photographs suggest, maquisards, like the Jeunesse et Montagne 
organisation, saw mountains as healthy places. This was nothing new. Alpine air and 
good health had been associated together since the eighteenth century onwards. 
104 Similarly. there were parallels between Vichy's and the resistance's conception of forest space. 
See Chapter Three. 
lOS Pierre Tenant, Vercors: HaUl-lieu de France. Souvenirs (Grenoble: Arthaud. 1948). 18.~. 
lOb Albert Darier. Tu Prendras les Armes (Valence: Imprimerie Nouvelle, 1973 [1994]). 151-2.219. 
107 Les photos de Marcel Jansen: reporter au maquis (Valance: Editions Peuple Libre. 1994). Jansen 
was originally from Lorraine and was 18 in 1940. when his family were ~xpell~ from Metz. In .1 ~3 
he began to engage in resistance activity. guiding maqllisards to camps In the \ ercors and prOViding 
them with food. He himself fought in the Vercors. before descending to Romans on 10 August 1944 
to help liberate the town. See Paul Jansen. 'Lajeunesse de 18 Resistance: in Ibid. 11-14. 
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especially since the development of climate cures.108 The Vercors had long been 
known and celebrated for its pure air. In 1904, Henri Ferrand described the massif as 
'a place of pleasure, of rest, of the cure d'air. It's the Garden where humanity 
remakes itself.' The plateau was the place for holidays 'blessed with pure air.' 109 As 
Anne Sgard notes, by the beginning of the twentieth century the Vercors' pure 
mountain air was believed to keep the montagnard free from the corruption of 
civilisation and provided tourists with a healthy break from the polluted city. 110 
During the war, it seems that maquisards (and Jeunesse et Montagne) echoed these 
associations between health and mountain air. 
Like Jeunesse et Montagne, maquisards recognised the rigours of mountain 
life, especially in winter. One maquisard remembers waking up in the freezing cold: 
'in the morning we found our shoes frozen. The bread and meat were also frozen. At 
night, ice formed under our blankets in front of our mouths.' III Winter could be a 
demoralising time in the mountains; 'the trees were bare and black, and our hopes, 
like them, seemed bald and withered.' 112 The winter weather was indeed the cause 
of much suffering; "the cold, the north wind. [and] the rain formed a coalition that. 
very often, worried us more than the "'boche" or the Italians,' remembers one. 113 
Although in the Vercors and elsewhere, many maquisards left their camps in the 
lOB See Jean-Paul Bozonnet and Daniel Grunwald, 'Montagne et sante: un my the qui ne manque pas 
d'air.' L 'Alpe 27 (Spring 2005), 6-11. . .. 
109 Henri Ferrand. Le Vercors, Ie Royanais elles Quatre Momagnes (Grenoble: LlbraJrle Alexandre 
Gratier et Jules Rey. 1904). i-ii. 
110 Anne Sgard. 'Paysages du Vercors: entre memoire et identite: Revue de geographie alpine. horJ-
serie (1997). 50. 
III Quoted in Paul and Suzanne Silvestre. Chronique des Maquis de I'lsere. 168. 
II~ Stephen. Vercors. 50. 
ID 'Histoire des C.amps C. 6. C. 8. et C. II: in Ie Vercors raconle par ceu:c qui /'onl l-eCU (Grenoble: 
Association nationaJe des Pionniers et combattants volontaires du Vercors. 1990).98. 
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winter of 1943, the ones who stayed benefited from extra security provided by the 
snow. 114 
But throughout the year, life in the Vercors was an 'exhausting existence.' 115 
Hunger and hardship formed part of everyday life. Masquisards spent their days 
cutting wood, fetching water, and securing food supplies, a routine that could 
become monotonous and, as a consequence, boredom could take root in the 
camps.116 Some believed that nature seemed to conspire against them, heightening 
their sense of danger and exhausting them through the sheer physical exertions of 
mountain life. This was particularly the case at night. Gilbert Joseph remembers 
walking in the darkness: 'the physical effort transformed the acoustics: all of nature 
seemed to buzz with a thousand stridulations of insects. But it was just the pulsations 
of our arteries and the accelerated beating of the heart which bored through to the 
bottom of our being.' 117 Away from roads and forestry routes, simply moving 
around the Vercors was a tiring and time-consuming activity, especially up steep 
mountain slopes; 'sometimes we had to walk on all fours. Often we stumbled and 
I bl " b D' 118 had to grab a branch or bush to stop ourse ves tum mg, remem ers aCler. 
Mountains were also dangerous places and at least one maquisard paid the ultimate 
price, tumbling down a ravine to meet his death. 119 
In another parallel with CAF's and Jeunesse et Montagne's representations 
of mountains, it seems that maquisards felt themselves detached and superior to 
114 Garrier. 'Montagnes en resistance: 213. 
115 Jean Dacier. Ceux de maquis, coups de main el combats: /'epopCC: d'lIne compagnie d'F.F.1 du 
Vercors (Grenoble: Arthaud, 1945). 76. . . 
116 See 'Histoire des Camps C. 6. C. 8. et C. 11: 97; Gilbert Joseph. Comballanl du ~ ercors (Pans, 
Fayard. 1972),21: and Stephen. Vercors.32. 
117 Joseph. Combattant du Vercors. 12. 
118 Dacier. Ceux de maquis. 76. 
119 Darier. Tu Prendras les Armes. 87. 
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those on the plains. 120 Darier recalls that it was 'nothing like life down below. The 
air that they breathe doesn't have the same taste.' 121 As Darier's comment suggests, 
the revitalising freedom of the mountains was contrasted with life on the plain 
below. Stephen felt himself 'cut off from the world, a recluse between the sky and 
the earth,' a life to which he became 'easily accustomed.' 122 Tenant recalls how this 
existence 'contrasted with the stifling life that one led throughout occupied France.' 
How different to the 'pure and invigorating air' of the 'magnificent Vercors.' 1:!3 
There were, however, key differences between Vichy's and the resistance's 
mountain mobilisation. Not least, maquisards placed a greater emphasis on the sense 
of freedom they felt in the Vercors. The fresh mountain air enhanced these 
sentiments, especially after the mass mobilisation following the D-Day landings and 
the "sealing off' of the massif from the rest of Occupied France. One resister recalls 
that they 'were ... no longer part of the French State, hein. we were completely 
separate. That was something quite sensational.' 124 Road signs declared 'ici 
commence Ie pays de la Liberte' ('here begins the land of freedom') and a large 
tricolour flew from the summits. Yet even before the heady days of June and July 
1944 one maquisard remembers that 'we had a vivid sense of freedom.' 125 This 
freedom was unforgettable according to Aux Armes!; 'one breathed the air of 
freedom. one practised a fraternity, an honour, which no one who was there will ever 
120 In general. Jackson argues that resistance 'rhetoric celebrated the cleansing purity of mountain life 
away from the corruption of the city.' France: The Darlc Years. 507. 
121 Darier. Tu Prendras Les Armes. 182. 
m Stephen. Vercors.43. 
I!.'l Tenant, Vercors: Haul-Lieu de France. 20. 36. 
1:14 Interview with Paul Borel in Enqueles sur la memoire orale des anciens du Maquis du J'ercors. r 
';ff,porl inlermediare (A vignon: 1992). . • . 
I!. Interview with Pierre Bichel. Pontarlier. 31 July 2005. Tapes and notes In author s possession. 
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forget.' 126 Fresh mountain life was equated to freedom from the Occupation. Tenant 
remembers that 'the weather was magnificent in this month of June. The sky is a 
resplendent blue. And above all, up there, on the verdant summits, one feels free.' 1~7 
As Anna Balzarro suggests, mountains symbolised freedom and resistance 
during the war while fascism and oppression were left behind in the valleys.128 The 
construction of mountains as pure spaces of resistance against oppression continues 
today. Gil Emprin and Jacques Loiseau, curators of the recent exhibition 'The Alps 
at War' at Grenoble's Museum of Resistance and Deportation, argue that the 
solidarity and freedom of the Alps represents a different kind of Europe to the one 
embodied by Auschwitz. 129 
Furthermore, it appears that maquisards celebrated more poetic images of the 
mountains. As maquisard and novelist Jean-Pierre Chabrol wrote, "to have climbed 
towards the summits, towards the sky, to have sought refuge in the heart of the 
• 
mountain ... when you sleep on the bare ground. that changes everything.' 130 Joining 
the maquis allowed maquisards to discover the mountain landscape up close. This 
led to almost banal but enraptured observations of the mountain scenery and lives of 
its inhabitants, such as a shepherd leading his sheep to pasture. 131 But the mountain 
experience could also border on the mysterious, even the sublime. Before climbing 
up to the Vercors, Darier had been fascinated by this 'mysterious land,' and on the 
126 Aux ormes! No. 10, July 1945. 3. 
127 Tenant. Vercors: Haut-Lieu de France, 56. 
1211 Anna Balzarro, Le Vercors et 10 =one libre de I 'Alto tortonese: recits. memoire. hisloire (paris: 
L 'Harmattan. 2002), 181. 
IlQ Gil Emprin and Jacques Loiseau, Alpes en guerre. /939-/945: une memoire en partage (Veurey: 
Editions Ie Dauphine, 'collection les patrimoines'. 2003). 3. •. • . 
130 Quoted in H. R. Kedward. 'The maquis and the culture of the outlaw. In Kedward and AustIn. 
Vichy France and the Resistance. 24. 




plateau de Veymont he discovers a 'landscape a little out of this world' consisting of 
'tormented rocks' and devoid of vegetation. For Darier, this was an "anachronistic 
landscape' with few human traces, where one could easily become lost and stumble 
into danger during a stonn or at night-time. 132 
The Vercors also inspired poetics in Stephen, who recalls climbing in the 
Vercors on a clear, sunny day where 'on each side [of us] the immense plantations of 
the Meaudre forest seemed like an infinite temple, of which the thousands of giant 
columns supported the intense blue dome over our heads: 133 Stephen' s observations 
echo those of Albert Marchon, who, in 1927, rhapsodised over the Vercors' "clear 
sky, free from the past' and its pine forests that resembled the columns of the 
'temple of Arcadia.' 134 The sense of discovery and authenticity is remembered to 
this day. In a 2004 interview with Liberation newspaper, Alain Ie Ray, the Vercors' 
military leader, described the massif as 'a landscape where you could shelter for 
three months of solitude and where you could discover something about yourself. 
and also about nature.' 135 These visions of the Vercors recall, consciously or not, 
representations of the mountain sublime advanced by romantic poets, writers, and 
artists. 136 
Like Vichy'S promotion of alpinism and the ideology of Jeunesse et 
Montagne. maquisards experienced and represented mountains as healthy. pure, 
spaces that tested men and made them physically and morally stronger. Both sides 
132 Darier. Tu Prendras les Armes. 220-1. 
I3J Stephen, Vercors, 43. ., 
114 Albert Marchon. Le Vercors (Paris: Editions Emile-Paul Freres. 1927). 100. 
11S Quoted in Eric Aeschimann. "Heros du plateau: Liberation. May 17. 2004. 
www.liberation.fr/page.php? Article=20630 I, 2. . 
IJ() On the invention of the mountain sublime. see Coates. Nature. 129-.H: McFarlane. Moun/oms of 
lhe Mind. 74-7; and Schrepfer. Nature's Altars. 41-4. 
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also portrayed the mountains as elite spaces. They were a privileged place in which 
to rejuvenate French men and being in the mountains set the mountaineers apart 
from the rest of France (even if both Vichy and the resistance claimed that the 
remade males would ultimately descend and save France). But in its mobilisation of 
mountains, the resistance went one stage further than Vichy by bestowing a military 
function on France's summits. 
Militarised mountains 
The mobilisation of mountains in Vichy France reached a peak with the 
maquis' designation of the Vercors as a military base, transforming it into a "natural 
fortress." In this case, mountains were to be a substitute for arms and men; by 
commandeering the Vercors' topography, the resisters hoped to counter the 
numerical and technological strength of German forces. In 1942, Pierre Dalloz. a 
keen alpinist and ex-editor of CAF's La Montagne revue, identified the Vercors as a 
'natural fortress' and developed the Plan Montagnards. 137 
As he claimed after the war, Dalloz believed that "it is a fact that this massif, 
with its rare and difficult access routes, its immense forests, its remote pastures. its 
sheepfolds, its little known network of caves, could provide the most secure refuge 
for outlaws.' For Dalloz, the massifs resistance potential came 'as much from the 
configuration of its soil as the independent and courageous character of its sons.' 
The Vercors radiated resistance spirit. Indeed, it was this quasi-mystical power that. 
Dalloz claimed, inspired the Plan Montagnards in the first place; 'I opened my door. 
137 46 Vergnon. Vercors. . 
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I breathed in the night's cold air. The familiar almond tree, stirred by the wind. 
brushed the starry sky with its foliage ... The mountains were straight ahead. There 
was the Vercors. I reflected for a long time. The darkness was an accomplice. The 
moment was heavy for me, full of responsibility, resolution, and hope.' 138 
Dalloz proposed that the Vercors could shelter a substantial number of 
maquisards, as well as offering Allied forces a secure aerial base within France for 
the anticipated landings in Provence. He claims in his memoirs that on a visit to the 
Vercors, de Gaulle's envoy General Delestraint was suitably impressed by the 
massifs potential; 'the General declared himself stunned by the beauty of the place 
and surprised by the strength of the plateau's defences.' 139 Dalloz's co-alpinists 
helped him to flesh out the Plan Montagnards. Marcel Pourchier. a retired 
commander and ex-alpinist, conducted a survey of the Vercors and Alain Le Ray. a 
member of the Groupe de haute montagne (an elite group of alpinists), helped 
finalise it, dividing the Vercors up into five sections and agreeing on the choice of 
Vassieux-en-Vercors to construct a runway for Allied planes. 140 
Elsewhere, French officers from alpine regiments were keen to realise the 
military potential of mountains. Commandant Vallette d'Osia from the 27c BeA 
envisaged the creation of a secret Alpine army and established a training school at 
the Col des Saisies in February 1943 to work towards this aim. 141 The winter of 
1943 was also when ex-army officers, many of whom were trained to deal with the 
exigencies of mountain life. entered the maquis, bringing with them new expertise 
138 ADI 13 R 1043 'Naissance des maquis du Vercors par Pierre Dalloz.· 2-4. 7. See also Pierre 
Dalloz. Verities sur Ie drame du Vercors (Paris: Femand Lanore. 1979).20-1. 
139 Dalloz. Verities sur Ie drame du Vercors, 76. 
'40 Paul Dreyfus. Vercors: ciladelle de liberte (Grenoble: Arthaud. 1997 [I 969]), ~7-50. 
141 Kedward, In Search of the Maquis, 133-4. 
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and reinforcing its military orientation. 142 In the Vercors. this took the fonn of 
military training that instructed other maquisards on how best to use mountainous 
terrain during combat. 143 
Recent military history gave credence to the belief in the military potential of 
mountains. In the summer of 1940, French forces had successfully repelled German 
and Italian attacks in the Alps, aided, at times, by the mountain climate and the 
construction of the 'little Maginot Line' which maximised the natural defences of 
the mountains. 144 More specifically, defensive preparations in June 1940 had 
incorporated the Vercors into a scheme under which military planners envisaged it 
as a fallback position. 145 Mountains, then, presented themselves as impenetrable and 
useful natural allies for French forces before and after the defeat. 
Dalloz's designation of the Vercors as a military base echoed prevIous 
evocations of the massifs fortress-like qualities. In 1904, Ferrand identified the 
• fortress of the Vercors' and the 'almost continuous ring of abrupt escarpments that 
surround it.' According to Ferrand, the 'steep walls' of the Vercors' cliffs "dominate 
the surrounding plains and rise up inaccessibly like the ramparts of a fortress.' 146 
Over a quarter of a century later, Jules Blache drew attention to the 'high white 
[limestone] wall' that "defends the east of the Vercors massif for fifty kilometres ... 
Nowhere else in the French Alps is there a fa~ade as remarkable for its regularity 
142 Garrier. 'Montagnes en resistance: 213. 
143 'Equipe volante,' in Pierre Bolle (ed.), Grenoble elle Vercors: de la Resistance a la Liberation 
1940-44 (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble. 2003 [1985]). 171: Stephen. J'ercors, 43; and 
Pierre Vial, La Bataille dll Vercors /943-44 (Paris: Presses de la Cite. 1991).50. 
144 1. E. and H. W. Kaufmann. The Maginot Line: None Shall Pass (Westport. C'T: Praeger. 1997). 
76.-83. 133-40; and General Etienne Plan and Eric Lefevre. La Bataille des Alpes, /0-25 jilin 1940: 
I 'armee invaincue (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle. 1982). For more on the military geography of 
mountains see Winters el al. BaJtling the ElemenJs. 170-5. 
I .. , Vergnon. Le Vercors. 29. 
146 Ferrand. Le Vercors, Le Royanais el us Quatre Mootagnes. ii. v. :!J. 
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d d· . , 147 A S d h " an ImenSlOns. s gaf argues, t ese writers deployment of "natural fortress" 
imagery created an impression of unity within the massif, which had previously been 
seen as a disparate collection of pays. 148 Constructions of the Vercors' unity and 
singularity were then strengthened by the Plan Montagnards. 
Perceptions of the Vercors fortress-like qualities were reinforced by 
maquisards' ascent into the massif, which was often physically challenging, 
involving a bus ride to nearby villages before 'attacking the mountain' on fOOt. 149 
One maquisard recalls his difficult journey up into the Vercors from the village of 
Beaufort-sur-Gervanne: 'the road climbed steeply alongside a small. calm stream. 
gently bubbling over the rocks. This must have been a torrent in the springtime. Our 
chocolate and bread had long gone, and we were thirsty. We carried on across wild 
gorges, without coming across a house or a person.' 150 Potential maquisards could 
also be unprepared for the rigours of mountain life. Marcel Brun-Bellut remembers 
surveying his companions as they prepared to make the trip up to Ambel in February 
1943; 'some were dressed in low heeled shoes, overcoats and [carried] suitcases, 
others [were] in overalls, carrying in one hand a lunchbag and in the other a blanket 
folded in a semi circle. Others carried a jute bag containing everything on one 
shoulder with a two litre waterbottle slung across the other. Few were suitably 
151 dressed to face the biting cold and endure the tough mountain life of winter.' 
Some new arrivals apparently arrived at Ambel with bleeding feet. 152 
147 Blache, Les massifs de la Grande-Chartreuse er du Vercors: Tome 1.82. 
148 Sgard, 'Paysages du Vercors: 21-2.45. 
14Q Femand Rude. 'Le Vercors: in Bolle. Grenoble erie Vercors. 101. 
I$() Dacier. CellX de maquis. 60. . 
lSI Marcel Brun-Bellut. 'Ambel. premier maquis du Vercors: in Le Vercors raconlt par ceux qUI 
I'onl veeu. 79-80. 
1S2 Stephen. Vercors. 32. 
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The resistance's mobilisation of the Vercors as an impenetrable military 
base, however, involved the erasure of certain aspects of its recent history. such as 
developments in its transport system and the growth of tourism. The Vercors was 
anything but inaccessible by the 1940s. Numerous hotel rooms catered for summer 
visitors and winter skiers, who could access the massif via the Grenoble-Villard-de-
Lans electric tramway or specially laid-on coaches (in 1928 coaches brought over 
21,000 visitors to marvel at the Grands-Goulets gorges). Before the war, the towns 
and villages in the Vercors had seized the opportunity to generate extra income from 
visitors; La-Chapelle-en-Vercors opened a tourist information office in 1930 and. on 
the eve of the Second World War, ViIlard-de-Lans was the biggest tourist resort in 
the Pre-Alps and planned to build new hotels, an ice rink, and ski lifts. 153 
Despite the fact that the Vercors was accessible to day-trippers from 
Grenoble, the Plan Montagnards was implemented. Construction began on a runway 
at Vassieux-en-Vercors, mines were laid along roadsides, and defences mounted at 
key access points. In June and July 1944, the number of maquisards swelled (a 
mobilisation order was issued on 6 June 1944, which was retracted to little effect 
four days later), attempts were made to regularise maquis units along military lines, 
and the massifwas apparently sealed off from the rest of France. In a display of their 
confidence, the maquis reinstated the French republic within the imposing ~~walls" of 
the Vercors and held Bastille Day celebrations on the fourteenth of July. 154 
ISJ Blache. Les massifs de /a Grande-Chartreuse el du Vercors:Tome II. 2. 419-21: and Ra~1 
Blanchard. Les A/pes occidenlaJes Tome I: /es Prea/pes jra1lfaise.'i du Nord (Tours: Arrault et Cle. 
1938).281. 
Is.. See Vergnon. Vercors.83-112. 
228 
Chapter Five 
The Vercors violated 
The topography of the mountains might have inspired hope that the 
"Republic of the Vercors" would be victorious. As military geographers Patrick 
O'Sullivan and Jesse W. Miner suggest, 'mountains have been a traditional haven 
for a lightly armed force opposing a heavi1y armed foe.' 155 But the Vercors showed 
itself to be penetrable by a heavily armed foe. German forces, who had been repelled 
from Saint-Nizier on 15-16 June 1944, returned on 20 July 1944, landing their 
gliders on the recently completed runway at Vassieux-en-Vercors and storming 
mountain passes with units trained for mountain combat. 
Controversy stilI rages about the Plan Montagnards and the degree of support 
the Free French and the Allies accorded it. Leaving aside the supposed Allied and 
Free French "betrayal" of the Vercors, a controversy heightened by Cold War 
political posturing, it seems that the leaders of the maquis had considerably over-
estimated the area's defensive strength. 156 With hindsight, then, this military 
mobilisation of the mountain can at best be described as a noble failure. Paul 
Silvestre argues that the Vercors' apparent fortress-like character generated a false 
sense of security that obscured the difficulties involved in living on the massif, such 
as the paucity of the water supply. He contends that maquis groups used 
mountainous areas most efficiently as a base for sabotage attacks on enemy forces. 
Above all. the most effective units were mobile and dispersed. a view backed up by 
I~S O' Sullivan and Miller. Geography o/Warfare. 65. 
IStI For more on this controversy. see Vergnon. Vercors. 109-12. 157-77. 
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contemporary Allied intelligence. Is7 In a similar vein, resistance historian Henri 
Nogueres outlines the Vercors' defensive frailties. By mid-June, German troops had 
already succeeded in opening up an access route through Saint-Nizier. The central 
plateau was also accessible by road from the South East, and even the apparently 
impenetrable eastern ridge contained a series of mountain passes which Axis alpine 
troops were trained to breach. Nogueres also points to strategic errors on the part of 
the maquis leaders, such as failing to defend Vassieux-en-Vercors adequately and 
under-estimating the enemy's strength. 158 
In defence of the Plan Montagnards, Alain Le Ray has stressed the elements 
of mobility it contained and the importance accorded to guerrilla tactiCS. 159 But as 
historian and former maquisard Femand Rude highlights, it was dangerous for large 
groups of maquis to gather in one place as they were easily encircled and destroyed 
by the enemy.160 The case of the Vercors and the Glieres plateau battle of March 
1944, when maquisards where overrun by superior German forces, suggest that 
mountains were no guarantee of military victory. 161 As Garrier argues, 'we must 
highlight the false idea that altitude creates distance and that natural barriers 
1.57 Paul Silvestre. 'STD. maquis et guerilla dans I'Isere: Revue d'histoire de /a deuxieme gllerre 
mondia/e 130 (1983). II. 47: and ADI J3 R 1043 'Note sur les Alpes de Provence: redige a Londres 
- remis au Commandant Manuel. chef duo B.C.R.A.L.. May 12. 1944, l. 
Isa Henri Nogueres. Histoire de /a Resistance de 1940 a 1945. Tome 5: Juin 1944- Mai 1945 (Paris: 
Editions Robert Laffont. 1981), 342-3. 375. 
IS9 Alain Le Ray. 'Preface: in Silvestre and Silvestre, Chronique des Maquis de I'/sere. 16; \'aJlade. 
'L 'enracinement de la Resistance iseroise.· 199. 
160 Rude 'Le Vercors,' 119-21. 
161 For a brief overview of Glieres' history and the ensuing controversy over strategy. see Kedward. 
In Search of the Maquis. 132-41. 
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guarantee absolute security.' 162 Topography did not detennine the outcome of the 
battle in the way that maquisards had planned. 163 
Nor was nature necessarily a natural ally for maquisards once defeat seemed 
inevitable and the order had been given to disperse into the massif. John Houseman. 
a British liaison officer with the maquis, remembers how 'every unusual sound in 
the woods caused an instant silence among the party - a hunted dog look.' 
Moreover, the Vercors' paucity of water sources led to agonising thirst. Houseman 
recalls having to extract water by squeezing the moisture out of moss; .. after two or 
three hours [of] hard work ... I had perhaps % of a pint which. though muddy and 
having an unwelcome taste, was nectar.' 164 The lack of water also haunted 
Houseman's colleague, Major Longe, who fell asleep dreaming of the 'pond at 
Yelverton full of crystal clear water: Upon discovering a rare stream in the Vercors, 
he 'almost cried with relief as we dropped face first into the wonderful cold 
water.' 165 
Movement was also difficult in the forests, 'climbing over rocks, crawling in 
the dark on our knees, never following the paths.' 166 For Jean Dacier, the silence of 
the forest oppressed the maquisards as they hid from Gennan troops, while for 
Marcel Brun-Bellot the night was sinister. its silence 'pierced by the cries of foxes 
162 Garrier. 'Montagnes en resistance: 219. .. . 
16.' As Winters el al argue, the "physical setting within which battles are fought IS neither passive nor 
presumable.' Banting the Elements. 3. 
164 IWM 0215211 Captain John V. Houseman. diary of Mission Eucalyptus-Vercors, France. August 
1944. 12, 25. 
1M IWM 03154/1 Major D. E. Longe. diary of Vercors mission [n.d.].' 45. 62. Water shortages also 
afflicted Stephen who relied on a boar's watering hole and the generosity of a local peasant to quench 
his thirst. Stephen, Vercors: Premier maquis de France. 163-7. ., . 
ItI() National Archives. London HS 6/424 First Lt. Andre E. Paray •. Interalhed MISSion Eucalyptus to 
the Vercors [n.d.]. 
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and other beasts' who populated the forests. 167 During the battle at Valcheviere. 
morale can hardly have been helped by the 'torrential rain, downpours of chilling 
rain, mist, fog, [and] wind.' 168 But nature also gave some encouragement to the 
desperate maquisards. One of them was grateful for the cover accorded to him by 
. d&".' k' . h . h G 169 ram an 109 10 S IrmIs es WIt erman troops. Tenant also remembers how one 
morning in the Lente forest the 'fog began to dissipate, giving way to the sun. The 
good weather, coming after days of rain, gave us courage: 170 Similarly, Darier 
recalls how nature gave a boost to those maquisards who had miraculously escaped 
from a cave at Pas de Aiguille; 'the air is stilI fresh under the trees but the sky is 
completely blue; the day will be beautiful. Irs as if nature wanted to ... help the 
survivors.' 171 
The failure of the Plan Montagnards led to material destruction as the 
German forces exacted reprisals, highlighting the physical consequences of this 
military mobilisation of mountains (in addition to the deaths of approximately 800 
maquisards and civilians). The "natural fortress" had been breached and violated. 
Gone were the experiences and representations of a pure. healthy, revitalising 
mountain landscape. For contemporary observers, it seemed that the conflict had 
disrupted the normally productive relationship between the inhabitants and their 
environment. A group of Swiss journalists noted that 'in the villages, in the pastures, 
on the irregular and sheep-filled higher plateaus. all is bum4 devastated, 
167 Daeier. Ceux de maquis. 135; and Brun-Bellot. • Ambel. premier maquis du Vercors.· 80. 
168 J. Puech. La MOnlagne des sept douleurs (Vercors 1944) (Paris: C.almann Levy, 1945),.57.. . 
169 ADI 13 R 990 [n.a.] • Attaque du Vercors. pas du Chattons et de 18 Selle et operauons qUI 
s'ensuivirent.' [n.d.). 
170 Tenant. Vercors: Haul-Lieu de France. 150. 
171 Darier, Tu prendras les armes. 277. 
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destroyed.,l72 It appeared that the German troops had stripped the Vercors bare. All 
that remained were 'pastures without cows and sheep, bedrooms without floors, 
forests without echoes. If they could have done, [the soldiers] would have taken light 
and water with them.' There was an uneasy ambiance in this pillaged land; "the 
atmosphere ... is of the most atrocious malignancy: avowed torture [was] perpetrated 
in the fresh air, in the middle of the day at one thousand metres of altitude. where. in 
normal times,. vets would come to care for the livestock: 173 At Vassieux-en-
Vercors, 'gloomy, ash coloured' vegetation and the grey. heavy sky where ravens 
circled overhead, added to the foreboding atmosphere of the 'plateau of death,' 
around which the limestone cliffs emerged out of the clouds. 174 This atmosphere 
did not go unnoticed by the authorities. The Prefect of the Isere reported that the 
military 'engagements' had left a "widespread uneasiness and even a real terror' 
across the region. 175 
The extent of the atrocities seemed unnatural. The Pionniers du Vercors, the 
most influential Vercors veterans association. later emphasised the German troops' 
"bestiality,' which was 'without precedent: 176 The Swiss journalists felt that the 
scale and brutality of the atrocities went beyond the wildness normally found in 
nature ('beasts don't take pleasure at the suffering of their victims'). They believed 
that the violence had 'broken the limit of natural things to where good and evil 
merge together ... in front of the survivors, one understands the wickedness of nature 
17;: Albert Beguin, Pierre Courthion. Paul du Bochet. Richard Heyd. Georges Menkes. and Lucien 
Tronchet. Le livre noir du Vercors (Neuchitel: Editions Ides et CaJendes. 1944).22. 
173 Pierre Courthion. • L ' Atmosphere.' in Beguin el ai, Lil're noir, 23. 
174 Puech. La montagne des sept douleurs. 64. 
m ADI 13 R 990. Prefet de I' I sere to Prefet regionaJ. Lyon, July 29, 1944. 
176 ADI 4° 330. Amicale des Pionniers et des Combattants volontaires du \'ercors. Mirreillt' opera 
programme. June 20. 1948. 
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and men.' In It was almost as if the "unnatural" violence had physically stained the 
mountains and that the bodies of the dead 'traced a bloody border around the 
• ,178 I . I h summits. n certam paces, t e stench of death replaced the fresh mountain air. 
R. Thibaud, the Drome's Departemental Director of Civilian Defence, visited 
Vassieux-en-Vercors and reported the 'odour of death that floated over the plateau' 
due to the unburied corpses that had been left exposed to the summer sun. 179 
As well as the macabre atmosphere, contemporary reports also laid bare the 
physical disruption and destruction. For a start, German forces requisitioned 
livestock to prevent the local popUlation from provisioning maquis groups, adding to 
the already severe shortage of food supplies. As if to worsen the situation further. 
work in fields had been put on hold due to a shortage of manpower. 180 American 
geographer Peter Nash carried out a study of this agricultural devastation. reporting 
that nearly all of Saint-Nizier-du-Moucherotte's chickens had been killed (the mayor 
claimed that the German troops had killed them 'for the sake of it') and that rabbits 
and poultry had been stolen from La-Chapelle-en-Vercors, whilst Vassieux-en-
Vercors had lost nearly all of its large animals. In all, Nash estimated that the 
German army had requisitioned twenty-five percent of all livestock, sixty-six 
177 Albert Beguin. 'Au seuil de l'Enfer,' in Beguin et al. Livre noir, 51; Courthion .• Atmosphere.' 25. 
178 Aux armes.' 10 July 1945. 3. 
11Q ADD 497 W 2 R. Thibaud. 'Les bombardements aeriens dans la Drome au cours de J'annee 1944: 
15 January J 945. 7-8. , . ,_ 
180 ADI J3 R 990 M. Duboin, 'Rapport sur les evenements survenus dans la region de \ Illard-de-
Lans • 26 July J 944: and ADI 13 R 990 M. Duboin, • Rapport sur la situation dans les communes de 
St Ni·zier. Villard-de-Lans. Lans. Corren~n. Meaudre. et Autrans.· I August 1944. 
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percent of horses, and thirty-three percent of pigs. Farmers had also endured the loss 
of substantial quantities of potatoes, wheat, and farm mach inery. 181 
In addition, some of the Vercors' forests had been mined, and near Saint-
Jean German planes had deposited phosphate bombs setting fire to fields. farms. and 
forests.
182 
On 14 July 1944, Stephen remembers seeing bombs 'boring craters' into 
fields sending 'geysers of loose earth' up into the sky or 'devastating woodland, 
breaking up branches with a hail of lead.' 183 Furthermore, 'La Chapelle-en-Vercors 
and the surrounding countryside had literally been sprayed with projectiles.' 
according to Thibaud. 184 Marcel Jansen's photographs, which had once captured the 
youthful atmosphere of camaraderie among ~ned, bare-chested maquisards, now 
bore witness to ruined farms and destroyed lives. 
The case of the Vercors shows how mountains acted as both a refuge and a 
trap. It is also an example, albeit an extreme one, of how the war physically 
transformed a mountain environment. But as this chapter demonstrates, the history 
of mountains in Vichy France is not just about the sites themselves. It is also about 
perceptions of mountains, which underscores the interlocking material and cultural 
histories of warfare. Both Vichy and the resistance saw mountains as spaces of 
regeneration, discovery, and authenticity, as well as tests of manhood. These ideas 
181 Peter H. Nash, 'Le massif du Vercors en 1945: etude sur les devastations causees par rarmee 
allemande dans une region alpine de la France et de leur effets sur les traits geographiques.· Revue de 
Geographie alpine 34/1 (1946),91-3. 
182 Stephen. Vercors. 125. 
183 Ibid. 129. Similarly. in South Eastern France the conflict of summer 1940 was not without 
environmental destruction. For instance. one French soldier remembers the French army's use of 
explosives to blow up a tunnel in the Southern Alps to prevent Ital ian progression into France. nus 
detonation created an 'immense flame that lit up the whole landscape' and threw up a mass of rocks 
which cascaded down the mountain. French forces also bombarded the Italian-held fort at Mont 
Chaberton with 200kg shells in dense mountain fog. It is hard to imagine that this did not cause some 
damage to the mountainside. See J~-Louis Panicacci, Les Alpes-Maritimes de 19J9 a 1945· un 
dt.r!rlemenl dans la tourmenle (Nice: Editions Serre. ] 989), 69. 
I Thibaud.· Les bombardements aeriens dans la Drome.· 5-6. 
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were not new. Robert McFarlane argues that for Victorian mountaineers, "climbing 
upwards came to represent - as it still does - the search for an entirely new way of 
being. Experience was unpredictable, more immediate and more authentic in the 
mountains. The upper world was an environment which affected both the mind and 
the body in the ways the cities or the plains never did.' 185 Despite their opposing 
political aims, this statement rings true for Vichy and the resistance: both tapped into 
long-standing images of mountains. Notions of masculine renewal and the 
militarisation of mountains attest to the myriad ways in which mountains mattered 
and were mobilised in Vichy France. And, as with the forest. human activity and 
aspirations during "dark years" led to the physical destruction of some mountain 
environments, such as the Vercors, necessitating their reconstruction in the postwar 
era. 
'1$ MacFarlane. Mountains ~rthe Mind. 213. 
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Reconstructing the French Environment, 1944-1955 
In 1918, after four years of war, the French Minster for Agriculture declared that 
'several years will suffice to restore Reims cathedral if we commit the necessary 
resources. But however much we spend, it will take at least a century before the 
forest of Viel-Armand will recover its former splendour.' I Like its predecessor in 
1918, the French government in 1944 faced the long-term task of repairing war 
damage to the French landscape. As it had during the preceding years of war and 
occupation, nature continued to matter in postwar France. beginning with the 
Liberation period. During the summer of 1944. Allied and French forces 
progressively liberated French territory from German Occupation, even if it was not 
until April 1945 that German troops were forced out of Alsace, Lorraine, and 
isolated pockets on the Atlantic coast. This was a chaotic time, characterised by a 
volatile mixture of public expectations, official and unofficial purges of 
collaborators, roaming bands of maquisards, and the presence of a new set of foreign 
.., 
troops stationed on French soil. -
I Quoted in Eaux el Forils du Ile au 20e siecle. 625-27. 
:! On the Liberation. see Alain Brossat. Liberation, fite fol/e, 6 juin 44- 8 mai 45: mylhes et rites au Ie 
grand IhedJre des passions populaires (paris: A~trement. 1994): and Philippe Buton. La joie 
douloureuse: la liberation de la France (Bruxelles: Editions complexes. :!004). 
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Despite the upheavals of the Liberation period, elements of continuity are 
evident in its environmental history, as in its political and social histories. Not I~ 
intense pressures continued to be exerted on France's natura) resources. These 
pressures came from both civilian and military sources. For despite the obvious 
differences between the Axis and Allied military presence in France. tensions 
surfaced between French foresters and AJlied troops in the years fo))owing 
Liberation. As Hilary Footitt highlights, the relationship between French civilians 
and Allied troops was, at times, riddled by misunderstandings and mutual 
frustrations. 3 Limited natural resources, such as timber. became potentially potent 
sources of conflict, although Footitt leaves this area unexplored. 
Beyond these short term pressures, the opportunity arose to reconstruct the 
French environment to benefit the nation in the long term. Across Europe. newly 
formed governments in war-tom countries turned their attention to the urgent task of 
reconstruction. Yet there was no desire to return to the political, social and economic 
conditions of the interwar years, which were held partly responsible for the outbreak 
of the Second World War. 4 To avoid a repeat of the chaos that followed the First 
World War and to create a stable, prosperous, and peaceful future for the continent. 
governments and civilians placed their faith in the power of the state to raise living 
standards. modernise industry. and boost production and consumption. Growth 
became the new objective and state planning the means to obtain it. 5 More than 
) Footitt. War and Liberation in France. 
4 As Tony Judt argues. "the sheer scale of the European calamity opened new opponunili~. The war 
changed everything. A return to the way things had been before 19~9. was o~t of the q~estlon almost 
everywhere.' Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (London: WIlham Hememann. _005). 63 .. 
5 Daniel W. Ellwood. 'Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe. America. and Postwar Reconslrucllon 
(London: Longman. 1992).2. 14. 
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anywhere else in Western Europe, the French state, under the guidance of 
technocrats such as Jean Monnet, identified planning as the most effective way to 
achieve growth and modernisation. 6 As Kedward highlights, the French state took 
the leading role in planning and implementing national reconstruction. taking 
measures such as nationalising coal, gas, and other industries to boost productivity 
and industrial output. 7 Yet although historians have studied political and economic 
reconstruction, and the rebuilding and modernisation of the urban environment. the 
reconstruction of the natural environment has been overlooked. 8 
Making the land productive once again, through the reconstruction of farms 
and forests, was one of the urgent tasks facing the provisional French government as 
it asserted its authority over French territory under the leadership of Charles de 
Gaulle. Few areas of institutional and everyday life were left untouched by the 
project of national reconstruction. As de Gaulle proclaimed in his speech at 8ayeux 
on 16 June 1946, 'we must instigate, despite the immense difficulties. a deep 
[national] renovation which will lead each Frenchman and each Frenchwomen to 
greater prosperity, security, [and] happiness.' 9 Demographers strove to induce the 
French to produce more babies, cultural identity was to be strengthened and 
rejuvenated, urban areas modernised. and industrial production rationalised and 
() Ibid. 17. Judt contends that 'only in France did rhetorical enthusiasm for state planning translate into 
the real thing. Postwar, 68. 
7 Rod Kedward, La Vie en bleu: France and the French since 1900 (London: Allen Lane. ~OO5), 350-
I. 
8 On political and economic reconstruction, see Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe. On the ur:t'an 
environment. see Dominique Barjot. Remi Baudoul', and Daniele Voldman (eels.). Les reconstructIOns 
en Europe. /945-/949 (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1997). On the reconstruction of the .French 
urban environment. see Clout. 'Ruins and Revival' 117-39; and Voldman. La reconstructIon d('.'i 
villes fran~aises. . 
9 Charles de Gaulle, 'Discours de Bayeux, 16 juin 1946: Charles de Gaulle webSite. 20 September 
2006. http://www .charles-de-gaulle.orglarticle.php3?id _ article=56&page=6. 5. 
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amplified. 10 As in these areas, the aim was not to restore the environment to its pre-
war condition but to initiate its modernisation and rationalisation. as well as 
rendering it more productive. 
This was a difficult yet urgent task. At the same time as they struggled to 
cope with the heightened material pressures of post-Liberation France. state officials 
undertook the necessary steps towards environmental reconstruction. The most 
urgent task was the removal of the millions of mines and other explosives that lay 
scattered across the landscape, which proved an arduous, dangerous, yet ultimately 
successful venture. Nature was not a static backdrop for mine clearers. whose job 
was rendered more difficult and dangerous by topography and vegetation. At the 
same time, foresters and other officials presented their plans to rationalise and 
modernise the environment. In the case of the forest. the scale of war damage. 
growing demands for forestry products. and the uncertainty of international timber 
markets all contributed to the introduction of the Fonds Forestier National (FFN) 
[voted into law by the Assemblee Nationale in 1946], an ambitious programme to 
reforest two million hectares of French territory over a timescale of twenty to thirty 
years. 
Parallels existed with Vichy's war on ·'wasteland.'· Liberation. as defeat had 
been. was an opportunity to remake the French landscape, which was seized as 
eagerly by repUblican governments as it had been by Vichy. And as in 1940. 
10 See Karen Adler, 'Demography at Liberation: Using History to Forget the Past: in Simon Kitson 
and Hanna Diamond (eds.), nchy. Resistance. Liberation: New Perspectives o~ Vichy France 
(Oxford: Berg. 2005), 183-94; Richard I. Jobs. 'Tarzan under Attack: Youth. ComICS. and Cultural 
Reconstruction in Postwar France.' French Historical Studies 26'4 (Fall 2005): 687-725: Clout 




reforestation was identified in 1944 as a necessary step to provide desperately 
needed resources and ensure the ecological balance of the countryside. State 
planners after 1944 also benefited from legislative measures introduced under the 
Vichy regime which gave the state greater control over the forest. There were. 
however, important differences between the periods following defeat and Liberation. 
For a start, the exigencies and destructions of war had exposed the apparent 
"weaknesses" of the countryside and accelerated long-term processes, such as rural 
depopulation. Furthermore, the scale of the physical destruction of the environment 
was much greater after Liberation than post-1940. Another key difference was that 
postwar reconstruction was devoid of the disgraced "back-to-the-Iand" rhetoric that 
had glorified the peasant and woodcutter in Vichy France. Instead. rhetorical 
emphasis was placed on modernisation and rationalisation. And, overall. the FFN 
was much more successful than Vichy's reforestation drive. due to more favourable 
peacetime conditions and better financing. 
In this chapter, I extend my geographical focus beyond South Eastern France 
to provide a wider perspective on the history of environmental reconstruction. 
However. I concentrate most fully on the reconstruction of the forest, a choice 
dictated by sources and the fact that the forest was identified as one of the habitats in 
most urgent need of regeneration and modernisation. I begin by outlining the civilian 
and military pressures exerted on the environment, before turning to mine clearance 
operations. I then address the plans advanced for reconstruction and consider the 
largely successful implementation of the FFN. ending with the milestone reached in 
1955, when over haifa million hectares had been reforested under the scheme. 
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Continuing pressures on the environment 
Liberation did not bring a relaxation of pressures on France' s natural 
resources and, as during the years of war and occupation, demands came from both 
military and civilian quarters. France continued to fight the remnants of German 
forces on its territory until spring 1945, as well as contributing resources and 
soldiers to the Allied invasion of Germany. Unsurprisingly. therefore. the National 
Military Commission emphasised that all available materials must be diverted to the 
war effort and, to this end, production must be increased. II As a consequence. not 
only did France have to provide foodstuffs to civilians and materials for 
reconstruction, it also had to support its own army and those of its Allies. 
Like the German and Italian troops before them, Allied soldiers consumed 
considerable quantities of natural resources whilst stationed on French soil. Timber 
was in particular demand. As one Allied report of June 1944 noted, ·the 
requirements of an army in the field for timber and other forestry products exceed in 
volume the demands for any other local resources.' The Allies, the report continued. 
would need sawn timber to construct barracks and hospitals, repair railway lines. and 
rebuild bridges, as well as requiring wooden poles for constructing signal lines. 
camouflage supports, and telegraph posts. In addition, firewood and charcoal would 
be needed in 'large quantities .. 12 As this list shows, the comments of Wendall R. 
II ADI 13 R 991 La Commission militaire nationale to Mouvements de la resistance. Comites de la 
Liberation. Commissions militaries regionales. departementales. et locales. 7 November 1944. 
I~ Plant Sciences Library. University of Oxford. 25557(4). Engineer Division. Supre~e Headqwu:ters. 
Allied Expeditionary Force. 'Utilization of local timber resources in France (Techmcallnformallon). 
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Becton, an Alabama-born forester drafted in to supply Allied engineers in France. 
were perceptive; 'anything the army needed and had to construct in a hurry was 
made of wood.' 13 
Given that the Free French were allies in the struggle against Nazi Gennany. 
it appears that British and US planners were more concerned than Axis troops to 
minimise tensions over forestry resources. In anticipation of the 1944 landings. 
foresters led by Colonel A. H. Lloyd of the University of Oxford's School of 
Forestry gathered intelligence on French forestry production and Vichy's forestry 
legislation. 14 The Allies ultimately planned to use local, French timber resources as 
this represented an easier and cheaper way to supply troops than shipping timber 
across the Atlantic. Major General Hughes, the Chief Engineer at the Supreme 
Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force, recognised. however, that this 
strategy might create tensions between Allied forces and French civilians. 
Consequently, Hughes urged the military to show consideration when securing 
timber; 'a French forest is a cultivated timber crop and a valuable source of supply 
for future generations. The people of France will realise the urgent military necessity 
of local timber utilization but unnecessary destruction by wasteful felling and 
logging will be strongly resented and may have political repercussions.' 15 
Becton (who was one of fifteen Allied officers in charge of wood supplies in 
liberated France) presented a largely hannonious picture of cooperation between the 
June 1944, A. H. Lloyd. 'Introduction: 21 June 1944. 3: and Wendell R. Becton with Elwood 
Maunder. 'Military Forestry in France after 1944,' Forest History 16 '] (October 1972).42. 
\J Becton. 'Military Forestry in France after 1944.' 40. . 
14 See. for instance, Plant Sciences Library. University of Oxford. 25556(b). 'Controlled prices of 
timber in France in 194213 (A summary of the "code de bois"),' May 1944. 
IS Plant Sciences Library. University of Oxford. 25557(4). Engin~r Di\'isio~ Su~reme Headquaners. 
Allied Expeditionary Force. 'Utilization of local timber resources an France. \1aJor General H. B. \\ . 
Hughes. 'The Utilization of Local Timber Resources in France.' 20 June 1944.' 
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French and the Allies in a 1972 interview. That Allied forces were able to obtain 
large quantities of timber that had been stranded because of transport difficulties 
aided the atmosphere of collaboration that Becton portrayed. In addition, they were 
able to secure wood supplies through local officials, thereby letting the French 
manage timber production. According to Becton, this 'production came from 
[French] forests in the regular way through good management practices using local 
facilities for manufacturing.' From his base in Paris, Becton was apparently able to 
meet the demands of the Allied forces in Eastern France by filing requisition 
requests with the Provisional Government. Such was the efficiency of this procedure 
that in the end there was no need to ship timber supplies from North America. 16 
French forestry files, however, reveal a more contentious story that echoed 
previous tensions between foresters and Axis soldiers demonstrating that the 
presence of army units, whatever their identity, placed a burden on already over-
stretched forestry production between 1940 and 1946. 17 For instance, in the Nord 
departement, US soldiers carried out a "massive [forestry] exploitation' in January 
1945 to rebuild bridges across the Rhine, further compromising an already war-
ravaged forest. 18 In Provence meanwhile, French authorities struggled to meet US 
demands for wood. Departements were ~ked to supply the American army with 
30,000 steres of firewood between 1 October 1944 and 31 March 1945, while the 
Itl Becton and Maunder. "Military Forestry in France after 1944: 39-43. . 
11 Bennett identifies a similar situation in the Solomon Islands. where the Alhes squeezed as much 
from the forest as the Japanese had done before them. See "Local Resource Use: .107. . ... 
18 CACAN 19880470/172 Volmerange. Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Lllle. 'Posslbllttc par 
volume des forets fran~ses.· 28 June 1947. 
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Drome was to supply 3,500 steres. 19 As if to increase these demands on the forest. 
French army units required 24,840 steres of firewood and wood for baking bread. ~o 
Continued fighting on the Franco-Italian border created further problems. A 
forestry inspector in the Alpes-Maritimes reported that the departement was unable 
to meet Allied demands for this very reason. 21 It seems that when local supplies 
were unable to meet their needs, US troops helped themselves to 'large quantities' of 
firewood without regularising the situation. Repeating the behaviour of German 
officers, some US commanders apparently refused to reveal their identity to 
foresters. 22 
As during German and Italian occupation, the presence of French and Allied 
troops inhibited forestry production and harmed the forest. For instance, firing 
practice conducted by the French 57th infantry regiment hampered production and 
damaged forestry cables at St-Martin-Vesible in the Alpes-Maritimes. activity which 
risked having 'regrettable repercussions on the general economy.' according to the 
local Forestry Inspector. 23 And on 10 March 1945, a fire started during a shooting 
exercise conducted by the US army damaged a recently reforested plantation in the 
Alpes-Maritimes. The local forestry official could not understand why a forest had 
been chosen for the practice rather than a patch of "bare ground.' He asked that US 
19 ADBDR 194 W 27 Comite central des Groupements lnterprofessionnels Forestiers. to 
Conservateur des Eaux et Forets, Aix-en-Provence, 24 October 1944; and ADD 61 \\' 6 Inspecteur 
general des Eaux et Forets, Repartiteur, Chef de la Section du Bois par interim, to Prefet de la Drome. 
'Prelevement de bois de chauffage par les armees aJliees.· 7 November 1944. 
20 ADBDR 194 W 27 B. Lazard Repartiteur. Chef de la Section du Bois. to Directeur regional de la 
Production forestiere. Marseille. 'Circulaire No. 123: besions en bois de chauffage et bois de 
boulange de I' Armee fran~ise,' 30 November 1944. 
::1 ADBDR 194 W 27 P. Herve. Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Nice. to Conservateur des Eaux et 
forets. Aix-en-Provence. 10 February 1945. 
~ ADBDR 194 W 27 Directeur de la Production forestiere to Secretaire General du Comite Central 
des Groupements Interprofessionels Forestiers. 15 February 1945. . .. .. 
~ ADAM 521 W 26 Caubel. Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Nice-Est. 'Dlfficultes d explOitation du 
fait des exercises militaires. 2 August 1945. 
245 
Chapter Six 
troops be made aware of the risk of forest fires in order to preserve the forests that 
had suffered so recently at the hands of occupation troops and wartime 
overexploitation. All must now be done, he continued, to 'preserve those forests 
which remain.' 24 
Alongside these pressing military requirements, French civilians continued to 
rely heavily on the forest for fuel, particularly as it was not until July 1946 that coal 
production returned to prewar levels. 25 The wood shortages experienced during the 
Occupation continued well into the post-Liberation period, reflecting general 
material scarcities at this time in France and elsewhere. 26 If anything, trees became 
even more vital to the national economy after 1944. Wood, according to Marcel 
Leloup, the Forestry Administration's Director General, was now even more 
essential than during the Occupation; 'more than ever wood currently constitutes the 
key material of the national economy; the war effort, coal mines, railways, housing 
for the needy (sinistres), industrial and domestic heating, paper fabrication, tanning 
leather, all depend on it.' 27 
Civilian pressures on the forest were intense. Not least. the reconstruction of 
urban areas required vast quantities of timber. Raoul Dautry. the Minister for 
Reconstruction and Urbanism, had high aims for reconstruction~ 4we must give 
24 ADAM 521 W 57 Bergogne, Inspecteur-Adjoint interimaire des Eaux et Forets to Commission des 
Reboisements des Alpes-Maritimes, 'Rapport: incendie du 10 mars 1945,' 12 March 1945. 
~~ Kedward. La Vie en bleu,35 1. 
26 These material shortages led to frustrations; in July 1945 the Under-Prefect of Aries reported that 
with regards to food supplies and reconstruction public opinion still 'wanted a "better" [situation) 
which has stilI not arrived.' ADBDR 150 W 190 Sous-Prefet de I' Arrondissement d' Aries to Prefel 
des Bouches-du-Rhone. 'Rapport Mensuel,' 10 July 1945. For more on material shortages in post-
Liberation France and Europe. see Michel-Pierre Chelin. 'La crise du ravitaillement en Europe. 1944-
1949: in Barjot et al. Les reconstructions en Europe. 159-160; Jean-Marie Guillon. La Liberation du 
J'ar: resistance et nouveaux pou'vo;rs (Paris: Cahiers de I'IHTP, no. 5. June 1990). 110-1: and Vinen. 
Unfree French. 357. 
~7 AD. 6 P 1122 Directeur-General des Eaux et Forets to Consenateurs Regionaux des Eaux et Forets. 
14 November 1944. 
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France a noble face [and] reconstruct in the spjrit of our time and r p t fi r th p 1 
with the solid materials found on our soil. 2 Ho e er there were in uffi i nt 
quantities of timber on French soil. As a report on recon trueting th 
highlighted, the problems facmg reconstruction ere the arne fr m Lill 
Marseille, namely the lack of raw materials, including wood. _9 
Figure l. Makeshift sawmill at Vassieux-en-Vercors. H 307 AP 171, undated photo. 
I n particular during the earl tage of th r e n tru ti . th r \\ 
pr ing d rnand fi r timber ten truet th \vo d n barra k u d t h It r th 
~\: Ra ul du n t 
hi loriqIJ ' 
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who had lost their homes during combat or bombing raids. 30 France's railwav 
operator, the SNCF, also required wood to repair its tracks that that had been 
damaged during the war (in September 1947 it still needed to replace 900,000 
sleepers), as well as wood for tools and carriages. 31 Given these demands, the 
government ordered the production of 8,500,000m3 of construction-grade timber and 
22,000,000 steres of fire- and industry-grade wood between 30 June 1945 and 30 
June 1946. 32 Although by 1946 production of construction-grade timber had 
increased by forty two percent (from prewar figures of 7,380.000m3 to 
10,511,502m3), it seems likely that before this date the forestry industry would have 
struggled to match this rate, given the severity of transport and manpower shortages 
(detailed below). 33 Indeed, officials in charge of reconstruction pressed for a thirty 
percent increase in wood production for 1946 and 1947, which suggests that existing 
supplies and rates of production were not meeting the demands of reconstruction. 34 
As well as the demand for the wood that was vital to rebuild France's cities. 
reconstruction in the countryside also relied on access to timber resources. In the 
Vercors, timber was needed to rebuild houses, farms, bridges, and barracks for 
30 As Clout notes, 'many Parisians endured the exceptionally harsh winter of 1947 - and many 
subsequent winters - living or working in draughty and often under-heated wooden huts.' Clout. 
'Ruins and Revival: 127. 129. 
31 C' ACAN 198880470/172 Directeur General des Eaux et Forets to Directeurs Depanementaux de la 
Production Forestiere, 'Impositions de bois de sous rails: 2 September 1947; and CACAN 
]98880470/172 Controleur General, Chef du Service de la Production Forestiere to Chefs de 
Circonscriptions et Directeurs Depanementaux de la Production Forestiere. 'Sesoins de la SNCF en 
diverses essences feuillues pour fabrication s¢<:iales' 14 May 1947. 
12 H.B., • Mobilisation des ressources forestiers,' Le Bois National. 8th Year, No.4, 5 February 1946. 
53-6. 
33 The figures come from Rivieres el Forets: numero special consacre (lUX Eaut el Forels el au 
lourisme cynegelique el haliealique. Nos. 10-12 (January-March 1949). 24-5. 
~ CHAN 307 AP 171 Direction des Materieux. Transports et Constructions Provisoires. 'Note pour 
Monsieur Ie Ministre: approvisionnenment en bois pour 1946,' 10 January 1946. 
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forestry workers as well as for erecting emergency shelter for tho e mad 
by the war and constructing a canteen for reconstruction worker. 3 -
Figure 2. Temporary wooden bridge at Goule oire, Vercors. HA 30 P I I, 
undated photo. 
The quantitie of wood needed were not insignificant. he ill g f t-Juli n- n-
Vercor alone requested 1 200m of resinou wood for recon tru tion in M r h 
1945. 
The Vercor resistance and ub equent "marty rdom ' \ r u d a 
bargaining chip n at 1 a tone occa Ion in an att mpt t m In 
mb r 1944, the Pr ident f th mit ' d' aid t d r c n tru tin u 
Chapter IX 
wrote to the Prefect of the [sere requesting that fore t in the rcor b x m t 
from supplying wood for paper pulp as ' the exceptional ituation f th m if 
meant that its inhabitants were struggling to supp\ them el e with w od. I t al n 
contribute to the rest of France's needs. 37 The Forestry on ervator in r n 
appears to have had little sympathy with the reque t that the r nt 
'martyrdom" justified its exclusion from contributing to national \ 0 d t k . H 
even suggested that this was yet another excuse fro m fore t wn r \ h hav 
always ' tried to escape their obligations to the wider community. 
Figure 3. Rebuilding a roofin the ercors. H 30 P 1 I undated ph t . 




At other times, however, there was a more cooperative relationship between 
foresters and the Vercors, with the forestry administration donating unsold wood to 
the Comite d'aide et la reconstruction du Vercors and conducting the marte/age 
(marking of trees with a hammer) for a timber cut from which the profits were to go 
towards alleviating the plight of St-Martin-en-Vercors' prisoners of war and 
deportees. 39 
High levels of timber felling did not pass unopposed. In May 1947. residents 
of Flayosquet in the Var wrote to the Forestry Conservator in Nice to protest that a 
newly arrived forest owner was conducting a 'veritable massacre' of oak trees in the 
hamlet. The disgruntled population believed that these oaks (some of which were as 
thick as a 'round table') were legendary in the area and may have formed part of the 
'ancient, original forest' of Provence. Although they understood the demands of 
reconstruction, they wondered why their picturesque forest was being targeted 
instead of other. less attractive woodlands in the area. As a consequence of this 
felling, 'the most beautiful site' in the area had been reduced to bare rocks and 
resembled 'the threadbare spine of a mangy dog.' What, they wondered. was the 
Commission des sites et du reboisement doing to stop the felling? 40 In response. the 
Forestry Administration highlighted that the trees had been marked for felling in 
1943. although it had asked the forest owner to halt the exploitation as it was unclear 
)Q ADD 122 W 1 luge, Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Valence. 'Rapport: foret de bureau de 
bienfaisance de St-Martin-en-Vercors. non soumis au regime forestier. vente de coupe.' 9 March 
1945: luge, Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Valence. 'Rapport: commune de V ass ieux-en-V ercors. 
cession amiable Service de la Reconstruction.' 7 September 1945. 




why these particular trees had been selected. 41 Although this is an isolated case, it 
points to persisting tensions between forest conservation and production in post-
Liberation France. 
The shortfall in forestry production 
As during the Occupation period, forestry production strugg led to meet 
demand after Liberation. In November 1944, Leloup recognised the dire situation: 
'although the needs of the country for wood have never been more pressing than at 
the current moment, we are witnessing incontestable signs of a weakening of 
forestry production.' 42 There were numerous reasons for the slackening of 
production. For a start, the military conflict and social upheavals of the Liberation 
period played a role in disrupting forestry production. To take one example. a 
September 1944 report from the Isere noted that due to recent 'events' it was hard 
for officials to assess the state of firewood stocks, felling had been halted. and 
sawmills had slowed their production. 43 To make matters worse, maquisards and 
regular French army units requisitioned forestry vehicles, which increased 
transportation problems that were already considerable. 44 
To address the lack of forestry vehicles, Leloup asked Prefects and 
Commissaires regionaux de la Republique (de Gaulle's regional representatives) to 
41 ADAM 521 W 74 Rougon, Inspecteur-principal des Eaux et Forets. Draguignan •. Rapport: 
exploitation de 18 foret particuliere Samaran a Flaysosquet. protestation collective.' 4 June 1947. . 
42 ADBDR 194 W :!5 Directeur-General des Eaux et Forc~ts to Conservators des Eaux et Forets, 
'Intensi fication de la production forestiere.· 7 November 1944. 
43 ADI 2101 W 29 Office departemental du Commerce et de la Distribution des Bois de Feu. 'Bois de 
feu,' 9 September 1944 
44 Ibid; and ADI 6 PI/22 Conservateur des Eaux et Forets to Prefet de rtsere. 5 October 1944. 
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divert draught animals that had been requisitioned by German authorities (but not 
yet returned to their owners) to be deployed in the forest. In making this request, 
Leloup stressed the importance of getting timber out of the forest to provide pit 
props which were essential for 'restarting the economic life of the country.' ~5 
Damage to transport infrastructure represented another obstacle to be overcome. For 
instance, the blockage of the Col de Rousset tunnel deprived the town of Die of the 
wood supplies that it normally received from the Vercors, as well as potatoes and 
dairy products. 46 
Besides transport, other factors, such as dilapidated sawmills and general 
material shortages, exacerbated the situation. 47 Private foresters also accused the 
government of not paying enough attention to the forestry sector, even though it was 
of 'vital interest for [France's] reconstruction,' and manpower shortages continued 
to pose problems. 48 The Forestry Conservator in the Isere identified a lack of 
workers as one of the main factors holding back production, meaning that it was 
difficult to maintain, let alone intensify the supply of forestry products. As a 
consequence, the Prefect allowed the conservator to requisition the necessary 'goods 
and personnel' to 'assure maximum production in the forestry camps.' 49 Other short 
term measures also came into effect. In Normandy, relief worker Francesca Wilson 
45 ADBDR ISO W 187 Marcel LeLoup, Directeur-General des Eaux et Forets to Commissaires 
regionaux de la Republique. Prefets, • Affectation a la production forestiere des animaux de trait 
recuperes sur I' ennemi.· 13 November 1944. 
46 ADD 943 W 13 Sous-Prefet de Die to Prefet de la Drome. 26 October 1945. 
47 Becton and Maunder. 'Military Forestry in France after 1944,' 39-41. 
48 'Nous ne sommes pas contents .... La foret du Sud-~Sl, 1st Year, No.3 .. 10 July 19:tt>. l. For 
manpower shortages. see ADBDR 194 W 31 Controleur Jure Bartoli •• Rapport no. 47. penode du 1 7 
au 27 janvier 1945,' 30 January 1945. 
49 ADI 6 P 1122 Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Grenoble to Prefet de l'Isere. 3 November 1944: 
and Prefect de I')sere, • Arrete: 16 November 1944. 
253 
Chapter Six 
recalled seeing German prisoners of war busy felling trees for firewood 'because of 
the lack of coal.' 50 
At Saint-Martin-Vesubie in the Alpes-Maritimes, tensions arose due to an 
inability to recuperate existing wood supplies. In the summer of 1945, forestry 
officials struggled to bring down 15,OOOm3 of timber cut by Italians during their 
occupation of the departement that now lay unused on high-altitude mountain slopes 
(the timber had already spent two winters on the slopes so risked deterioration if left 
any longer). Hampering their efforts were landmines laid by German and American 
troops, unauthorised firing practice conducted by French soldiers, a lack of 
manpower, and time-consuming negotiations over the price of the timber. SI An 
article in L 'Aurore du Sud-Est on August 1945 demanded that progress be made as 
the wood was urgently needed for reconstruction. The newspaper was also 
concerned that the cut timber would prevent water from draining ofT the slopes. 
thereby undermining the forest's sustainability and leading to landslides. 52 Although 
this was an exceptional incident, it suggests the strain that the Forestry 
Administration was working under and the urgency of maximising forestry 
production and distribution. 
Local authorities struggled to control the situation. In the face of severe 
wood shortages, the Prefect of the Drome ordered, on 7 August 1945, that 
so Francesca M. Wilson, Aftermath: France. Germany. Austria, Yugoslavia 19-15 and 19-16 (West 
Drayton: Penguin. 1947). 20. 
SI ADAM 521 W 26 Caubel, lnspecteur des Eaux et Forets, Nice-Est. . Rapport: vente de grumes 
abandonees par des exploitants italiens: 1 May 1945; ADAM 521 W 26 Caubel. Inspecteur des Eaux 
et Forets. Nice-Est. 'Rapport: bois abandonne par "ennemi dans Ie departement. des,. A I pes-
Maritimes: 21 June 1945; and ADAM 521 W 26 C.aubel. 1nspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Nice-Est. 
'Difficultes d'exploitation du fait des exercises militaires.· 2 August 1945. 
S2 'Pour eviter une catastrophe ... iI faut utiliser Ie bois entasse il Saint-Martin- \'esubie: L 'Aurore du 
Sud-EsI. 30 Augst ) 945. newspaper clipping in ADAM 52) W 26. 
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communes were to provide firewood for schools, bakers, and refugees living on their 
territory. If need be, they should requisition wood from private foresters. 53 Before 
this date, it appears that communes in the Drome were experiencing difficulties in 
securing wood from forest owners. One forester even suggested that bread should be 
withheld from reticent forest owners, while some blamed the temptations of the 
black market for wood distribution problems. 54 Others targeted local mayors; 
according to the Forestry Conservator in Valence, wood shortages in towns 
remained low because town halls were not taking a sufficiently active role in 
obtaining supplies. 55 Another forestry official recommended withholding tobacco 
and sugar supplies from two communes which had claimed that they were not in a 
position to supply firewood to urban areas. 56 
The scarcity of firewood was felt keenly by certain individuals. For instance, 
a disgruntled refugee from Toulon wrote to the Drome's prefect in December 1944 
complaining that he had not received enough firewood from his local town hall. As a 
consequence, he would now have no choice but to endure winter without adequate 
heating "in a far fresher climate than that of the Mediterranean.' 57 Yet despite the 
prefectoral decree of August 1945, it seems that such shortages persisted. For 
instance, the mayor of Erome resorted to asking parents to donate wood to keep the 
53 ADD 61 W 7 Prefet de la Drome, 'Arrete: imposition de bois de feu pour I'exercise 1945-1946.' 7 
August 1945. 
54 ADD 61 W 7 Maire de Savasse to Prefet de la Drome, 20 December 1944; ADD 61 W 7 Pondu. 
Inspecteur-Adjoint des Eaux et Forets, Montelimar. "Rapport: commune de Savasse. reclamations.' 
15 February 1945; ADD 61 W 7 Cochet. Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Valence. 'Impositions 
communales: bois de chauffage,' 24 April 1945; ADD 60 W 14 Pondu. Inspecteur-Adjoint des Eaux 
et Forets. Montelimar, "Rapport: impositions en bois de feu: 27 March 1945; and ADD 60 W 14 
Pondu, Inspecteur-Adjoint des Eaux et Forets. Montelimar. 'Rapport: communes de Port-Laval et 
Pont-de-Barret. reclamation pour I'imposition en bois de feu.' 12 December 1944. 
55 Cochet. 'Impositions communales: bois de chauffage.· 
56 ADD 60 W 14 Fondard. Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Die. 'Rapport: communes de Glandage et 
de St-Julien-en-Quint: impositions de bois de chauffage.· 13 November 1944. 
57 ADD 61 W 7 Jeanne-Marie Lespine to Prefet de la Drome. 28 December 1944. 
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local school heated as the little firewood that existed in the commune had been 
'almost totally cut down during the last five years.' 58 Similar problems arose in the 
neighbouring Isere departement where, in March 1946, the Prefect urged mayors to 
'do everything' within their means to extract as much firewood and bakers' wood as 
possible from their commune's resources. 59 
The cases of the Drome and Isere are illustrative of the wider wood shortages 
identified by Leloup in November 1944 (see above), In the light of such scarcity, he, 
like local state foresters, highlighted the possibility that forest owners were 
deliberately holding back wood to speculate on prices or showed a "reluctance' 
(mauvaise volonte) to meet the demands expected of them. 60 
France had one possibility, though, to alleviate shortfalls in timber supplies 
in the shape of the forests that lay in the French zone of occupation in Germany. 
Although France oversaw the smallest of the Allied occupation zones (comprising 
the South West regions of the Rhineland, Baden, and WUrttemberg), it nonetheless 
possessed considerable timber resources awaiting exploitation (not least those of the 
Black Forest), 61 One of the aims of the Allies in Germany was to reduce the 
country's capacity to wage war, an objective which informed their forestry policy. 
V.P. Rock, a US army lieutenant on the Allied Forestry Sub-Committee proposed a 
sa ADD 61 W 7 Maire de Erome to Prefet de la Drome, 5 September 1945. 
S9 AD} 2101 W 37 A. Reynier, Prefet de l'Isere to Maires de l'Isere. 12 March 1946. 
60 Directeur-General des Eaux et Forets to Conservateurs des Eaux et Forets. 'Intensification de la 
production forestiere·. For local reports see ADV 2 W 69 President de la Chambre departementale 
des negociants detaillants en combustibles. 'Rapport a Monsieur Ie Sous-Prefet de Toulon concernant 
I'execution du plan de ravitaillement en bois de feu du mois de decembre: 11 January 1945: and 
ADBDR 194 W 32 Section Bois de Boulagne des Bouches-du-Rhone to members of Comite du 
Ravitaillement. Representants du Comite de Liberation, 7 November 1944. 
61 The quantity of wood in the French zone was apparently three billion cubic metres. of which half 
was construction grade timber. CACAN 19880470/173 'Interview between General Noel and Colonel 
Altman.' 30 August 1945. 
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timber-felling regime that would destroy 'the war potential of the forests and forest 
industries of Germany,' allow for the 'systematic exploitation' of Gennan forests 
over a twenty-year period, yet ensure that sufficient 'vegetative cover and density of 
stocking' remained so that 'dangers arising from erosion, floods, and lowering of the 
water level will not prevail.' Overall, 'the ultimate aim will be to reduce the forests 
to a point where they will no longer be a source of war materials.' 62 French forestry 
officials based in Gennany agreed that the 'war potential' of Gennan forests should 
be reduced and recognised that the timber needs for Allied reconstruction would 
'very quickly absorb several supplementary [production] possibilities over the 
course of the occupation.' 63 Gennany's forests offered a seemingly hwin-win" 
situation for the Allies as they could simultaneously secure timber for their own 
countries' reconstruction and consume the raw materials that Gennany could 
potentially use to wage war. 
Unsurprisingly after their recent experience of Gennan occupation, there was 
a feeling of revenge on the part of the French. 64 In 1947, the Minister for 
Agriculture observed how the Gennan forests 'which had been specially saved to the 
detriment of our own' during the Occupation would now be used to satisfy France's 
62 (' ACAN 198804701173 V.P. Rock, Lt. Jg U.S.N.R., U.S. Secretary of Allied Control Authority 
Economic Directorate. Food and Agriculture Committee. Forestry Sub-Committee. 'German 
Forestry-Paper' SCFOIP (45) 2 [n.d.]. 
63 CACAN 1988041173 Rodary. Conservateur des Eaux et Forets to lnspecteur-General des Eaux et 
Forets. Berlin, 16 November 1945. The Soviets also concurred on the need to reduce the war potential 
of Germany's forests. See CACAN 19880470/173 Allied Control Authority Economic Directorate. 
Food and Agriculture Committee. Forestry Sub-Committee. 'Propositions of the Soviet Delegate on 
the order of exploitation of German Forests: 21 November 1945. Eaux et Forets also used game from 
Gemlan forests to restock France's reserves after the war. See 'Attributions sur Ie plan technique,' 
Rivieres e/ Fore/s. Numero Special consacre aux Eaux el ForeLs el au lourisme cynegelique el 
ha/iea/ique. Nos. 10-12 (January-March 1949).39. . 
bot A desire for revenge and compensation also influenced the Soviet occupation of Germany. See 
Ellwood. Rebuilding Europe. 52. 
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timber needs. 65 Articles in Le Bois National noted how French lumberjacks based in 
Germany (whom the paper named 'the pioneers of reconstruction') would enable 
France to find some compensation 'for the immense ravages inflicted on the French 
forest' between 1940 and 1944. One commentator suggested that it was time for 
France to consider the war potential of Germany's forests alongside German forestry 
policies in occupied Europe and 'draw the conclusions' arising from "these acts of 
barbarity.' The implication was that France should enjoy carte blanche to over-
exploit German forests. 66 
However, France struggled to realise the production potential of the forests 
that lay on the other side of the Rhine. Although permits to exploit over four million 
cubic metres were issued, by August 1947 just under two and a half million cubic 
metres were actually produced. Furthermore, over half of this production had not yet 
reached France. 67 As in France itself, manpower and transport problems held back 
the production and transportation of desperately needed timber. In September 1947, 
a sawmill owner in the Marseille region complained that production in his mill was 
threatened because of a lack of timber. Yet despite his desperate situation, no one 
was able to tell him when timber supplies would arrive from Germany. 68 In 
addition, the Forestry Conservator in Aix-en-Provence noted that only three 
6S CACAN 19771461/46 Ministre de l'Agriculture to Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, 'Organisation 
des Services Forestiers en Allemagne,' 21 April 1947. See also P. Romart. 'Echos d'outre-Rhin: les 
bois allemands de la zone d'occupation fran~ise: Le Bois National. 8th Year. No. 30, 25 October 
1947. 453-4. . 
b() 'O'une decade a I'autre: Le Bois National, 8th Year, No.8, 15 March 1947. 118; and Echos 
d'outre-Rhin: les bois allemands de la zone d'occupation fran~aise: Le Bois National. 8th Year. ~o. 
31.5 November 1947,465. 
tJ7 CACAN 198804/172 Directeur-General des Eaux et Forets to Oirecteurs departementales des Eaux 
et Fo~ts, 'Controle des livraisons de grumes a sciages en provenance de Z.F.O.: Paris 21 October 
1947. 




businesses in the Bouches-du-Rhone had requested timber from Germany because 
the waiting time could not be guaranteed. 69 This inability to realise the full potential 
of German forestry resources alongside the demands of emergency reconstruction. 
the continuing reliance on wood for fuel, and the Allied forces' mobilisation of 
French forests testify to the continuing pressures on France's forests. These factors 
combined to make landmine clearance operations all the more urgent. 
Deminage: removing the explosive traces of war 
Deminage, or mine clearance, was a dangerous, difficult, yet essential task. It 
was only through the neutralising of these explosive traces of war that France could 
begin reconstruction. Although initial estimates of a hundred million mines were 
found to be excessive, the task of removing the thirteen million that were eventually 
found was no mean feat. In all, these mines covered one percent of national territory 
(or the equivalent of one administrative departement). 70 Mines also drifted off the 
Mediterranean coast, causing problems for fishermen who were reluctant to abandon 
their fishing zones. 71 Initially, the military had responsibility for clearing strategic 
sites while the Ministry for Agriculture dealt with mines on civilian land. It was not 
until February 1945 that a centralised mine clearing organisation (the Direction de 
deminage) was created under the leadership of resistance veteran Raymond Aubrac. 
According to Daniele Voldman, Aubrac viewed mine clearance as a continuation of 
b9 ADBDR 194 W 20 Conservateur des Eaux et Forets, Aix-en-Provence. to Direction des 
Exploitations en regie en Allemagne. 14 August, 1947. 
70 Voldman. Deminage de France. II. 
71 ADAM 21 W 1 Prefet des Alpes-Maritimes to Maires des Alpes-Maritimes. 'Mines ramassees par 
les chalutiers.' 10 October 1947. 
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the fight against 'Nazi barbarity.' 72 In this sense, deminage was a way to restore 
French sovereignty and control over national territory after the humiliation of 
occupation. 
Mine clearance was also an integral step in the attempt to increase 
agricultural, forestry, and industrial production. As the rationale behind the creation 
of the Direction de deminage recognised, 'the laying of mines and traps rends entire 
cities uninhabitable and vast expanses of land inaccessible and unproductive.' Mine 
clearance would return land and buildings to their 'primitive function.' allowing 
access to agricultural produce and the raw materials, such as timber, that were 
desperately needed for reconstruction. 73 In the words of the Direction de 
deminage's representative in the Alpes-Maritimes; 'it is obvious that reconstruction 
work can only be undertaken ... once land has been cleared of mines: 74 The 
Ministry of Reconstruction and Urbanism took the threat to agricultural interests 
seriously and gathered statistics on the surface area of mined agricultural land. As its 
figures show, it was the Mediterranean region that had the greatest number of 
hectares of mined farm land, even if it was Normandy's agricultural land that was 
proportionally the most mined (see figure four). Overall, the Bouches-du-Rhone held 
the dubious honour of being the most heavily mined departement. 7S 
72 Voldman, Deminage de France, 36-46. 
7J CHAN 307 AP 174 Minstre de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme, 'OrdoMance no. 45-271 du 21 
Fevrier 1945 portant creation d'une direction du deminage: expose des motifs: 22 Febl"Wll). 1945. 
74 ADAM 163 W 32 General Despas to General Gerodias. Regional Deminage Representative for the 
Marseille region. 7 June 1945. oepanemental Representatives possessed extensive powers, and w~e 
charged with establishing maps of mines fields, prioritising the area to be cleared. and controlling 
recruitment into deminage teams. See Voldman, Deminage de France. 63. 
75 Voldman. Deminage en France. 11. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of mined land 
Region Total mined area Mined agric:ultural land 
(in hec:tares) (in hectares) 
North 31,000 15,000 
Nonnandy 42,000 35,000 
Brittany 19,600 10,000 
Atlantic (Ocean) 16,000 10,000 
Mediterranean 118,000 SO, 000 
East (1) 68, ISO IS, 000 
East (2) 60,500 35,000 
Total 355,850 170,000 
Source: CHAN 307 AP 171 Communication from the Minister of Reconstruction 
and Urbanism, 'Situation actuelle du deminage en France,' October 1945. 
Given the scale of the task, and its inherent dangers, the French government 
permitted the use of German prisoners of war in mine clearance operations 
(approximately 52,000 were used overall 76). The legality of this decision was 
dubious, given that the terms of the Geneva convention stipulated that prisoners of 
war were not to be exposed to dangerous work. But France argued that the prisoners 
of war were well-trained (thereby reducing the risk of death or injury). and Aubrac 
justified their inclusion on the grounds that it allowed the Direction du deminage to 
finish its 'task as quickly as possible and tum mined land back to production.' 77 Yet 
there was also a sense that French lives were worth more than German ones. One 
French soldier in the Alpes-Maritimes urged that German prisoners be deployed as 
'it is natural to make [them] carry out the most perilous missions,' as it spares as 
many French lives as possible. 78 This point of view was apparently shared by 
others. The Comite de Liberation of the Alpes-Maritimes requested that 
76 Ibid. 92. 
n CHAN 307 AP 171 Raymond Aubrac. Commissaire de la Republique. Directeur du deminage to 
Representants Departementaux et Regionaux du Deminage, • Emploi it des travaux autres que Ie 
deminage des prisoMiers de guerre affectes au deminage' 25 October 1945. In all, approximately 
52,000 German PoWs were used for mine clearance. In 1949 the Geneva Convention was revised to 
explicitly exclude PoWs from mine clearance. See Voldman. Deminage de France. 89-94. 
78 ADAM 163 W 32 Lt-Colonel Barli. Commandant la Subdivision des Alpes-Maritime to Chef du 
Service oepartementaI du Deminage, 'PersoMel de deminage' 28 April 1945 
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collaborators and veterans of Vichy's hated milice work alongside German prisoners 
of war to clear mines. 79 
The mine clearance operations exposed the continuing importance placed on 
cultivated land after Liberation. The Direction du deminage determined the order in 
which land was to be cleared in an instruction issued on 25 February 1945. which 
placed cultivated land as one of the top priorities, alongside transport. 
communications, industrial installations, and public property 'essential for national 
life.' Next came factories and workshops that supported agricu1ture, food supplies. 
and the 'revival of economic life,' followed by private houses. Pleasure gardens. 
lUXUry industries, unexploited forests, and uncultivated land came last. 80 
However, as deminage officials in Provence emphasised. the distinction 
between cultivated and uncultivated land was 'often difficult' to make. Heathland. 
for example, was frequently classified as uncultivated land even though it could 
equally serve as pasture for animals. 81 It is unclear exactly where exploitable forests 
came on this list of priorities, but it is certain that they were prioritised above 
unproductive forests. Leloup stressed that the Forestry Administration needed to 
clear mines 'as quickly as possible' from forests mined during the German retreat. 
7Q ADAM 163 W 32 Comite de Liberation des Alpes-Maritimes, 'Seance du 29 septembre 1944. 
decision.' 30 September 1944. 
80 ADAM 163 W 32 Raoul Dautry. Ministere de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme. 'Note generale 
aux delegues departementaux,' 18 April 1945. On a local level. this pattern was followe~ in the 
Camargue. where cultivated soil was cleared before 'idle land.' Sous-Prefet de r Arrondissement 
d'Arles to Prefet des Bouches-du-Rh6ne. 'Rapport Mensuel.· 
81 ADV AU 1042 W 655 Reynaud. Ingenieur en Chef Regional du Genie Rural. Ct. Dumont Chef 




Areas where felling contributed directly to the .. immediate necessities of forestrY 
production' were to be cleared first. 82 
Not only high-ranking officials stressed the immediate necessity of mine 
clearance. Local communities demanded that their land be rendered accessible and 
productive. In October 1944, the under-prefect in Toulon noted that 'diverse 
communes had brought to [his] attention the necessity to start clearing mines from 
1 . did ' . G' 83 cu tlvate an, usmg erman prIsoners of war. Likewise, the Camargue town of 
Saintes-Maries-de-Ia-Mer urgently wanted mines removed as they represented 'a 
serious danger for the population and a major obstacle from the point of view of 
food supplies.' 84 Aries town hall also expressed its concern that 'the presence of 
mines literally ruins farmers' and other landowners, who faced the eventual 
~disappearance' of their untended crops and plantations. 85 
At times, agriculture and forestry were placed on a similar level of urgency. 
The town hall of Bollene-Vesubie in the Alpes-Maritimes recognised that mines 
~gravely compromised' both agricultural and forestry interests in the commune. 
Mines, it argued, must be cleared to avoid the "total loss of dairy and forestry 
products.' 86 Mines threatened other local economic interests. In May 1945. the 
Syndicat d'initiative at Napoule Plage (near Cannes) called for beaches to be cleared 
8~ ADHA 1043 W 64 Marcel Leloup, Directeur-General des Eaux et Forets to Conservateurs des 
Eaux et Forets, 24 March 1945. 
8.1 ADV 2 W 59 Sous-Prefet de Toulon to Maires de la zone cotiere de l'arrondissement de Toulon. 21 
October 1944. 
84 ADBDR 150 W 174 Sous-Prefet de I' Arrondissement d' Aries to Prefet des Bouches-du-Rhone, 29 
September 1944. . . . . 
as ADBDR 150 W 174 Mairie d' Aries • Extrait des deliberations de la delegatIOn speciale. seance du 
30 decembre 1944. no. 31 voeu tendant au deminage rapide des terrains de la commune d' Aries.' 
lib ADAM 163 W 32 Mairie de la Bollene-Vesubie. 'Extrait du registre des deli~rations du conseil 
municipal, seance 13 mai 1945: deminage des terrains communaux.' [n.d]. 
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ahead of the anticipated return of tourists during the forthcoming summer. 87 
Removing the explosive remnants of war, for whatever reason, was a politically 
sensitive issue. Dautry advised departemental delegates of the Direction de 
deminage to make sure that local mayors 'calmed the legitimate impatience' of their 
populations who desperately wanted their land to be cleared. 88 
Nature was not a neutral backdrop for deminage, and the ease and speed of 
mine clearance operations were, in part, dictated by topography and vegetation. In 
the Herault departement, mine clearance was relatively easy as the minefields were 
well-signalled and located on land largely free from 'invasive vegetation: 89 
Elsewhere, however, mine clearance was, in words of the Alpes-Maritimes 
departemental representative for mine clearance, 'thankless work (travail ingrat).· 90 
The type of terrain actively contributed to the ease or difficulty of detecting and 
removing mines. As a mine clearance official in the Alpes-Maritimes pointed out. . it 
is obvious that to clear mines in land covered with tall grasses and bushes is 
practically impossible. Unfortunate experiences have taught us the dangers that this 
brings, [a lesson] reinforced by our death and injury lists.' 91 Trees, bushes, and 
grasses sometimes had to be burnt back to enable mine clearance, an activity that 
87 ADAM 163 W 32 Syndicat d'initiative. Napoule Plage. to Prefet des Alpes-Maritimes. 14 \fa) 
1945. 
88 Dautry, 'Note generale aux delegues departementaux.· . 
8Q CHAN 307 AP 167 R. Thevenot, Ingenieur du Genie Rural. 'OCminage: joumee de documentation 
du 26 janvier) 946 a Montpellier. rapport confidential,' [n.d.]. . . . 
Q() ADAM 163 W 32 Representant OCpartemental du OCminage des Alpes-Mantlmes to Prtfet des 
Alpes-Maritimes. 'Situation genera Ie du deminage: [n.d.]. . . 
91 ADAM 163 W 32 Representant oepartemental du Service du Deminage des :\Ipes-Manumes to Ci. 
Lahillonne. Sous-Prefet charge de mission atTaires economiques. 4 September 1944. 
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could be resented by the local community who aw their alu d tr and r p 
going up in smoke. 92 
Mine detection and clearance was perhaps hardest in ar a of 117 qUi and 
other scrubland. Photographs taken by the departemental repre entativ D r 
deminage in the Landes testify to the difficulties in 01 ed in detectino min in th 
undergrowth (figure five). The caption to one photograph exp lained h \ d ' min lIr 
tentatively checked a ' very dense ' undergrowth of bru h, brack n. and hath r. 
which could only be done 'slowl y, by hand. Another capti n tr d h w th 
clearance of one particular minefield wa made' ery di fficult du t th umpy 
relief of the terrain and the luxuriant bush egetation .' 
Figure 5. erman pri oner of war checking the undergr wth for u~d ~tec t ed min _ 
after a mine clearance operation. H 307 P I 4 Jea n Renard, Oepartement de 
Lande,' I n.d·l· 
• Ibid .: and Pr pri ' t ir d t rratn min ' d 1 R ut \ 1 nt n . 
-Mari tim [n o .J. 
P 174 J n R nard. R r ' ntant ' part m nl I du ' min 
part 111 'nt d n e : [n .d.) . 
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In Provence, unexploded ordinance was discovered in the Beaume Soumiere vaIlev 
. , 
in November 1953, an area covered in maquis, where the 'prickly' and "inextricable' 
vegetation had made it 'materially impossible to uncover' the munitions. The maquis 
was burnt away to allow for the explosives' destruction, but even after this measure 
munitions continued to crop up (an occurrence which was partly blamed on the 
'negligence' of the deminage company). 94 As this case shows. according to terrain 
and vegetation, it was difficult to confirm that a mine removal operation had been 
successful. On certain sites, where it was 'impossible to certify that a terrain has 
been completely cleared,' mines could lie hidden in a forest or buried in the soil and 
grenades popped up 'in the most unexpected places.' 95 
Deminage operations in forests were particularly hard to verify. Before 
timber felling took place, herds of sheep were sometimes driven through forests to 
detect any unexploded mines that had remained undiscovered after a mine clearance 
operation. As a town hall official in Breil-sur-Roya explained to the Prefect of the 
Alpes-Maritimes, sheep 'can be very useful for us by exploding those individual 
mines which escaped the checks of the demineurs.· 96 Foresters in the Haute-Alpes 
realised that farmers would be reluctant to donate their sheep for such a perilous 
mission, although one suggested that this was because the animals would become 
94 ADBDR 148 W 411 Colonel Gerome to Secretaire d'Etat a la guerre, 'Desobusage du terrain de 
demolition du vallon de Beaume Souniere,' 14 November 1952; ADBDR 148 W 411 Sous-Prefet 
d'Aix-en-Provence to Prefet des Bouches-du-Rhone, 'Afs des propositions de I'autorite militaire de 
nettoyer Ie vall on de Beaume Sourniere des engins explosifs s'y trouvanl,' 18 February 1953; 
ADBDR 148 W 411 Capitaine de Fregate Michel, Commandant Ie Batallion de Marins-Pompiers de 
Marseille. Inspecteur departemental des Services d'incendie. 'Incineration de l'ex-depOt de munitions 
de Beaume Soumiere,' 9 October 1954; and ADBDR 148 W 411 Sous-Prefet d' Aix-en-Provence to 
Prefet des Bouches-du-Rhone, 'Incineration de rex-depOt de munitions de Beaume Soumiere: 10 
November 1954. 
95 ADAM 163 W 32 Representant Departemental du Deminage des Alpes-Maritimes to Prefect of the 
Alpes-Maritimes. 'Situation generale du deminage.· 
9b ADAM 163 W 32 M. Botton. President de la Delegation Speciale de Breil-sur-Roya to Prefet des 
Alpes-Maritimes. 16 July 1945. 
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tired, thereby overlooking the more obvious and lethal danger posed by unexploded 
• 97 1 ·dedh . mmes. t may m e ave been difficult to secure "sacrificial Iambs" in sufficient 
numbers. In at least one case a prisoner of war detachment was dispatched instead of 
a flock of sheep, suggesting that they were viewed as being more dispensable than 
the animals. 98 
Yet despite these measures, it was difficult to guarantee that forests had been 
successfully cleared. In the late 1940s and early 1950s foresters and other officials 
reported that the continued existence of mines and other explosives strewn through 
their forests represented an obvious danger for public safety. 99 In the state forest of 
Villers-Cotterets (in the Picardie region) where the German forces had maintained 
an explosives depot, a forester noted that explosives hidden under the fallen leaves 
of successive autumns proved difficult to locate. He feared that in one or two years' 
time the explosives would be undetectable, making the forest "extremely dangerous 
for walkers and workers.' 100 Elsewhere, a forestry conservator reported a fatal 
accident near La Rochelle, and, even in the 1960s, explosives continued to be 
uncovered in certain forests. 101 
91 ADHA 1043 W 64 Tinchant. lnspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Barcelonnette. 'Operations 
complementaires de deminage.· 19 October 1945. 
911 ADHA 1043 W 64 Tinchant, Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets. Barcelonnette. 'Operations 
complementaires de deminage.' 15 May 1945. 
QQ See. for example, ADV 1790 W 47 Brigadier des Eaux et Forets to Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets. 
Draguignan. 13 November 1945; ADV 1790 W 47 Directeur-General des Eaux et Forets to 
Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Nice, "oeminage,' 31 October 1945: and ADV 1790 W 47 Prefet du 
Var to Maires du Var, Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Nice. Ingenieur en Chef des Ponts et 
Chaussees. Draguignan. Commandant de Gendarmerie. Draguignan. 30 August 1949. 
100 C'ACAN 19771615177 Inspecteur-Principal des Eaux et Forets. Villers-Cotten!ts. to C'onser\-'ateur 
des Eaux et Forets. Compiegne. 28 February 1949. 
101 C'ACAN 19771615177 Vinconneau, Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Niort. 'Rapport: deminage 
de la for~t dominale de la Courbe (ex-poche de Royon): 4 February 1949: ADV 1790 W ~7 
Conscrvateur des Eaux et Forets. "Note de service: explosives et engins de guerre.· 7 FebruaT) 196::!. 
Explosives from World War One continue to crop up and cause problems. See Jon Henley. ·\tine 
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In addition, forests were damaged during mine clearance operations as some 
became sites at which to destroy live explosives found elsewhere. 102 The Forestry 
Conservator in Rouen lamented that those plantations 'that were still intact at the 
end of the war are today riddled with shrapnel from such explosions.' The situation 
was particularly frustrating for the conservator as 'uncultivated land' elsewhere in 
the region could have been used for the explosions. 103 
On the. whole, however, removing mines and other explosives from French 
soil was a largely successful operation. Proportionally, most minefields were cleared 
in 1945, suggesting that placing the deminage operation under centralised state 
control was an astute move. 104 Alongside the mine clearance operations, other 
defensive installations were removed, including barbed wire, poles. sea defences. 
and concrete pyramids blocking river mouths. 1.05 In all, 653.978 coastal defences 
had been removed by 1949, as well as the destruction of 17,459.191 diverse 
projectiles, and the unearthing of 56,572 bombs. 106 Landing strips and aerodromes 
were also demilitarised during this time and returned to agricultural land. 107 Yet 
clearance teams move in after first world war grenades found in French park, The Guardian, 27 July 
2005, 15. 
102 See. for instance, ADBDR 148 W 411 Maire du Rove to Prefet des Bouches-du-Rhone. 12 July 
1947; ADBDR 148 W 411 Capitaine de Fregate Brne, Commandant Ie batallion de marins-pompiers 
de Marseille, Inspecteur departemental des Services d'incendie to Prefet des Bouches-du-Rhone. 
'Explosifs au quartier St-Tronc a Marseille: 5 June 1953. 
10:\ CACAN 19771615177 Lesage, Conservateur des Eaux et Forets, Rouen, • Rappon: destruction des 
engins de guerre en forc~ts dominales,' 29 October 1948. 
104 Voldman. Deminage de France, 129. 
105 ADAM 163 W 32 Representant r>epartementa1 du Deminage des Alpes-Maritimes to Prefect of 
the A I pes-Maritimes, 'Compte-rendu des operations de deminage: 14 November 194~;. and 
Representant Departemental du Deminage des Alpes-Maritimes to Prefect of the Alpes-Mantlmes. 
'Situation generate du deminage.' 
lOb Voldman. Deminage de France, 129. 
107 CHAN FlO 7101 Ingenieur en chef du Genie Rural to Prefet des Bouches-du-Rhone, 'OCmolition 
de pistes d'aviation dans la region de Salon: 18 March 1946; CHAN FI~7101 ~~ini.s~~ des ~ravaux 
Publics et des Transports to Ministre de r Agriculture. 'Demande de levee des requls!tlons ~al.tes sur 
les terrains de la commune de Lancon (Bouches-du-Rhone): 6 June 1946: R. DuboiS. lngemeur en 
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there was a human cost to pay; between 1944 and 1950. approximately 471 French 
demineurs and 738 prisoners of war lost their lives, while a further 738 French 
deminuers and 2,988 prisoners of war were injured. 108 
The mines, other military installations, and combat-related environmental 
modifications had covered vast swathes of the French countryside. 109 Removing 
these physical and explosive traces of warfare allowed productivity to return 
incrementally to fields and forests, an essential step towards meeting the high 
demand for natural resources in the years following Liberation and preparing land 
for reconstruction. 
Planning for reconstruction 
Assessing war damage in order to plan for reconstruction began before 1944. 
During the Occupation, both the Vichy regime and resistance movements had begun 
to calculate war-related damage to agricultural land, forests, and the built 
environment. In 1941, Vichy created the Service national des statistiques to assess 
war damage, while Vergeot and Aube prepared a clandestine report on the evolution 
chef du Genie Rural to Houdet. Inspecteur-General des Eaux et du Genie Rural. 'Construction des 
fermes sinisuees de la commune de Bemes. 15 October 1949. 
108 Voldman, Deminage de France, 129. 
109 Military installations and aerodromes, as well as floods provoked for defensive purposes (such as 
the Camargue's submersion) had rendered unusable a further 304,114 hectares of land. Vergeot and 
Aube. Rapport sur Ie prob/eme agricole /ranrrais. 50. In addition. there lay seventy million cu~ic 
metres of rubble to clear and eighty million cubic metres of trenches and bomb craters to fill an. 
Commission consultative des dommages et des reparations, Dommages subis par la France ell'union 
jran"aise du/ai/ de 10 guerre el de I'occupation ennemie (/939-1945) (Imprirnerie Nationale. 1951). 
10 vols. Vol. l.. xxii. 
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of the French countryside for the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 110 Yet after 
Liberation, state officials invested more time and effort in assessing the material 
impacts of war, to prepare the ground for reconstruction and seek reparations from 
Germany. On 21 October 1944 the Commission du cout de I' occupation was created 
to calculate the reparations that Germany owned France, a body which later evolved 
into the Commission consultative des dommages et des reparations (CCDR), which 
was attached to the President's office. 111 The CCDR's findings presented a grim 
picture of a war-tom landscape. France's agricultural sector had experienced 
damages to harvests, property, and farmland, as well as suffering Gennan and Italian 
requisitions and more general war-related dilapidation (see chapter two). 
Yet despite difficulties in accurately assessing war damage to the 
countryside, the level of destruction resulted in the government formulating plans to 
reconstruct the environment. After 1945 the agricultural sector was transformed by 
increased specialisation, mechanisation, greater reliance on pesticides and fertilizers, 
and the breaking up of the traditional field system. As a result, agricultural 
production and yields rocketed, even though the number of agricultural workers 
dropped sharply. 112 Agricultural modernisation formed part of the state-led 
reconstruction and productivity drive, which economist Jean Fourastie has 
memorably termed ~ les trente glor;euses,' the thirty years of unprecedented growth 
and modernisation from 1946 to 1975. during which living standards and levels of 
110 Voldman. Reconstruction des villes fran~aises. 26-7; and Vergeot and Aube. Rapport sur Ie 
~robleme agricole fran~ais: donnees et solutions. 
II Voldman. Reconstruction des villes fran~aises. 26-7. 
112 See Jean Fourastie. Les trente glorieuses ou la revolUlion invisible de 1946 a 19-5 (Paris: Fayard. 
1979). 208; Pitte. Histoire du pa)'sage fran~ais. 340-4; Kedward. La Vie ~n bleu. 350-1; ~ de 
Planhol and Claval. Historical Geography of France. 444-9. For cultural anxiety over the passmg of 
the old agricultural way of life see Bess. Lighl-Green Society. 38-53. 
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. I c. 113 
matena comlort rose enormously. Less documented, however. are the plans 
advanced for the modernisation of the forest. 
In an era of state-led reconstruction devised along productivist and 
interventionist lines, the upper echelons of the Forestry Administration proposed that 
the state tighten its grip over private forests to ensure their rational exploitation. This 
interventionist vision was most forcefully elaborated upon in the pages of the Leloup 
report, which was approved by the Minister for Agriculture on 18 May 1945. Marcel 
Leloup, socialist Conseiller d'Etat and Director General of the Forestry 
Administration, proposed (for the first time in French forestry history) that demand 
for forestry production should dictate supply. In order to meet these demands, the 
report recommended that two million hectares of uncultivated land be reforested. 
private forests reorganised into larger units, and private forest owners be made to 
exploit their forests in accordance with the 'general interest.' The report also 
prescribed that the state should buy private forests to consolidate existing state ones, 
thereby ensuring greater production in the long term, as well as imposing forestry 
management plans on the largest private forests to prevent irresponsible felling. The 
state, in tum, would pay greater attention to the needs of the market in its own 
forestry policies. 114 However, Leloup's report was considered too dirigiste by 
pressure groups favouring a more liberal forestry market. In the end, they secured 
his replacement by the less radical Bernand Dufay in the summer of 1945. 115 
Yet even after Leloup's dismissal. the Forestry Administration continued to 
experience critici sm from private foresters who opposed the state' s increased control 
III Fourastie. Les trente glorieuses. 
114 Les Eaux et Forels du J 2e au 20e siecle. 632-4. 
lIS Ibid. 632. 
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over the forest. Opposing the Corporation of Forestry Exploiters and Sa\\vers 
passing under the control of the state in 1947, Jules Taquet in Le Bois .\'ational 
protested vehemently that the laws introduced by the German occupier through its 
Vichy intermediary continued to constrain private foresters. According to Taquet. 
Germany had left behind its forestry structure in France' like a fly leaves maggots in 
[a piece of] fruit.' Laws introduced during the Occupation were still in force and he 
demanded that France's forests be 'denazified.' 116 The tide. however. had turned 
against supporters of a laissez-faire forestry sector as war and occupation had 
seemingly persuaded state foresters and administrators of the need for a centrally 
controlled forestry sector. As such, plans to reconstruct the forest in the immediate 
postwar period echoed Leloup's proposals for wider reconstruction schemes which 
were to be led by the state and centrally planned. Yet they also built on forestry 
legislation introduced by Vichy (see chapter three). 
After Liberation, foresters used the continuing war against Germany. 
alongside civilian pressures, as justifications for increasing state intervention. In 
February 1945, at a conference organised to discuss the Marseille region's economy. 
the Regional Forestry Conservator stressed that wood had become a 'key material 
necessary to meet the demands of [the] war [effort], coalmines. and railways,' as 
well as being essential for reconstruction, 'domestic and industrial heating, paper 
fabrication, tanning leather, [and] forest fuels: According to the conservator, this list 
(which echoed those forwarded by foresters during the Occupation). and the fact that 
the forestry industry boasted 65,000 employers and 200,000 employees. led to the 
conclusion that the state should 'take control' of what was 'one of the largest sectors 
116 Jules Taquet, 'Survivance du nazisme: Le Bois National. 8th Year, No.6. 25 February 19~7. 82. 
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of the country's economy.' The Forestry Administration, he argued, was already 
expert in forestry production and should therefore oversee 'this mission.' 117 In the 
discussion that followed, Pierre Mendes France, then Minster for the National 
Economy, agreed that any reorganisation of the forestry sector should aim to . meet 
immediate needs' and 're-establish one of national resources [that] suffered much 
during the war.' 118 
Forest degradation during the war (see chapter three). provided foresters and 
other officials with the opportunity to address long-standing issues, such as rural 
depopulation and reforestation. In a speech delivered in October 1945, Boutiere. 
Forestry Inspector in Draguignan, addressed the problem of the 'Sylvo-Culturo-
Pastoral balance' in the Mediterranean region, based on recent experiences in the 
Var deparlemenl which had been 'so affected by recent destructive events: 
Although recognising that nature, given time, could sometimes "repair" itself. 
Boutiere argued that in those places where forests had disappeared and local 
popUlations had abandoned mountain life for the "rich valleys' below 'only the state 
can take charge of this ruined land.' 119 
France, according to Boutiere, needed to • adopt the same system as the 
United States: a vast plan of restoration financed and controlled by the state.' This 
"New Deal" for France, however, should not be overly 'centralised and Caesar-like.' 
Instead, it should be decentralised and adapted to local conditions as . each portion of 
117 C'onservateur regional des Eaux-et-Forets, 'Nouvelle organisation de la production forestiere: in 
Conference economique regionale du Jfevrier 1945 (Marseille: Imprimerie Nouvelle. 1945),35. 
118 Quoted in ibid. 35. 
119 ADAM 521 W 30 Boutiere . Ape~u des conditions pratiques de realisation d'un equilbre Sylvo-
Culturo-Pastoral des pays mediterraneens (Considerations sur les possibilities actuelles et examen 
critique des moyens a mettre en oeuvre): causerie faite a I' Association des Ingenieurs Agronomes. 
Groupe de Marseille, t 1 October 1945, 4. 
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Provencal soil, each terrain, each micro-climate requires a different solution.' In the 
Var alone, some sites required the passage of fire, others needed reforestation or 
agricultural modernisation, whereas mountain pastures needed development and 
protection. Yet despite Boutiere's stress on decentralisation, he believed that only 
the state, and men who had devoted their careers to a particular region, could 
implement such a project over the long term, thereby bringing about a Roosevelt-
esque 'man-made biological revival' in France. 120 
Like Boutiere, Arthur Dugelay, now promoted to Forestry Conservator in 
Nice, was deeply concerned about the level of deforestation in Provence, which had 
been aggravated by recent economic and military conditions. According to Dugelay. 
the state of Provence's forest was a painful sight: those who had seen "the distressing 
spectacle of vast deforested expanses desolating the landscape under the glaring sun. 
could not deny the timeliness of a reforestation policy.' 121 In reaction to Provence's 
'critical forest situation' in 1946 (a result of the ravages of war and fire), Dugelay 
prepared a law on the restoration of the region's forests and the development of its 
agriculture and pastures, which envisaged that state investment would fund all 
restoration costs in state forests and contribute between ten to thirty-five percent of 
costs in private forests. According to Dugelay, the situation was desperate and 
required urgent action; in 'two or three years it will be too late because any more 
large fires could reduce the Var to rocky landscape.' 122 
Dugelay painted a bleak picture of a forestless Provence: 
120 Ibid. 4-5. 
121 ADAM 521 W 30 Arthur Dugelay. Conservator des Eaux et Forets. Nice. 'Le reboisement dans Ie 
departement des Alpes-Maritimes.' 1946. 1-2. " 
In ADAM 521 W 30 Arthur Dugelay, Conservator des Eaux et Forets. ~Ice. to Prefet des Alpes-
Maritimes. 10 August 1946. 1-4. 
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The forest reduced to scrubland, without roads or paths, is generally the end of fanning and a 
sign of inhabitants deserting farms and hamlets. Bare soil means irregular water supplies. the 
installation of water run-offs, the stripping (decage) of land, [and] the end of crops. A 
coastal region reduced to bare rocks equals the abandonment of tourism, the installation of a 
semi-desert climate, [and] a whole region without shade, lacking shelter from the mistral and 
any form of agreeable habitat, just as we have seen in the hills around Marseille and in the 
North A~ican landscape. 123 
In contrast, the benefits of protecting and reforesting Provence's forests were 
enormous. They included new forest routes opened up to tourists, new agricultural 
exploitations, improvements to climatic conditions, less rural depopulation. greater 
soil protection, and the "general embellishment of a region universally known for its 
azure coast, of which one of the most appreciable charms is undoubtedly the Maures 
and Esterel pine forests.' 124 
Attached to Dugelay's report was an earlier rationale for a proposed 1945 
government plan, which stressed the importance of Provence's forests. Again 
evoking the emergence of desert-like Provence in the near future, the rationale 
identified the necessary role of the state in reforesting and restoring existing forests, 
alongside developing agriculture and pastureland. The result would be the 
"maintenance of rural populations and the reconstruction of the war- and fire-
dev~stated coastal region.' 125 As Boutiere's and Dugelay's reports suggest. foresters 
123 Ibid. 4. 
124 Ibid. 4. 
l~ ADAM 521 W 30 "Mise en forme d'un projet d'ordonnance relative Ii la reconstitution des forcts 
proven~es (Bouches du Rhone. Var. Alpes-Maritimes. Vaucluse). devastees par les incendies. et des 
cultures en terrasse abandonees: expose des motifs.' 1945. 
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portrayed reforestation as an essential factor underlying the region's economic. 
social, and ecological reconstruction and long tenn well-being. 
Plans were also formulated for the modernisation of individual forests that 
had suffered war damage. A scheme for a war-damaged communal forest in the 
Maures massif did not suggest restoring the forest to its pre-war state as this would 
have re-created a forest with 'the same inconveniences' as before. In other words. an 
unprofitable, impenetrable, and 'messy' (sale) forest prone to fire. Instead. the plan 
proposed to create a modem forest of cork-oaks interspersed with pines and 
featuring fire-breaks and forest roads. The forest was to be planted rationally. 
meaning that reforestation would not be attempted in arid areas where . even the 
maquis struggles to grow.' 126 
War damage also presented the opportunity to modernise mountain 
landscapes. One report suggested that the state must provide comprehensive aid to 
reconstruct mountainous regions even where ~working the land is difficult' and 
unprofitable, as the most pressing concern was to ~maintain a strong race [of 
mountain people] who have provided the most vigorous elements of the French 
nation.' Modernisation of 'rural habitats' and the development of villages was 
needed, the report continued, to counteract rural depopulation, a trend which 
threatened to 'deprive the [mountains] of [their] young people who talk of getting 
jobs or leaving for the valleys.' 127 
126 ADV 1790 W 47 [n.a.] Foret communale de Montacroux - 3823 AG proj.et de reconstitu~ion 
definitif. expose des motifs.' [n.d.]. For more on the difficulties of restoring past ecologl~1 
conditions. see Marcus Hall, Earth Repair: A TromaJ/antic History of £m';ronmenlal RestoratIOn 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005),2-3. 
127 CHAN F 1°7103 [n.a.] 'Hautes-Alpes,' [n.d.]. 
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A 1945 report presented by agronomic engineer Chauvet, also stressed the 
dangers posed by rural depopulation in high Alpine villages; . from the social point 
of view, it decimates a stable, reasoned, thoughtful rural population to swell the 
number of disappointed and discontented drifters (deracines) in the cities.' 
Furthermore, the abandonment of agriculture 'diminishes [our] national heritage.' 
The Alps were of particular concern as 'from the national point of view. the 
depopulation of a frontier region is always dangerous.' 128 Presumably. Chauvet 
believed that during a period when France was re-asserting its international borders. 
a depopulated mountain region would make its territorial claims harder to justify. 
Chauvet was not the only one concerned about rural depopulation on the 
Franco-Italian border. The chief engineer of Genie Rural was anxious that border 
communes be maintained, including Risto las, which was located next to Italian 
valleys that exerted a 'very strong demographic pressure.' As a consequence, the 
reconstruction of Ristolas brought 'into question France's prestige, which must be 
kept high at the very moment that [the country is] negotiating the rectification of the 
Alpine frontier.' 129 A 1945 Genie Rural report on the Vercors also aimed to address 
rural depopulation in mountain areas, arguing that 'in the general economy of France 
the Vercors represents, quantitively. a small part. But it is necessary to maintain 
(fIXer) these mountain populations whose the qualities are indispensables to the 
country.' If need be, a "reasonable and carefully considered' immigration policy 
I~R CHAN F 10 7103 Chauvet. 'Notes sur la reconstruction du Queyras et des Hautes vallees aJpestres 
en general.' 5 November 1945, 1-3. . . , 
l;!q CHAN F 10 7103 Ingenieur en Chef du Genie Rural and Directeur des Services ~~)es. Ra~port 
a M. )'lnspecteur General du Genie Rural. Delegue General a la ReconstltutJOn Agncole. 
Reconstruction et equipement de la commune de Ristolas.· 21 t\·1ay 1946. 
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should be considered to 'replace disappearing or already extinct families: 130 
Reconstruction of mountain areas, which often involved some form of reforestation. 
was a way for France to maintain its territorial integrity. In such away. the 
reconstruction of a small mountain village took on national importance. 
Although Chauvet's report recognised that the exode rural had long term 
roots, it highlighted that wartime evacuations and destructions of Alpine villages 
could represent the coup de grace for certain communities. Reconstruction would 
now not be enough; 'it is necessary to resuscitate' these communities. Luckily, the 
postwar situation offered an unprecedented opportunity to bring the mountains back 
to life and Chauvet urged for the implementation of a regional plan. 131 According to 
Chauvet, such a plan could take two forms; France could either abandon permanent 
settlement in the high valleys, thereby relying solely on seasonal migrants to work 
the land in the summer, or it could develop the economy and raise standards of 
living in those areas. Unsurprisingly, Chauvet favoured the latter option. suggesting 
that agriculture, hydroelectricity, and small industry could provide the foundations 
of the mountain economy. Tourism also presented excellent opportunities as the 
Southern Alps enjoyed the benefits ofa Mediterranean climate Csun, clear skies') as 
wel1 as the snow and freshness provided by altitude. Ifplanners were able to develop 
tourism with 'intelligence and taste' there would be 'enormous possibilities; even if 
~some keen mountaineers would regard with terror this prostitution of natural 
beauties to hordes of tourists.' For Chauvet, it was necessary to accept such 
'sacrifices' whilst managing the "inevitable' development of the mountain 
110 CHAN F 10 7103 Casays, Chef-Adjoint du Cabinet. M. Thevenot. Ing~ni~ur ~u. Genie Rural. 
'Compte-rendu de la Mission effectuee dans Ie Vercors: 8 June 19~5: em~~ls m ongmal. 
III Chauvet. 'Notes sur la reconstruction du Queyras: 1-3. EmphasiS m ongmal. 
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landscape. For not only would tourism raise living standards, through the provision 
of running water and electricity; it would create new cultural and entertainment 
possibilities for local communities, thereby resurrecting mountain 'folklore: 132 
The Vercors was one of France's mountainous areas which experienced the 
most material damage during the war (see chapter five) and within this 
geographically defined area modernisation plans were also mooted. As elsewhere. 
the emphasis was strongly on rationalisation and economic development. One report 
on the massif s 'valorisation' (mise en valeur) recognised that some farms were too 
isolated to be maintained and the land should be "methodically integrated' into the 
forest. Remaining farms should be modernised through electrification. The forest too 
needed development; experiments in acclimatising new tree species should be 
conducted and further forestry cables established to facilitate exploitation. 133 It 
seems that the government took the need for modernisation seriously~ in 1945 the 
Minister for Agriculture promised that the development of agriculture and forests 
would be "at the heart of the [Vercors'] reconstruction.' According to the Minister, it 
was not just a question of recreating pre-existing fields and forests, but orientating 
d · h . 134 them towards the future through new pro uctlon tec mques. . 
There was at least one dissenting voice. however, and it came from Gustave 
Boissiere, a naturalist and speleologist who had helped Allied agents in the Vercors 
during the war and who was now president of the Comite d'aide et de reconstruction 
du Vercors. Although acknowledging that reconstruction entailed some 
m Ibid. 6-10. 
13) CHAN F 10 7103 [n.a.] "Mise en valeur du Vercors: [n.d.]. " .. 
1304 CHAN F 10 7103 Ministre d' Agriculture to Gustave Boissiere. President du Comlte d BIde et de 
reconstruction du Vercors, 13 November 1945. 
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modernisation, Boissiere worried that 'we risk, under the influence of pure 
technicians, to tilt towards hyper-organisation to the detriment of individualism. 
moderation, and diversity.' For Boissiere, such modernisation placed too much 
confidence in mass production, organisation, and quantity. 135 
According to Boissiere, the reconstruction of the Vercors did need a 'modern 
development plan' (amenagement moderne), but one which 'places the cultivator in 
full confidence with nature and leads him to consider his farm, his village. his 
commune and the entire region which surrounds him as an indivisible whole: 136 It 
was not that Boissiere was against modernisation per se. Rather. he was urged that it 
be introduced on a human scale. 
On the whole, however, the measures prescribed for the forests and 
mountains implied their restoration and modernisation through rationally planned 
measures recommended by experts. Although the aims of these schemes were 
similar to those of Petainiste "back-to-the-Iandism," most notably preventing the 
exode ruraie, they placed greater faith in technocratic and managerial expertise. 137 
In a sense, they combined Petainiste ruralism with the more technocratic strand of 
administration that emerged within the Vichy regime. although the fundamental 
difference was that the plans were to restore the landscape of a forward-looking 
republic rather than re-create the rural golden age that Vichy traditionalists dreamt 
of. These plans were also forerunners to the Commissariat General du Plan' s larger-
m CHAN F 10 7103 Gustave Boissiere. President du Comite d'aide et de reconstruction du Vercors. 
to Raoul Dautry, Ministre de Reconstruction, 4 January 1946. 
136 ADD 943 W 13 Gustave Boissiere. President du Comite d'aide et de reconstruction du \'ercors to 
Directeur du Cabinet du Commissaire de la Republique. Prefecture de Lyon, 17 November 1945. 4-5, 
J)7 For more on the continuing concerns about rural depopulation during and after the war. see Sara 
B. Pritchard '''Paris et Ie desert fran~is": Urban and Rural Environments in Post-World War II 




scale projects to restore regional balance (principally between Paris and the 
provinces) guided by the principle of 'amenagemenl du le"iIOire' or ''territorial 
h k . ,,138 I '11 . ouse eepmg. WI now examme how postwar reforestation became one of the 
ways to restore balance and prosperity to the French countryside. 
The Fonds Forestier National 
Despite Leloup's dismissal following his controversial report (see above). 
many of his proposals were eventually implemented. 139 Most immediately. his 
vision of a vast reforestation of France looked set to be realised as the Assemblee 
Nationale voted in the Fonds Forestier National (FFN) on 30 September 1946. The 
FFN addressed many of the issues raised in the plans put forward by Provence's 
foresters. In particular it prescribed the reforestation and the modernisation of 
existing forests. And like other forms of national reconstruction. the FFN was 
planned and implemented by the central state (one article in Rivieres e/ Forels 
explicitly linked the reforestation programme with the plan Monnet 14'). Developed 
by forestry officials and managed by the agricultural ministry through a Comite de 
controle de fonds (Finance Control Committee), the FFN built on increasing state 
control of the forest that had been strengthened through Vichy legislation. It also had 
138 Bess, Light-Green Society, 49-52. 
139 For instance, Charles de Gaulle launched a policy of state acquisition of private forests in the 
1960s and a 1985 forestry law reorganised private forests. See Les Eau:c et Forils du 12e au 20e 
siecle, 633. 
140 J. Melinotte, 'Le plan Monnet ... et la foret,' Rivieres et fortIS: re., ... ue de de.fense du paI~m.o;ne 
nature I /ranfais 1 (April 1947) I ~-15. For more on Monnet, 'the architect of post-war plannmg see 
Kedward. La Vie en Bleu, 353. 
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a recent precedent in Vichy's largely failed reforestation campaIgn. such as the 
reforestation la\\ of21 January 1942 (see chapter two). 
The reforestation of France was part and parcel of the countf)' S 
reconstruction project. Reconstruction meant more than repairing war damage and 
increasing growth and standards of living. It \\ as also supposed to ensure F ranee' s 
independence and grandeur. This echoed other developments in French societ~. 
such as new attitudes towards technology which responded to the need for enhanced 
national sovereignty. Although recognising the difficulties of establishing exact 
causal links between the Second World War and long-term structural changes. 
Michael Bess identifies the traumatic defeat of 19.+0 as a 'wake-up call" for the 
French, paving the way for the acceptance of a form of 'technological Daf\\inism' 
among French politicians and the general population (which was related to ideas of 
social Darwinism): 
Not only statesmen of the Left and Right, but also broad segments of the population, entered 
after 1944 into a tacit but steely-hard agreement: we will never let another "1940" happen to 
us again; we will make ourseh es so technologically strong and so economical I) \ igorou~ 
that we ne\er find ourselves at any other nation' s mercy again. Here lay the essence of 
technological Darwinism. Rapid and sustained economic growth. in the eyes of many French 
citizens. became not just a desirable goal but a matter of maintaining national independence; 
technolog) became not just a \ehicle for enhancing the quality of life. but a pivotal f~h;t,)r in 
prmiding basic economic and militaf) security. I ~ 1 
l~l Bes~. Li~hr-(i""l'l/ Sodery. ~(). 
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The war had starkly exposed the deficiencies of France's political. social, and 
economic structures, especially in comparison with the technological prowess of the 
United States, which had recently dropped two atomic bombs on Japanese cities. 
The consensus in France was that the country must modernise to survive. 
'Technological Darwinism' arguably motivated France's development of nuclear 
power and weapons in the post war period. As Gabrielle Hecht contends, Ie 
nuc/eaire enabled France to claw back a sense of grandeur in the face of the 
shambolic state of French infrastructure and feelings of national humiliation 
generated by the war. 142 
France's bid to use technological projects to enhance independence and 
restore its grandeur impacted on ideas about nature and the landscape itself. As Sara 
Pritchard highlights, postwar development of the Rhone river and the challenges to 
be surmounted during its transformation were represented as ways of rebuilding 
national pride and identity; 'amid reconstruction, the portrayal of river development 
as a battle - and one that France would undoubtedly win - might assuage and 
redeem a nation haunted by memories of defeat. Winning the war on the banks of 
the Rhone could be a crucial first step in regaining domestic and international 
political stature.' 143 Controlling, improving, and overcoming nature were ways to 
reclaim and reinforce the nation's grandeur and independence. 
142 Hecht, The Radiance of France. 1-3. Bess also suggests that nuclear weapons were supposed to 
guarantee France' s independence and territorial integrity. Under de Gaulle' s leadership during the 
Cold War 'both military sovereignty and an independent foreign policy ... hinged on the special status 
that nuclear arms conferred; henceforth the French territory would become a sanctuary. a haven that 
no invader could violate without facing incineration.' Bess. Light-Green Society. 30. 
143 Pritchard. 'Reconstructing the Rhone,' 766. 
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Similarly, postwar reforestation was a way of "improving on nature" or 
developing the French landscape, as well as reinforcing the nation's strength. In the 
postwar era, a consensus emerged among administrators and state foresters that 
France needed to rejuvenate its forests to maintain national sovereignty and ensure 
the ecological balance of the nation. This was influenced by numerous factors that 
are worth recapping. War and occupation had depleted forestry resources as well as 
exposing France's alarming reliance on timber imports to sustain its industries. 
Moreover, substantial quantities of wood were needed for reconstruction. Concerns 
also existed that the general dilapidation and possible disappearance of forested 
areas would exacerbate rural depopulation, as well as increase the risk of erosion and 
floods along with their social and economic repercussions. The FFN addressed these 
recent and longstanding concerns. 
But before the FFN's introduction, foresters had linked reforestation to 
national regeneration (as had been the case during the Occupation). In 1945. Dufay 
argued that reforestation was needed to 'repair' the "devastations' of war and fill in 
the 'numerous holes' in forest cover that had been created by combat and 
overexploitation. At stake was more than the revival of forests, important as that 
was. Instead, Dufay argued that 'for the reconstitution of our national economy. 
reforestation is vital; it's a collective endeavour with which every French person 
should collaborate.' 144 For foresters, the FFN provided a vital means to restore 
France's forests and enhance their productivity, thereby restoring the country's sense 
of pride and reducing its dependence on imports. In such away. the FFN can be seen 




as an attempt to guarantee France's self-sufficiency and sovereignty through a policy 
of 'autarky.' 145 The idea that reforestation was a national endeavour was distilled 
into and advanced by the FFN's slogan; 'Reforestation is a national duty' (Reboiser 
est un devoir national). 146 
Given their training and professional background, it is hardly unexpected that 
forestry officials claimed reforestation to be of immense national importance. Jean 
Messines, the Forestry Administration's Inspector General, argued that "in the 
troubling period in which we live, after the disastrous war and at a time of intense 
fermentation of political and social ideas [alongside] dominant economic 
preoccupations, it is not surprising to see the question of reforestation ... rise up the 
agenda.' 147 Unfortunately, there is little available evidence to assess the level of 
interest in reforestation among the general population. It is entirely possible that 
many French people were indifferent to reforestation as they struggled to rebuild 
their lives after the war. In 1949 Dufay himself admitted that "too many French 
people are unaware... of the capital importance of the problem of our forestry 
resources.,148 But it seems that the country's president, Charles de Gaulle. 
recognised the forest's role in national life when he stated that the 'existence of 
empty expanses' (etendues desertiques) in the fire-ravaged Landes forest in the 
South West was 'undignified ofa great country like France,' 149 It seems that for de 
145 ADAM 521 W 78 Jean de Vaissiere, 'Le reboisement de la France dans Ie cadre du plan de 
restauration agricole,' (Toulouse: Imprimerie regional, [n.d.]), 6. 
146 ADAM 521 W 78 'Reboiser est un devoir national' undated publicity brochure. 
147 Jean Messines, 'Etude generale: actualite du Reboisement,' Revue des Eaux el FOrels. 84/ 8-9 
(August-September 1945), 435. 
148 Bernard Dufay. "Avant-propos,' Rivieres el FOreIS, Numero Special consacre aux Eaux el Fort!1S 
et au lourisme cynegelique el halieatique. Nos. 10-12 (January-March 1949).3. 
149 'Ordannance no.45-852 du 28 avril 1945 relative a 18 mise en valeur de la region des landes de 
Gascogne,' in Revue des Eaux et Forels. 83n (July 1945).430. 
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Gaulle, the existence of barren, deserted land undennined his vision of French 
grandeur. Rebuilding forests was deemed to be in the national interest. and on 19 
October 1945 the government took on the responsibility to contribute eighty percent 
towards the costs of restoring forests that had been 'partially or totally destroyed by 
acts of war.' ]50 
Just as it had done in Vichy France, the Forestry Administration portrayed 
itself as an embattled agency tirelessly working against the odds to reforest France 
and thus contribute to the nation's revival. Dufay outlined the huge task ahead to 
readers of Rivieres et Forets; in France 6,328,000 hectares were ripe for 
reforestation, as well as approximately 300,000 hectares of degraded forests and 
coppices that were currently incapable of providing construction and industry-grade 
timber. The Forestry Administration was charged with the "enormous' job of 
replanting France's forests and foresters would become the "apostles' of 
reforestation. Employing similar language to that used after defeat in 1940, Dufay 
highlighted that 'each forester must direct all his will towards the goal [of 
reforestation] and spare neither his time nor his efforts.' At stake was the chance to 
'serve France and contribute to [the nation's] revival.' Dufay reassured his readers 
that the foresters were up to the task; 'a long tradition of honour is the guarantee.' lSI 
An important question concerning the FFN is its place in the history of 
French forests and the extent to which war and occupation brought about its 
introduction. After all. the FFN was proposed by forestry officials in response to a 
variety of forest-related anxieties, many of which were of long germination. 
ISO ADV 1790 W 122 Directeur-General des Eaux et Forets to conservateurs des Eaux et Forets 
Consevators. "Subventions pour reboisement~' 19 October 1945. 
151 Dufay. "Avant-propos: 4. 
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including concerns about the low productivity of France's forests, rural 
depopulation, and the deforestation of certain regions. These issues pre-dated the 
war. As the Forestry Administration's leadership explained in the FFN's expose des 
motifs, France's deficiencies in forestry production meant that the country had to 
import huge quantities of wood each year before the outbreak of the war. 152 
But war, occupation, and post-Liberation pressures had brought to a head 
these long-standing problems. As the Forestry Administration acknowledged, 
France's forests had found themselves in a 'considerably aggravated situation' since 
Liberation, due to the 'devastations of war,' as well as attacks by fires and insects in 
h · d' . d 153 Th . . f . d . t e Imme late postwar peno . e eXIgencIes 0 reconstructIon an growing 
consumption of wood-derived products, such as paper, combined with timber 
shortages in France and elsewhere meant that France 'risked, if it does not undertake 
an enormous effort, to find itself greatly handicapped in years to come.' 154 
Although a project in the mould of the FFN might have been introduced 
without the experience of war and occupation, it seems that the effect of the '"dark 
years" made it expedient to legislate in favour of reforestation in 1946. As Bess 
argues, after the war, the 'key discontinuity' was the 'pace of change.' 155 The war 
had brutally exposed the apparent fragility of France's forests as well as 
IS2 CACAN 19880470/144 Annex No.1, 'Expose des motifs et de projet de Loi de la Direction 
Generale des Eaux et Forets instituant un Fonds Forestier National,' in Recueil des lois, decrels. 
arretes et reglements financiers concernant Ie Fonds Forestier National (Paris: Maison Rapide, 
In.d.]), 15. 
S) 'Expose des motifs et de projet de Loi de la Direction Generaie des Eaux et Forets instituant un 
Fonds Forestier National: 15. Fires continued to devastate the Landes forest after 1945 and elm tree 
beetles were particularly active in forests in the Vosges. See Badre. HislOire de la foret fram;aise. 
245-6. 
1S4 Expose des motifs et de projet de Loi de la Direction Generaie des Eaux et Forets instituant un 
Fonds Forestier National,' 16. 
1.5~ Bess. Light-Green Society, 16. 
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substantially weakening their resources and capacity. For foresters, and presumably 
the Assemblt!e Nationale, which voted in the law, rebuilding the forest was an 
t · If' I . I 156 essen la component 0 natlOna survlva. France needed a productive forest to 
satisfy its need for timber and to shelter it from the unpredictability of international 
timber markets. The consequences of failing to do so were disquieting. In 1949, 
Dufay raised the possibility that due to a lack of wood and the fact that exporter 
countries were becoming more interested in supplying finished products than raw 
materials, France may soon find itself in the position of having to import paper, with 
disastrous consequences for its own paper industry and balance of payments. 157 
The FFN aimed to 'reconstitute [France's] forest resources (palrimoine 
forestier), through 'reforestation on a vast scale,' as well as "transform deciduous 
coppices into forests or pine plantations, organise the valorisation and conservation 
of wooded land, increase forest resources, and [ensure] better use the products of the 
forest.' 158 There was, at this time, some recognition from foresters that a productive 
forest did not necessarily equate to uniform stands of easily exploitable full-growth 
timber. A 1945 article in the Revue des Eaux el Forels authored by the Forestry 
Administration's Inspector General recognised some of the uses of "wasteland," 
such as grazing and hunting, noting how 'very little land is completely uncultivated. 
Shrubs, friches, heath land, garrigues, dunes and marshes are not totally 
156 A similar realisation occurred in Britain after the First World War which had exposed the 
country's timber deficiencies and paved the way for the creation of the Forestry Commission. See 
West, 'Forests and National Security,' 270-94. 
1$1 Bernard Dufay, • Avant-propos,', 4. • . . 
ISS 'Expose des motifs et de projet de Loi de la Direction Generale des Eaux et Foret.s mstltuant un 
Fonds Forestier National,' 16. 
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unproductive.' 159 But as the FFN's rationale suggested, it fell very much within the 
productionist vision advanced in post-war France; forest surface area would be 
increased and existing forests made more productive. 
The FFN's steering committee identified three main priorities; the 
reforestation of abandoned agricultural land; the valorisation of coppices; and the 
reconstitution of fire damaged massifs. 160 The most ambitious aspect of the FFN 
was the reforestation of two million hectares of uncultivated land. to be paid for 
(along with the other strands of the FFN) by a variable tax on forestry products. 161 
The reforestation of two million hectares was to take between twenty and thirty 
years at a rate of 70,000 to 100,000 hectares each year. The level of reforestation 
needed was not uniform across France and certain areas that had suffered recent fire 
damage or been unproductive for many years, such as the Massif Central. the Landes 
forest, and the Maures and Esteral massifs, were identified as being in particular 
need of reforestation. 162 Given that two-thirds of French forests were privately 
owned, the FFN directed its publicity efforts towards private foresters and provided 
considerable financial incentives for them to reforest and ameliorate their land. in 
IS9 Messines. 'Etude generale: actualite du Reboisement,' 437. On a local level. a 1947 Eaux et Forets 
report acknowledged the importance of the maquis on the island ofPort-Cros; 'it is certain that one of 
the essential characters of the island is the arborescent maquis vegetation [which] hikers like to walk 
among and enjoy it up close.' ADAM 521 W 31 Monsieur Coudes. 'Rapport sur la foret de Port-
Cros,' attached to Conservateur des Eaux et Forets, Nice to Inspector Pal. Toulon. 'Note de service: 
i1e de Port-Cros- Marine Nationale,' 28 April 1947. 
160 Les Eaux el Forets du 12e all 20e siecie, 643. 
161 This tax was originally set at ten percent but was lowered to six percent on 2 August 1947. See 
'Arrete du 1 er octobre 1946 fixant Ie taux de la taxe instituee par I' article 4 de la loi du 30 Septembre 
1946 relative au Fonds Forestier National,' in Recueil des lois, c/ecrets, arrete!i el reglements 
financiers concernanrle Fonds Forestier National. 5; and CHAN 19880470/144 . Annexe II: textes se 
rapportant au Fonds Forestier National [n.d.]. 
lb. See Vaissiere, 'Le reboisement de la France,' 4; Les Eaux et Forels du 12e au 20e siecie. 643; and 
CACAN 19880470/144 Direction General des Eaux et Forets. 'Evaluation des surfaces a reboiser par 




the form of loans, grants, and materials. And in keeping with productivist priorities. 
fast growing species of trees, such as poplars, were favoured. 163 
Foresters attempted to add credence to their pro-reforestation arguments 
through the assertion that reforestation was not simply about producing more trees 
for reconstruction and industry. Instead, reforestation facilitated the efficient use of 
the rest of the countryside. In the 1950s, Jean De Vaissiere. the forestry conservator 
in charge of the Service de la foret privee, stressed the importance of the FFN and 
the forest as a whole to the 'general wellbeing' of the country; where the ~forest 
disappears, regions inhospitable to man [ sic] replace it.' According to de Vaissiere. 
the forest was essential to agriculture as it protected fields and crops from "natural 
disasters' (such as erosion and floods), while woodland was the only possibility of 
exploitation for certain types of land. Reforestation also allowed for a more useful 
division of land. Vaissiere argued that agricultural lands should be grouped together 
around the village with isolated and outlying fields given over to reforestation. This 
would stop wasteland spreading from one field to another; "each plot that falls en 
fr;che causes surrounding fields to be abandoned and the rot (mal) spreads like a 
cancer.' 164 In sum, the FFN was presented as part of a 'coherent plan aiming for a 
rational exploitation of land through the search for a satisfactory balance between 
farms, forest, pasture, and fruit tree crops.' With such schemes. France and other 
European countries strove to replace 'anarchical' forms of land use. 165 
Healthy but largely unprofitable forests, then, had a place in the postwar 
French landscape. In 1952. the Forestry Administration '5 Director General advised 
163 Vaissiere. 'Le reboisement de la France: 7-9; and 'Reboiser est un devoir national.' 
164 Vaissiere. • Le reboisement de la France.' 4. 
1M Ibid. 10. 
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conservators that reforestation on land which was unable to support highly 
productive forests was stiJl in the 'general interest' as it prevented soil erosion and 
was a means of ensuring the 'economic and human balance.' 166 In addition. a 1952 
issue of Revue Forestiere Fran~aise stressed that the FFN would revive economies 
and restore 'social balance,' even in those areas where reforestation was not 
particularly profitable. As such, it deserved to be considered alongside the better-
known developments in electricity, coalmines, shipping, and railways. 167 
A thorough investigation into the success of the FFN lies beyond the scope 
of this study. Nonetheless, it seems that there were some teething problems. at least 
in the dry Mediterranean climate of Provence where the heat (and rabbits) inhibited 
the growth of some plantations. 168 Such was the lack of success with Aleppo pine 
reforestation plantations at Roquefort-Ia-Bedoule in the Bouches-du-Rh6ne (due to 
again to rabbits and aridity) that FFN repayments were suspended until new 
reforestation techniques could be perfected, much to consternation of the local town 
council. 169 One forestry official in the Alpes-Maritimes also complained that local 
town halls and forest owners remained indifferent or even hostile to reforestation. 
believing that it opposed their interests, while those that were in favour were 
166 ADAM 521 W 78 Directeur-General des Eaux et Forets to Conservateurs des Eaux et Forets. 'Plan 
de reboisement 1952-1957,' 26 March 1952. 5. 
167 F. du Vignaux, Directeur-General des Eaux et Forets, "Le Fonds Forestier National: Preface: 
Revue Foresl;ere Fran~aise 9 (September 1952). 523-4; and Louis Velay, 'Premier bilan: Re~'Ue 
Forestiere Fran~aise 10 (30 September 1952). 613. 634. . 
168 ADAM 521 W 75 Directeur-General des Eaux et Forets to Conservateur des Eaux et Forets. Nice. 
'Travaux de reboisement par contrat du Fonds Forestier National pour Ie compte des collecthites 
~ubliques et des particuliers en zone mediterraneene.· 16 November 1950. 
b9 ADBDR 188 W 79 Maire de Roquefort-Ia-Bedoule. "Resolution: 8 July 1953; and Abraud. 
Ingenieur des Eaux et Forets. Aix-en-Provence. 'Rapports: subventions pour reboisements -
resolution du Conseil Municipal de Roquefort-Ia-Bedoule. 13 August 1953. 
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disheartened by 'repeated failures' due to fire, soil, and climate. 170 And on a 
national level, it appears that funding shortfalls restricted the functioning and extent 
of the FFN; in 1955 one-third of reforestation projects had to be turned down. 171 
However, it appears that over the longer term the FFN performed well. and 
by 1955 foresters were celebrating the reforestation of the first 500,000 hectares (a 
figure which had risen to one million hectares by 1965). 172 A brochure produced by 
the ministry of agriculture to mark the FFN's ~twenty five years of work: 
predictably gave a positive account of how the programme had aimed to break with 
a forest 'subsistence economy' to move towards a 'market economy: 'reconstitute' 
war-damaged and over-exploited forests, and move on from a 'tradition of 
attentisme and non-intervention.' By 1971, the brochure continued, the FFN had 
financed the reforestation of 1,459,000 hectares, of which seventy-six percent had 
been achieved in private forests. 173 
Although the FFN had yet to reach its target of two million hectares, the 
figure reached by 1971 represented a considerable extension of the forest (a trend 
also helped by the abandonment of farmland during agricultural modernisation). 
France had also increased forestry production levels; production for construction-
170 ADAM 521 W 75 Flekcher, Inspecteur des Eaux et Forets, Nice Ouest, to Conservateur des Eaux 
et Forets, Nice, 'Reboisement - Fonds Forestier National - Propagande,' 28 June 1948. 
171 ADAM 521 W 75 F. du Vignaux, Directeur-General des Eaux et Forets to Conservateurs des Eaux 
et Forets, 'Contrats du Fonds Forestiers National, programme du 2eme semestre 1955.' 8 August 
1955. See also ADAM 521 W 75 Directeur-General des Eaux et Forets to Conservateurs des Eaux et 
Forets, 'Subventions pour reboisement,' 4 April 1946. 
172 CACAN 19880470/146 Reunion du Comite de Controle du Fonds Forestier National, 'Note pour 
Ministre de l' Agriculture: Projet de manifestation a I'occasion de la mise en boisement, par Ie F.F.~. 
du 500,OOOe hectare,' 27 October 1955: and Les Eaux el Forels du Ile au JOe siecle, 645. 
173 Out of the 1,459.000 reforested hectares. the extension of forests onto 'bare land' represented 
thirty-four percent, the 'reconstitution and improvement' of existing forests, fifty eight percent, and 
plantations outside of the forest. eight percent. According to the brochure, reforestation was still 
important as forests were needed for their products. soil preservation qualities. and as a space where 
city dwellers can 'find calm, isolation, rest [and] relaxation.' Fonds Foreslier National: 25 ans de 
Iravaux (Paris: Documentation Fran~iseJ Ministre de I' Agriculture. 1972), 1-6, 22. 
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quality timber had risen from 10,1 00,000m3 in 1945 to 18,500,OOOm3 in ] 970. while 
industry-grade timber had increased from 4,600,000m3 to 10,OOO,OOOm3 during the 
same period. 174 As these figure show, France succeeded in increasing production in 
its forests, as it had elsewhere in its economy. 
In all, therefore, it seems that the FFN was successful in repalnng the 
environmental damage of the war, even if not all traces had been eradicated (in the 
1970s, a considerable number of trees in Lorraine stil1 had bullets embedded in their 
trunks, a legacy of the world wars 175). In addition, the FFN made France less 
dependant on timber imports. Postwar reforestation, however, did not restore the 
forests to their exact pre-war composition. The sixty years or so that have passed is a 
relatively short time in forest terms, meaning that some war-damaged forests have 
not yet regained their former maturity. Furthermore. the type of forests produced by 
the FFN were ones more geared towards production, were composed of different 
species, and were better equipped with fire breaks and forestry roads. 
As the case of the FFN suggests, war-related environmental modifications 
contributed to changes in environmental policies which in tum led to further 
environmental transformation. But forests in France have never been static. and in 
this sense the war was part of their continual evolution. The FFN is also illustrative 
of the ways in which the forest continued to be linked to national survival. both in 
terms of forestry production and more nebulous notions concerning social and 
ecological balance in the countryside. As such, it represented a national duty even as 
the French began to put the material repercussions of the war behind them. In the 
17. Fonds Forestier National: 25 ans de trQ\'QUX. 2. 
m M. Bach. 'Les forets mitraillees en Lorraine: Revueforestierefra~aL'ie '!.7 (1975). 217-12. 
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words of Andre Dulin, State Secretary for Agriculture in the 1950s, "reforestation is 
a work and duty of the whole nation.' 176 
The French were largely successful in removing the traces of war from the 
landscape and reconstructing their countryside in the immediate postwar era. The 
dominant narrative of this chapter, therefore, has been the erasure of war's physical 
impact. The next chapter presents a different story. as it examines how guardians of 
memory have sought to preserve and perpetuate the traces of war within the 
landscape. Rather than provide a comprehensive overview, I focus exclusively on 
the relationship between nature and wartime memories in postwar France. 




Nature and Memory in Postwar France I 
This chapter explores the ways in which memories have been associated with 
natural (as opposed to urban) landscapes in postwar France and how they have 
been "grounded" in the French soil. Preservers of memory have at times 
employed the natural environment to naturalise and eternalise memories. as well 
as to instil "living memory" in the subsequent generations that did not directly 
experience the war. In certain places, such as the Vercors, the landscape itself 
becomes a sacred site of remembrance. The French state and resistance veterans 
revere the V ercors' mountainous terrain as a patriotic space and an affirmation of 
their democratic values. 2 However. landscapes have other functions and 
meanings, and not all visitors glean the lessons they are supposed to. Moreover. 
although nature is mobilised to remember resistance, it can obscure the past and 
transform sites of memory. This manifestation of nature's indifference to human 
memories exposes the problematic relationship between nature and memory. as 
nature undermines the very memories it is supposed to guard for eternity. 
In this chapter. I consider this relationship both in general terms and 
through specific sites of memory. in particular the Vercors. Not only has the 
Vercors become a major, if not the major, symbol of armed resistance against the 
I A version of this chapter will appear as Chris Pearson. . Memorial ising the Maquis: 
"Grounding" the Memory of War in the Vercors Regional Park. France: in Charles Closmann 
(ed.). War and the Environment (forthcoming). 
2 On how battlefields become sacred, patriotic sites. see Edward Tabor Linenthal. Sacred 




German occupier, it is also one of the sites where most effort has been made to 
preserve and perpetuate resistance memories within a naturaI landscape, 
especially since the creation of the Site National Historique de la Resistance en 
Vercors (SNHRV) in 1994. 3 Resistance organisations and the French state have 
moulded the Vercors into a patriotic site to be revered and protected as an 
affirmation of French republican and democratic values. 4 According to historian 
Fran~ois Bedarida, one of the SNHRV's historical consultants, 'the Vercors has 
become the. "'haut-lieu" par excellence of the Resistance and the very 
incarnation of its spirit.' 5 Just as nature was mobilised as a natural ally during 
the conflict, it was then - and still is - deployed as a means of remembering the 
war. 
I do not wish to suggest that the relationship between nature and the 
commemoration of wartime memories is somehow "natural" or inevitable. In this 
sense, I disagree with Bedarida' s claim that the 'ruggedness' of the Vercors' 
landscape 'spontaneously evokes the call of freedom.' 6 Instead, I consider 
memory as something actively constructed in relation to landscape.7 For although 
memorial landscapes may, at first sight, appear fixed and eternal, they are 
3 GiJles Vergnon claims that the Vercors is the most famous maquis site in France. Vercors. 13. 
In aU, Olivier Vallade estimates that there are approximately 300 memorials dedicated to the war 
years in the Vercors. Des combats au souvenir: /ieux de resistance et de memoire - Isere el 
Vercors (Grenoble: Presses Universitaire de Grenoble. 1997). 5. The Site National Historique de 
la Resistance en Vercors was created under the auspices of the Parc Natural Regional du Vercors. 
after pressure from the Pionniers et Combattants Volontaires du Vercors. Its funding was assured 
by the central French state. local authorities, and the European Union. 
4 As such, the Vercors corresponds with Kenneth Foote's identification of sites of 'sanctification' 
where the victims are remembered alongside the cause for which they died. Shadowed Ground. 
7-10. 
s Fran~ois Bedarida, 'Le Vercors dans l'histoire,' in Pare Naturel Regional du Vercors brochure. 
Site national historique de la resistance en Vercors [n.d.]. This document was produced to 
introduce and promote the Site national historique de la resistance en Vercors. before its 
introduction in 1994. 
6 Ibid. 
7 For more on the human construction of memory. see Maurice Halbwachs. On Co/le(.1ive 
Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1992): Daniel 1. Sherman. The Construction of 
Memory in Interwar France (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999); and Jay Winter and 
Emmanuel Sivan, 'Setting the Framework.' in Winter and Sivan. War and Remembrance. 6-39. 
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endlessly (re)formulated and challenged, reflecting the wider expression of 
memories in the public sphere, which are constructed, disparate. and mutable. 8 
Memory, like nature, is subject to endless changes; neither is a fixed nor stable 
entity. In fact, unpredictability and disruptability may more accurately describe 
the characteristics of both. 9 The linking of nature and memory can naturalise or 
obscure the production, fragility, and contradictions of memory for political 
ends. 
I begin by examining the associations drawn between resistance 
memones and maquis, forest, and mountain landscapes. I then explore how 
memorials engage with their natural surroundings, as well as how guidebooks 
and organised tours try to recreate a sense of the past through nature. Finally. I 
consider nature's challenge to memory through its modification of memorial 
sites. 
Maquis, forests, and memories of resistance 
Though associations between forests, maquis, and armed resistance were 
made during and after the war. there is nothing preordained about the linkage 
between resistance and nature; many resistance networks developed and fought 
in urban settings (the numerous plaques, memorials, and resistance-related street 
names that pepper the French urban landscape attest to this activity). 10 
8 Young questions the notion of "collective memory," persuasively putting forw~ in its pl~ce 
the concept of "collected memories." a model that suggests diverse and com~ur.'~ memones 
focussing on particular sites or acts of commemoration. See Texture of Memory. XI-Xli .. 
9 For the view of nature as disruptive and unpredictable see Worster. 'Nature and the Disorder of 
History.' 65-85. . . 
10 As Kedward argues, between 1940 and 1942. resistance was 'urban-based With .urban vatu.es. 
and resisters barely considered "guerrilla warfare in the countryside or even a tacttcal reteat IOto 
the hills.' Kedward. 'The Maquis and the Culture of the Outlaw: 23~. On Lyon's urban 
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Nonetheless, resistance IS now most commonly associated with natural 
landscapes. As Jean-Marie Guillon argues, memories of rural resistance now 
over-shadow other forms of struggle against the occupier and have become the 
'archetype' of resistance combat in 'everyday memory.' As such, Guillon agrees 
with Philippe Joutard that France has seen the emergence of a 'maquisardisation 
of memory. , 11 
As I argued in chapter two, rural resistance units were perhaps the first 
group within French society to invest maquis landscapes with positive meanings. 
In the immediate postwar period, imaginative associations persisted between 
maquis vegetation and notions of freedom, heroism. and combating oppression. 
In 1945, 1. Puech offered the following association of maquis and resistance: 
Maquis! That cracks like a gunshot! One sees the desert of stone and dry herbs; one 
smells the odour of labiates and the resin of cytise. Maquis! Land of the ·'vendetta." a 
more honest justice than that of men [sic], a more demanding honour than that of our 
laws. Maquis! Something raw, savage, chivalrous. [It represents] bravery, panache, 
[and] heroism mixed with a light touch of "don quixotism." 12 
Puech 's passage transformed maquis landscape into a synonym for bravery, 
honour. and mystery - qualities associated with resistance. 
In turn, the coupling of maquis-resistance and maquis-vegetation has 
invested the latter with notions of tenacity. resistance and freedom. For instance. 
environment and earlier "resistance" activity in post-revolutionary France. see Richard Cobb, The 
French and Iheir Revolution (London: John Murray. 1998).271-87... , 
II Guillon suggests that the focus on the maquis has arisen becaus~ It rem~orces ,the Idea thal,the 
French bore anns against the occupier and 'actively participated m the LiberatIon ~ombats" In 
addition, the 'maquisardisation of memory' links the resistance's ~ombatants With P':VIOUS 
volunteer and regular anny units who fought to secure French soverelgn,~' not least dunng th~ 
First World War. Jean-Marie Guillon. 'Monuments et memoire de la resIstance en Provence, 
Provence historique 193 (July-September 1998).337-8. 
12 Puech, La mOnJagne des sept douleurs, 29. 
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a recent text describes Mediterranean scrubland thus; . solitude! strangeness! 
toughness! humility/ purpose/ freedom.' 13 It is striking how many of these words 
- in particular 'toughness," 'purpose,' and 'freedom' - are associated \\ith 
resistance fighters and it is hard to imagine that these words would be linked to 
maquis without the wartime maquisard experience. Furthermore, the deployment 
of "maquis" has become suggestive shorthand for the alternative. underground. 
or oppositional nature of certain social groups and activities. For instance. Sandy 
Queudrus entitles his research on the French free-party scene Un maquis techno 
and Philippe Gamier names his book on maverick U.S. writers. Maquis. 14 Jean 
Orsini is correct, therefore, to argue that the term maquis has become 
universalised, 'a synonym for resistance against all oppression.' 15 
One of the most remarkable aspects of the reinvention of the maquis 
during the Second World War is that a relatively obscure. overlooked. and hard 
to define form of vegetation rooted in the particular climatic and topographical 
features of the Mediterranean gained greater international significance, due 
solely to the resistance's adoption of the term. Not least, the wild maquis 
landscape has become entwined with images and memories of resistance on the 
British side of the channel. For instance, Gunby Hadath"s 1947 novel Men of the 
Maquis links maquis landscapes and the struggle to save France' s freedom in the 
following passage in which his characters plan the location of their resistance 
base: 
13 Conseil General de la DrOme. Mille tendresses: grands espaces naturels de la Dr()me 
(Valance: Imprimerie Jalin. 2000). 36. . . 
14 Sandy Queudrus. Un maquis techno: modes d'enga~ement et p',allques .'i(}c~LlIc!J da~~ 10 f!'e~-. 
party (Nantes : M. Seteun. 2000): and Philippe Gamier. Maquts: Aperfl' d lin aulrt r(~\\Ll.~l 
americain (Paris: Editions Payot & Rivages, 1993) . 
• , Jean Orsini. 'Le maquis. pay sage historique.· in Lorenzi. Le maquis corst.'. 39. 
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De LatIrey: "'surely they will be hidden high on the mountains" 
"As was the maquis in Corsica!" Mollier exclaimed. 
De LatIrey caught up the word, and his eyes were alight -Tis so! Like the 
Corsican maquis. I thank you, friend Paul. And yet.·· he resumed the next 
moment, quietly pondering, "how unlike in its essence shall our maquis prove 
to the Corsicans!' For theirs was the refuge of brigands in fear of the law. and 
of malefacteurs with a price on their heads. Come. tell me. Paul. what shall 
ours be?" 
"The symbol of the soul of France," Paul responded. 
"Upon my faith, you speak truly! Said Jacques. with odd gruffness. "If Ie bon 
Dieu wills, our maquis shall stand for France freed.'" 16 
Hadath's laboured prose is likely to have had less exposure than an information 
board in Cornwall at the Eden Project's Temperate Biome. which uses maquis' 
resistance connotations to introduce visitors to the vegetation (figure one): 
Maquis - heard the name before? 
Where have you heard the name before? 
Maquis was the name given to the French underground movement that fought 
against the Gennan occupying forces in World War II. This is where they hid 
out - not the most comfortable place to be. 
An adjacent plaque draws attention to maquis' toughness, highlighting its 
resilience and ability to survive dry climates. A subsequent plaque describes 
maquis plants as 'tough customers,' containing flora that resists "munchers.' 
water loss, and fire. These plaques invest similar qualities. such as fortitude and 
resistance (whether to the German army or munchers). in both maquis-resistance 
and maquis-vegetation. Moreover. the Eden Project plaques are illustrative of 
16 Gunby Hadath. Men of the Maquis (London and Redhill: Lunerworth Press. 1947), 14. On 
maquis landscapes in Corsica. see Lorenzi. Le maquis corse. 
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how as Orsini argues the word maqui became 'globaJi d' du t th 
World War. 17 
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. I . 'b 18 
memona s m more access} Ie places. At Bessillo~ a roadside memorial 
(complete with a lay-by for cars) marks the beginning of the route up to the more 
seclu~ed monuments. As the Bessillon and Signes memorials suggest the 
seclusion and dense cover of maquis vegetation act as obstacles to public 
memorialisation. Maquis vegetatio~ then, is an authentic site of resistance and 
yet also obscures the commemoration of maquisard memories. 
Full-growth forests often provided better refuge than maquis vegetation 
during the O.ccupation, not least because forestry camps provided cover and 
employment for maquisards (see chapter three). Therefore, forests have also 
become associated with memories of resistance in non-forested sites. The 
paintings of resistance veteran Jean Amblard provide a useful focus for 
uncovering the ways in which forests have been linked with resistance in postwar 
France. Amblard, in a 1946 series of paintings commissioned by the French 
government, presented the forest as a natural ally of resistance fighters. Covering 
the walls of the Hotel de Ville's salle des mariages in the northern Parisian 
suburb of Saint-Denis, Amblard's paintings depict maquisard life in the forest. 
Such is the intensity and detail of the countless leaves in the paintings that the 
forest milieu almost overshadows the maquisards, suggesting that the trees are an 
integral part of resistance history (figures three and four) . 
• 1 See Guillon. 'Monuments et memoire de la resistance.' 328.332. 
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Figure 3 and Figure 4. Paintings by Jean Amblard located in th e aile de mar;age 
of aint-Denis ' hOlel de ville (December 2005). © Chri Pea r on 
1 - 1 publicati n. L maqll i d Franc , r pr du m \\ r~ 
id r udi nc and t d that th p intino u [ulh 
it fr i tan awa ' fr m th ~ r tit > 1 r. I- r .\ u1u 1 • 
aint- nt m I r and m mb r fth n i 1 t1 n I 1<1 
. udd nl) tran p rte . th it r ·t ~ r t mnurn r 
Chapter Seven 
strange murmur seems to rise up, [comprised] of the wind mixing \\ith the 
chirping of birds, the clanking of weapons, [and] men' s voices.' Gillot praised 
Amblard's representation of the 'Arbres de Liberte' as 'witnesses of our people's 
battle for a radiant springtime.' 19 A poem by celebrated surrealist poet and 
communist resistance veteran Paul Eluard in the same publication again 
highlighted the interconnections between trees and maquisards. Eluard's poem 
suggested that during the Occupation the 'leaves of the trees moved in time with 
[the maquisards'] hearts.' For Eluard, Amblard's trees had 'same blood as man' 
and were the 'trees of the maquis, the trees of the resistance.' 20 
Poet Jacques Gaucheron dedicated his contribution to Les maquis de 
France to Amblard 'who celebrates the entry of trees into history.' Gaucherons' s 
poem tells how a 'firm friendship arose between trees and men' during the 
Occupation, during which the 'assassins' (the German occupier) 'discovered the 
huge anger of the forest.' 'Shoulder to shoulder' men and trees fought and 
defeated the occupier. Such was their cooperation that the enemy soldier who fell 
in the forest didn't know if his life had been taken by a resister or a tree acting in 
'anger.' After the gruelling war years, 'our forests' now sing the names of 
resistance heroes through their branches and guard their memory. For Gaucheron 
it is in the trees that' glory is forever inscribed.' 21 Even if we are not supposed to 
take Gaucheron's poem literally, it still portrays a tight bond between resisters 
and the forest milieu and suggests that memories of resistance reside in and are 
perpetuated by the forest. 
19 Auguste Gillot in Jean Arnblri Auguste Gillot. Paul Eluard. Elsa Triolet. and Jacques 
Gaucberon, Les maquis de France (Paris: Les Editions cercle d'art. 1951). 
20 Paul Eluard [untitled] in us maquis de France. 
21 Jacques Gaucheron, 'Les maquis de France: in Les Maquis de France. 
305 
Chapter e en 
Amblard ' s paintings and their accompan ing p ms ug
o 
th t \ . n r 
communist intellectuals in a northern Parisian suburb th fi r t w an \' ti\' 
and effective imaginative device through which to r m m r an m 
resistance memories, Elsewhere forests and tree \ r r pr Ul 
resting places for those who died combating azi m. H. B ut -K r Iii 
poem 'La foret de M.,, ' evoked the lea es that· catt red a d Ii III n III 
the mausoleum forest ' where maquisard la buried . -- B ut -K r IIi r' m 
portrayed the forest as a calm temple-like resting pIa fit £ r th atri ti 
of the Republic. 
As in the aftermath of the Fir t World War, tr ar u r m m r 
the dead of the Second World War. 2 For in tanc , at th B ul [J m t ry n 
the edge of the Esterel state for t in th Var, childr n h v plant d a tr t 
remember the dead (figure five). 
Ce arbre a ete plante 
r des enfants de F ance 
en mefl10ire des cOfllba tan 
et des vic imes de la ue 
1939-1945 
(le 0 r • I 1 75 
Figure 5. Plaque at the Boulori cemetery, ar (March 2 ". ( n 
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Forests, however, could stir controversial memories about the war. When. during 
a parliamentary debate in September 1981, Prime Minster Pierre Mauroy 
suggested that unemployed youths could be deployed to restore France's forests, 
a RPR depute, Robert-Andre Vivien called out "'Marechal, nollS voila!" The cry 
of "Marshal, here we are!" alluded to the Chantiers de la Jeunesse's forestry 
work and shows that in this case Vichy's appropriation of the forest 
overshadowed that of the resistance. 24 
On the whole, however, monuments and other memorial devices 
continued the associations developed between landscapes and resistance during 
wartime France. Maquis and forests served as natural allies during the war and 
are remembered as such, but they have also become a means for preserving and 
perpetuating resistance memories. Maquisards, however, took to forests and 
maquis not just for the shelter provided by bushes and trees, but because the 
vegetation often covered hilly or mountainous terrain. In chapter five I stressed 
how mountains served as a refuge and military base for maquisards. As a 
consequence, they have become heavily associated with resistance memories. 
Mountains of memory 
Mountains stand tall. literally and metaphorically. in French memorial 
landscapes of the Second World War. The Glieres and Oisans alpine massifs are 
recognised as important sites of resistance, as is Mont Mouchet in the Auvergne 
where 6,000 maquisards gathered and were subsequently attacked by German 
24 Rousso. Vichy Syndrome. 185. 
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forces in June 1944. As a consequence, this "grandiose and moving landscape' 
(in the words of the Musee de la Resistance du Mont-Mouchefs webpage). has 
been turned into a national symbol and memorial to resistance. 2S 
Of all the nation's mountain ranges the Vercors has become most heavily 
associated with France's resistance heritage and memories. 26 Philippe Mestre. 
Ministre des Anciens Combattants et Victimes de Guerre, argued in 1994 that 
'among all the sites,' the 'magnificent and bloody' Vercors stood out. 27 As Anne 
Sgard suggests, the war brought the Vercors out of 'anonymity to make it one of 
the symbols of the resistance.' 28 
Why does the Vercors stand out in France's memorial landscape? One 
reason is that the Vercors was the setting for an act of large-scale armed 
resistance against the German occupier. In the words of General de Lattre de 
Tassigny, it was in the Vercors that France 'made real war: 29 Another factor 
behind the Vercors' powerful symbolism is undoubtedly the striking topography 
of the massif. As historian Henri Amoroux suggested, the Vercors was a ·tragedy 
that strikes the imagination for the men' s sacrifice as well as [for] the almost 
spiritual decor amongst which [the events] took place.' 30 
Early resistance accounts and memoirs constructed the Vercors itself as 
an integral part of the resistance and remember it as an ally. According to Puech 
~~ / . 
.. Musee de la Resistance du Mont-Mouchet webpage, http:/ www.tounsmorama.com 
/PAGE INFO/4342 l.htm. assessed 9 May 2006. 
26 Although the VerC"ors is remembered for resistance, it is also important to bear in mind that it is 
8.lso portrayed as a symbol of Nazi barbarity and French victimhood. Referring to the "many~ 
village" of Oradour-sur-Glane where German soldiers set fire to the town and m~sacred Its 
inhabitants, Gilles Vergnon notes that Vassieux-en-Vercors has became somet~mg of an 
~Oradour drOmois.' Vercors. 125. For more on Oradour itself. see Fanner. Martyred' ,/laKI!· 
27 Philippe Mestre, Preface. in Pare Nature I Regional du Vercors brochure. Site national 
his/or;que de /0 res is/once en Vercors [n.d.]. 
28 Anne Sgard. ~Paysages du Vercors: 63. . . 
29 Quoted in Joesph La Picirella. Temoignages sur /e rercors Dr6me e//sere (L~on: Impnmcne 
Rivet 1969).383. 
JO Quoted in Vergnon. J'ercors.9. 
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'the entire massif resisted'; the Vercors, 'kingdom of grass and domain of the 
forest, offered its refuge and the assistance of its peasants.' And after the Gennan 
attack and reprisals the 'fortress' of the Vercors was crowned \\ith a "painful 
halo' (aureole douloureuse). For Puech, nature joined humans in the painful 
experience of destruction and death. The tree roots sunk into the soil "saturated 
with blood' and the 'wind quivered with the rustling of leaves and the groans of 
the dead.' 31 Lieutenant Stephen also suggested that the Vercors had acted as a 
willing accomplice during the war, addressing it thus: 
You did your best... you kept your promises as much as you could. You defended us. 
you nourished us, you hid us ... To the best of your ability, you opposed the invader with 
the barriers of your rocks, the gulfs of your gorges, the thickets of your woods, and even 
when the skies betrayed you, you spilt your blood and you didn't abandon us. Your 
forest guarded us and the dead. whom we left on your soil. sleep fraternally with your 
martyrs. 32 
The personification of the Vercors (addressed in the familiar ''tu'' form) adds to 
the sense that the mountain landscape should be remembered and recognised as 
an ally in resistance. 
The construction of the Vercors as a natural ally and partner-in-
resistance. empowered resistance veterans who wanted to tum the mountains 
themselves into a symbol of armed resistance. In 1948. Pierre Tenant argued that 
the Vercors. a region that had endured so much destruction and seen the deaths 
of · seven hundred martyrs" on its soil, "must remain in the history of our country 
as one of the most beautiful symbols of the will (\'oIOnle) of the French 
31 Puech, Monlagne des sept douleurs. 12-3. 33. 
32 Stephen. Vercors. 178. 
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resistance.' For Tenant, the 'amount of blood spilt has made these mountains 
sacred land, [which] should be now be respected as a sanctuary where the flame 
of our liberty was relit and as one of the cradles of the [French] renaissance: 33 
Writing almost forty years later, Albert Darier asserted that the 'land of the 
Vercors will forever symbolise a refuge for a combat and sacrifice.' 34 And as 
one former maquisard told Le Journal du Dimanche. the wind that continues to 
blow through the Vercors is, for him, 'the breath of liberty.' 35 Such was the 
belief that the Vercors' topography was synonymous with resistance that Pierre 
Dalloz opposed plans to build a new memorial in the 1970s as "the Vercors is 
itself a monument, the most grandiose of monuments.' 36 
It is hardly unexpected that former resistance fighters fashioned the 
Vercors into a symbol of freedom, armed resistance. and patriotic sacrifice. But 
the higher echelons of the French state have done the same thing. During a 
speech given as part of the sixtieth anniversary commemorations in Vassieux-en-
Vercors, the then French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin stated that he had 
come to the 'heroic plateau' to 'pay the homage due to all the resisters ... of this 
place, which is so emblematic of their values. their courage. and their historical 
role.' 37 
The close association created between the Vercors and resistance IS 
reproduced in memorials which mimic the form of the landscape. At the village 
of Malleval. where ten civilians and twenty three resisters were killed during the 
33 Tenant. Vercors.216-17. . 
34 Darier Tu Prendras Les A.rmes. 479. Aux Armes.' also fashioned the Vercors Into a symbol of 
French ~sistance. arguing that 'its defeat was only a preface for the victory of France. ,.fux 
Armes.' No. 10. July 1945.3. .., 2 
3' Alexandre Duyck. 'C'etait I'esprit Vercors. . LeJourna/ du Dlmanche. II July _004. 4. 
36 Quoted in Vergnon. Vercors, 187. . . . . ." . ., ., 
J7 Quoted in Gensi Hoxha. 'Hommage aux martyrs.' Le Dauphme Libert'. -- Jul) _004. -. 
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Gennan attack on 29 January 1944 the memorial' depictj n 
figure seemingly mirrors the shape of the cliff-face b hind it fi ur 
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Figure 6. Resistance monument at Malleval in the Vercor (April 2005), 
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Figure 7. Resistance memorial at Gre e-en-Vercor (July 2005 . hri P ar on 
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was 'impregnable for two years.' As such, it was a "beautiful natural fortress.' 41 
In addition, the main resistance veterans' association, the P;onn;ers du Vercors. 
proudly and publicly evoked the fortress-like qualities ofVercors with its "almost 
impenetrably high forests, its deep rock and cliff faces,' lending "itself admirably 
to the role of protector.' 42 
Natural fortress imagery has endured well beyond the immediate postwar 
period. The Parc Naturel Regional du Vercors (PNRV). introducing itself in the 
pages of the Pionnier du Vercors in 1974, described the area as "an impervious 
fortress,' language that was sure to appeal to former maquisards . .t3 Fortress 
imagery also surfaced during the planning stages of the SNHRV: 
The borders of the Vercors! Terribly abrupt and dominant. They impose their boldness 
and their rectitude over the surrounding valleys. 
The cliff faces drop straight down to the valleys. They attract the attention. they 
magnetise, they bewitch. 
It is not necessary to search any further for the reasons for resistance. It's there. 
inevitably, that one day or another, the beautiful and cruel tragedy of a rebellious people 
would unfold. It is there, obviously, that one of the most poetic and symbolic pages of 
French history would imprint itself onto the limestone and spruce trees. This territory is 
a natural fortress. 44 
41 Puech. Montagne des sepl douleurs. 12. 32: and Stephen. J ·ercors. 9. 1 S. 
42 Amicale des Pionniers. Mirreille. 
4J Le Pionnier du Vercors. 301h anniversary special edition. 1974. . 
44 'Un site predestine.' in Sile nalional hislOrique de la n;sisrance en J ercor.\. 17. 
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Similarly, Dominique Partenay of the PNRV suggested that one of the reasons 
why the French population identified the Vercors with resistance was its 'verv 
particular territory which is [that of] a fortress.' 45 
Other writers have contributed to the prolongation of the natural fortress 
discourse. In 1978, Michael Pearson described the V ercors' . sheer walls 
thousands of feet tall' whose 'immense, gaunt ramparts form a high. often 
endless skyline.' The 'huge plateau' in its centre lies "enclosed within soaring 
cliffs' and 'can only be reached from the surrounding plains by a few. steep 
narrow roads that have been hewn and tunnelled from the mountain.' The 
Vercors represented an 'enormous natural citadel [that] was designed for 
drama. ,46 Furthermore, Paul Dreyfus entitles his book Vercors: ciladelle de la 
Liberte and Arthur Layton Funk notes the V ercors' • formidable cliffs' with its 
'plateau so high, so well protected, and so inaccessible.' 47 
Resistance memorials also reinforce and perpetuate the "natural fortress" 
narrative. Philippe Barriere observes that the Pionniers du Vercors have largely 
succeeded in transcending the Vercors' diversity enabling them to speak "of the 
Vercors, in the name of the Vercors.' One way in which they have done so is 
through their logo of a chamois astride the word "Vercors," which is a recurrent 
motif of the memorials and, as Barriere argues, "practically functions as a label. a 
sign of quality, encompassing and equalising all the experiences (combats. 
martyrs, French, foreign, military, civilian) at the heart of the largest 
4S Dom inque Partenay. • Le Projet de pare historique du Vercors,' in Georges Kanlin and ~ iIIes 
Manceron (eds.), Les Echos de la memoire: tabous et enseignemenl de la Seconde Guerre 
MondiaJe (Paris: Le Monde Editions. 1991). 227. . 
46 Michael Pearson. Tears of Glory: The Betrayal of the J 'ercors 1944 (London: Macmillan. 
1978). ix. . . . , , 
H Dreyfus. Vercors: citadelle de la Liberte; and Funk. Hidden A~~l" 16. Wntmg In HL\lorla. 
journalist Gerard Chauvy argued that the Vercors has an 'undemable charact~r o~ a na~u~1 
bastion: 'Le maquis a-t-il ete trahi par les Allies?' HislOria 571 (Jul?' 19(4). 6. LI~ewlsc. Oh\'ler 
Vallade remarks on the fact that the Vercors offered itself as a 'ventable fortress. De.'i combats 
au souvenir. 69. 
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verconenne memory possible (figure eight. 4 Mor r ntl)' . th , HR\' h 
sought to standardise resistance sites proposmg to plant \' \\. tr \' th 
memorials to ' create an identical symbol for the v h m if.' 4 h 
standardisation and unification of memorials wjthin th Ii 
physical way of giving credence to the ' natural fortre .. narrativ \\ithin th 
fortress all is homogenised and united. 
Figure 8. Logo of the Pionniers du Vercor (February 200~). hri Pea on 
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and of all opinion managed to come together and unify, with the sole ambition of 
escaping servitude.' This held a contemporary resonance for Tenant as he 
suggested that when divisions arise again, 'eyes should look up ... towards those 
high places where the spirit of France blew.~ 51 
Evoking the natural fortress not only helps strengthen this sense of unity 
but it also serves to surmount the massif s diversity. It was only in the early 
twentieth century that geographers marked out what we now consider to be the 
Vercors as a single, coherent space collapsing topographical. climatic. and 
administrative differences between north and south (see chapter five). Repeated 
mention of the "natural fortress" helps mark out the Vercors as a discrete. 
coherent space united in resistance, which can serve as a model for postwar 
France. 52 
As well as generating a sense of unity in the face of diversity, the '''natural 
fortress" narrative helps to paper over the resistance' s strategic errors and over-
confidence in the massif s natural defences. Repeated reminders of the Vercors' 
"natural fortress" characteristics create the impression that resistance was 
inevitable and had to happen there. As a front page 1974 Le Monde article put i~ 
'certain landscapes have their destiny.' 53 Furthermore, some suggest that the 
Vercors' fortress-like qualities continue to explain why the maquisards 
considered it inaccessible to German forces. In its report on the sixtieth 
anniversary commemorations in the Vercors. Le Dauphine libere noted that 
.51 Tenant. Vercors.216-17. . 
S:! There are hints. however, that tensions remained between the north and the south of the masSIf. 
A 1967 committee on regional development noted the 'ancient apathy" th~ exi~ts be~een north 
and south. CACAN 19770105/14 Comite pour ramenagement el rexpanslon economlque.~ ~a 
Region Rhone-Alpes. 'Pares naturels regionaux. VlIb Le Vercors et ses Hauts-Plateaux. actIvates 
sPQrtives et de detente,' IS August 1967.23. . ' . 
.5.1 J. M Domenach. "II y a trente ans, la tragedie du Vercors resumall celie de loute la reslslance 
annee.· Le Monde, 29 July 1974. 1. 
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'maquisards thought their fortress impenetrable. And~ yesterday, among these 
grandiose landscapes some thought that they were right.' 54 The "natural fortress" 
narrative drowns out potential criticism of the Plans Montagnards and the 
military decisions taken during the summer of 1944. 
Although memories of resistance have been repeatedly associated with 
the "natural fortress," the meanings attached to the fortress have not remained 
static. Not least, the rise of environmentalism in France has '''greened'' the 
" t I ~ rtr " 55 D' h th . na ura 10 ~ss. unng t e war, e maIn purpose conferred on the Vercors 
was to shelter and protect maquisards. It is now called upon to safeguard their 
memory and protect the area's natural habitats and rural way of life. A 1967 
report by a regional development committee observed how the V ercors' 
'escarpments and cliffs' rise above the surrounding countryside leading some to 
describe it as a 'fortress.' The Vercors stands out and above 'the feverish and 
necessary activities of the towns and the plains. It constitutes an immense refuge 
of which, as far as possible, we must preserve the originality so that man [sic] 
can reconcile himself with nature [and experience] its relaxing character, beauty. 
silence, and peace.' 56 
Similarly, "natural fortress" imagery surfaced during the creation of the 
PNRV. Proposals for creating the Pare naturel regional described the Vercors as 
a 'limestone island standing above the plains,' a land of 'free men.' and the last 
"bastion' of the northern pre-Alps. 57 It appears that such rhetoric is heavily 
influenced by the "natural fortress" narrative. To this day. the PNRV's publicity 
54 Maryse Schoon-Gayet. 'A ux heros et martyrs du Vercors.· Le Dauphine Liher,} ~ 22 July 2004. 
55 On the emergence of French environmentalism, see Bess. LighJ-Grt'c!n Stx:lety: ~d Joseph 
Szarka, The Shaping of EnvironmenJal Policy in France (New York and Oxford. BerghBhn 
Books. 2(02). 
56 Comite pour I'amenagement. 'Pares naturels regionaux.· 14. 
"CACAN 19770105/14 'Projet de charte du Pare Naturel Regional du Vercors. [n.d·l· 
317 
Chapter Seven 
continues to link fortress-like qualities with a discourse of environmental 
protection, proposing that within this 'veritable natural citadel of limestone ... 
wooded plateaus and valleys shaped by agriculture, shelter a remarkable fauna 
and flora.' 58 In summary, as Sgard argues, the image of the "natural fortress·' 
increasingly rests on its protection of 'preserved nature and mountain 
traditions. ,59 
Historian Philippe Hanus calls for the destruction of the "·natural fortress·' 
myth. 60 Yet it seems that this narrative continues to thrive. The fortress 
metaphor binds resistance memories to the landscape. as well as unifying and 
strengthening them. However, this alone has been deemed insufficient to 
guarantee the maintenance and transmission of memory to subsequent 
generations. The creators of memorials in the Vercors and elsewhere have 
therefore actively mobilised nature to perpetuate memories. 
Appropriating nature 
In his analysis of French First World War memorials, Daniel Sherman 
briefly highlights the aesthetic influence that nature exerts over monuments. 
Specifically, Sherman argues that the . site of the Bargemon monument. in the 
hills of Haute Provence. lends it a dignity and power that go beyond its formal 
qualities.' 61 In a similar manner, certain Second \\,'orld War monuments 
58 Pare Nature) Regional du Vercors leaflet. Terre d'accueil: Ie Pare ,1Vatllrel Re~iofUJl dll 
Vercors, vif de nat lire, "ivant de cultllre (200 I). , ~9 Anne Sgard. 'L'invention d'un tenitoire: Un hors-serie de I'Alpe: J ercors t'n questIOns 
(200]).50. f th Id PhT 
60 Hanus argues that the Vercors has never been isolated from ~e rest 0 e wor. I Ippc 
Hanus "Briser Ie mythe de la citadelle: in L 'Alpe: Vercors en questIOns: 17-18. . ' 
61 Daniel J. Shennan. "Art.. Commerce. and the Production of Mernol') In Franc,e afte~ \\ orld \\ ~ 
I: in John R. Gillis (ed.). Commemorations: The Politics of National Idenllty (Princeton. NJ. 
Princeton University Press, ] 994). 193. 
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appropriate nature to heighten their aesthetic qualiti an m 11\' t. hi 
appropriation of nature echoes both Vich ' and the r i tan m iIi tl n f 
forests , mountains and other landscapes for rhetorical. pra ti al. an 1 m 1..0 In lJ \ . 
reasons. 
Nature can provide memorials with an aura of perman nc . t:,r 
solidity. This is particularly true for mountain land cape . which r \ ' 1 
sublime VJews. The Memorial du debarquement de Pro\ n nt- n 
(inaugurated in 1964 by General de Gaulle) command im me n 
Toulon and the Mediterranean. One reason that tm military fI rt w h n t 
host the memorial was the prestigious ite and th f th \') \-\. 
figure nine suggests the visitor is more likel y to r m mb r th m ni fi nt vicw 
than the somewhat dated exhibition inside the memorial. 
. I d d Ab nt d Pr venc at 1 nl- ar n. Figure 9. View from MemOria u '-": arquem 
(July 2005) hri Pear on 
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of the plaque and flagpole channel i itor . art ntj n aw y r m thi \ 1 \\ 
toward the imposing cliff faces of Le Moucherorte mountain 
n. 
Figure 11. Cemetery at Sa in t-Nizier-du-Moucherotte (Februar. 2 O~). © hri Pear n 
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in the village toward the mountainous backdrop, while the evergreen trees in 
front of the wooden crosses remind the visitor that life continues thanks to the 
resistance's sacrifice. 63 Nature both inside and outside the cemetery at Vassieux-
en-Vercors is crucial to this process. While the trees in front of the graves recall 
renewal, the mountain backdrop hints at the sublime. As David Schuyler argues. 
the development of rural cemeteries in the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
was, in part, a response to romanticism's belief that 'natural scenery had a 
positive impact on the mind,' and, in the cemetery context, could 'assuage grief 
and elevate the emotions.' 64 This is arguably the case at both the Saint-Nizier-
du-Moucherotte and V assieux -en-Vercors sites, where the majestic landscape 
echoes the magnitude of sacrifice and yet offers, perhaps, some solace in the 
beauty and apparent permanence of nature. 
Landscape considerations have also influenced the location of other 
monuments in the Vercors. The Stations of the Cross memorials. which follow 
the route from Villard-de-Lans up to the ruined village of Valchevriere 
(destroyed during the German attack of 22 and 23 July 1944), capitalise on their 
surroundings to emphasis the supposedly spiritual dimension of death. 
Inaugurated in 1948 and funded through public subscription. these memorials 
represent the passion, sacrifice, and suffering of both Christ and the maquisards. 
The memorials are designed to maximise their natural surroundings and, 
consequently. not all of them are situated on sites where maquisards lost their 
lives. Instead. aesthetic factors influenced their location; 'so that the work is 
63 As Morris argues, nature can act as a symbol of rejuvenation and regeneration in cemeteries. 
See 'Gardens "for ever England. ... 410-434. 
M David Schuyler. 'The Evolution of the Anglo-~merican. Rural I Cemetef)~ Landscape 
Architecture as Social and Cultural History.' Journal of Garden History 43 (IQ~). _94. 
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beautiful the most picturesque sites were cho en. and a h rat ry 1 
the landscape. 65 
Memorials inaugurated under the SNHR continu thj n tJ n f 
nature to enhance their effect, such as the Re ter-Re i t r . gard \ 
sculptor Emmanuel Saulnier in the centre of Vas ieu){- In thi 
memorial space rectangular panes of glass shoot up rtically fr m th un 
their number corresponding to that of the illage' ci ilian d ath fi~ur tw Iv 
Figure 12. Rester-Resister 4 jardin de memoire" by Em manu I aulnier 
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The determination of the PNRV to secure the col de La Chau site in the 
face of strong local opposition suggests how important the site and its view were 
to the memorial's conception. Moving beyond a conventional museum 
environment, the memorial directs the visitor through the cold. dark. and 
claustrophobic atmosphere of the exhibition rooms onto a balcony boasting 
spectacular views over the Vercors. This contrast between light and dark is a 
deliberate attempt to show the heroic/tragic elements of the Vercors' history. As 
the rationale for the memorial suggests, the 'exit towards light. a symbol of 
freedom, is a moment of confrontation between a landscape and its history ... the 
memorial reminds us of the two most contradictory aspects of our humanity ~ 
darkness and light.' 71 For visitors, the 'bright light" is supposed to act as a 
'symbol of liberty.' 72 As these comments show. the memorial actively deploys 
the Vercors' landscape as part of its strategy to transmit resistance memories and 
radiate their moral and political "values." 
The col de La Chau memorial attests to a deeper connection between 
memorials and the natural world, due. in part. to the passing of the resistance 
generation and anxiety that their memories would subsequently fade. 73 While 
earlier monuments strove to act as permanent reminders of resistance and 
would be maintained. See AMVV Extrait du registre des deliberations du conseil municipal. 'Site 
National Historique,' 23 July] 993, 1-2. 
71 'Pour ne pas oubJier; in Site national historique de 10 resistance en Vercors. This text is 
reproduced in Pare Naturel Regional du Vercors. Le memorial de 10 Resistance en rercurJ 
~ undated leaflet]. 
'Site national historique de la resistance: les chemins de la Liberte.· 4. According to its 
creators, the memorial is intended to concentrate 'on the analysis and expression of human 
behaviour' rather than an 'exposition of historical facts' so as to 'underline the universal value of 
the Vercors' history.' See . Pour ne pas oublier.' and 'Le Memorial du col de la Chau.· in Silt! 
national hislorique de 10 resistance en Vercors. Vergnon criticises the memorial's lack of 
historical content. its emphasis on contemporary concerns. and its reinterpretations of resistance 
history. Vercors, 190. 
73 The publication of Le J 'ercors raCOnle par ceux qui I'ont l'ecu is a sign of resistanc~ vet~s' 
desire to relate their experiences. A major justification put forward for the SNHRV 5 ~real1on 
was that the revamped memorial space of the Vercors would 'transmit the memof) [of resistance] 
to those generations who didn't experience the events: Partenay. 'Projet de pare: 227. See also 
'Pour ne pas oublier.· in Site national hislorique de la rbislance en J ·t'rcurs. 
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the visitor to meditate on the site's significance. Furthermore. the proximity to 
the forest and its supposedly strategic location are designed to 'plunge' the 
visitor into the maquisard experience. Overall. this isolated site is supposed to 
'disorient,' 'question,' and provoke thoughts and memories. The memorial was 
also planned as a demanding experience; visitors must make a conscious decision 
to reach the site as it is located off the main road, ancL once there. the memorial 
requires 'effort' from the visitor. 75 
Arguably, the memorial's engagement with the landscape is an attempt to 
preserve resistance memories in the ground itself and produce a visceral 
experience for the visitor to make memories more authentic and reflexive. In his 
discussion of French Holocaust monuments, James Winchell argues that recent 
memorials try to realise a dynamic, sensual experience for the visitor by creating 
a sense of 'corporeal suffering,' rather than a more passive, visual encounter with 
the past. 76 The memorials that Winchell describes are mostly located in urban 
areas. In contrast, the one at col de La Chau seeks to achieve a similar effect 
through a deep engagement with the natural environment. 
Experiencing nature 
The idea that sites were to be visited and experienced emerged straight 
after the war. In the Vercors. memorial inaugurations and anniversaries brought 
mourners and others into the massif and highlighted its symbolic significance. 
Yet it was not just mourners and pilgrims that officials and local communities 
7' 'Le memorial.' Site National Historique de la Resistance en Vercors website. 
http://www.memorial-vercors.fr/index2.html. accessed 22 June 2~. . .' 
76 James Winchell. 'Holocaust Memorials in France: A Walkmg Tour for the Bod~-al-Rlsk. 
Conlemporary French Civilisalion 2012 (1 (96): 305. 
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hoped would visit the massif. Recognition was accorded to the imponance of 
tourism to the region. A 1945 Genie Rural report argued that the resistance. 
combined with civilian suffering, had given the Vercors a 'symbolic renown 
abroad which could be used in the future to develop tourism,' while in 1951 the 
Drome's Prefect identified "resistance tourism" as a way of developing the 
massif, in particular the Southern Vercors. 77 The concerns of Vassieux-en-
Vercors' mayor over the location of the col de La Chau memorial in 1993 also 
suggest that "resistance tourism" remains an important source of revenue for 
local communities (the mayor hinted that towns in the northern half of the 
massif, such as Lans, which took the hen-Vercors" suffix after the war, only did 
so once they realised the economic benefits of "resistance tourism"). 78 
Visiting sites, however, is not just a question of tourist revenue. Instead, 
visitors to war-related sites are intended to glean historical lessons and take away 
messages with contemporary resonance. In the case of the Vercors, General 
Koenig, commander of the Free French forces during the D-Day landings. 
considered the mountainous landscape, dotted with memorials and cemeteries, as 
'an astonishing lesson for the young people who visit it: 79 Moreover, in 1994. 
Mestre highlighted the lessons of the Vercors, imploring his fellow citizens to 
visit the massif: 
Come to the Vercors. 
n CHAN F 10 7103 R.E. Houdet 'Note pour M. Ie Ministre: 6 June I ?45. I.:. and ~ ergnon. 
Vercors. 191. As Sgard points out wartime events meant ~at pre~iou~ly h"le-Vlslt~ sites. such 
as Vassieux-en-Vercors and the Luire cave. became tounst destmatJons. Sgard. Pa~sages du 
Vercors: 67. .• ") F'd 
71 Extrait du registre. 'Site National Historique de la Resistance. 3 August 199_. \. or a \\ 1 er 
discussion on wh\' tourists visit war and genocide-related sites. see John Lennon and Malcolm 
Foley, Darlc Tourism (London: Continuum. 2000). 
?9 Quoted in General Giraud. 'Le Vercors. it y a 60 ans.· Lt'!i Cahiers des troupes de monla~nt' 36 
(March 2004). 6. 
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Understand the close links which unite this exceptional territory and its fighters. 
Understand what we owe to those who, up there, gave everything. 
May their memory help the French people to recognise the founding values of the 
Republic. 
May the memory of the Vercors inspire goodwill, of which peace has so much need. 10 
In this passage, the Vercors is fashioned into a lesson in republican values and 
the importance of peace. 
However, the landscape does not necessarily reveal its history by itself. 
As Les Cahiers des troupes de montagne highlights. visitors often fail to spot or 
realise the significance of the numerous 'plaques and steles disseminated in 
nature.' 81 Veterans and other guardians of memory now try to guide and control 
visits to Second World War sites. explaining their history and contemporary 
significance. Signposts direct car-based tourists around the "Open-Air Museum 
of the Battle of Normandy' and in the Vercors the SNHRV introduced 'Les 
Chemins de la Liberte ('The route of freedom") comprising of eight main sites. 82 
Elsewhere, a hike organised by the Union Sportive de l'Enseignement du 
Premier Degre for approximately 1,000 school children in the Bessillon 
mountains on 2 April 2005 included a talk given by resistance veterans in front 
10 Quoted in Site national historique de 10 resistance en Vercors. 
81 Giraud OLe Vercors iI v a 60 ans ' 6. This edition of Les Cahiers des troupes de montagne 
presents ~hotos and a' bri~f description of the Vercors' numerous memorials. alongside their 
location on a map. . . 
82 These sites are the cemetery at Saint-Nizier-du-Moucherone. the rumed Village of 
Valchevriere. Malleval. Vassieux-en-Vercors. the cemetery at Vassieux-en-Vercors. Pas de 
l'Aiguille, the Luire cave. and the Cour des Fusilles at La Chapelle-en-Vercors. See SNHRV 




of the aforementioned memorial. The outing was presented as an opportunity for 
the schoolchildren to learn about both natural and resistance history. 83 
Like memorials located in urban areas, the surrounding landscape has a 
bearing on visitors' experiences of rural sites. As John Lennon and Malcolm 
Foley argue, post-1918 battlefield tours to Northern France and Flanders 
encouraged visitors to 'envisage the scene and tactical problems from within the 
landscape itself, thereby offering the countryside as a perpetual and living 
museum of th~ war.' 84 Furthermore, David Lloyd suggests that for visitors to the 
First World War sites, 'remembering was not a passive activity. They assumed 
that at particular places and moments it was possible to renew or recapture 
something of the past.' 85 In a similar way. guidebooks and organised tours 
mobilise the natural environment as a way of recreating historical experiences 
and providing a direct link to the past for the Second World War, thereby 
creating living memory and transforming visitors' perceptions of the past. As 
dwing war. therefore, the experience of being in nature is designed to have a 
positive, transformative effect on individuals and. by extension. society 10 
general. 86 
83 Created in 1939. the USEP is an association that organises sportive and other educational 
activities for schoolchildren. For the Bessillon day out. see V.T. 'Mille jeunes randonneurs au 
Bessillon,' Var Malin. 3 April 2005. 
84 Lennon and Foley. Dark Tourism, 124. 
8~ Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism. 277. Lloyd also notes how one guidebook to GaJlipoli .informed 
visitors how 'vividly you see all that [the soldiers] saw. the grandeur of Nature. the gh~mer of 
the sea! You can still smell the Dardanelles expedition. and tread in old footsteps which have 
been worn away' (117). . 
86 Th is memorial strategy is not restricted to France. Petri J. Raivo draws .anentlon to a ~ew. breed 
of simulacrum and replica landscapes which try to re-create the expeTience of war I~ Fmland 
between 1939 and 1945 and are 'made to manifest. maintain. and support the memory of war. and 
thus the national narrative, for the generations that do not have any personal experience of the 
wars concerned: Petri J. Raivo. "'This is where they fought": Finnish war landscapes as a 
national heritage: in Timothy G. Ashplant. Graham Dawson. and Michael. Roper ~eds.). 




In contrast to the trenches of the First World War, sites of resistance have 
not necessarily left a lasting mark on the landscape. Indeed~ the site may be an 
unmarked footpath, field, or farmhouse. Consequently, guidebooks produced by 
local walking and resistance organisations lead visitors around these disparate 
sites and encourage them to read the landscape, with the aim that they come to 
understand its resistance history. A guidebook on "resistance walks" in the 
Gatinais proposes that this area of Paris' • green belt,' which was once 'ideal' 
terrain for resistance activity, is now 'ideal for relaxation and rambling.' Anned 
with the guidebook, walkers discover the caves where maquisards hid. the fields 
where they recuperated weapons, and the farms in which they sought refuge. 87 
Local resistance veterans approve of the guidebook as there is 'no better way ... 
to discover the Resistance' than to go 'step by step' to the sites where 'so many 
resisters fought for our liberty with courage and often heroism.' The guidebook 
highlights the lesson to be had from this "'resistance rambling," namely an 
understanding of the importance of defending freedom. 88 
In his introduction to a guidebook produced for the Alpes-de-Haute-
Provence departement, former resister Fernand Tardy argues that maquisards 
and hikers tread the same paths, but these routes had different functions; the 
paths that allow ramblers to discover nature and feel at one with themselves were 
once used by maquisards to find refuge and carry out raids on Gennan troops. 
According to Tardy, the experience of being outdoors enables the walker to 
87 The guidebook encourages ramblers to think of 'all the young men who lived (and~ often 
suffered in the cold or under the rain. in fear and in hope. among these same copses. Villages. 
[and] paths.' Association pour I'amenagement hannonieux des vaJlees de rOrvann~ et du 
Lunain MalJllis en Gdtinais: la Resistance dans les val/ees d.: / 'On'anne el du Lunam el les 
• ..,- 7 p~ A "F'gh . alentours pendant la seconde gue"e mondiale (Voulox: AHVOL. 1994). : -_. . ,I tcrs 
Trail" has also been created at the battlefield of Ilomantsi in Finland. See Raivo, "·Thls IS where 
they fought ... • 1 58. 
g Ibid. 5. 
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remember the resistance's struggle and sacrifice: 'perhaps each time that you 
gaze upon nature's beauty you will spare a thought for those who allowed you to 
walk these paths as a free and happy man [sic].' In such away . Tardy hopes, will 
memories of resistance be perpetuated. 89 The act of walking and being in nature 
is intended to produce active, "authentic'~ memories of resistance. 
Elsewhere, the physical and sensual experience of being In the great 
outdoors is linked to resistance memories in a more strenuous fashion. In 1994. 
"Association Le Chemin de la Liberte," in consultation \\ith veterans' 
associations, inaugurated a way-marked "'freedom trail" following one of the 
most frequented escape routes across the Pyrenees. The aim was to 'perpetuate 
and transmit' memories of the resisters. refugees, and Allied airmen who fled 
France for Spain. 90 Each July, a four-day "memory-walk' of up to 120 French 
and non-French hikers takes place complete with ceremonies in honour of the 
escapees and their guides. 91 
As its organisers stress, the hike is a strenuous one conducted at high 
altitude over testing terrain (several hikers have been helicoptered ofT the 
mountain during recent expeditions). The hardships walkers sufTer are portrayed 
as a link to the past: 
If the weather is bad as it was during our trek of July 2002 with raging stonns. lashing 
rain and then a blizzard at 2242 metres, the sensation is not excitement but a fair amount 
89 Femand Tardy, 'Perpetuer la memoire.' in Helene Vesian and Claude Gouron. Les chemins de 
/a Liberte: sur /es pas des resistants de Haute-Provence (Chiteau-Amoux: ADRI AMRID. 
2004), 14-17. . .... 
90 'Le Chemin de la Liberte.· http://www.ville-st-girons.frlblenvenueJactuahues:chemm 
liberte/chemin Ol.htm, 1-6, accessed 14 June 2006. The route stretches from St-Giron in the 
Ariege departement to Esterri in Spain. For more on escape routes across the Pyrenees sec 
Eychenne. Montagnes de /a peur et de I 'esperance. 
91 The success of the Chemin de la Liberte means that plans are underway to open three more 
way-marked trails on fonner escape routes. See 'Le Chemin de la Lihcrte'; and Seon Goodall: 
'Le Chemin de la Liberte: WWII escape route· to Spain, 
http://www.ariege.comlhistoire.chemin.html. accessed 9 December 2003. 
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of misery! In other words, as it was back in 1943-44 for evading aircrew who had no 
boots, no food, no warm clothes. All they had was youth on their side and a desperate 
desire to cross the peaks and see their families again. 92 
The organisers do not claim an exact replication of the war expenence. 
Nonetheless, they suggest that there are similarities between wartime and 
contemporary expeditions through the mountains; "it's a bloody hard challenge 
and one hopes that some of the history rubs off on the participants.' 93 
Although it is unwise to speculate on how different hikers experience and 
understand the Chemin de la Liberte's history. it does seem that the physical act 
of walking and the demanding mountain environment renders the past more 
immediate. In the words of one British hiker; 'from the onset of the walk. 
tho~ghts of what the passeurs and escapers had to tolerate during their 
(hopefully) successful passage to neutral Spain and freedom from the Nazis. 
came to mind continually. .. . We thought we were going to have it hard; [but] we 
had relative luxury when all said and done: 94 For another participan~ the 
physical and mental challenges encountered on the walk enabled him to imagine 
and experience some of the wartime hardships: 
What must it have been like for those who done [sic] this for real? They had no Gore-
Tex jackets, carried little food. and had no idea where they were. Most of them never 
even had a proper pair of boots and would be crossing at night. The privations I had 
92 'Le Chemin de la Liberte 2006 - Instructions.' WW2 Escape Lines Memorial Societ)' website. 
http://www.conscript-heroes.comlescapelineslChemin%20lnstructions.html. accessed I ~ June 
2006. . '1 W' 
93 Scott Goodall quoted in David Sharrock. 'Celebrating the Mountam Tral to artlme 
Freedom,' The Times, 13 July 2004, 16. . . 
94 Derrick Williams. 'Chemin de la Liberte 2005 - another view: WW:' Escape Lmes Memonal 
Society website. http://www.conscriptheroes.com/escapelineslChem in 
o/0202005o/020[)ennck~o 
20Williams.html. accessed 14 June 2006,2. 
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suffered on this small trip pale in comparison to the feats of those who travelled the 
same route I was now on during the war. Who was I to grumble as I trudged through the 
dirty snow. 95 
The same participant also recalled how after hearing the Chant des Partisans 
during the ceremonies held at memorials along the route, the song kept returning 
to him as he walked, 'a constant companion to help me through the miles. as if I 
was still being helped by passeurs long dead.' 96 In this case, the demanding act 
of walking through the same landscape provided an imaginative and physical 
link to the past. 
However, the creators of guidebooks, walking tours. and memorials 
cannot guarantee that all (indeed any) visitors will understand the experience in 
the intended way. As a consequence, the lessons derived from resistance history 
can be lost or subverted. Although nature is mobilised to create living memories 
of resistance. picturesque landscapes contain different meanings and 
expectations. In the case of the Vercors, the celebrated natural environment 
attracts visitors to the area who may be more interested in leisure activities than 
resistance history. 97 
Tourism has long existed in the Vercors. but meeting the demands of 
modem tourism does not always go hand-in-hand with a reverence for maqllis 
heritage. A cross-country ski kiosk now sits on the route of the Stations of the 
Cross and husky dog rides are available 200 meters above col de la Chau during 
9' Stewart Stirling. 'Chemin de la Liberte 200S - another view,' WW2 Escape Lines Memorial 
Society website. http://www.conscript-heroes.comlescapelineslChemin%20 
200SO/020Stewarto/020Sterling.html. accessed 14 June 2006, .t. 
"Ibid. 2. , f 
rn Sgard suggests that areas of ''moyenne montagne:' such as the Vercors. now act as Sites 0 
relaxation for stressed urbanites. 'Paysages du Vercors.' 80. 
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preserving and perpetuating resistance memories are discovering how 
unpredictable that very ground and its meanings can be. 
Nature's challenge to memory 
Although memories of resistance have been associated with landscapes 
and memorials actively engage with their surrounding natural environment. 
nature cannot automatically be relied upon to preserve memory. As well as being 
oblivious to human concerns to remember the past. nature is an active force with 
the ability to cover up, change. or challenge sites of historical significance. 
Schama, for instance, contrasts common perceptions of a grey. almost landscape-
free Holocaust with the 'brilliantly vivid countryside' that now surrounds the 
former site of Treblinka death camp. 103 A jarring sense of dislocation between 
recent human tragedy and glorious natural beauty was also noted in the Vercors 
immediately after the German attack, where it was felt that nature almost 
disguised the atrocities. According to visiting Swiss journalists; "as if to delay the 
laying bare of so much horror. the luminous mountain landscape seemed 
peaceful around the ruins.' For them, it was uncanny to experience 'the 
surprising silence of the pastures without herds, in the immense calm of a land 
swelled with the dead, apparently left to its natural tranquillity.' 104 Similarly. in 
Normandy, a year after the D-Day landings. relief worker Francesca Wilson 
discovered a peaceful and bucolic landscape far removed from the destruction of 
military invasion. lOS 
10.1 Schama, Landscape and Memory, 16. 
104 Seguin. • Au seuil de r en fer. ' 22. 38. . 
IO~ Wilson found Nonnandy 'a graceful countr)' of orchard. pasture. and plough~ field wh~ 
the trees shone • in the enamel of their fresh leaves. and the air was full of the tamt songs and 
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At sites where France carried out or e p n n d i h n ura 1 
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Figure 19. Site of Saliers internment camp the Camargue (March 2 -'). 
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presence of the camp among the immen e rice fi ld .. 10 Th unmark 
It th 
perpetuated and reflected a lack of recognition gi en to th 
uti n f lh 
Roma during the war. 
At such sites of persecution recent effort ha e 
n m d t h\' i IIv 
"recover" the war years' physical traces and mark the 
n f nati n I 
significance, 108 At Les Milles, a section of train track and platD rm ha\' n 
recovered from the undergrowth to form part of the "wag n- U\ D1f m rn ri I 
to the camp's deportees (figure twent ), 
Figure 20. Recovered platform at Les Mille (March 200~ , hri Pear n 
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A similar act of memory reclamation has recentl
J 
taken pI t 1 i
After pressure from local Roma associations and of it o\vn initiatiy \\11 
hall decided to ' commemorate memories directl ' on the it wh r th 
stood, so that its memory is never effaced and is pre eI\ ed D r tb futur II 
steel memorial now physically designates this unmarked fi Id a It 
memory and represents the first memorial dedicated to the per cuti n f R m 
on French soil during the Second World War (figure tv.renty n . 
Figure 21. Memorial to Saliers camp by Jean-Claude Guerri with R rn a nag in th 
foreground. inaugurated 2 February 2006. Chris Pea r on 
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Chapter e en 
Just as nature had to be taken into account durin th war. it h 
factor in the preservation (or not) of wartime rnemorie . For in tan 
overtaking the ruins of Nazi defensi e bunker in ormand)' . 
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home to me the madness, the insanity and arrogance of [tb 1m 
advance of nature, quietly covering 0 er what terrible thjng th ' ha n III 
It seems that for Rutheven, nature act In oppo iti n t it 
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remains of German defensive in tallation ar ut 
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Figure 2 1. a nd Figu re 22. The remain of erman military def n iv ' in the 
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Chapter Seven 
Civil War battlefields, 'p~ysical preservation is designed to preserve the sanctity 
of the site itself and, consequently. guardians of memory attempt to •.. freeze" 
the natural landscape of the battlefield as it was at the time of the battle so that 
visitors can reflect on the meaning of the epic event in an "authentic" 
landscape.,114 In France, similar efforts have been made to hold back time and 
nature at certain sites to maintain their "authenticity," but this has proved a 
problematic approach. 
One of the most famous cases in France of an attempt to "freeze·' 
memory is that of the "martyred" village of Oradour-sur-Glane where an act of 
reprisal by German forces ended in 642 civilian deaths and the physical 
destruction of the village. In the massacre's aftermath. the local Comite du 
Souvenir (supported by Charles de Gaulle) took the decision to preserve the ruins 
as an eternal reminder of Nazi barbarism and French suffering during the "dark 
years." Having actively sought to ""freeze" memory through preserving the ruins. 
the guardians of memory have discovered that their efforts have been 
undermined by the natural environment in which the ruins stand. As Sarah 
Farmer observes, weather has eroded the ruins, softening and romanticising them 
so that they now 'convey a mood of not unpleasant melancholy. rather than 
revulsion at horror.' Moreover. the ruins require active human intervention if 
they are to be conserved, raising difficult questions about their historical 
authenticity. As Farmer argues, 'it is almost as if the ruins mock the very effort 
of this particular commemoration, as their progressive erosion reveals the 
impossibility of fixing both time and memory.' liS 
114 Linenthal, Sacred Ground, 5. . 
II~ Fanner. Martyred Village. 201. Shennan also notes how one criti~ attack~ ~omm~rclaJl~ 
produced World War One memorials for the way that the weather qUickly 'dilapidated them. 
Shennan, 'A~ Commerce, and the Production of Memory,' 194. 
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In the Vercors the natural en ironment al 
preservation of wartime sites and objects. Weather erode 
illlp tun th 
th 
S.S. gliders that landed at Vassieux-en-Vercors in Jul 1944. ",\'hi h 
display in the village. Preservation efforts ha e not been entir I u I an 
rust breaks through the layers of paint applied to the glider. Furth nn r , in th 
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itself as symbolic of a place where ' life has stopp d.' 11 atur . h \\ 
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Steps, however, are being taken to restrain nature's relentless onward march. One 
fonner maquisard regularly visits the site and attempts to cut back the 
vegetation, although he admits that nature is taking over VaIchevriere (" la nature 
d d 't ') 117 Th' I' . repren ses rOl s . e enVIronmenta servIces of Vtllard-de-Lans manage 
the ruins, clearing trees and other vegetation and replanting some species. such as 
walnut and lime trees. A desire to maintain the ruined village's 'natural aspect' 
informs this management. 118 However, the rapid growth of weeds. grasses. 
bushes, and trees means that more dynamic and interventionist management of 
the site is under consideration to secure its future. 119 
As the case of Valchevriere demonstrates, active human intervention is 
needed to preserve the "natural state" of ruins because if nature were left to run 
riot the site would change beyond all recognition. This paradox reveals how 
nature, the supposed preserver of memory. becomes the destroyer of memory. 
This difficu'lty of preserving ruins within a dynamic natural environment is just 
one facet of the complex relationship between nature and memory that this 
chapter has outlined, and a further indication that nature mattered both during 
and after the war. 
117 Interview with Eloi Arribert-Narce, Vmard-de-Lans. 2 August 2005. Notes and tapes in 
author's possession. . . V'llard-d Lan 
118 Email communicationwithKarenFaure-Comte.Maisondupatnmome.1 e- s. 
August 17,2004. . . 'dd' wails and other built 
119 Propositions for the site include removi~g ~es to ~prove \'I~~:~ r~x I~~n the site to \'isitors. 
structures of vegetative growth. and erectmg mformatlon boar
v 
I h ~..I. "7 Oct-L - .,~ 
. d '1 't du"" 1004 ae evndC. - ~I - . 
'Compte-rendu de la reunion e traval sur SI e --.. 
Document provided by Karen-faure-Comte. 
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Nature mattered during the "dark years" in numerous and complex ways. Over-
exploited forests, fatal mountaineering expeditions. displaced flamingos. 
reforestation schemes, embattled nature preservationists, repetitions of '''natural 
fortress" imagery, and rebellious maquis vegetation all point to the diversity of 
the war's environmental history and its aftermath. The environment was an 
unpredictable site of combat, a source of desperately needed natural resources. 
and a place in which to (re)create political and social identities. Although it has 
been overlooked by existing historiography. nature was a central component of 
the conflict, both materially and culturally. 
Political appropriations and military mobilisations of the environment 
came from across the political and social spectrum, as the Vichy regime. 
resistance movements, and occupation and Allied armies endeavoured to turn 
nature into an ally. At the same time. state foresters battled to conserve France' s 
natural resources and the SNAF strove to preserve its most valued landscapes. 
While they had some success, particularly in the Camargue, the years of war and 
occupation left an ecological footprint. necessitating the reconstruction of the 
environment in the postwar era. Although most of the physical traces of war have 
now been effaced from the landscape. the existence of thousands of memorials 
highlights the fact that the environment is now a site of remembrance. albeit one 
that cannot be taken for granted by France's '''guardians of memory:' 
It may be tempting to see the four years between 1940 and 1944 as 
exceptional ones in contemporary French environmental history. For example. 
once coal and oil production and distribution resumed normal levels. France no 
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longer lived in the 'age of wood,' and gazogene cars have long since disappeared 
from the streets of Paris and other French cities. But there are strong elements of 
continuity, which link the war years with the pre- and post-war eras. Concerns 
over deforestation and the forest's productivity are cases in point and. while the 
history of maquis resistance groups is exceptional in many ways, their use and 
representation of the forest and mountain space echoed previous rebellions in 
France and elsewhere. In addition, organisations. such as CAF, adapted their 
longstanding aims and practices to fit with the circumstances of war and 
occupation. It is therefore impossible to fully understand the history of mountains 
during the war without recourse to existing notions of masculine regeneration 
amongst the peaks. In the same way, knowledge of the physical and cultural pre-
war history of the Camargue is needed to comprehend why the SN AF strove to 
preserve its landscape and why the German submersion scheme threatened so 
severely the wetland's ecosystem. 
Yet despite these continuities, the war was something of a turning point 
in French environmental history. The wartime conditions led to an intensification 
of existing environmental practices, such as tree felling, which, in tum, led to 
changes in environmental policies. Reforestation is a prime example of this. 
During the war, the state also increased its control over the forest and began 
implementing large-scale amenagement works, such as marsh drainage. In the 
postwar e~ these developments provided the background for greater state 
intervention in environmental management. demonstrated by the FFN. On a more 
cultural level. the war transformed perceptions of maquis landscapes and 
invested sites. such as the Vercors, with new meanings. 
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My thesis has attempted to show the importance of nature during the 
"dark years" and narrate an unexplored area of its history. I have not been able to 
cover all aspects of the period's environmental history . To create a fuller picture 
of the interactions between nature, war, and occupation~ more research is needed 
on other regions of France (work on the forests of Alsace and Lorraine. which 
were under direct German control and acted as sites of sustained military combat .. 
would be particularly welcome). Also, due to space and time restrictions. I have 
been unable to explore the history of animals during the war. But based on 
preliminary archival findings (and tales of eagles being used to feed hungry 
French families), I believe that research into the history of poaching and hunting 
during the "dark years" richly merits greater attention. I 
I have endeavoured to show that the environmental history of the "dark 
years" is valuable in its own right. My study has wider implications though. both 
in terms of historiography and societal concerns. Environmental historians note 
how environmental history has so far largely failed to realise its potential in 
terms of influencing the wider historiography. 2 Consequently. it has remained on 
the margins of historical inquiry. Given that war is a subject of long-standing 
interest to many historians it seems that environmental histories of war are well 
placed to illuminate the environmental dimensions of the past and the 
interconnectedness of human and nonhuman nature for the historical community 
at large. The case of France during the Second World War is particularly useful 
I Kedward explores the links between hunting and the resistance. but not from ~~ pers~tiv~ of 
environmental history. See 'La Resistance et la polyvalence de la chasse. In GUllion and 
Mencherini. Resistance etles Europeens du Sud. 245-55. ., . . ". 
:2 Ted Steinberg. 'Down to Earth: Nature. Agency .. and Power In. Hlsto~· . . .fmeTlcan HlStorl~aJ 
Review 10713 (June 2002). accessed at http://www.hlstorycooperatave.org . 
joumaJslahr/)07.3/ah0302000798.html. I: and Stroud. 'Does Nature Always Maner? 76. 
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in this respec~ as nature was an influential feature of a conflict that seemingly 
lacked environmental aspects. 3 
Regarding Vichy historiography, the environmental history of wartime 
France contributes to existing scholarship in numerous ways. For a start it 
reinforces some of the key conclusions of Vichy historians. The history of forests 
supports Robert Paxton's argument that collaboration with Nazi Gennany 
secured few, if any, advantages for France; given the extent to which Gennany 
plundered F(ance's forests, it is not possible to argue that Vichy acted as a 
"shield" protecting French woodland. Paxton's influential analysis of Vichy's 
agency has not been left unquestioned. Simon Kitson' s work on counter-
espionage is a recent nuancing of Paxton' s arguments, which argues that Vichy' s 
attempts to track down German spies were not acts of resistance but the actions 
of a regime tom between collaboration and independence ... The policy of the 
Forestry Administration can also be seen in this light. as it was forced to work 
with occupying forces whilst trying to preserve French sovereignty in the forest 
and uphold its scientific forestry principles. 
Forest history also supports Paxton' s identification of the tensions 
between traditionalists and technocrats that lay at the heart of the Vichy regime. 
and the continuities between the Third Republic, Vichy. and the Fourth Republic 
(such as the emphasis on reforestation), as well as Footitt's highlighting of post-
Liberation tensions between Allied soldiers and the French authorities. 5 The 
3 This begs the question: what was the role of nature in other. co~t1~cts of which the 
environmentaJ dimension is not immediately apparent such as the SpanIsh cl\,11 war? 
4 Simon Kitson, Vichy ella chasse aux espions nazis 1940-19-12: complexilies de la poIilique de 
col/aboralion (Paris: Autrement, 2005). 5. . . 
5 For traditionalist-technocratic divisions. see Paxton. richy France, 259-73: 352-57. Footln 
underscores the ambiguity of the Allied-French relationship when she ~ues that 'the guests w~o 
were to arrive in France on '0' Day were neither freely invited in. nor likely to lea,,'e at the whIm 
of their hosts.' War and Liberation. 35. 
352 
Conclusion 
wartime environmental history of forests and mountains also pro\;de an 
alternative way of approaching Kedward's analysis of the ways in which the 
resistance assumed control of the French countryside. 6 
Furthermore, environmental history complements existing narratives. For 
instance, although Vichy's glorification of peasant values and preference for 
cultivated land is no secret, the material basis of this ideology has been left 
largely unexplored. In contrast, in chapter two I explored the efforts Vichy 
expended trying to cultivate all of French territory. In addition .. focussing on 
war's materiality exposes the essential role that wood played in ensuring the 
continuation of everyday life. For although social histories stress the lack of 
food, petrol, and other supplies, they have yet to fully emphasis the importance 
of wood for heating homes, fuelling vehicles. and supplying industry. 
Perhaps most significantly, environmental history provides new historical 
narratives on Vichy France. Not least. I stressed the lengths to which 
preservation groups such as the SNAF went to protect natural landscapes. This 
history of nature protection is noteworthy. For as well as providing evidence that 
wartime environmental destruction could be resisted, it shows that individuals 
continued to care about the natural environment despite personal and social 
problems. The SNAF's campaign to preserve the Camargue showed that there 
was some room for manoeuvre with the German authorities. Furthermore. it 
offers an alternative historical narrative to the well trodden ones of resistance. 
collaboration, and accommodation. 
This is not to say that nature preservationists were divorced from the 
wider social and political context: they too were forced to interact with 
6 Kedward. In Search o/the Maquis. 
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occupying forces. Their priority, however~ was preserving France's landscapes 
for the future and their main concern was the effect of military activity on the 
landscape rather than the identity of the combatants (which led to them opposing 
French and Allied air forces before the defeat and after Liberation). Yet this was 
not resistance in the classical sense, as the SNAF only openly opposed Vichy's 
and Germany's schemes when they threatened the environment. For instance. 
one contribution to the SNAF journal welcomed the 'possible application' of 
German nature conservation laws during the Occupation. 7 Nor did the SNAF 
seek to overthrow Vichy or expel the Germans from French soil. This suggests 
that we need to rethink the concept of resistance for these kinds of campaigns. 
just as Lynne Taylor has done for popular protests against food prices and 
working conditions. 8 
Beyond these historiographical concerns, environmental histories of 
warfare can inform an important public debate on war and the environment. 
Attention to this area has long-term roots. The links between nature and war were 
recognised before the rise of modem environmentalism: moral codes from the 
Bible onwards have sought to limit war-related damage to land and British 
observers during the world wars marked animals' contributions on the battlefield. 
as well as drawing attention to the plight of animals caught up in bombing raids.9 
More recently. the harrowing prospect of a nuclear holocaust. the extensive 
7 A. Feuillee-BilJot, 4Quelques observations sur les oiseaux pendant la guerre.· Societe nationale 
d'acclimatalion: conferences (1943). 166-7. 
8 Taylor, Between Resistance and Collaboration. 
9 On laws and moral codes. see Environmental Law Institute. Addressing Environmental 
Consequences of War. 3: and Karen Hulme. War Torn Environment: interpret inK the Legal 
Threshold (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 2004). On animals d~ring the world w~. see 
Frank Hart. The Animals do their bit in the Great War (London: Blackle and Son. 1918); Sidney 
Galtrey. The Horse and War (London: Country Life and George Newnes. )918.>; and L~ZZ)' L:ind-
Af-Hageby. Bombed Animals, Rescued Animals. Animals Sm'edfrom DestructIOn: Typical (a.H·.~ 
from the Records of the .4.nimal Defence Society's War Work and Some Commenl (London: 
Animal Defence & Anti-Vivisection Society, 1941). 
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defoliation of Vietnamese jungles and burning 0'1 II d' th . 
, I we s unng e Persian Gulf 
War of 1990-1, have all raised public awareness about th . tal . 
e envlronmen Impacts 
of war. Furthermore, soldiers, who are frequently the agents of war.s 
environmental destruction, are not oblivious to the natural world. as the bird-
watching activity of Sergeant Jonathan Trouern-Trend. a Connecticut Army 
National Guardsman and committed twitcher stationed in Iraq in 2004. amply 
demonstrates. 10 Today, the level of attention that the subject is receiving from 
scientists, environmentalists, and governments around the world IS 
unprecedented. 
Scientists and others highlighted the ramifications of wars in the Gulf and 
the Balkans during the 1990s, while contemporary international law and 
organisations such as Green Cross International undertake to restrict war's 
I . l' 11 h eco oglca Impact. Sc olars also have become concerned about the military use 
of land in the name of national defence and social scientists seek to understand 
the link between war and natural resources. 12 Beyond the academy. museums 
curate exhibitions on animals at war, memorials are erected to commemorate the 
10 Jonathan Trouern-Trend, Birding Babylon: A Soldier's Journal from Iraq (San Francisco: 
Sierra Club Books, 2006). 
11 See Farouk El-Baz and R.M. Makharita (eds.), The GuJfWar and the Environment (Lausanne: 
Gordon and Breach, 1994); Bernard Nietschmann, 'Battlefields of Ash and Mud' Natural 
History 11/90 (November 1990): 35-7; Mervyn Richardson (ed.), The Effect of War on the 
Environment: Croatia (London: E & FN Spon, 1995); Survivre el revivre: gue"e et destruction 
de I'environnement en Croat ie, 1991 (La Possoniere: Environnement sans frontiere. 1994); and 
Vadort, Guerres et environnement. The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
prohibits 'methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected. to cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.' Environmental La" 
Institute Research Report, Addressing Environmental Consequences of War, 5. Mikhail 
Gorbachev founded Green Cross International in 1993. Its mission statement can be accessed at 
www .greencrossinternational.netJGreenCross 
Family/index.htmI. 
12 For military use of the land. see John Childs, The Military Use of the Land: A Histor), of lhe 
Defence Estate (Berne: Peter Lang, 1998); Stephen Dycus. National Defense and 'he 
Environment (Hanover NH and London: University Press of New England. 1986); and KakOnen. 
Green Secur;tv. For war and natural resources. see Thomas F. Homer-Dixon. Em'ironment. 
Scarcity. and' Violence (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. 1999); Philippe Le Billon. 
Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict (Abingdon: Routledge: 2(05); and NanC) 




contribution of animals in battle, and conservation organisations, such as English 
Heritage, now assess the best way to preserve Cold War landscapes. 13 
As these examples indicate, policy makers, scholars, and the public are 
now demonstrating a greater awareness and apprehension about the linkages 
between war and the environment. By illuminating the historical context of the 
war-nature relationship, environmental historians can promote greater 
understanding of how societies exploit natural resources during wartime, of how 
combatants mobilise the environment, and of how ecosystems recover (or not) 
from war's ecological effects. Past case studies, such as the SNAF' s efforts to 
protect the Camargue, also highlight the possibilities and challenges of nature 
protection during times of military conflict. Moreover. given that most oftoday's 
wars are fought with conventional weapons and many involve guerrilla warfare. 
the case of France during the Second World War may prove particularly 
significant. For although it would be extremely rash to deploy it as a model for 
predicting how the war-nature relationship will unfold in the future. the history 
of nature and the environment in South East France during the "dark years" is a 
timely reminder of the multiple ways in which nature matters during and after 
war. 
\3 The Imperial War Museum in London has curated an exh~bition entitled 'Th1e Animars War' 
running from 14 July 2006 to 22 April 2007 (see http://www.lwm.org.uk!upl(}8d; 
packagel74/ Animals War/ .' 
index.htm). Jilly Cooper's Animals in War (London: Heineman. IQ83) IS based on a preVIOUS 
Imperial War Museum exhibition. A memorial to animal "combatants" has recently been erected 
on Park Lane. London. For English Heritage and Cold War lan~. see Wayne D. ~.ocro~ 
and Roger J. C. Thomas. Cold War: BUildingfor Nuclear ConfronJall~n ~946-19X9 (S~mdon. 
English Heritage, 2003); and John Schofield (ed.). .\fonJlmenls of .. or: Tift,. E\'IJlu~/lOn. 







Archives departementales des Alpes-Maritimes (ADAM). Nice 
7 M 795 Mont Baron, mouvements militaires 
21 W 1 Deminage 
109 W 8 Organisation departementale de la defense passive. 1939-1945 
163 W 32 Deminage 
521 W 5 Eaux et Forets 
521 W 6 Organisation du service forestier 1941-1945 
521 W 7 Defrichement 
521 W 9 Defrichement 
521 W 22 Restauration des Terrains en Montagne 
521 W 26 Recherche et constatation des infractions. 1941-1945 
521 W 30 Reboisement, 1944-1961 
521 W 31 Protection des sites et des monuments, 1947-1964 
521 W 50 Incendies de forets, 1936-1950 
521 W 52 Incendies de forets, 1942-1944 
521 W 57 Incendies de forets, 1940-1959 
521 W 74 Reboisement, 1946-1968 
521 W 75 Fonds Forestier National 
521 W 78 Fonds Forestier National 
717 W 409 Monuments 
Archives departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone (ADBDR). Aix-en-Provence 
and Marseille 
46 W 4 Chantiers de la Jeunesse. 1940-1942 
51 W 25 Dommages de guerre-exploitations forestieres 
51 W 69 Dommages de guerre-exploitations forestieres 
51 W 73 Dommages de guerre-exploitations forestieres 
I Only sources directly cited in the text have been included. 
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76 W 33 Militaires, feu de forets, explosions, 1944 
i~: 128 Projet de la submersion de la Camargue et la vallee des Baux .. 1940-
97 W 24 Camp de Saliers 
142 W 76 Camp de Saliers, 1942-1945 
148 W 411 Deminage, 1949-1957 
150 W 174 Deminage, 1944-1946 
150 W 187 Service agricole, Eaux et Forets, 1944-1948 
150 W 190 Service agricole, Eaux et Forets, 1944-1948 
188 W 19 Questions agricoles 
188 W 21 Assainissement de la Camargue, 1951 
188 W 39 Mise en culture des terres abandonees, 1941-1949 
188 W 79 Reboisement des forets, 1951-1963 
194 W 20 Eaux et Forets, 1942-1944 
194 W 25 Organisation de la production forestiere etc, 1941-1945 
194 W 27 Eaux et Forets, bois pour la reconstruction, etc., 1941-1945 
194 W 30 Eaux et Forets, rapports circonstanciers des gardes-jures. 1943-1944 
194 W 31 Eaux et Forets, rapports circonstanciers des gardes-jures, 1944 
194 W 32 Rapports circonstanciers des gardes-jures. Bois de chaufTage, 1942-
1944 
Archives departementales de la Drome (ADD). Valence 
60 W 14 Bois (charbon), instructionslarretes 1940-1942, impositions. 1942-1945 
61 W 6 Bois (charbon), instructions/arreres. 1942-1947 
61 W 7 Bois (charbon). correspondance. 1944-1945 
122 W 1 F orets, rapports, 1944-1945 
497 W 2 Defense passive, instructions. demandes de fonds. 1939-1945 
943 W 13 Reconstruction, Vercors, 1945-1946 
Archives departementales des Hautes-Alpes (ADHA). Gap 
1042 W 3 Rapports avec Ie Ministre de la Defense 
1043 W 64 Eaux et Forets, Deminage 
1043 W 74 Eaux et Forets, Dommages de guerre, 1941-1954 
Archives departementales de l'Isere (ADI), Grenoble 
4° 330 Amicale des Pionniers et des Combattants volontaires du Vercors 
6 P 1/22 Eaux et F orets. correspondance 
13 R 990 Bombardements dans 1'1 sere, resistance et repressions dans Ie Vercors 
13 R 991 Bombardements dans l'Isere. resistance et repressions dans Ie Vercors 
13 R 1043 Naissance des maquis du Vercors par Pierre Dalloz 
21 J 9 Jeunesse et Montagne 
170 M 8bis Chambre d'Industrie touristique, 1940-1945 
2101 W 28 Office de bois de feu.. circulaires. instructions. correspondance. 
statistiques. 1942-1945 
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2101 W 29 Office de bois de fe~ rapports procedures rense· . . 
1942-1946 " 19nements generaux. 
2101 W 37 Office de bois de fe~ cheques et bons matieres req' w·s·t· 1942 1945 ' 110OS. -
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